

15

Part I

Second Series

Selected works of Jawaharlal Nehru



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Second Series

15 Part I



“So the story of Jawaharlal Nehru is that of a man who evolved, who grew in storm and stress till he became the representative of much that was noble in his time. It is the story of a generous and gracious human being who summed up in himself the resurgence of the ‘third world’ as well as the humanism which transcends dogmas and is adapted to the contemporary context. His achievement, by its very nature and setting, was much greater than that of a Prime Minister. And it is with the conviction that the life of this man is of importance not only to scholars but to all, in India and elsewhere, who are interested in the valour and compassion of the human spirit that the Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund has decided to publish a series of volumes consisting of all that is significant in what Jawaharlal Nehru spoke and wrote. . . .the whole corpus should help to remind us of the quality and endeavour of one who was not only a leader of men and a lover of mankind, but a completely integrated human being.”

Indira Gandhi

**Selected
works of
Jawaharlal
Nehru**



AT LUCKNOW, 3 OCTOBER 1950

Selected works of Jawaharlal Nehru

Second Series

Volume Fifteen

Part I

(1 August – 25 October 1950)

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S. Gopal

FOREWORD

Jawaharlal Nehru is one of the key figures of the twentieth century. He symbolised some of the major forces which have transformed our age.

When Jawaharlal Nehru was young, history was still the privilege of the West; the rest of the world lay in deliberate darkness. The impression given was that the vast continents of Asia and Africa existed merely to sustain their masters in Europe and North America. Jawaharlal Nehru's own education in Britain could be interpreted, in a sense, as an attempt to secure for him a place within the pale. His letters of the time are evidence of his sensitivity, his interest in science and international affairs as well as of his pride in India and Asia. But his personality was veiled by his shyness and a facade of nonchalance, and perhaps outwardly there was not much to distinguish him from the ordinary run of men. Gradually there emerged the warm and universal being who became intensely involved with the problems of the poor and the oppressed in all lands. In doing so, Jawaharlal Nehru gave articulation and leadership to millions of people in his own country and in Asia and Africa.


That imperialism was a curse which should be lifted from the brows of men, that poverty was incompatible with civilisation, that nationalism should be poised on a sense of international community and that it was not sufficient to brood on these things when action was urgent and compelling—these were the principles which inspired and gave vitality to Jawaharlal Nehru's activities in the years of India's struggle for freedom and made him not only an intense nationalist but one of the leaders of humanism.

No particular ideological doctrine could claim Jawaharlal Nehru for its own. Long days in jail were spent in reading widely. He drew much from the thought of the East and West and from the philosophies of the past and the present. Never religious in the formal sense, yet he had a deep love for the culture and tradition of his own land. Never a rigid Marxist, yet he was deeply influenced by that theory and was particularly impressed by what he saw in the Soviet Union on his first visit in 1927. However, he realised that the world was too complex, and man had too many facets, to be encompassed by any single or total explanation. He himself was a socialist with an abhorrence of regimentation and a democrat who was anxious to reconcile his faith in civil liberty with the necessity of mitigating economic and social wretchedness. His struggles, both within himself and with the outside world, to adjust such seeming contradictions are what make his life and work significant and fascinating.

As a leader of free India, Jawaharlal Nehru recognised that his country could neither stay out of the world nor divest itself of its own interest in world affairs. But to the extent that it was possible, Jawaharlal Nehru sought to speak objectively

and to be a voice of sanity in the shrill phases of the 'cold war'. Whether his influence helped on certain occasions to maintain peace is for the future historian to assess. What we do know is that for a long stretch of time he commanded an international audience reaching far beyond governments, that he spoke for ordinary, sensitive, thinking men and women around the globe and that his was a constituency which extended far beyond India.

So the story of Jawaharlal Nehru is that of a man who evolved, who grew in storm and stress till he became the representative of much that was noble in his time. It is the story of a generous and gracious human being who summed up in himself the resurgence of the 'third world' as well as the humanism which transcends dogmas and is adapted to the contemporary context. His achievement, by its very nature and setting, was much greater than that of a Prime Minister. And it is with the conviction that the life of this man is of importance not only to scholars but to all, in India and elsewhere, who are interested in the valour and compassion of the human spirit that the Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund has decided to publish a series of volumes consisting of all that is significant in what Jawaharlal Nehru spoke and wrote. There is, as is to be expected in the speeches and writings of a man so engrossed in affairs and gifted with expression, much that is ephemeral; this will be omitted. The official letters and memoranda will also not find place here. But it is planned to include everything else and the whole corpus should help to remind us of the quality and endeavour of one who was not only a leader of men and a lover of mankind, but a completely integrated human being.

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Indira Gandhi". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "Indira" and the last name "Gandhi" clearly distinguishable.

New Delhi
18 January 1972

Chairman
Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund

EDITORIAL NOTE

The period from 1 August to 25 October 1950, covered by this first part of the fifteenth volume of the *Selected Works*, was marked by serious national and international crises. The war in Korea was closely linked to great power rivalry. Nehru realized the importance of early admission of People's China into the United Nations if the chances of avoiding an extension of the war were to be strengthened. This strained relations with the United States.

There were disquieting reports of a Chinese invasion of Tibet and repression of a popular movement for reforms in Nepal caused concern. With the Dixon mission failing to ease the tension over Kashmir, Pakistan became eager to build a case against India before world bodies. She repudiated the Agreement of 1948 on canal waters and was cool towards India's proposal of a no-war declaration. The only welcome trend was a progressive decline in the exodus from East Pakistan.

In domestic affairs, the primary problem was the growth of communal and revivalist tendencies. As the President of the Congress, Purushottamdas Tandon, seemed to symbolize these tendencies, Nehru did not shirk confrontation and the Congress session at Nasik in September 1950 passed various resolutions reflecting Nehru's viewpoint.

The documents in this volume, apart from throwing light on Nehru's attitudes to immediate issues, give some idea of his wide interests, his involvement in details of administration and his all-encompassing vision of a future India.

The Nehru Memorial Library has been good enough to provide access to the papers of Jawaharlal Nehru and other relevant collections. Shrimati Indira Gandhi made available to us documents in her possession and these papers have been referred to in the footnotes as the J.N. Collection. The Secretariats of the President, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, the Ministries of Home Affairs and External Affairs, and the National Archives of India have authorized the reprinting of material in their possession. Much of it is classified and some portions of it have necessarily had to be deleted. A cartoon from *Shankar's Weekly* and some items from *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50* have also been included.

The biographical footnotes covered in the earlier volumes of the *Selected Works* have been mentioned in the index with the volume number.

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ABBREVIATIONS

A.I.C.C.	All India Congress Committee
A.I.R.	All India Radio
C.-in-C.	Commander-in-Chief
C.P.I.	Communist Party of India
D.G.H.S.	Director General of Health Services
D.P.	Displaced Person
H.M.	Honourable Minister
I. & S.	Ministry of Industry and Supply
I.C.S.	Indian Civil Service
I.N.T.U.C.	Indian National Trade Union Congress
M.E.A.	Ministry of External Affairs
M.H.A.	Ministry of Home Affairs
M.L.A.	Member of Legislative Assembly
M.P.	Member of Parliament
N.M.M.L.	Nehru Memorial Museum and Library
N.W.F.P.	North West Frontier Province
P.C.C.	Provincial Congress Committee
P.D.	Preventive Detention
P.E.P.S.U.	Patiala and East Punjab States Union
PMS	Prime Minister's Secretariat
R.S.S.	Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh
S.G.	Secretary-General
U.K.	United Kingdom
U.N.O./U.N.	United Nations Organisation
U.N.C.I.P.	United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan
U.N.C.O.K.	United Nations Commission on Korea
U.N.C.U.R.K.	United Nations Commission for Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea
U.N.I.C.E.F.	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
U.N.T.C.O.K.	United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea
U.P.	United Provinces/Uttar Pradesh
U.P.A.	United Press of America
U.P.P.C.C.	United Provinces/Uttar Pradesh Provincial Congress Committee
U.P.S.C.	Union Public Service Commission
U.S.A./U.S.	United States of America
U.S.S.R.	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
W.H.O.	World Health Organisation
W.M.P.	Ministry of Works, Mines and Power

NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION

I. The General Approach

1. Unity and Equality¹

Sisters and Brothers,

This is the third anniversary of the independence of India. I congratulate you on this auspicious occasion. We have come a long way during these three years. We have stumbled and fallen but have picked ourselves up and gone on. I congratulate you for everything that has happened, good and bad, during these years. Why do I include the bad? Perhaps that is wrong. But what I mean is that you are to be congratulated for the joys as well as the sorrows that these three years have brought. Nations grow with the joys as well as the sorrows and troubles that come their way. When long years go by without a nation being tested it becomes slack and weak. We have been through gruelling tests during the last three years, and also in the years which preceded independence. We gained independence by passing those tests with flying colours. Now the nation faces even greater challenges and we shall succeed to the extent that we succeed in facing them with courage and confidence. You should accept the good and the bad, happiness and sorrow, as they come. What you must guard against, however, is cowardice, narrow-mindedness and disunity because they weaken the nation and pave the way for its downfall by debilitating its strength to protect its freedom.

We have been able to reach many of our goals in the last three years. On the 26th of January this year, we saw a big dream of ours come true.² There are many other dreams which still remain unfulfilled. Within a few months, millions of people will be going to the polls to elect a new government and the new Constitution which we have adopted will bear fruit. In this way, we are inching forward step by step, no doubt with difficulty, bearing many hardships. But we are going ahead anyway.

Look at the world around you and the troubles that other countries are facing. There is once again talk of war.³ Then you come to India where, in spite of our weaknesses and evils, we are gradually making progress. It is against the backdrop of the world situation that we must try to understand India, bearing in mind where our duty lies at a time when the whole world is in turmoil. We cannot look to others to help us out of our difficulties, for if we did, we would become weak. We fought for our freedom by relying not on others or on any weapons but on ourselves and our courage and so we succeeded. Similarly, we can overcome the dangers that threaten us only by relying on ourselves. We do not want enmity with anyone. We want to be friends with all nations. But ultimately we have to rely on our own strength.

1. Speech from the Red Fort, Delhi, on Independence Day, 15 August 1950. A.I.R. tapes, N.M.M.L. Original in Hindi.
2. India became a sovereign, democratic republic on 26 January 1950.
3. It was feared that war in Korea, which started on 25 June 1950, might spread.

Freedom of thought and of expression is an essential prerequisite of a free country. People should be free to form different parties and express their political views. Without this freedom a country cannot remain free. But, at the same time, you should beware of people who work against our freedom or do something by which that freedom is shaken or weakened. Freedom of thought and expression must prevail but always with the proviso that it does not weaken the country's unity or independence. If that happens, it is a betrayal of the country. People often fail to make this distinction. Freedom does not give the right to anyone to do evil. Freedom of expression does not mean the freedom to abuse others in the street or print obscenities in newspapers. Such things will vitiate our entire life.

Freedom particularly does not mean a right to strike at the roots of that freedom. If someone attempts such a thing, it is obvious that we have to prevent it. There are many people in the country today who have fomented trouble and incited people in the name of freedom and tried to weaken the nation. They have been dealt with, and since India is strong in spite of our weaknesses, we have succeeded and continue to progress. Some people have made a declaration that they would not participate in the Independence Day celebrations.⁴ Some others went a step further and said they would obstruct the proceedings. You can imagine the kind of mentality which prompts such thinking and emotions. This has nothing to do with freedom of expression or thought. It is an outright onslaught on India's freedom and, no matter who they are or to which party they belong, we have to fight against them and root them out completely.

What is the meaning of all this? There are people in the country who are always fomenting disunity and trouble in the land. Their constant cry seems to be that the freedom they have is not enough; and so they want to break up even what they have. This is indeed strange, and indicates stupidity or some strange quirk of emotion. How can anyone behave in this manner when we are living at a crucial time in the history of India and of the world? If we Indians have differences of opinion, we may quarrel among ourselves, but when the question of India arises, it is the duty of all Indians to bury their mutual differences and to remember that our loyalty is to the country. Those who do not accept this are not Indians. They are welcome to go and live elsewhere.

What brought us together in the past was the unity of India despite various diversities of religion, caste, province and region. Now I find that some parties are once again raising their voices in favour of communalism and fostering fissiparous tendencies in the country. They invoke the name of religion for purely political purposes. You can imagine whether communalism and provincialism will

4. The spokesmen of the Hindu Mahasabha announced on 14 August that the Mahasabha could not participate in the Independence Day celebrations as 15 August 1947 marked the partition of India "rather than the transference of power from British hands."

weaken the country or strengthen it. People are welcome to hold different views and to give free expression to them. I do not want everyone in India to repeat the same thing like parrots as though they had no power to think for themselves. We have every right to express our views. But no Indian has the right to raise his voice against India's freedom or to do something which weakens her unity. Those who indulge in such things, whether they understand it or not, are traitors. We must understand these fundamental truths for we are living at a delicate moment in history and we cannot progress unless our freedom is secure.

As you know, there are many problems before us. The world is in a strange flux today. War is going on in a part of Asia, and though Korea is a small country, it is a terrible war. Nobody knows how long it will last, whether it will remain limited there or engulf the world. We are making all efforts to end it soon,⁵ but our efforts cannot succeed all over the world. Nobody knows what might happen. But we can do one thing at least: if we can set our own house in order and keep the country on an even keel, give her a proper direction, we can keep India safe even if there is a world conflagration. We can even help to save the world if we have the strength and the spirit and if we are united.

Many problems are before us today, the biggest being that of food. Everyone needs to eat. We have made tremendous efforts during the last two to three years to solve this problem. As you know, there is food shortage even now in Madras, Bihar and some other States. The reports that come in are heart-rending. The situation is still pretty serious. But it has been blown out of all proportion and that is even more serious.

So our first priority is to solve the food problem. Due to various reasons enough food is not produced in India. Many factors are responsible for that: the war, partition—with the creation of Pakistan, large food-producing areas have been lost to us—and our population has increased. A country, particularly a large country like ours which does not produce enough food, becomes dependent on others. We have to spend enormous amounts of foreign exchange on importing food. But the most important thing is that it weakens us and leaves us vulnerable to outside pressures which may threaten our freedom.

If, unfortunately, there is a world war, we would not be able to import foodgrains at all. How will we manage then? It is obvious that we have to become self-sufficient in food. Secondly, we must change our food habits. If a certain type of food is available, we should be ready to eat it. We must learn to eat whatever is available, particularly if import of foodgrains becomes impossible. We must try to produce enough foodgrains in the country. We must not waste even the smallest quantity of food. We have been thinking of ways and means of doing so. I want you to understand that we will stick to what we said about stopping all import of foodgrains and becoming self-sufficient in two years. Even if there are some shortages, we

5. See *post*, Section 9.

shall have to put up with that. This is our policy and programme and we will stick to it despite difficulties.

You will find that the situation on the food front is rather strange. On the one hand, there is no doubt that we are succeeding in our drive to produce more food, and we shall grow more in the next year or two. But at the same time, we have had natural calamities like floods and drought in certain areas such as Madras, Bihar and Saurashtra. We do not have enough food stocks in the country to tide us over these crises. Even so we have sent supplies to the worst affected areas. There may be problems in supplying foodgrains to all the villages. But there is sufficient food in every State for the next two or three months. So there is no cause for alarm. It is true that any problem of this kind is a sign of inefficiency in our administration either in the States or at the Centre. I accept that. We must not try to evade our responsibility but learn a lesson.

The other thing, which is more serious, is that there are many people in India who have no scruples in making profits out of other people's distress. Traders and shopkeepers hoard foodgrains in order to make a profit later. I cannot understand this mentality which prompts people to cash in on adversity. How can we tolerate that? You will say that all this is mere talk and that Jawaharlal had said three years ago that black marketeers would be severely punished, but that nothing has been done. You would be justified in saying this. I am myself ashamed that we should have become so callous as to allow black marketeers to flourish. It happens openly in Delhi and we seem helpless to do anything about it. Why should anyone tolerate some people taking advantage of a shortage to make money, and becoming millionaires, without caring whether some other people are dying? It is obvious that the first duty of the Government is to deal with this. But no matter how many laws a government may pass, they cannot be effective unless the people help and cooperate with the government. If all of us make up our minds to put an end to black marketing and hoarding we can do it; and those who persist in these activities will be severely punished.

You may have read in the newspapers that a Bill was moved in Parliament a few days ago and only last evening a law has been passed to put an end to these activities.⁶ The law will be implemented within a few days and we shall take action to curb inflation. The Central Government has assumed some powers to deal with the matter even at the State level in order to ensure uniform action throughout the country. But, as I said, we need your help because it cannot be implemented without the help and cooperation of the people. Your complaint that the officials do not discharge their duties well and sometimes take bribes may be justified. We must correct such mistakes and remove the guilty officials.

6. Parliament amended on 14 August the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, providing for drastic punishment of hoarders of foodgrains, textiles and other essential goods and enlarging the territorial extent of the Act to cover all Part B States except Jammu and Kashmir.

There is another problem before us which concerns the whole of India and particularly the city of Delhi. This is the refugee problem. We have made an effort to gradually solve this problem. But it is regrettable that innumerable people are still in camps, braving the vagaries of weather—first the heat of the summer and now the rains. Time is passing, but the problem remains unsolved. I would, however, like to point out that it is not possible for the Government to solve this problem on their own. We need the help of the people, particularly the refugees. It is almost impossible for the Government to solve every problem. We have succeeded to some extent here. But the problem has assumed terrible proportions in Bengal. As you know, we reached an Agreement⁷ with Pakistan four months ago which has generated much discussion. Some people seem to think that we have made a mistake. But that is irrelevant; if we are determined to solve the problem, we can succeed. I do not want to go into the details just now, but I want to tell you honestly and sincerely that though the problem of the Bengali refugees is extremely complicated and troublesome, in my view, it is being gradually solved. I cannot make any promises about what happens in the future. That depends on the strength or weakness of the people. But I am not prepared to accept, even for a minute, that the situation is hopeless or that any steps should be taken which, instead of improving the situation, will only bring ruin and hardship to Bengal and the rest of India.

Behind all such problems as food shortage and the rehabilitation of refugees lies the real problem of the economic development of India. How are we to bring that about? It can be done only through cooperation between the Government and the people. Neither the Government nor the people can do it on their own. You have every right to point out the weaknesses and shortcomings of the Government, to criticize them, and also to change the Government any time that you choose. But in criticizing the Government or objecting to their policies, you must not do anything which weakens India. You must be careful because very often people forget this. Governments and people come and go. Our time will also gradually come to an end. As I told you, we are soon going to have general elections. In any case, we will not be in power for ever. But so long as we have the responsibility of administering the country, we cannot show any weakness. We must work hard and to the best of our ability, mental and physical, so long as we are in charge, whether the danger is external or internal.

I would like to repeat on this anniversary of India's independence that though India is free, freedom brings in its wake its own responsibilities, not only for the Government but for every single individual who enjoys that freedom. If you do not understand and accept those responsibilities, it shows that you have not understood the true meaning of freedom and if ever that freedom is threatened, you will not be able to defend and protect it. If there is an external attack upon

7. An agreement with Pakistan on the treatment of minorities in the two countries was signed by Nehru and Liaquat Ali Khan in New Delhi on 8 April 1950.

India, our armed services, the army, the navy and the air force, in which some of our best young men work, will no doubt fight and repel it. But, ultimately, it is not the armed forces which save a country; it is the men and women in the country who do so and unless every single individual in India considers himself or herself as India's soldier, the country cannot remain safe. When we were fighting for freedom, we did not wear any uniform and yet we regarded ourselves as soldiers in the cause of freedom and faced the British empire fearlessly. People in other countries were amazed at what we dared to do—a motley rabble of weak and unarmed human beings challenging the might of a great imperial power! But the strange thing is that at that time, there was no fear in our hearts. We had learnt the lesson of fearlessness from that great leader of ours, and so we went ahead boldly as soldiers of India's freedom. We must create that atmosphere once again and learn to be completely fearless.

We must remember these fundamentals on the anniversary of India's independence and avoid petty quarrels. The unity of India is of fundamental importance. India can become strong and can progress only when there is complete equality for everyone, irrespective of religion, caste and province. All doors of opportunity are open to everyone, and all the citizens of the country are equal shareholders in freedom. If there is disunity and people fight with each other, believe me, we shall weaken ourselves and the country's freedom. The only course open to us is to forge ahead and face the problems which confront us, whether it is of food shortage or something else, squarely and without fear or panic in our hearts. A man who is afraid is useless and unfit for anything. When the problems are bigger, we have to face them with greater fortitude instead of giving in to panic or running away in fear.

So I greet you once again on the third anniversary of our independence. I hope that in the coming year we shall face our problems with courage and determination, rather welcome them, and solve and overcome them. *Jai Hind.*

2. The Problems Facing India¹

Sisters and Brothers,

...What are our weaknesses? It is true that there are many weaknesses in us and we have a lot to learn. At the same time we have forgotten many things we had learnt. I do not know what advice to give you because it has been my experience

1. Speech at a public meeting on the occasion of Mahatma Gandhi's birth anniversary, New Delhi, 2 October 1950. A.I.R. tapes, N.M.M.L. Original in Hindi. Extracts.

that too much counselling benefits neither the counsellor nor the listener. It becomes like an old coin—people do not respect it even though it may be very valuable because they have got used to it.

Often, but especially today, our thoughts go back to the days when Mahatma Gandhi was still with us, and those of us who had the opportunity of being with him and working with him miss him even more. What are the sentiments that those memories conjure up? I think it is a feeling of happiness and pride—pride not in a bad sense but pride that such a great man, who raised his country high and gave her strength, should have been born here. He raised the stature of the country by raising the stature of her millions. So we felt proud that we too were with him on such an occasion and played a small part in the venture. But we feel a sense of shame too at our weaknesses and shortcomings which have prevented us from doing the things which were taught to us. Though we recognize them to be the right steps we are too weak to take them. Sometimes we miss him tremendously and yearn for the moral support that is no longer there and our hearts feel heavy. Sometimes our eyes are filled with tears. But this is all sentimental talk. The question is ultimately what we are going to do and how we are going to do it. We have a long list of our objectives, achievements and failures. Mahatma Gandhi had come to us with a message for our country and the world and the strange thing is that though we often take his name and praise him, I often wonder whether he is respected more in other countries than in our own country. I may tell you that he is highly respected in other countries. Thousands of people in each of them remember him and hold him in great respect while we only take advantage of his name. We are satisfied with merely praising him and feel that we have done our duty and that we do not need to do anything else. So I sometimes wonder whether other countries are going to benefit more than our country by the great message that he brought because very often we, in this country, almost forget him.

If you study his life, you will learn about the numerous things that he did, the tremendous steps that he took and how he brought new life into everything that he touched and made it great. But the one fundamental principle that he stood for all his life was peace. He wanted everyone to practise non-violence, not superficially but whole-heartedly so that we did nothing mean or despicable. Even in our struggle for freedom, he dealt with the enemy only on the highest plane. When I see the world today on a razor's edge—and none knows when war may break out—it almost seems like a dream when he was with us and could gauge our reactions so perfectly. In India, though there is no fighting anywhere, there is no peace in the heart and there are several reasons for this disquiet. But instead of making an effort to remove those evils—or perhaps we have become so weak that our efforts are not successful—every individual expects his neighbour to do everything and is himself unwilling to take on any responsibility. Everyone criticizes others and fails to do his own duty. On my part, I have reached the conclusion that it would be useless to go about telling others what they should do or should not do. It is possible that

occasionally it may have some effect but saying it too often makes it less effective. The question before me constantly is what I should do. What is my duty? It would be a big thing if I could be quite clear in my mind about this for then I would be able to go about my task confidently. What the consequences will be I cannot say because it is not in my control but at least I would be confidently doing what I feel is right. If I were not a responsible person and did not have the burden of the reins of Government, then what I did or did not do would not matter a great deal because it would have been my personal problem and I alone would be affected by its consequences. But the difficulty is that what I or my colleagues in Government do has an impact on the whole country. This is a great responsibility and so it adds to our worries.

When I look at the world I find a strange situation: tensions, bitterness, quarrels, strange suspicions and ultimately fear. I reached the conclusion a long time ago that the most important lesson that I learnt—and India learnt too to a very large extent—from Mahatma Gandhi was that the worst thing in a human being or a nation is fear. Nothing is worse than fear because once there is fear, it suppresses a human being, frightens him and leads him into all kinds of wrong action. A country goes to war out of fear of another country. Each fears an attack from the other. This is the condition of the world today. Look at the great nations of the world, powerful with huge armies and great wealth, but living in constant fear of attack from the others, fear of being bombed. It is a peculiar situation and the result is that they try to increase their armed might. It becomes a vicious circle, vitiating the entire atmosphere of the world....

There are constant rumours that Pakistan is about to attack us and if you read the Pakistani newspapers and the statements of their leaders, it seems as if there is almost a kind of hysteria there, possibly due to fear. Recently Sir Owen Dixon brought out a report on Kashmir² which might have also contributed to the fear. Anyhow, it is a peculiar situation. It is not the fault of one or two people. It is to some extent the responsibility of the media. Now it is futile for us to get annoyed or to try to retaliate in similar manner because that would be even worse. We see that kind of thing in the rest of the world where hysteria in one country provokes strong feelings in the other and the tension keeps escalating and both sides indulge in all sorts of madness....

As you know, fighting has been going on in Korea for the last three months. It has been a terrible war in which Korea is facing ruin. It is a peculiar thing that in today's world we have to be saved from our saviours. The saviours bring complete ruin on the people they are trying to save by fighting among themselves. Now this is the plight of Korea and if the war does not end soon, it will be completely ruined. Then the future will have to be decided over its corpse. The responsibility for this lies with those who attacked first. But an important thing about this Korean

- 2. See *post*, Section 7.

war is that there is a fear that it might spark off a bigger conflagration and if that happens it is bound to spread all over the world. Therefore we were greatly worried because the strange thing is that most countries of the world desire peace and not war.... But even without wanting it, sometimes nations are led into a war by circumstances, from fear or panic. Well, we tried to the best of our ability and I feel that our efforts had an impact and it is possible that perhaps without our intervention the war might have spread.

At the moment, there has been a slight change in the situation in Korea. The United Nations forces, which consist mostly of American troops, have won a resounding victory. The question is, what is going to happen now. Suddenly a dangerous situation has arisen and a spark might ignite a bigger conflagration, engulfing other countries. Please remember that there are many large countries bordering on Korea—China, Soviet Union, Japan. So we are, in short, once again sitting on a razor's edge, wondering what will happen....

So, as I was saying, here I sit in my room and send long telegrams to other governments and then suddenly the thought occurs to me that I am advising others, but how far am I managing things at home. Well, how far am I fulfilling my duties. If I cannot keep my house in order, what right do I have to advise others? Immediately I hesitate and feel a sense of shame....

I mentioned Pakistan just now. As far as I can see, the issue of Pakistan does not arouse as much passion in our country as it did perhaps a year and a half ago. The matter is cooling off a little and rightly so. Sometimes someone may be deeply aroused but it is a mere waste of one's energy. It is obvious that a day is bound to come when the problems between India and Pakistan will be solved. The present impasse will not go on forever. That day may come in a few months or a few years. But it has to come. The question is what we can do, on behalf of either the Government or the people, to bring that day nearer, while maintaining our own pride and yet putting an end to all this fighting and squabbling, so that we can go about our work. The tension which prevails between India and Pakistan has been harmful to both countries. A great deal of our money has been wasted because of expenditure on defence and many such matters and Pakistan has had to spend even more. That money could have been fruitfully spent in developmental work which cannot be undertaken because of lack of funds. All trade is at a standstill. It is normal that there should be trade between two neighbouring countries. We are having wheat shortages and they have a surplus. But we have to import wheat from Australia and America. They need cloth which we can supply to them, but they get it from across the seas. So both countries end up paying much more. Both of us have to bear the losses because we wish to hurt each other. It is a different matter as to whose fault it is. The fact is that it is futile, but we are so entangled in it that it is difficult to extricate ourselves.

You may remember that about a year or so ago, there was great disparity in the value of the Indian and Pakistani rupee and in our view wrongly so.

It affected trade adversely. They suffered great losses and to some extent we also did though to a lesser extent. The problem remained unsolved. Whenever we tried to solve it, there was some obstacle and it was postponed. Our Finance Minister went to Paris on this very issue and we hoped that there would be some result. But Pakistan saw to it that the matter was postponed.³ We were in a dilemma because it was obvious that we could not take any step as it might turn out to be wrong and entangle us further. So we thought it was best to keep quiet till the matter was settled, even if it meant some loss. Similarly, there are other problems between Pakistan and us. I leave aside the Kashmir issue for the moment. It is a complicated issue and I do not wish to take up your time. I have given a long statement⁴ to newspaper reporters only the day before yesterday and those of you who are interested in the matter can read it.

There are two more problems. Evacuees' property, the property which has been abandoned on both sides by refugees, has caused untold hardship to millions of people. Therefore the sooner the matter is settled the better it will be for Pakistan and us. Now, there have been many conferences and consultations but without any result. The fact of the matter is that the people who have come from Pakistan have left property behind which is far more valuable than the property left here by those who have gone to Pakistan. Now you must remember that, legally, the property which the refugees have left behind still belongs to them. But though legally the property belongs to the owner, he cannot benefit from it because he cannot get any income from it, nor can he live in his house and it is almost impossible that he can go back to it. Therefore a decision has to be taken. Efforts are being made but no decision has been taken.

Another question on which there has been great uproar in Pakistan is that of canal waters. That is also an extremely complicated matter. We have said that all efforts must be made to see that both countries, rather both sides of the Punjab, can benefit from the canal waters. We have to consider how to go about it. But now it is three years since the enquiry was started and it is not yet over and we feel that Pakistan is delaying it. So we made a proposal that we are agreeable that both questions—those of evacuees' property and canal waters—may be taken up before the highest court, that a judicial tribunal may be constituted with two of the seniormost judges from both sides to decide. After all, when there is tension or disputes between two nations, how are they to be decided? Wars do not solve anything. If we fight over the evacuees' property or the canal waters or for anything else, we may be causing far more damage to both sides than what the issues would

3. C.D. Deshmukh attended the annual meeting of the Board of Governors of the International Monetary Fund in Paris from 6 to 14 September 1950. At a closed door session on 13 September, the Executive Directors of the Fund decided to postpone consideration of the par value of the Pakistan rupee because of the matter being complicated.

4. See *post*, pp. 235-243.

be worth ultimately. Apart from the damages a war can cause, waging a war itself is not a sensible action. Therefore we made a proposal to Pakistan, not today but nearly a year ago, that we are prepared to accept any means of settling our disputes and not to resort to fighting. We had prepared a simple statement for both the countries to sign jointly. They said that it was all very well but there was no point in making the statement so simple and that many more issues should be touched upon. We said that the time was not right for saying all those things and it would be better to create a climate for it and then other things can follow.⁵ Well, anyhow, the matter is still dragging on. Then we made this other proposal, which I mentioned just now, that a judicial tribunal consisting of two senior Supreme Court judges from each side be appointed to go into the disputes. When such a high-powered tribunal sits on a case, then there is no political bias. Examination of matters on a political plane may generate heat and passion. Judges consider issues dispassionately and then give their verdict and often the matter is resolved. It is possible that our judges and theirs might hold different views. We can think about it when the problem arises. It is absurd to start with the premise that there will be no consensus. In short, we made this proposal after due consideration because it would have been to the advantage of India and Pakistan and the world.

The world of today is a very complex one and, as I said, it is constantly hovering on the brink of war and anything could happen at any time. If there is even an iota of good sense in us, we will realize that at a time like this, it is extremely important for us to preserve our strength, military strength or trade or whatever it may be, and to keep the nation in a state of preparedness to face any eventuality. A country has to face all sorts of difficulties but I think there is hardly any country in the world which could have faced so many problems as India has had to in the last two or three months. There have been tremendous floods in five of our major States. Thousands of villages were washed away and the crops were ruined in Orissa, Bihar, U.P., Punjab and Saurashtra. It is a strange situation and just when we were looking forward to good crops, they were all washed away. Then, as you know, in Assam there was a big earthquake and the extent of damage is still not fully known because we have not been able to reach the mountainous regions. Then rivers and streams changed course. Some of them which come down from Tibet are in spate and it is difficult to cross them. At some places they have changed their course and are eroding the cities. I hear that the house which I had stayed in a month or so ago in Dibrugarh has been swallowed up by the Brahmaputra. The whole house has disappeared. So all sorts of disasters have struck the country in the last few months and we have been extremely worried, especially in the matter of food, because the surplus has been wiped out since the crops failed....

As you know, there were big riots in Bengal in February and March this year and thousands of refugees came over to India. On the 8th April, we came to an

5. See *post*, Section 8, subsection II.

Agreement with Liaquat Ali Khan, here in Delhi, about Bengal and Assam. That Agreement has come in for a great deal of criticism though I can still not understand how anyone can find fault with it. I can understand it if they say that this Agreement has not solved the problem and they would be right because the problem has not been solved. Problems in life do not really get solved so quickly. Our effort is to gradually move towards solving them. What was our Agreement of the 8th April all about? We decided upon a few things and the immediate result was that hundreds of thousands of people, both in Assam and Bengal, began to breathe more freely. This does not mean that they are completely reassured. But their feeling that a terrible disaster had been staved off was no mean achievement. Those who wanted to go back could do so with their belongings and money. This was not a small thing. From the daily reports that we have been getting for the last week or so, it is obvious that the number of people going back to East Bengal exceeds that of the people coming in. Anyhow, this is a superficial matter. How we view this problem and with what intention we proceed in the matter is the real thing.

Some of our refugee brethren complain that the Government is not doing enough for them and perhaps their complaint is not unjustified. But they must also understand that we just do not have the capacity to meet all their demands. It is not something that I can dispose of with a stroke of my pen or pass a law in Parliament. These things cannot be done by law, if the country is not actually capable of doing them. Whatever is possible must, of course, be done. If we can spare a few crores of rupees, we would utilize this money for starting a number of important development projects which produce wealth but are stalled for lack of money. But I am certainly not in favour of distributing doles. Those in dire need must be given help. But real help would be to put them back on their feet so that they can earn for themselves. That is, their rehabilitation should be complete so that they can produce wealth for themselves and the country.

Take any problem in India, of refugees, of poverty, or anything else. There is no solution except through hard work. We can certainly help out for a short time. But ultimately we are not going to get wealth from any other country and even if we do, it will be only a loan which would have to be paid back. We can go ahead only with what we have got.

So long as we do not produce more wealth in the country, we can neither undertake any big task nor remove poverty or solve any of our problems. The wealth of a country can be increased only by hard work. It increases by what a farmer or a factory produces. If we spin a charkha and produce cloth, that adds to our wealth. Or if the mills produce cloth and a skilled worker makes something, it adds to the country's wealth. In short, these things benefit those who do the work as well as the country, and the more trained and skilled the workers are, the more will be the wealth produced. If you go to China or Japan or the United States or Britain, you will find that the people there are far more hard-working than us and so they earn more. They reap the full benefit of their work. Then they have machines which help them to produce more.

In short, there is no other way of solving the problems of India except through hard work and whether you call it socialism or capitalism or communism, ultimately you can remove poverty from the country only by increasing production. Of course, people may say that socialism will ensure more production. This is open to debate. But if socialism can do it, let us have socialism by all means. What I want you to understand is that we can progress only by so much as we produce or the amount of hard work that we put in. Otherwise whether you bring in socialism or capitalism, you will only be talking in the air. The production from land in our country is probably less than that in any other country in the world. The others produce four or five times as much as we do from one acre of land. What does it mean? Naturally their wealth also increases faster. So what should we do? It is a complex and a tough world and absolutely merciless. It is a world for the tough ones, not for weaklings, and therefore we cannot hope to solve any problems by merely shouting or raising slogans. There is a great deal of noise that something should be done and that the present system is bad. Where is the defect? How are we to remedy it? Or should the system be changed? If we feel that the present system is no good, it should be changed. There is no need to sit by idly and watch. By changing the system I do not mean a change in government for that is a minor thing. I mean a fundamental change, a social change, if necessary, because after all we want to find a solution to our problems. If the present system is not able to solve them, we will change it. We must think about when we should do it.

It is my considered opinion that no good can come out of constant squabbles and fighting. In the present condition of our country, internal squabbles, apart from wasting whatever is available, stop people from working and producing more wealth. Poverty and tensions spread. There are many good points about our country but it is still not entirely stable. People are easily swayed by all sorts of emotions. Sometimes it is provincialism, sometimes communalism. You may have heard that in Punjab some Sikhs want a separate state.⁶ In fact they wanted to create a separate nation of Sikhs like Pakistan.⁷ Now you will forgive my saying that this is so childish. If there is a real problem, it can be sensibly dealt with. How can we deal with childishness? Those who talk of such things understand neither the world of today nor history. They have learnt nothing from the history of the world or of India. It is impossible to permit such things. It will break up India into tiny fragments and the whole country will be ruined. We cannot stand by and watch India being enslaved again.

6. Master Tara Singh demanded on 11 July 1950 a separate Sikh state within the Indian Union where Sikhs would be in a majority and free from "Hindu domination".
7. The Shiromani Akali Dal had demanded on 22 March 1946 the creation of a Sikh state for the preservation and protection of the religious, cultural, economic and political rights of "the Sikh nation" in the face of the demand by the Muslim League for Pakistan on the one hand and "of the danger of absorption by the Hindus on the other."

India has many weaknesses. We have to be clear in our minds about one thing: we are underdeveloped. However highly we may regard ourselves, we are backward. We have great pride in ourselves and think we are great because we had Mahatma Gandhi's support. Mahatma Gandhi was a great man and the world recognized his greatness. We also grew somewhat taller under his influence. But it is wrong to be proud of our greatness because we are not great. We are pretty backward. We have a great many good qualities as well as defects. The good points are keeping us afloat while the defects weaken us, create dissensions among us, and we get involved in petty matters. There is no discipline among us. We have to get rid of these weaknesses. So, I am convinced that internal squabbles will take the country nowhere. I regard anyone who creates dissensions in the country to be an enemy of the country. It can only do great harm apart from the fact that such people can never really hope to win. They ruin themselves and others too. Anyhow, we must make up our minds to put an end to these things.

Apart from the obvious dissensions there are people who indulge in anti-social activities. There is a great deal of such activities in our country at the moment. All of us complain about these things but the matter stops there. I am telling you this without any reservations. I am ashamed that we proclaim loudly that we shall stop black marketing, control prices, and punish the dishonest, and even make laws, but everything goes on as usual. It is possible that all of us are to blame. But ultimately, since I am in a position of responsibility, whether the fault is mine or not, it is I who should be punished. Why is there this weakness and inefficiency in me and my Government? This is what perturbs me, though it is true, as Shri Deshbandhu⁸ said, that such developments cannot be stopped by mere legislation. We must of course have laws, but these cannot be dealt with by laws alone, without the cooperation of the people. As far as trade and other things are concerned, it is our misfortune that especially since the last War the atmosphere has been vitiated. There is tremendous corruption in government offices too—I do not wish to spare anyone. It has become extremely difficult to control the situation and unless we have the cooperation of the people, it cannot be checked. Corruption eats into the fabric of the nation and ruins it. So how to put an end to corruption has become the most important question for us. I cannot go into more details but we are giving it top priority and I want you also to do the same. You must help us and if the people of Delhi want to put an end to it, I have no doubt that they can easily do it.

...You might have read recently that there was a Congress Session at Nasik.⁹ There had been a good deal of discussion about it before that and people took a lot of interest in it. There was the question of election of the Congress President.¹⁰ It led to heated debate, but there was nothing personal about it. The fact is that the problems before the nation are extremely complicated and you must

8. Deshbandhu Gupta also spoke at the meeting.

9. The 56th annual session of the Congress was held at Nasik on 20 and 21 September 1950.

10. See *post*, Section 2, subsection I.

try to understand them. Therefore I issued a statement¹¹ before the Nasik Congress in which I drew the attention of the country to some of those problems and said that certain clear-cut decisions will have to be taken at the Nasik Session. I mentioned three problems specifically. One was of course about our foreign policy because it has a great deal of importance just now. The world can be destroyed if one wrong step is taken. Second was communalism which is linked with our relationship with and behaviour towards Pakistan. Third and, in a sense, the most important question was regarding our economic policy. How are we to solve our economic problems? These are the three questions that I had posed and the Nasik Congress accepted the resolutions¹² which were proposed. I should be happy that my suggestions were accepted and there is no doubt that I was happy. But a small doubt remains in my mind that we have become rather accustomed to passing resolutions and then forgetting all about them. I am afraid that something which is accepted so easily may as easily be forgotten.

But, anyhow, the Nasik Congress was very successful. Delegates from all over the country approved of the proposals and gave me, as the Prime Minister, a clear direction to follow a certain line of action. I will certainly do my best to go in that direction and if, for some reason, I am unable to do so, then there is no need for me to continue as Prime Minister. So, I have received my directions from the Congress and my way is somewhat clearer. It is certainly not easy, but at least the direction is clear for me and for the Congress. Now the question that arises for you and me, and for Congressmen specially, is how we are going to follow the path charted so clearly by the Nasik Congress and whether we are likely to be led astray. It is an important problem and we have to be vigilant because when I see the situation in the country and in the Congress, I am not happy. In fact I feel perturbed when I see petty squabbles, groupism and complete disregard for principles. These things can never help in making a country strong. Petty matters and small men reduce the country's stature. Therefore we have to continue the work started by the Nasik Congress and try to complete it. Only then can we go ahead. It must be clearly understood by the nation that the Congress will remain firmly on the path it has chosen and even if some people try to sway it, there are many more who will not let it be led astray because ultimately our entire political and economic life is tied up with these resolutions. These are not merely platitudes on record.

It is a good thing that we have become independent and a republic. But this was ultimately for making the country better off. Swaraj means that outsiders who could put obstacles in our way are removed. After that it is upto us to make progress and go ahead by our own hard work and stand on our own feet. Now that we have got Swaraj, we must go ahead. That involves our political policies, our economic policies and plans to increase production, to provide more work and to put an end

11. See *post*, pp.113-116.

12. See *post*, Section 2, subsection II.

to unemployment so that gradually the wealth in the country may increase and we may take up major tasks of construction and development. These are the economic activities in which everyone ought to take an interest and not merely to give views, though that is also important, but to help in a constructive way and do one's bit. You must not think that it is the Government's job. There is a strange tendency in our country that people expect the Government to do everything. If you go to any other country you will find that there are duties for the government as well as for the people. Within a few months our Planning Commission will prepare a plan, an important aspect of which will be people's cooperation. Today every government says that it works for the people, but that is not enough. It should be said that the government works for the people and with the people, which would mean that people themselves work. Because it is evident that without the active role of the people no big task can be performed by a government.

At present the attention of many Congressmen and non-Congressmen is drawn towards the coming general elections to be held within a few months. Evidently the general elections are of tremendous importance, because Parliament which will be formed after that will decide many important matters for the country. Hence it is essential for you to elect the better type of persons. Let me tell you I do not like to be preoccupied and troubled so much with the general elections. Long ago I came to the conclusion that in elections the less ambitious persons should be elected. I am suspicious about over-ambitious candidates. But the problem is that the really good people, with no ambition, usually stay in the background while the less desirable ones take the lead and make a great deal of noise.

Well, anyhow, elections will be held. Some will win, others will lose. I do attach importance to elections. But I would like to tell you one thing, and that is, my mind is not filled with these elections. I very seldom think about them except to wish that they are held on schedule. I do not want them to be postponed. The arrangements for elections are so complicated that they keep getting delayed. But I hope that they will be held as scheduled. I am more worried about which way we shall go in the future. What you and I do is important. If we go in the right direction, then we can go very far within six months; and the right direction is the one shown by the Nasik Congress. So you must understand this and see that we do not stray from that path but stay firmly on it, however much anyone may try to mislead us.

I would like to remind you of one thing in particular which is always in our hearts but is seldom mentioned because there is a certain helplessness about it. What is there to say about a matter in which we can do nothing? But today especially we think of one of the greatest colleagues of Mahatma Gandhi—Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan. For the last three years he has been lying in prison¹³ and when

13. Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan was arrested in Pakistan on 15 June 1948 and sentenced to three years' rigorous imprisonment on the charge, *inter alia*, of inciting the people "against the lawfully established Government of the country."

I think of him, my power and position seem thorny and I begin to wonder what I have achieved when one of our greatest freedom fighters is in jail. Anyhow, we can do nothing for him. But at least we can follow the path that he adopted throughout his life and the principles by which he still firmly abides. Remember that if Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan or Doctor Khan Sahib indicates by a word or a letter that he is willing to retract from his principles, he will immediately be set free. But he is not prepared to do that. He is willing to stay in jail for the sake of his principles which we so often forget. So let us at least remember those principles and abide by them. Perhaps we can do our duty in this way and do some good to ourselves and even to him.

3. The Right Ways of Solving Problems¹

Sisters and Brothers,

I do not remember how long it is since I came to Lucknow and participated in a public meeting here at Aminuddaula Park. But it has been a long time and I feel somewhat of a stranger here. I do not know what you think, but I feel that it is not merely the long interval after which I have come but there are so many other developments taking place which change us and it becomes a little difficult to recognize one another fully. The fact is that in today's world, whether you look at the whole world or our own country, so many things are happening—some of them good, others bad—which affect all of us, and if we meet after an interval all of us are bound to have changed. I cannot easily gauge how much I have changed; others must do so. I can realize to some extent how much others have changed. Even in the short time that I have been here, I find many changes. It is not that the city of Lucknow has taken on a new glow. There are the same old buildings and the same old roads. Our Indian cities do not change very easily. They continue to remain unchanged for centuries. But the atmosphere changes. I feel that even the style of speech-making has altered somewhat and I wonder if you will be able to understand what I say. I often see notices here and there which I simply cannot understand. I used to think that I knew the language of this State but it has changed so much that I cannot comprehend much of it. Perhaps being away in Delhi, I have

1. Speech at a public meeting, Lucknow, 3 October 1950. From A.I.R. tapes, N.M.M.L., and the *National Herald*, 4 October 1950. Original in Hindi. Extracts.

forgotten some of it or it is more likely that there has been progress here and I have remained backward.

Well, as you know, there are tremendous problems before us. I am here in Lucknow specially to attend a very big conference² in which people are participating from all over the world—from Britain, the United States, Japan and many other countries. This conference would be dealing specifically with problems concerning Asia. For a long time now, people interested even remotely in world affairs have come to realize that Asia has become the centre of the most crucial problems of the world which are bound to have an effect elsewhere. I have also often emphasised this because it is seen that whenever world affairs are discussed in Europe or in the United Nations, Europe is invariably regarded as the centre and the other countries as peripheral. Therefore a great deal of attention is paid to complicated European questions....

As I sat here watching,³ I was reminded of the fact that what I witnessed was an example of our strength as well as our weakness. Strength there is in abundance but it is frittered away because we are not capable of utilizing it properly. I do not know why those of you who were seated suddenly stood up or tried to move forward or whether you deliberately wanted to create disturbance or could genuinely not hear me. But whatever the reason, this is a sign of our weakness. What will be the impression created on the foreign delegates who are here these days? It is true that India is very strong in her manpower but we do not know how to utilize that strength. People have not yet acquired the ability to conduct themselves with discipline. This is an old weakness of ours. I do not know how far we have succeeded in overcoming it. On the one hand, we are making progress and, on the other, we are becoming weaker. This is true not only of the people but of organizations too. There are two kinds of forces operating in our country. On the one hand, the country is progressing through people's work and effort. But at the same time, the country is going downhill. Now the question is which forces are going to be dominant—the ones that make or those that mar? You have to be clear in your minds about this.

You have imposed a tremendous responsibility upon me by putting me in such a high position. Well, you placed me in a high position earlier also by giving me a place in your hearts and there cannot be a higher position than that. However, this post where you have placed me is one of the highest in the world which carries great responsibilities with it. It is a difficult post and there are always tremendous problems to be faced and solved. The world is in a predicament at the moment

2. An international conference organised by the Institute of Pacific Relations was held at Lucknow from 3 to 14 October 1950. For Nehru's inaugural speech at the conference, see *post*, pp 499-507.
3. Nehru's speech was interrupted due to failure of the microphone for about twenty minutes. The crowd became restive and surged towards the rostrum, breaking the wooden barrier.

and no one knows when it may be set ablaze. There is talk of war and if there is a war, no one can escape it.

What is the wealth of a nation? Ultimately the wealth of a nation is its people. You can measure the strength of a country by the quality of the people who live in it. The money that you have in the treasury is not the real wealth of a country. That is merely a tool of trade. Man can produce wealth and he can squander it away too. If we have the strength in us to work hard, we can make this country very wealthy. If we do not possess that strength, even the little wealth that has been accumulated will be squandered away. If we have the capacity to work unitedly, we can face any problem with tremendous strength. If we keep squabbling with one another, we will merely fritter away that strength.

So these are the important questions which are constantly before us. My main responsibility is in the area of foreign affairs. But what is more important is the state of affairs in the country because ultimately the future of our country depends upon the real strength of the people. If they are strong, intelligent, able, honest and truthful, the country will go far. It cannot progress by shouting slogans or by declaring our intention to have democracy and the like. If the people are useless, the country becomes useless too. We cannot make a people look wise by calling ourselves a democracy. A country can progress only if its people act wisely.

I have spent nearly thirty or thirty-five years of my life in the service of this country. I worked to the best of my ability and strength and learnt a great deal living in the shadow of great men. All this has borne fruit—not my work alone but the combined effort of millions of my countrymen. We reached our goal, the country became independent and the world was amazed to see how we won our independence. But immediately after that, our body politic began to develop many abscesses. All the evils in our society began to come to the fore. It leads one to wonder whether we are indeed worthy of independence. After all, freedom is not something that can exist irrespective of whether the people are worthy of it. If we prove ourselves unworthy of it, freedom will slip away and rightly so, because freedom brings with it responsibilities too. Freedom cannot be ours by right if we are not prepared to pay the price in terms of responsibility. The two go together. The question that faces us is: Are we capable of shouldering our responsibilities or not, now that we have attained independence? We are busy in internal squabbles and the air is rent with dissonant voices. I sometimes wonder if we have forgotten the lessons taught by Mahatma Gandhi during the last thirty years. Are we not in fact pigmies who have succeeded in fooling the world for sometime that we are giants? In reality, it was Mahatma Gandhi's greatness which raised our stature. Since he departed, we have shrunk once again and become useless and servile.

Why is it so? We have to try to understand this. I do not know how many more years I have to live. But whatever it may be, my life is after all almost over. Many of our old colleagues have gone away and those of us who remain have at the most a few years more left. We may come and go but the nation goes on—it

is immortal. But whether the people in a country conduct themselves with grace, dignity and courage or in an unworthy manner is more important. I am not happy if India, which is shown as an independent country on the map, is in fact backward and constantly immersed in internal squabbles and forgetful of all her basic principles and ideals. I do not want our country to be like that. Have I and so many others sacrificed our lives for an end like this? Have we attained independence in order that petty wrangling and corruption and black marketing and bribery might flourish? You must seriously ponder where we are going.

You have placed me in a position of great responsibility by making me the Prime Minister and lavished your love and faith on me and even if I worked for a thousand years, I cannot repay that love and faith. But I feel perturbed by the weaknesses and evils that I see in our society and I feel that ultimately the responsibility is mine. The various acts of commission and omission may not be mine but the responsibility is mine and my Government's. I am not prepared to absolve myself or my Government or the Government of this State or of any other State, of the responsibility. Even the wrong deeds of others become our responsibility. If there were riots in Lucknow on the occasion of *Id*,⁴ then every single Hindu and every minister of Government here was responsible for it. I am not prepared to absolve anyone. I am sick of anyone trying to shirk his responsibilities. It is a strange thing that we in Government are not prepared to recognize our shortcomings. If we cannot overcome them, we are not fit to be in Government. I have a great confidence in myself. Please do not think that I have lost my self-confidence; the old fire still burns within me. But sometimes a thought comes to my mind that if such things happen when I am Prime Minister, then I am not an effective Prime Minister. I begin to wonder what right I have to continue in this position. I do not know the answer to this riddle. It is possible that there are some weaknesses in me of which I am not aware. Perhaps someone else may be able to handle this better.

Well, anyhow, you and I understand one another because ours is a long-standing relationship. After all, we are what we are because of you. We are not some extraordinary beings. We have established a relationship with the people in both urban and rural areas by understanding their problems and their suffering. This special bond ought not to be severed. So, if you fall, we shall fall too. We can only achieve with your help. I owe my position to you and your support as without it I cannot do much for your welfare and betterment.

So these are the big problems before us. I am fed up with our weakness of criticising others and expecting others to do everything. We are not prepared to do much ourselves but are always ready to find fault with our neighbours and like

4. A clash on 23 September 1950 during the *Id-uz-Zuha* celebrations over the rumoured sacrifice of a cow resulted in arson and injuries to ten persons, one of whom died later.

to preach to them. Our students, sitting on student committees, pass resolutions on world affairs and about what the Government should do. I have hardly seen any resolution about what the students themselves ought to do. Everyone preaches to others, forgetting his own duties. This is absolutely futile as no country and no people can progress by preaching to others. Everyone has to work hard for the country to march ahead. Look how fast the defeated countries of the world are progressing. Germany lost and was in ruins. Japan was another country which was defeated and ruined. Both are going ahead without any fuss. They are progressing because they are quietly working very hard. We are among the victorious nations but are going downhill or at least not going ahead very fast.

All sorts of problems confront us. Take this tremendous problem of refugees. You may have heard that at the moment there are in West Germany—which is only as big as one of our States—one crore of refugees from other countries. It is a tremendous burden on a country already reeling under defeat and under an army of occupation. When they were faced with the problem of housing the homeless millions, they decided not to construct houses first. They decided to give priority to running their factories, putting up with hardships. That would produce wealth and the houses could come later. So the situation is that four years later, their factories are working at full steam. People work hard, day and night, and so they have been able to put Germany back on her feet economically. Now they are building houses in thousands. The refugees are building the houses—they do not wait for the Government to do it for them. Here the people have become accustomed to depending on the State or the Central Government. This is a habit which comes down from the days of the British when the Government was known as the *Mai-Baap* Government.⁵ It is a peculiar situation when everyone looks to others for help. Everyone has to stand on his own feet. That is how countries can progress, not by preaching to others or passing resolutions and shouting slogans but by hard work and self-reliance. The State Governments or the Centre may be useless and may make mistakes. I accept that. But you are free to change the Governments or influence them to work properly through your own work.

Each one of you must ask yourselves every morning when you get up what you have to do and in what way you can contribute to the country's progress. Today's world is a merciless one which has no pity for any country or people or individual. If we are not strict with ourselves and don't present a united front to the world, we will most certainly remain backward and ultimately fall. It is possible that we will lose our freedom too even though, on the political map, we may be a free country and have a Parliament or legislative assemblies. But nowadays, political freedom is not enough. Freedom means economic and other kinds of freedom. You can be strangled if there is not enough to eat in the country; and if we have to depend on others to supply us with food we cannot really be

5. The practice of looking on the Government as paternal.

independent and can be strangled economically at any time. We will be at a tremendous disadvantage if we are not self-sufficient in essential goods and economically independent.

So these are the complications. Some people think that now that the British have gone, they can indulge in hooliganism, create disturbances and make demands on the Government as though the Government had an enormous treasury to distribute. Where does the Government get money from? It comes from your pockets by way of taxes. If you want that more money should be spent, you are most welcome to pay more taxes. You must remember that the money comes from you, the shopkeepers, the farmers, and zamindars. The Government uses that money. You cannot have it both ways—that on the one hand, the revenue becomes less and, on the other, the expenditure increases. It cannot go on—the country will be ruined. You must understand this.

People feel that problems can be solved by mere legislation, that if we declare socialism, we become socialist. Socialism is a great concept and I believe that the problems of the world can be solved by going in that direction. But other things are necessary before socialism is established. If you were to go to Africa and declare socialism, it will have no impact whatsoever. It is essential to have material, training and the ability to work together before we can achieve socialism. The nation has to maintain a very high rate of progress to bring about socialism. So the question arises as to how we can bring it about. Otherwise the entire chain will be broken. You may call it communism or socialism or imperialism or capitalism but the essential factor is hard work. The country has to work hard together. If you do not have that capacity, all your isms will be futile and you will fall. You cannot bring about socialism on paper. You have to work for it. Take the Soviet Union or the United States. The two are at different poles. But if you go to either of them, you will realize how hard working their people are. They are striving all the time to make the country stronger because it is hard work that produces wealth. Then the wealth produced has to be distributed in such a way as to ensure that it does not remain in a few pockets. It has to be equitably distributed.

Where are we heading? Some people in the country are adopting strange attitudes. First of all, the Partition of the country was a big shock to all of us and its consequences are still pursuing us. But the greatest evil which resulted from it was the bitterness it generated. It has filled us with despicable emotions, while anti-social elements steeped in communalism found the atmosphere propitious to foment trouble. They pose as courageous upholders of the country's honour and capable of putting the enemy of the country—Pakistan—in its place. These elements bent upon hostility towards Pakistan did not have the courage to lift a finger against the British Government. Now they stand to lose nothing by shouting slogans and demanding that we should wage war on Pakistan because it is others who will fight. It is cowardice to indulge in such things and let me make it quite clear to you that I cannot tolerate it. Whether it is done by the Rashtriya

Swayamsevak Sangh or the Hindu Mahasabha or the Sikh Sabha, it has to be combated and rooted out. An atmosphere has been created in the country so that even right-minded people are getting carried away. But that does not mean that we should be led astray. I will repeat what I said at the Nasik Congress,⁶ that if there is one thing in the world on which I am not prepared to compromise at any time, even if you or anyone else did, it is communalism which, in my opinion, is destroying India and may do so in the future too if we do not put a stop to it. We must understand this very clearly and whoever advocates it, big or small, young or old, has to be combated. The world of today offers the highest pedestal which India can easily mount. Respect for India is growing, but when I look at the country and hear the slogans and complaints, I am at a loss. The pedestal is lying vacant, but instead of aspiring to ascend it, these people are dragging the country towards the gutters. This is something that we ought to think seriously about.

After all, a country is great because of the greatness of her people. We cannot be great because of the area of our country or the size of our population which has always been large. The same thirty to thirty-five crores were slaves under the British but they did succeed in removing them. So numbers are not important and we cannot be proud of them. No country is great because of the size of its population. What counts ultimately is your capability—your mental, spiritual and physical qualities. Do you have enough competent scientists and engineers in the country? There are certain categories of people whom we can dispense with totally without any loss. For instance, take the lawyer's profession. It will be no loss to anyone if there were no lawyers because it is a profession which may lead to personal gain but does not benefit humanity very much. The legal profession does not create any wealth, nor does it build a nation. Similarly, if there were no money-lenders, it will be no great loss to the country and, in fact, it will be a gain. I mean the wrong type of money-lending which merely means making money. Who is important to a country? It is the people who contribute to its progress, whether they are farmers or factory-workers, engineers or masons, carpenters or blacksmiths, in short, the people who produce wealth through their own hard work. It is extremely important because the more wealth a country produces, the greater will be its prestige. The progress of a country depends entirely on the quality of its scientists, engineers, farmers and workers and the better they are—and by that I mean what they can produce—the faster a country will go ahead. It cannot progress by speeches and slogans. It is often necessary to give speeches in order to explain things. But ultimately there is no other way to make progress except by hard work.

What is the situation in the country today? You might be aware that I went to the Nasik Congress with a perturbed mind. I do not wish to hide from you the

6. See *post*, pp. 128-130 and 137-141.

state of my mind and heart. If I have any achievement to my credit it lies in the fact, I think, that I have always frankly put before you whatever came to my mind and have tried to understand a little what is in your minds. This has been our relationship. So if I were to suddenly hide behind a curtain, I would become useless. I, therefore, put whatever is in my heart and mind before you, whether it is right or wrong. Even if I am wrong it becomes clearer when I speak of it.

Now I have been troubled for some time. Why is it that a powerful Government like ours is unable to bring evils like black marketing under control? I have often said much about this and I am reminded of this by others. What is the matter with us that we cannot bring such evils under control? Where does the defect lie—in us, or in our laws? There is some shortcoming somewhere—perhaps in the governmental set-up.

Secondly, and there is no point in hiding facts, I see deterioration taking place among Congressmen. It is obvious that their contacts with the masses are diminishing. Why is this so? Earlier, they went out into the field and visited villages and served the people. They did not do this in the hope of any reward or position. But now everyone wants membership of Parliament or Assemblies or of committees. So we are in a dilemma. After all, the Congress has to be run as a political organization because its work is political in nature. The elections are a complicated affair and if we were to permit everyone to stand as they pleased, there will be chaos. Therefore it becomes necessary that at least people of one shade of opinion and the right kind of views should be elected so that they can work in cooperation and in a disciplined way to serve the nation. Others whom the people elect should also work to implement their programme but there should be discipline among them. This is how the Congress which was born sixty-five years ago completed the task it had set out to accomplish and made the country free. Freedom was not achieved in the sense we had visualized it but there is no doubt that we got political freedom and British rule came to an end. We are free to do what we like in and outside the country—and we have the power to do it. So the Congress completed its task.

The question that now arises is: having completed its work, should the Congress continue or not? It is important at all times—and especially now when the situation in the country is rather delicate and anything may happen in the world—to have a strong organization and we cannot afford to show weakness or get bogged down in petty quarrels. It becomes important to have a strong and powerful organization with a countrywide base which can keep these matters under control. So I feel that it is absolutely essential for the Congress to go on because its work is by no means complete yet and it has a great deal to achieve. But I want that the Congress should become stronger and try to remove its weaknesses. Though there are many organizations in the country—some good, some bad—I cannot find a single organization which has the strength to hold the reins of Government. Moreover this is a dangerous time for different people to pull in different directions.

So I inevitably reached the conclusion that we have to make the Congress work. But the Congress is not a mere organization of a few thousands or a few lakhs of people. It is a live organization which attracted the four hundred million people in the country. Though its membership was only fifty or sixty millions in the beginning, even those who were not fully in agreement with the views of the Congress had sympathy for it. It maintained a relationship with the common people and served them. But I cannot see that kind of thing any more. Therefore, though I wish the Congress to continue, I am wondering why the Congress should not be modelled once again as in the past as a grand organization, and this greed for position which is weakening Congressmen removed. This problem has been troubling me for a long time now.

The other problem, as I mentioned to you, is the way even Congressmen are getting carried away by communal feelings. I am amazed at the kind of speeches made and the statements issued by them. I cannot understand why the people of your State should behave in such an amazing fashion. I was grieved and troubled by reports of riots in your State because I feel that there are certain things before which Congressmen should never bow down even if the world acquiesces in them. You may or may not remember what Ganesh Shankar Vidyarthi had done nearby in Kanpur.⁷ It is something to remember. I am in constant search of people of the calibre of Ganesh Shankar Vidyarthi, especially when all sorts of things happen everywhere which cause me pain and trouble me greatly. I want to run away from my post in Delhi in search of more fruitful things to do. I am often tempted to resign from the Prime Ministership and to go out into the field and do some useful work. Can I do more good sitting in Delhi as Prime Minister or should I go elsewhere? Then people stop me from quitting Delhi and I wonder if my going would cause more harm or do some good. What is my value now? You must judge for yourselves. I have to constantly weigh the pros and cons of my actions in order to decide whether it is better to stay or to go. You may perhaps say that I stick on for some selfish reasons but the question is always in my mind and the balance may tilt at any time and I may go off elsewhere because, after all, my profession is not that of a prime minister. My profession is the service of India and so I shall go wherever I feel I would be able to do good. I would, however, like to tell you one thing quite clearly, and that is, if there had not been one big obstacle in my way, I would not be in Delhi today. That obstacle is India's external problems in which I am greatly interested and I feel that I can be of real service in that field. The world knows me and I have some influence in its affairs. If I move away, it may damage our position slightly and perhaps it will have an effect on the world too. This is the ultimate reason for my staying on. As far as the internal affairs of the country are concerned, they pull me towards working in that field.

7. While trying to staunch a communal riot in Kanpur, Ganesh Shankar Vidyarthi, a prominent Congress leader of U.P., was murdered by rioters on 25 March 1931.

Well, I do not know whether the internal or the external affairs will affect my thinking more powerfully but especially now when I see the world situation and the dangers that confront it, when nobody knows what may happen in the next few weeks, then I do not have the courage to tilt the boat which may lead to internal instability at a time when India needs to be strong enough to face any situation. But the fact is, and you will forgive me for laying my mind and heart bare before you, that I wish you to understand a little about my thoughts. I am perturbed by what is happening in my State and all over the country and in the Congress too. There are quarrels, tension, clamour to include such and such and to throw out the other, not on the basis of merit but because of groupism. These things are spreading very rapidly. I have been in the Congress for over thirty to thirty-five years but never felt the least desire to form groups or join one. I worked alone and had the good fortune to work with many of my colleagues and friends. But I neither joined any group nor will I do so in future.

The country has to choose between high idealism and petty-mindedness. Some people raise the cry of Hindu *rashtra*. It is such narrow-mindedness that would degrade our nation.

At Nasik, my resolutions were passed and indeed they had an easy passage. But that makes me feel that the people did not understand the implications of those resolutions. However, if we do not follow those resolutions, the country is doomed. I, therefore, think that it is the duty of everyone to implement those resolutions in letter and spirit.

The general elections are coming soon and most of us are getting busy with them, or rather too busy. Elections are important for a country, but more important and far-reaching events can occur in the world and we must be prepared to face them.

NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION

II. The Economy

(i) Planning and Resources

1. To Central Ministers¹

New Delhi
August 18, 1950

My dear Minister,

At the Cabinet meeting today, we discussed our financial condition. We have often discussed this before. The position, as it appeared today, was little short of desperate² and we had to face, as you know, some very painful dilemmas. There is no help for it but to make another and very earnest and, I hope, effective attempt at reduction of our normal expenditure in every Ministry.

The Finance Minister has been asked to look into this matter and, if he considers it necessary, to appoint a special officer who should consult heads of departments, etc., in an attempt to bring down expenditure. Ultimately, the responsibility lies with each Ministry and unless the Ministry itself makes that attempt, it will be difficult for an outside officer to do much.³

I realise how difficult it is for many Ministries to make any vital change at the present moment. But we have no choice in the matter. We are being compelled to give up some of our most important and essential schemes. In fact most of our real nation-building activities are being starved. It is better for us to economise in our administrative apparatus⁴ than to stop important work. As a matter of fact, for the present, we have to do both.

I would therefore beg of you to give earnest thought to this matter in regard to your Ministry and to advise your Secretaries to take immediate steps in regard to it.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

2. The total national revenue and expenditure (excluding railways) for 1950-51 was Rs 7,115 million and Rs 7,130 million respectively. The internal public debt was Rs 18,476 million while the external debt amounted to Rs 592 million.

3. In the last week of August, C.D. Deshmukh, the Finance Minister, revising the earlier decision of appointing a retrenchment officer in each Ministry to impose economies from above, asked the various Ministries on their own to prune their budgets.

4. The expenditure on general administration amounted to Rs 1,427 million during 1950-51.

2. To V.K. Krishna Menon¹

New Delhi
September 26, 1950

My dear Krishna,²

I have received your letter of the 23rd September.³ It is always good to have your reactions to events and they help to fill up gaps in my mind.

I have also received your hand written letter of 24th September. About the possibilities of capital investment for our large-scale industries, I would certainly like you to enquire and let me know. Since Deshmukh is there, it would be a good thing if you talk to him fully on the subject. If necessary, Mahtab⁴ can go over to England later on.

The business of forming the Congress Working Committee has got stuck.⁵ I am in a very curious position. I had decided not to join it, but after Nasik there is no logical reason for refusal. There are other reasons, but they can't be put out before the public.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

1. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, N.M.M.L.
2. India's High Commissioner in the U.K. at the time.
3. Krishna Menon wrote that American aid would be an important issue at the forthcoming Commonwealth Finance Ministers' meeting on economic development of South and South-East Asia at London, and it was highly improbable that the U.S. would render aid without the conditions now known to surround Marshall Aid or other similar conditions.
4. Hare Krishna Mahtab, Central Minister for Industry and Supply.
5. See *post*, Section 2, subsection III.

3. To Ravi Shankar Shukla¹

New Delhi
October 2, 1950

My dear Shuklaji,²

Gulzarilal Nanda has sent me a copy of your letter to me dated 17th September. I understand he has already written to you in answer. I wish to deal especially

1. J.N. Collection.
2. Chief Minister of Madhya Pradesh.

with your last two paragraphs in which you express your disapproval of the manner of formation of the National Planning Commission and its limited personnel. I think there is a misunderstanding in this. It is perfectly true that actual execution of any work and even a great deal of planning will have to be locally done in a State. That is why we have laid great stress on each State having a proper planning and execution machinery of its own. Some States have got this.

But a Central Planning Commission cannot be a collection of representatives from the States. This would be too large and totally ineffective. No planning commission, to my knowledge, has been built up in this way. In order to be effective, it is to be small but with plenty of advisers and in constant touch with the States and Ministries. I cannot conceive of any other type of planning commission. I can conceive of large and vague advisory bodies. We have been consulting States for years past on planning and such like matters. The time has come for a coordinated all-India view and priorities to be laid down. This can only be done officially by a small expert body giving all its time to it and seeing every question in relation to a hundred other questions. It would be a disadvantage if this body consisted of a large number of persons taking a local view of the situation and pulling in different directions.

Of course the National Planning Commission should be in constant touch with the States. But the basic conception in regard to planning and priorities can only be thought of in terms of all India. I am quite sure that any suggestions that you and your Government make would be given the most earnest consideration by the Planning Commission.

It is to be remembered that planning is not merely a collection of large number of local plans. It is an integrated approach to different and many-sided problems. This cannot be done on a provincial basis. Personally I feel that the present Planning Commission is peculiarly fortunate in its personnel.³

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. The National Planning Commission was constituted in March 1950 with Jawaharlal Nehru as Chairman, Gulzarilal Nanda, Deputy Chairman, and C.D. Deshmukh, G.L. Mehta, R.K. Patil and V.T. Krishnamachari as members.

4. To C. Rajagopalachari¹

New Delhi
October 7, 1950

My dear Rajaji,²

I am circulating the note³ you sent me yesterday to the Members of the Cabinet and to the Planning Commission. This is to make them think.

With your basic proposition that food production should not give place to anything else, I am in general agreement. More especially in the conditions which are prevailing in the world that seems to me very important. Some of the other matters that you have raised are very important and we should consider them fully.

It seems to me that even now there is not that effective liaison between the Planning Commission and our various ministries. I think closer contacts and joint discussions are desirable so that there might be a living interchange of thoughts between the various organs of our Government and the Planning Commission. Most people seem to think that planning is merely a collection of individual plans and not an integrated approach, and so each Ministry goes its own way regardless of what others may be doing or thinking. The Cabinet or the Economic Committee of the Cabinet to some extent bring about a certain coordination but, in the nature of things, this is limited and we cannot give continuous thought to this process of integration. That is where the Planning Commission comes in. It is their special job to think continuously of this matter and to view each separate part in terms of the whole.

I think it would be a good thing if Gulzarilal Nanda was invited to all your meetings of the Economic Committee. When any special subject is taken up, some other Member of the Planning Commission, like Mehta, might be asked to come. This will keep them in touch with the work of the Economic Committee. As a matter of fact, it will be a good thing if the Planning Commission considered the matter previously so that the Economic Committee can have the advantage of their views.

1. File No. 17(200)/50-PMS.
2. Central Minister without Portfolio and chairman of the Economic Affairs Committee of the Cabinet.
3. Rajagopalachari emphasised the importance of achieving self-sufficiency in food production so as to avoid permanent dependence on import of food. He decried the policy of using the prepared rice fields for jute crops and converting jungle lands to grow food, and said that the rationalisation of prices of foodgrains should be linked to the basic problem of rural wages rather than to the pressure of economic forces generated by crops meant for exports which paid better.

I should like you to take the trouble of attending meetings of the Planning Commission occasionally for general discussions. I propose to go there about once a week and I would be grateful if you could come then also.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal

5. To Hare Krushna Mahtab¹

New Delhi
October 20, 1950

My dear Mahtab,

I enclose a copy of a letter from Neville Wadia and my reply.² You will notice that in the peculiar circumstances of the case I have agreed to Dr Sankaran going to Geneva.³ I feel that we should accept the proposal that Wadia and his Committee have made about the formation of a company.⁴ I suggest that this may be done regardless of any general policy that we may lay down for State-owned industries. It would be desirable to avoid uniformity and to judge each project on the merits. We can thus also see which method is the most successful for future guidance. In this case of penicillin, we have got an excellent board and I have a high opinion of Neville Wadia as well as of Choksi.⁵ It is far better to give them freedom of action and expect results from them than to come in their way in regard to matters of management, etc. They have taken a lot of trouble over this matter and it would be a pity to upset all this and have to start afresh. This will not prevent you from adopting a somewhat different procedure in regard to other industries, if you so wish.

1. File No. 17(116)/48-PMS.
2. Wadia complained on 19 October that contrary to assurances given to him when he accepted the chairmanship of the Penicillin Committee of the Government in April 1949, he was not being given a free hand in the working of the penicillin project. Nehru's reply has not been printed.
3. Permission was earlier refused to Sankaran, the technical member of the Committee, to go to Geneva to secure UNICEF assistance for the project due to foreign exchange constraints.
4. Wadia believed that the delay by the Government in giving clearance to the formation of a State-owned company with an autonomous board of directors as unanimously decided by the Committee in August 1949 was due to the Government's desire to evolve a uniform pattern for all such undertakings.
5. J.D. Choksi.

Again, the penicillin project is one in which it may be necessary or desirable to invite private capital later. The door should be left open. I hope therefore that a very rapid decision will be taken by the Economic Committee about this particular project, regardless of the general question.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION

II. The Economy

(ii) Food and Agriculture

1. To Sri Krishna Sinha¹

New Delhi
August 14, 1950

My dear Sri Babu,²

I have just received your letter of the 11th August.

Thank you for writing to me at length about the food situation in Bihar. I am passing on your letter to the Food Minister, Shri Munshi, although he is well acquainted with the facts.

The rapid deterioration in the situation in Bihar has caused us a great deal of anxiety and distress. This anxiety is not only due to the misery caused to people, but much more so to the failure of our governmental apparatus to deal with the situation of this kind in time. There is obviously a failure. How far the Central Government is responsible for it or the Bihar Government is another matter. It is clear, however, that a great deal of responsibility attaches to the Bihar Government and one is inevitably driven to the conclusion that the administrative apparatus of Bihar for dealing with such questions is of poor quality. There is no awareness of the growing situation and no rapid steps to deal with it. In my last fortnightly letter³ I mentioned the case of Saurashtra where sudden flood and disaster came to the province. The steps that the Government took were rapid and effective. Not an hour was lost and hence the situation was controlled. I have no such sensation of rapid and effective action in Bihar. The Government of India is blamed. Whether that blame is justified or not, surely the Bihar Government must be more wide-awake and must have a much better administrative system to deal with such problems.

It must be realised that the Centre has no inexhaustible reserves, and our capacity to buy abroad is very strictly limited, apart from the money involved. We are trying to get foodgrains from abroad. We just cannot get them in sufficient quantity. Therefore, we have to deal with the situation with such resources as we have. Tomorrow there may be war and it may become absolutely impossible to get any imports. Are we then to allow our people to starve? We must, therefore, look at this problem from this point of view and realise that we have to depend upon our own resources. If so, then we cannot possibly tolerate any hoarding or any waste and the whole strength of the Government must come down to prevent this. We have been much too slack in this matter and there is a general impression that Bihar takes things more easily than most other States in India.

The minds of most people are turned to political aspects and to the elections. If we are not strict in our procurement, what will be the effect on the peasantry

1. File No. 31(103)/50-PMS.
2. Chief Minister of Bihar.
3. See *post*, pp. 517-521.

and the voters? The fact of the matter is that if we fail to solve our food problem adequately, then the result is bound to be disastrous even from the political point of view. I am convinced, therefore, that every Government must look to itself as far as possible and make it impossible for any hoarding or black marketing to take place. We are passing legislation to help us to do so. If this legislation is not enough, we shall not hesitate to declare a state of emergency in any badly affected area and apply all the special methods which will be open to us then to prevent hoarding, etc., whatever the political results in the elections might be. I would beg your Government, therefore, to consider this question from this far more important and vital point of view.

I hope to see you and Anugraha Narayan Sinha⁴ when you come here for the conference of Chief Ministers.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. (1887-1957); joined noncooperation movement, 1921; member, Central Legislative Assembly, 1935-37; Minister, Government of Bihar, 1937-39, and again from 1946 till his death.

2. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
August 20, 1950

My dear Vallabhbhai,

In the discussions yesterday and today at the Chief Ministers' Conference,² attention was drawn to the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, which empowers both the Central and State Governments to detain a person who is acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community. It is clear that this was specially put in the Constitution and in this Act to apply to black marketeers, hoarders and other like persons, who interfere with the maintenance of supplies, etc. It is desirable that we should give effect to this provision. The attention of the Chief Ministers has already been drawn to it. It

1. File No. 57/208/50-Poll., M.H.A.
2. A conference of the Chief Ministers and Food Ministers held in New Delhi on 19 and 20 August 1950 discussed steps to increase food production, bring down prices, and launch an all-out drive against hoarders and profiteers.

would be a good thing if some action was taken under this provision in the Centrally administered areas, notably Delhi.³ That would have a very good effect.

This Preventive Detention Act also empowers the Central or State Governments to detain a person who might be acting in a manner prejudicial to the relations of India with foreign powers or the security of India, etc. I think it might well be considered that people who shout too much about war with Pakistan or people who take pledges to liquidate Pakistan come within the scope of this clause. There can be no doubt that the relations of India with a foreign power are affected. This open challenge by taking pledges is something which no country could tolerate. The way the Hindu Mahasabha people have functioned recently in Delhi,⁴ and possibly elsewhere, has been amazing. If this flouting of authority is to be overlooked, it may well spread and become more difficult to deal with.⁵

Yours,
Jawaharlal

3. In his reply on 24 August, Patel, doubting the wisdom of using preventive detention against persons suspected of such offences as black marketing, suggested their prosecution. The detention earlier of alleged black marketeers by the U.P. Government had been declared illegal by the High Court and "it would not be proper to start with such action in Delhi; an acquittal here attracts far more attention than it does in the States."
4. The Working Committee of the Hindu Mahasabha had on 13 August 1950 endorsed the demands of the All India Refugees Conference in respect of annulment of the Partition, annexation of territories from Pakistan and planned exchange of population. At a public meeting at New Delhi two days later, a pledge was taken to work for the undoing of the Partition.
5. Patel replied that action had already been taken in regard to some prominent supporters of the Hindu Mahasabha. This was bound to be challenged in the Supreme Court, and the Court's decision should be awaited before taking further action.

3. The Food Situation¹

Friends and Comrades,

I am going to talk to you about food and the food situation. Last year, I addressed you several times on this question, and I was very happy to find that the public reaction to our appeals was good. We worked hard and, as a result, slowly the situation in India in regard to food began to improve. State Governments gave special attention to this problem and large tracts of new territory were brought

1. Broadcast to the nation, New Delhi, 22 August 1950. A.I.R. tapes, N.M.M.L. Nehru spoke also in Hindi on the same lines.

under cultivation. Waste was to some extent avoided and so there was a steady improvement in the situation and we began to feel at the beginning of this year that we had turned the corner.

We could not be sure, of course, because there are so many uncertain factors to be borne in mind and nature has a big part to play. You will remember that we had fixed the end of 1951 as the date for our programme of self-sufficiency and for stopping food imports except in cases of great emergency. We worked to that end with some success. If I had spoken to you at the beginning of June of this year, I would have given expression to a sense of satisfaction at the progress made. The prospects were good.

Speaking now, two and a half months after, I have a different story to tell. Nevertheless, do not forget that the progress made holds and will stand us in good stead in the future. But nature has been most unkind to us during these two months and more. Premature rains ruined the maize crops in north Bihar and then came floods in the Kosi river. The south-east monsoon failed for the third time in several districts of Madras. There were floods also in Saurashtra and lack of rain in three districts of Bombay. These vagaries of nature suddenly made an immediate difference to the food situation in these provinces. The Korean war led timid or unscrupulous people to hoard and to put up prices. Large numbers of refugees in Bengal and Assam had to be fed. Last of all came a tremendous earthquake in Assam which not only ruined the crops in many places, but also broke up the entire communication system by the sinking of roads and railway tracks. To add to this, some people started scares of famine in Bengal and Bihar which added greatly to the difficulties of the situation.

I am taking you into my confidence, because it is right that you should know what the position is. That position has been and is serious. Nevertheless, it is absurd and foolish to talk of famine. There is at present enough food to go round and our chief difficulty is the heavy strain on our transport, with the result that scarcity pockets had been created where it took some time for food to reach. The position is a serious one and we have to put forward our utmost effort, both governmental and public, to meet it. Particularly, there is scarcity of rice not only in India but outside also. Assam, for instance, which was to have supplied one hundred thousand tons of rice to the rest of the country, has become a deficit area. The prices of foodgrains are rising all over the world, and it is not always easy to procure them. The international situation continues to be a critical one, and no one knows what the future might unfold. We must not therefore rely too much upon imports from outside. Indeed we must think, even more than before, of fulfilling our programme of self-sufficiency, not only because that is good for us and we have pledged ourselves to it, but also because the compulsion of events demands it. The internal availability of foodgrains must therefore be drawn upon. But the difficulty of the present, and in the near future, is not the lack of foodgrains provided we meet the situation calmly, mobilise all our resources and strengthen procurement and

distribution. The gravity of the situation demands that we face it in the spirit of a war effort and with the full determination to overcome every difficulty that comes in our way.

You know that a few days ago we held a Conference of Chief Ministers in Delhi. This Conference decided that food procurement and food production must be organised on a war footing and dealt with both by the Centre and the States as matters of highest priority; that wherever administrative machinery is weak, it is to be overhauled and strengthened; that procurement should be intensified in all the States, both surplus and deficit; that the systems of procurement have to be coordinated and vigorously enforced. Such an approach can only be successful if there is full cooperation and coordination, and I am happy to say that the Chief Ministers assembled in conference took these decisions unanimously. This is a matter affecting every person in India and it should be treated as one above political controversy. Unfortunately, politics enters into the picture, and some people use this situation for political purposes and help to create a scare in the country. I earnestly hope that in this matter at least we would rise above the petty politics of the day and there will be a coordinated approach, on the part both of the Government and of the public, to meet the situation.

For some time past there has been a controversy in the country on the subject of control and decontrol.² Some people have thought that we should aim at decontrol.³ Decontrol is of course desirable if conditions are favourable for it. But let it be clearly understood that there is no question of decontrol at present or in the foreseeable future. This was almost the unanimous opinion of the Conference and even those who had previously been in favour of decontrol recognised the necessity of carrying on controls. Therefore there should be no uncertainty on this issue. Controls are going to be continued and to be worked efficiently and vigorously.

Government have taken other steps also in regard to food supplies and the rise in prices. The Essential Commodities Act has now been applied to a number of other States and there will be a unified direction in regard to these matters. The tendency to look upon State barriers as matters of ensuring food supplies to the State itself, regardless of conditions in other parts of the country, has been arrested. Henceforward, we shall try to maximise the effort to utilise food supplies for the

2. Procurement and distribution of food by the State began in India in 1943 when Bombay introduced food rationing, and the practice was followed later in other parts of the country. Towards the end of 1947, food was decontrolled resulting in rise in food prices and this necessitated reintroduction of controls in September 1948.
3. R.P. Noronha, a member of the Foodgrains Procurement Committee, had in his minute of dissent in the Committee's report to the Central Government in July 1950 favoured a system of relaxed control allowing free market prices to operate. A number of Congressmen also favoured decontrol in view of the forthcoming general elections.

country as a whole. The Conference decided that the surplus States were to put forward their highest effort to supply foodgrains to the deficit States. Due provision has already been made to maintain supplies in the deficit States during the lean months of August, September and October.

This is the governmental aspect of it, but the public aspect is even more important. If people hoard and create scares and spread alarm and help in raising prices, they commit a crime against the whole country. Therefore the public conscience must not tolerate this. Excessive hoarding has now been made a serious offence with a heavy penalty. Governments, both Central and State, have been armed with powers to keep in detention those who interfere with essential supplies. Officials, including district magistrates and the police, have been instructed that any laxity in food administration will be recorded against them.

There is, I repeat, enough food in the country, but it is true that we may not be able to get the particular food that we are accustomed to. More especially, the lot of the rice-eating public is a hard one, for they are unaccustomed to wheat or millet or other diet. But, in view of the emergency, old habits and tastes have to be subordinated. People, especially in the northern States, who are accustomed to wheat, should refrain completely from rice so that others may get it. But all of us should try to adapt our food habits to the existing situation.

There has been some criticism that the present situation has arisen because the Government did not import enough quantities of foodgrains. This is not true. In January last there was a substantial carry-over. This year the internal production is larger by about two million tons. Even so, the import target of one million, five hundred tons has been raised to two million tons. But for the unexpected calamities which have occurred during the last two months, we would have had a substantial reserve and a carry-over next January.⁴

Let us all recognize the seriousness of the situation. But at the same time let us also recognize that we can meet it and have the capacity to meet it, and therefore let there be no scare or alarm. Our pledge of self-sufficiency by the end of 1951 holds. It was not a propaganda stunt but the firm policy of Government behind which lay a great deal of thinking and well-planned effort. Only to the extent of some calamity, or to replace food cultivation in some places with cotton and jute required for national purposes, is this going to be varied.

I have been perfectly frank with you for we can only face difficulties with frankness and courage and cooperation. The world is in a troubled state today and may have to face even greater conflict and difficulty. Let us prepare ourselves for every contingency, relying upon ourselves and our capacity to meet difficult situations with courage, determination and unity. *Jai Hind*.

4. The expected minimum additional production of 2.56 million tons of foodgrains in 1950-51 had been more than neutralized by the loss of 5.5 million tons of grains caused by natural calamities. The total production of foodgrains in 1950-51 was 53.1 million tons, which was 5.4 million tons less than the previous year.

4. The Importance of Compost¹

I send my good wishes to the *Farmer* on the occasion of its special number dealing with the *Gram Sudhar Saptah*. I understand that this year it is proposed to concentrate on compost making.

One of our major and most important failings is low productivity of land as well as in factories. The whole problem of our food production revolves round low productivity. We may bring more land under cultivation and we shall do so, but ultimately it is the increase of yield per acre that is going to make a big difference to our food production. India's yield is among the lowest in the world. There can be no doubt at all that it can be greatly increased as in other countries. This increase will depend on many factors, but more specially on better manuring or use of fertilizers, selection of better seeds, etc.

Fertilizers are helpful. But manure in some form or other is far more beneficial. Unfortunately we do not use it sufficiently and much of the stuff out of which proper manure can be made is wasted. Therefore the importance of compost making. In a sense, this might well be said to be the foundation of our food production programme. If we prepare and use enough compost, we increase our yield and food production goes up greatly.

So, I hope that this *Gram Sudhar Saptah* will result in a much wider appreciation of compost making and the use of this compost by the average farmer.

1. New Delhi, 27 August 1950. Message sent to B.G. Kher, Chief Minister of Bombay, for publication in the *Farmer*.

5. To Chief Ministers¹

New Delhi
September 11, 1950

My dear Chief Minister,

I have already drawn your attention more than once to the necessity of swift and stern action against hoarders, black marketeers and the like.² I have pointed out

1. This letter is also printed in G. Parthasarathi (ed), *Jawaharlal Nehru: Letters to Chief Ministers 1947-1964*, Vol. 2 (New Delhi, 1986), pp. 191-192.
2. See *post*, Section 12, items I, II and III. In another letter to Chief Ministers on 26 August 1950, not printed here, Nehru reminded them of the consensus at the recent Chief Ministers' Conference to exercise the power of detention in dealing with economic offenders. Drawing their attention to the provisions of the P.D. Act passed by Parliament in February 1950, he asked them to apply the Act wherever necessary as public opinion would approve of it.

to you the provisions of the recent Ordinance³ as well as of the Preventive Detention Act. This last Act clearly lays down that people can be kept in detention for interfering with essential supplies.

2. One Chief Minister informs me that in the view of his Law Department this is not legally possible. It is said that hoarding or black marketing is not interference with essential supplies. I confess I do not understand this argument and, indeed, consider it quite wrong. Even if there was something in that argument, it is for the courts to decide and not for us to admit our helplessness in such a vital matter.


3. I cannot understand how it can possibly be said, either from the point of view of the law or of common sense, that hoarding and black marketing can neither of them be considered to be an interference with essential supplies. I should think it is the exact reverse of it, that they are obvious and patent interference of this kind. In any event, we have to decide whether we as a Government in the Centre and in the provinces can effectively deal with this situation or are completely helpless in the matter. A government that confesses defeat against the evil-doer ceases to have any justification for functioning. This is a serious matter and I would draw your particular attention to it. We must function swiftly and effectively and, if necessary, take risks in the matter so far as the law is concerned. The public should know that we are earnest and serious and are prepared to take action. If the law comes in the way, we must immediately set about changing the law, but I do not think the law comes in the way. It is clear enough.

4. It is of the utmost importance that our Ordinance should be followed by such or similar action. Also that if goods are frozen, they should not be kept frozen but distributed as soon as possible.⁴


Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. The Supply and Prices of Goods Ordinance, 1950, promulgated on 2 September, empowered the Central Government to fix the maximum prices chargeable by dealers or producers and the maximum stocks that might be kept by them. Initially, eleven articles were covered by the Ordinance, whose violation attracted drastic punishment.

4. B.G. Kher wrote back on 29 September that since detention orders under the P.D. Act had been challenged in the High Court on the doubt as to what constituted essential supplies, it was necessary to amend the Act to empower the Central and the State Governments to determine the essential nature of any particular supplies and to enable the authorities to determine the adequacy of grounds for action against offenders.



AT THE INDIAN AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE, NEW DELHI, 12 OCTOBER 1950



EXAMINING A DOUBLE PLOUGH MADE AT THE INDIAN AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE, NEW DELHI, 12 OCTOBER 1950

6. To K.M. Munshi¹

New Delhi

October 13, 1950

My dear Munshi,

Yesterday, at the Pusa Institute,² I was shown one of the double ploughs which has been evolved in our Agriculture Department. This was good in its way, but I rather doubt if it is a kind of thing which will help our agriculturists very much for two reasons: One, that it requires a strong pair of bullocks which an average agriculturist may not have. Secondly, because it is rather expensive. It is very heavy and not easy to be moved about.

Personally I think that the line of improvement should be a single plough which is cheap. My mind immediately went back to the plough I brought a year and half ago from the Allahabad Agricultural Institute and which I sent to the Agriculture Department. It seemed to me then that this plough was a very great improvement on the ordinary plough used in India, and yet it was cheap. I wonder if you could find out what has happened to that plough. Has it been used and with what results?

Once we get a better plough, we should try to encourage its use everywhere. That itself would improve our yield greatly.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 31(34)/48-PMS.

2. The Indian Agricultural Research Institute, popularly known as the Pusa Institute, was founded in Pusa, Bihar, and transferred to New Delhi in 1936.

NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION**II. The Economy****(iii) Land Reforms in Bihar**

1. To Rajendra Prasad¹

New Delhi
September 11, 1950

My dear Mr President,

I find from the Home Ministry that they have not yet received your certificate for the Bihar Land Bill.² Yesterday I conveyed to you the request of the Cabinet,³ after reconsideration, and I also pointed out that there was a certain urgency about this matter which has already been delayed long enough. I do not know what difficulty has arisen now to postpone this still further.

I would request you, therefore, again to be good enough to certify this Bill. Any other course would render my position as Prime Minister and that of the Government difficult.⁴

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.
2. The Bill sought to provide for transfer to Government of interests of proprietors and tenure holders in lands, forests and fisheries. Besides laying down procedure for abolition of zamindaris, it contained provisions for collection of rent and management of forests and wastelands through village panchayats. It also provided for appointment of a land commission for advising Government on the agrarian policy to be pursued.
3. At its meeting on 9 September, the Cabinet decided to advise the President to certify the Bill, which was sent to him for his assent in June 1950.
4. In his reply the same day, Rajendra Prasad stated that he had written to the Attorney-General on 10 September seeking "his opinion generally with regard to the powers of the President and also with special reference to Article 31" of the Constitution, but, "in view of the urgency which you attach to the matter," he was giving his assent to the Bill without waiting for the Attorney-General's opinion.

2. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
September 12, 1950

My dear Vallabhbhai,

Thank you for your letter of the 11th September about the Bihar Land Reforms Bill.² The Cabinet (which was a very full one, every member being present except

1. J.N. Collection.
2. Patel, who was recuperating in Bombay, wrote that the President's note raised some constitutional points and points of substance and might be referred to the Ministries of Home and Law and the matter reconsidered by the Cabinet in the light of their advice.

you) considered the President's note and discussed it at length. They were all of the opinion that it should not be circulated so as to preserve secrecy. It would have been unfortunate if parts of it leaked out to the press. Therefore, it was not circulated but read out as a whole in Cabinet.

The Cabinet was strongly of opinion that the advice tendered by them to the President should be acted upon, both from the constitutional and the practical points of view. The points that the President had raised had been considered previously by the Cabinet Committee and were considered again by the full Cabinet.

I was instructed by the Cabinet not to have any copies made of the President's note and that this should be deposited with the Cabinet Secretariat.

The day after the Cabinet met, I went to the President and told him of what had happened. I believe he asked the Attorney-General³ for his opinion about some matters. Yesterday evening he sent me the Bill duly certified.

I do not think, therefore, that any occasion arises now for a reference of the Bill to the Law or Home Ministry.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

3. M.C. Setalvad.

3. To Sri Krishna Sinha¹

New Delhi
October 19, 1950

My dear Sri Babu,

Your letter of the 15th October about the latest developments in connection with the scheme for the abolition of zamindaris. I am as concerned as you are with these quibblings of lawyers coming in the way of our social progress. I entirely agree with you that we shall have to consider seriously an amendment of the Constitution. I am consulting the Law Ministry in regard to it.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION

II. The Economy

(iv) Labour

1. To Jayaprakash Narayan¹

Bombay
September 22, 1950

My dear Jayaprakash,

I received your letter of September 19th at Nasik.

Whatever the merits of the Bombay textile strike,² I think you will agree with me that it would have been quite improper for me to intervene in the way that was suggested. Any other way would have been difficult; but that particular way was completely out of the question. I was asked to attend a public meeting of strikers.³ Even if the meeting had been allowed by the Government or the police, surely I could not have attended a meeting of the strikers when such a conflict was going on. At the most, I might have met some representative who could have given me his version of the facts.

I quite appreciate that it is no small matter for two hundred thousand workers to be on strike in an industry of importance. It is not a local matter and not only the strikers but the whole industry and the country are suffering because of it. Nevertheless, it is not clear to me how I can jump in and take a part in this business.⁴ Whatever the motives might have been, the strike raises very important questions of principle. Are we to put aside all ideas of approaching such conflicts through tribunals and the like and leave a decision of the issue to repeated conflicts? A strike is a legitimate weapon but, surely, even a legitimate weapon can be misused. This particular matter is being considered in some tribunals. It is not a question of legalism being made a fetish.⁵ There is another side to it that the laws we frame have no importance and can be set aside at any moment. If that is so, then there can be no ordered approach to this problem or any problem. I can understand the

1. J.N. Collection.

2. A strike in the textile mills of Bombay which began on 14 August involving most of their work-force was organised by the Socialist-controlled Mill Mazdoor Sabha. The demand was for three months' wages with allowances as bonus instead of two months' wages awarded by the Bombay Industrial Court on 8 July 1950. At the instance of the Millowners' Association, the Bombay Government referred the matter to an appellate tribunal.

3. Nehru declined to address a meeting of the strikers stating that he had no desire to intervene in a matter which had been engaging the attention of the State Government.

4. Jayaprakash wrote that the strike affected the whole country as well as India's foreign trade and it would be "partisan" on Nehru's part to refuse to look personally into this matter. He thought that many millowners would have settled with their employees but for fear of the State Government and the Congress Party.

5. Jayaprakash thought it legalistic of the Bombay Government to recognise only the Rashtriya Mill Mazdoor Sangh controlled by the I.N.T.U.C. as the representative union despite its negligible following. He wrote that a fetish was being made of tribunals and suggested direct negotiations between employers and employees. What was needed was "a psychological approach" to the workers.

strikers in a moment of excitement or frustration taking any action which is not strictly legal. We should not be hard on them. But to encourage them to do so is surely to encourage something which must result in confusion and chaos.

How can a Prime Minister jump into the fray and ignore the laws he is supposed to uphold?

I have no doubt that some employers misbehave and have misbehaved, not only in Bombay, but elsewhere. Is it wise to employ tactics which put them in the right and thus cover up their misbehaviour?

I am not referring here to the merits of the dispute about which I cannot form a final opinion without enquiring. But there are certain basic factors which seem to me to override the particular merits.

I understand that Rao Sahib⁶ and Asoka Mehta are likely to see me this evening. I should gladly meet them if they come.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

6. Rao Sahib Patwardhan.

2. The Bombay Mills Dispute¹

Two main issues are involved in the strike, namely, the question of bonus and the recognition of a particular union. The question of bonus has been referred to a judicial tribunal in accordance with law and the Government are expecting daily the findings of the tribunal. I do not know how the Government can intervene when the matter is being considered by a judicial tribunal.

I might mention that although the matter is before the tribunal nothing comes in the way of the employers and employees talking to each other at any time. What has been suggested is that the Government should initiate such talks.² It is embarrassing for the Government to do so, since the matter is referred to the tribunal. The Bombay Government are perfectly agreeable to any talk taking place at any time. In fact, they welcome mutual agreement any time, but they cannot bypass

1. Remarks at a press conference, New Delhi, 30 September 1950. From the *National Herald* and *The Sunday Statesman*, 1 October 1950, and File No. 43(102)/50-PMS. For other parts of the press conference, see *post*, pp. 148-150, 243-247 and 405-407.

2. At his meeting with Nehru on 22 September, Asoka Mehta suggested that the Prime Minister should use his good offices to bring the representatives of the millowners and the workers together to discuss the bonus question.

the law, especially when in a few days the decision of the tribunal will be available.³

As regards the second point, namely, the recognition of a particular union or opportunities to be given to it in its representative character,⁴ there is a specific law in Bombay which lays down that only those unions which could show that their membership includes certain percentage of the total workers would be recognised. The Government do not come in the picture at all. The registrar appointed for the purpose, after going through the books, recognises the unions. The registrar came to a decision that I.N.T.U.C. was a more representative union as it had a membership of 40,000. Therefore, it was recognised as such.

It is open at any time today for any other union to go to the registrar and say that it has a larger membership than the other union. If it fulfils the conditions, as far as membership is concerned, the result will follow automatically without the intervention of the Government. The normal procedure is perfectly easy enough for any union to prove its representative character to the registrar and unless the law is changed, it is difficult, again, for the Government to bypass their own law.

It is said that there has been a large number of people, about 200,000 or so, on strike. It shows that the people behind the strike have considerable influence. In Bombay out of 220,000 textile workers, the so-called representative union⁵ has a membership of 40,000 or a little more, the Socialist 15,000 and the Communist 13,000. The rest of the workers are not organised properly. For strikes, it will be easy to influence them. The real influence of the union depends upon how effectively it can ask the workers not to strike.

Any union which proves its membership before the registrar would be recognised as the representative union of the industry. I am quite sure that the Bombay Government are prepared to give every facility to any union to satisfy the terms. I am also sure that the Bombay Government would be prepared, if necessary, to discuss any change in the law of recognition of unions with the parties concerned. After all, it takes a little time and it is very difficult in the middle of a strike to change laws like this which cannot also have possible immediate effect.

It is no use blaming a large number of workers for doing something that is some time wrong—they may do it under stress of circumstances and I will not blame them. Our policy should be to have a peaceful settlement which does not leave behind trails of bitterness.⁶

3. On 9 October 1950, the Labour Appellate Tribunal unanimously upheld the award of the Bombay Industrial Court.

4. The Mill Mazdoor Sabha claimed a majority among the mill workers as its followers, but as it was not officially recognised it was not allowed to appear before the Industrial Court giving an award on the bonus issue. The Sabha kept away from all further negotiations.

5. The Rashtriya Mill Mazdoor Sangh. It was opposed to the strike.

6. The strike was called off with effect from 16 October 1950, and a resolution adopted at a rally of workers expressed the hope that the workers' demands would now be examined.

If the Government function in such a way today which would lead to their putting an end to the structure of tribunal and other means of settlement the Government will be completely at the mercy of those people who only think of entering conflict to get decisions. The Government are trying to get out of this situation. The Government, on the other hand, will encourage workers to form trade unions, to have collective bargaining and arbitration and, ultimately, the right to strike. It should be exercised only after the preliminary things, like negotiation, reference to tribunal, etc., are fulfilled. It would be a dangerous thing if the Government, under the stress of circumstances, swept away all this laboriously built-up structure of tribunal, etc.

3. To Jagjivan Ram¹

New Delhi

October 17, 1950

My dear Jagjivan Ram,²

Basawan Singh³ and certain others saw me on the 15th regarding the strike in the State collieries in Bokaro, etc., since the 16th September.⁴ They also handed over to me the enclosed memorandum.

It appears that the labourers in the State collieries had for a long time been in receipt of special concessions in regard to the supply of rations. This, to a certain extent, compensated them for comparatively lower earnings as compared to the private collieries. In any case, the concession was an appreciable part of their total wages and the normal practice, when wages are to be reduced, is to do so either by an agreement with the labour or after reference to an industrial tribunal. In this case there was no prior reference to an industrial tribunal, nor was agreement of the labour secured. The labour unions unanimously protested against the reduction.

It is true that a uniform practice in regard to payment of wages in collieries is desirable and varying rates between the State and private-owned concerns only cause confusion and trouble. Rationalisation, however, should be brought about in such a manner as to cause the minimum hardship to the persons principally concerned and so far as possible without a conflict.

You have now decided to refer the dispute to an industrial tribunal. Industrial tribunals, however, are judicial bodies and their deliberations take long. It would take a few months for the tribunal to give its award and the Government would take a few more months to take its decision on it. In the meanwhile, labour would

1. File No. 26(102)/50-PMS.

2. Central Minister for Labour.

3. He represented the Koyala Mazdoor Panchayat affiliated to the Hind Mazdoor Sabha.

4. The reduction in certain concessions in ration supplies to workers had led to a strike.

continue to subsist on reduced wages which even during the pre-reduction period were barely sufficient for a precarious existence. The assurance that the tribunal's award if against the Government would be given retrospective effect, which of course should be given, is small comfort to the labourer, who in the meanwhile would have to undergo considerable privation.

In the circumstances, would it not be possible to revert to the old practice, pending decision of the dispute by the industrial tribunal, provided the labourers agree unconditionally to go back to work.⁵ This would be a good gesture and obviate avoidable hardship. Failing this, it may even be possible to devise a middle way whereby pending the consideration of the matter by the tribunal an *ad hoc* concession rate somewhere between the old rate and the new rate might be given.

I would be glad if this matter is expeditiously considered by the Labour and the I. & S. Ministries. I am sending a copy of this letter to Mahtab.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. Jagjivan Ram replied on 20 October that the matter had been referred to a tribunal on condition that the workers rejoined duty prior to the reference and that the old concessions were not restored pending adjudication. He added that the workers had resumed work on 16 October.

4. To Jagjivan Ram¹

New Delhi
October 20, 1950

My dear Jagjivan Ram,

Thank you for your letter of the 20th October.² I appreciate what you have written. Nevertheless, I do not see the justice of taking a step which upsets the practice of many years before a tribunal has decided. I should have thought that a reference to the tribunal should have been made in any case before that step was taken. Secondly, that whatever the tribunal decides for a larger payment, surely this cannot apply to the future only but to the recent past also.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 26(102)/50-PMS.
2. Jagjivan Ram wrote that the Ministry of Industry and Supply had set up a committee on which labour was also represented and this committee had recommended that concessions enjoyed by workers in railway collieries should be brought in line with those in private collieries. The Ministry of Labour had concurred with the recommendations as the workers would not be worse off than those in private collieries in spite of the reduction in concessions.

5. To Hare Krushna Mahtab¹

New Delhi

October 20, 1950

My dear Mahtab,

There was recently a strike in the railway collieries in Bihar or thereabouts, because certain changes were brought about in regard to the concessional supply of foodgrains and other articles. These changes brought about a strike. The strike is now over.

When a practice has long been in vogue of giving certain concessions, I do not understand how they can suddenly be withdrawn without reference to a tribunal. The normal course should be that a reference is made to the tribunal and the old practice continues till the tribunal arrives at a decision. Further that whatever the decision of the tribunal might be, it should have a retrospective effect.

The strike has been withdrawn and it will be a graceful gesture on our part to treat the workers with some generosity. First of all, every step should be taken to expedite the decision of the tribunal. Secondly, it should be clearly understood that their decision will have retrospective effect. Thirdly, I should like you to consider if it is not possible to give them something pending adjudication. This need not be the entire concession as of old, though even that would not have been unfair at all.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 26(102)/50-PMS.

NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION**III. Scientific Research**

1. Glass and Ceramic Research¹

I am happy that another of our great National Research Laboratories is being opened. I am only sorry that I cannot be present on this occasion to convey in person my good wishes to this Laboratory and to those who are going to run it. I should have greatly liked to associate myself with this function and to see this new Laboratory for which a noble building has been put up.

During the last two or three years, we have some achievements to our credit in this country and some lack of achievement also. But I think it may be said with truth that we have laid, during this period, the foundations of scientific research work on a firm basis. If those foundations are built upon properly and in the right spirit, I have no doubt that they will bear rich fruit in India. The modern world depends, to a very great extent, on science and the applications of science. If we are to be a prosperous and progressive nation, it is on science that we have to rely. If we have to solve the problem of liquidating poverty and unemployment, we have to go to science, in its many phases, and seek inspiration from it. To whatever problems we address ourselves, science offers help and is a guide to action. Above all, it is to science and the spirit underlying science that we have to look for a widening of our horizon and to find the way for the solution of the many social and other problems that afflict us.

Thus, every institute of science, every laboratory, every university where science is nurtured, should become a true temple for the search of truth and for the advancement of our people and of humanity.

We have built up great laboratories in Poona and in Delhi.² It is right that another of these national research institutions should be in the great city of Calcutta which has in the past advanced the cause of science so much in India and which has produced so many eminent scientists.

The Central Glass and Ceramic Institute deals essentially with one of the most important applications of science. It will, I hope, play an important role in developing not only the glass industry in India, but many of its ramifications. Above all, I hope that this Laboratory will nurture and spread the spirit of science so that we may grow out of our narrow selves and thus raise ourselves and our country to higher levels of thought and achievement.

I send my greetings to the eminent men of science and of public affairs who have gathered on this auspicious occasion to bless this undertaking.

1. Message sent on the occasion of the opening ceremony of the Central Glass and Ceramic Research Institute at Calcutta on 26 August 1950, New Delhi, 25 August 1950. From the *National Herald*, 27 August 1950.
2. The National Chemical Laboratory and the National Physical Laboratory respectively.

2. To Hare Krushna Mahtab¹

New Delhi
October 10, 1950

My dear Mahtab,

I enclose a note from Bhatnagar² about the proposed Central Rubber Technological Research Institute.

You know that I have been anxious to develop scientific research in this country and we have made great progress in establishing a number of research laboratories. I believe in scientific research. Nevertheless, I feel that we must stop this business of having additional research institutions³ for some time at least. We have far more than we can manage effectively. It is up to us to make them a success. Even now the burden is great, both in finances and technical personnel. I would, therefore, suggest to you not to go ahead with any proposal for the establishment of a new research institute. Sometimes, we are attracted by the fact that some industrialist gives donations towards such research institutes. On examination, however, you will find that their contribution covers only a small part of the expenditure on the scheme. Even in the initial stages, and subsequent running, all expenses fall on Government.⁴

At any time we should be cautious about expansion since we have got so much in hand. At the present moment, with so much stress on economy, we must be doubly cautious and, in fact, we should not do it at all unless there are reasons of the most urgent character.

It seems to me that any rubber research could easily be carried on at present in our National Chemical Laboratory at Poona.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 17(214)/50-PMS.
2. S.S. Bhatnagar, Secretary, Council for Scientific and Industrial Research.
3. Besides the national laboratories at New Delhi, Pune and Calcutta, the Central Fuel Research Institute was established at Dhanbad. Work on the establishment of seven more research laboratories and institutes was in progress.
4. In 1950-51, the Central Government contributed Rs 41.91 million out of a total expenditure of Rs 49.87 million on scientific research.

3. Food Technology¹

I had hoped to be present on the occasion of the opening ceremony of the Central Food Technological Research Institute, Mysore. I am sorry that I am unable to attend this ceremony because of other work, but the fact that Shri C. Rajagopalachari is performing this ceremony shows the importance we attach to scientific and industrial research and to this Institute.

One of the remarkable developments in India, during the last three years, has been the opening of national laboratories and research institutes. We have put up some magnificent laboratories, not only impressive to look at but, I hope, the homes of productive effort and work. It is ultimately on the basis of work done in our research institutes and laboratories that we can progress in most directions. Thus far we have depended on other countries and have merely copied them or taken advantage of something that they have done. We cannot go far with this dependence. We have at least laid good and true foundations for scientific progress. It is for the young scientists of India to take advantage of the great opportunities offered to them and thus help in building up the new India.

During the last few years, we have talked about food more perhaps than anything else. We have given top priority to the production of foodgrains or subsidiary foods. It is obvious that food is of the first importance and its value cannot be judged merely in money terms. We cannot depend on imports for our food and, therefore, we have laid down a target for food sufficiency. This is the 1951-52 session. In spite of all difficulties and disasters, we still adhere to that target and are trying to work up to it. We hope to succeed. It must always be remembered that food production has the highest priority.

How can science help in this? The primary responsibility is of our Department of Agriculture. Science can help in agriculture greatly. It can also help in various other processes. It is more particularly with these other processes that this Institute will be concerned. I hope the work done in this Institute will bear fruit not in developments on paper and in scientific journals, but in terms of human values and in increase of suitable food for our people.

Some time ago, I had the pleasure of accepting from the Government of Mysore the fine building² in which this Institute is lodged. Now it is receiving the blessing of Shri C. Rajagopalachari. I look forward to good work being done there for the benefit of the nation.

1. Message sent on the occasion of the opening ceremony of the Central Food Technological Research Institute at Mysore on 21 October 1950, New Delhi, 16 October 1950. From the *National Herald*, 22 October 1950.
2. During his visit to Mysore on 29 December 1948, Nehru formally accepted on behalf of the Central Government the Cheluvamba Mansion, situated on 160 acres of land, for locating the Institute.

NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION

IV. Health

1. The Importance of Public Health¹

Friends,

Two years ago, I am reminded, I came over to attend, inaugurate or open one such gathering. I have not the least recollection of what I said on that occasion.² I have no doubt that on that occasion we uttered several platitudes, as we always do on such occasions. I have no doubt also that we meant them and that most of us, if not all, tried our best to give effect to such policies and programmes as we decided on. But the fact remains that while we make progress in various directions, somehow the overall view is very, very far from satisfactory. I am not for the moment talking about the activities of Health Ministers but the general activities which go to promote the public good. Whether it has been our fault or the fault of circumstances which were beyond our control, I do not know. Normally speaking, of course, it is not right or justifiable to blame the stars for our own failings.

We are judged by results. A commander in the field of battle is judged by his victory or defeat in the field and the longest and most eloquently written report of his failure is not enough. Historians may consider later on whom the responsibility lay for success or failure but the fact is that the battle has been either won or lost. Therefore the only real test of any report you may write or I may write is victory or what we have achieved. There is also another thing connected with it almost as important, namely, not only what we have achieved but what people think we have achieved. That is important not merely from the publicity or propaganda point of view but because when you have to undertake vast social schemes it is highly important what the people think of them. Because you cannot attain success without people's cooperation. You cannot attain success without raising the morale of the people in that direction. If the people think that you are going ahead or that the country is going ahead, their morale goes up and thereby their capacity to work goes up everywhere. If the people think that we are where we were or worse, their morale goes down, their desire to help goes down, their capacity to work goes down, and this affects you and me and everybody else and all our work suffers. Now, of course, there are many kinds of work, very important work, which do not show immediate results—many kinds of research work which the public cannot judge. In fact, the public may even be rather amused or critical about them, and yet they are highly important and any country must carry on those works of research so that they may yield results in future.

1. Inaugural address at the third conference of the Health Ministers of the Union and State Governments, New Delhi, 31 August 1950. File No. 28(59)/50-PMS.
2. For Nehru's speech at the second conference of Health Ministers, New Delhi, 2 August 1948, see *Selected Works* (Second Series), Vol. 7, pp. 474-475.

Nevertheless, the important thing is the results achieved in the present, and the standing and appreciation of those results. That is to say, the results must have a social bearing. It is not much good from the public point of view if some laboratory could do something which is odd and unique. Of course, it may have some bearing on future results, but generally speaking this question must be looked upon—whatever the aspect may be, whether it is health or any other aspect—from the general point of view of the social well-being and advancement of the people as a whole. I should like to lay stress on that. As you know, more and more stress on this aspect is laid all over the world. In fact, the whole science of medicine, which some hundreds of years ago or even less was largely concerned with what might be called individual treatment, has changed its outlook. Of course, there is still that aspect of individual treatment, but that is a very minor aspect of the problem, and certainly from the State's point of view it is infinitely less important than other aspects of importance—public health, sanitation, hygiene. The whole conception of health and medical treatment has changed in the last few generations. And because that conception has changed and people have looked more towards public health and not towards the private health of individuals, there has been a tremendous improvement not only in public health but also in the private health which follows. If you pursue private health you will have individual health here and there but generally speaking it does not do much good.


Now, public health is—I am repeating something which I said earlier, something that is obvious and trite; nevertheless trite things have to be repeated again and again. Public health depends far more on other factors than just drugs and medicines. It depends primarily, I should say, on enough food to eat. What is the good of your trying to treat a man who is starved or who is under-nourished? He is weak, he cannot resist disease. If you treat him today, he falls sick again because he has not got the wherewithal to live. Public health depends, I suppose, next, on relatively decent living conditions, that is, housing. Housing seems to be more important than all the medicines in the world from the public health point of view, next only to food, partly because of the fundamental idea of changing the environment, of providing environmental hygiene. Not only are its effects physical but they affect the mind too, tremendously.

So, from the health point of view, you branch off into subjects which are not directly concerned with you at all and which yet fundamentally affect health, that is, the question of food and housing. Of course, there are other things too—you might say education comes in—but leave them for the present. I would like to lay stress on food and housing.

Well, we have been talking a great deal about food. In the last two months or so, to our great misfortune we have had to face great calamities. If three months ago I had referred to the food situation of the whole of India, I would have struck a hopeful note. I might have said that in spite of difficulties we have turned the corner, and so on and so forth, and I would have been right in saying it—it would



AT THE CENTRAL DRUG RESEARCH INSTITUTE, LUCKNOW, 3 OCTOBER 1950



AT THE BIRBAL SAHNI PALAEOBOTANICAL INSTITUTE, LUCKNOW, 3 OCTOBER 1950

not have been wishful thinking. And I think that the good that we have done in regard to the Grow-More-Food and other schemes, in spite of a great deal of waste, is a basic and substantial good which will endure and which will pay us dividends in the years to come. So if I had said three months ago that the food situation was satisfactory and we had turned the corner, I think I would have been more or less right.

And yet, today we have to face a difficult situation for a variety of reasons, chief of them being failure of rains in many parts and tremendous floods in other parts: failure of rains in Madras and floods in Kathiawar, Orissa, Bihar and U.P. There is an amazing succession of these unfortunate calamities. On top of these comes this tremendous earthquake in Assam³ which, the more we learn of it the more we find it of a colossal character, bigger than even the earthquakes we have known. We do not yet know what exactly the damage is. The fact that that area of Upper Assam is relatively thinly populated and is not a so-called developed area, is the reason why the loss in human life and property is not so great as it might have been in a more populated region, but still it is heavy. And apart from that actual damage, we have to face today the problem of people marooned and rivers changing their courses. Hills have disappeared and the whole of Upper Assam has changed. I hope to go there in the course of two or three days.⁴

So, because of all these ravages, we have been put on our trial as a nation, a trial which few occasions, even war, could put a country on. Therefore, we have to realise in all its fullness the gravity of this problem—not one problem but all these problems that face us; we have to realise the extreme gravity in every way and the sense of urgency that we should have in dealing with it. We have, if I may say so, for the moment lost interest in long-distance schemes which you are going to take up a few years later, as one has to when there is a grave sense of urgency.

Then take this housing problem⁵ which is not quite as important as the food problem but which is, nevertheless, of extreme importance. We were discussing this in our Planning Commission the other day and the result of that discussion was an immediate realisation of the overwhelming character of this problem. The problem, of course, was bad enough, say, ten years ago—very bad. Living conditions, workers' conditions and peasants' conditions were bad. It progressively worsened during war-time, and all that has happened since then—the Partition, then the refugees and displaced persons—has made it a stupendous and overwhelming problem. And yet what exactly are you going to do in your education

3. On 15 August. See *post*, Section 4.

4. Nehru visited Assam from 4 to 7 September 1950.

5. According to the 1951 Census, for 660 lakh households there were only 643 lakh houses leaving a shortfall of 17 lakh houses. Migration of labour to industrial centres during the Second World War and the large influx of displaced persons due to Partition were mainly responsible for this shortfall.

and health conferences if a person has to live in a gutter, if a child has to live in a gutter? What is the good of your talking of health and education without housing, which is the basic thing. A person should have fair, if not luxurious, sanitary living conditions. You go to cities like Bombay or Calcutta. It makes one despair to see the conditions in which people live there.

Now I have laid stress on two matters, food and housing, which I consider basic to health. These are not normally within your purview and probably your conference will not consider them.

I just referred to the gradual changeover during the last few generations from the idea of individual treatment for disease to the idea of public health. From the Government point of view, this idea is very important. It is gradually being spread more and more and social systems of medicine and treatment are being adopted, something in the nature of what is being done in, say, Britain⁶—the State coming in and taking charge practically of the whole population. In the ultimate analysis, this is not only good in itself but probably cheaper in the end; that is to say, cheaper not in the sense of cost in terms of rupees, annas and pies, but in the sense that if you raise the general health of the nation, the whole mental and physical well-being of the individual and the nation would improve and the money you spend upon it would be well worth it. We must therefore make progress in this direction. All these things cost money and money is just the thing that we lack, and yet, may I tell you that while we lack money and while that is a great drawback, I do not think in the ultimate analysis it is money that comes in the way.

Money does come in the way and delays matters. But it is the human factor that counts more, in my opinion. Even if we had all the money in the world, we cannot obviously, suddenly or in a short time, raise our standard to the standard, say, of the United States. We just cannot do it. Whether it is worthwhile or not is another matter. We just cannot do it all of a sudden; it takes time. And we have to take things as they are. We should like to have money, but for the moment there are things which are infinitely more important than money and I go back again to the human factor, the morale of the individual, his capacity to look at things, to have some objective in view, and looking forward to it and working for it. If you have that in the people, progress will be far more rapid than if you do not have it and have all the money in the world. I want you to remember this. Money is important undoubtedly—in the modern world it certainly is. But infinitely more important is the human factor. Money minus the human factor will not go very far, but human factor minus the money will take you some distance, though not very far. Therefore, we must think always of the human factor and of getting public cooperation and public understanding in the things that we do. It is not perhaps the experts' job. I realise that. I cannot expect each one of you to go into these

6. A national health service was inaugurated in Britain in 1948.

things and approach the public and convert them or make them understand. It is difficult, but I am merely putting to you a certain governmental point of view, because I should like public servants to approach this and other problems. But even experts as you are, if you keep that viewpoint before you, it will help you, I think, and it will help others too.

Now, I find from your agenda that you are going to consider reports of the Indigenous Systems of Medicine Committee,⁷ the Homoeopathic Enquiry Committee,⁸ etc. There has been a considerable amount of argument and discussion on this. I understand that our Health Minister⁹ is going to address you on this subject. I have some inkling of her views, because she has expressed them to me on several occasions, and she feels fairly strongly on this subject. First of all we have to be clear in our minds about the public health aspect of this question which the Government has to consider as being more important than the aspect of individual treatment. Insofar as public health, sanitation and preventive aspects are concerned—I speak subject to correction—I do not know that such attention has been paid by the older systems of medicine to them at all. So, from that point of view, there is a vacuum or something near a vacuum.

If you want to consider anything from the public health aspect, you have to adopt what are called modern methods. Now, what does this word 'modern' mean? A thing that is modern is not necessarily good because it is modern; and a thing that is old is not necessarily bad because it is old. Similarly the converse is also to be considered. A thing that is old is not necessarily good because it is old, and a thing is not necessarily bad because it is modern. Now, if you look back to the development of science and the applications of science and, as a portion of that, the development of the science of medicine, it is a very interesting history. In early days there were various theories in the domain of physics and chemistry, in the domain of medicine, etc., in India, in Arabia, in Europe, in Greece, in Rome, etc., and gradually, step by step, old theories changed as more experience was gathered and new methods were adopted. There were also new methods of understanding, of approach, and ultimately of treatment too. In other words, as you are building, each successive step that you take is building on an old experience. If you adopt

7. The Committee reported in 1948 that there was need to adopt modern scientific methods in the development of indigenous systems of medicine, and recommended the establishment of special research institutions for the systems.
8. The Committee recommended in 1949 legislation providing for supervision and control of homoeopathic educational institutions, hospitals, pharmacies, laboratories, and manufacturing concerns, and registration of practitioners.
9. Amrit Kaur held that modern medicine was "incomparably superior" to the indigenous systems and that organisation of parallel health services based on different systems was a "definitely retrograde" step. She suggested that all future medical practitioners should have a complete course of training in the basic modern medical sciences before they took up training in any other system of medicine.

that method, that approach, then what has been achieved at one time becomes out of date. If you attain perfection, then of course there is no question of building over it. There you stop. I do not know if it is possible to say of any activity in human affairs that is perfect. If a human being becomes perfect, that human being, if I may say so without disrespect, at once attains nirvana and is out of our sphere of action. It is only imperfect people who function in this world. Perfection means a complete solution, a complete balance of everything, and going off into some other sphere.

So it is absurd for us to say that any system, any thought, or any line of activity attains perfection. It would be equally wrong for us to say that any system of medicine, at any time of history, including the present time, has been anywhere near perfection. What Dr Jivraj Mehta¹⁰ or any other eminent doctor would advise his patients to do today, he might not ten years later, on account of a new development. You may strongly recommend something today; something new happens and you revise your opinion. That is the way of advance—having an opinion, accepting all the experience that lies behind you, and adding fresh experience and knowledge to it.

I say that because it is obvious that the old systems of medicine of India, the Ayurvedic¹¹ and Unani¹² systems, have been great systems. There is no doubt about the fact that they are famous systems. In their own day they had quite a large influence not only in our country, but in far-away countries. Harun al-Rashid¹³ sent for Indian physicians to cure him. Our systems went to Arabia and to Europe and influenced the systems of medicine there. So there is no question about the fact that India has a very creditable record in the field of medicine in the past. It does not, however, follow from it that we must imagine that that was the *summum bonum* of the systems of medicine; nor does it follow either that you should ignore it and put it aside as worthless.

What then should our approach be? Obviously, in a sense our approach should be one of trying to profit by past experience and integrate it with the best in other systems. That approach I would, for want of a better word, call the scientific approach, the approach of a knowing mind, an experimental mind, which is prepared to accept anything which factually or theoretically justifies itself, and goes ahead on the basis of it, so long as it justifies itself. When something else justifies itself, that mind would take that. That is the scientific approach. In theory at least what is called modern medicine is based on that scientific approach. I am not prepared to admit that every practitioner of modern medicine practises the scientific approach.

10. Mehta, at this time Minister for Public Works at Bombay, was present at the meeting.
11. The Indian system of medicine set out originally in *Atharvaveda*.
12. The Greco-Arab system of medicine introduced into India in medieval times.
13. (c.764-809); the fifth Abbasid Caliph; his court at Baghdad was a famous centre of art and learning.

I think many of them are very far from scientific in their outlook or in their work. But a scientific approach is essential in whatever domain of life you are functioning. If you do not have that approach, you lose yourself, or you will get stuck up. You won't make progress at all.

I dislike, I may tell you, calling this modern system of medicine as Western system. I think it is a wrong thing to do, because it is as much Eastern as it is Western, because it has grown out of what we have done here and what the Arabs and the Greeks have done in their countries. So, to call it Western is just giving credit to others and not giving ourselves credit for something that we did. It is just like some people calling the modern system of numbers Arabic. As a matter of fact in Arabia they are called Indian figures. The invention of the zero and the decimal system two thousand years ago is one of the most amazing instances of the Indian genius. It is one of the greatest discoveries of any time. And to call it a Western or Arabic system seems to be absurd and wrong. So also to call modern system of medicine as Western is completely wrong. Certainly, the West had a great share, and a dominant share too, during the recent past. But the whole thing is based on generations of experience of India, Arabia and other countries. It is this concentrated experience that is known as modern medicine.

Now, there is no doubt at all that Ayurvedic and Unani systems have excellent remedies. There can be no difficulty whatever in the integration of all the old and tried remedies of Ayurvedic and Unani systems with any other system. It is fairly easy and in fact, as you know, many of them have been integrated in that way. The difficulty arises not in integrating the various remedies, but it is a little more basic and fundamental. And that again takes me back to this scientific approach.

I believe that an Ayurvedic physician thinks and talks in terms—you will forgive me if I am wrong—of *pitta*, *vayu* and *kuff*.¹⁴ I am no scientist and I do not wish to go into this matter; but undoubtedly that basic line of reasoning is opposed to what might be called the basic line of reasoning of modern science. Mind you, the *pitta*, *vayu* and *kuff* approach is very similar to the one that prevailed in Europe. It is not a speciality of India. Maybe those ideas went from India. Everywhere they had that particular type of approach in the Middle Ages. Gradually by experience and experiment they evolved different approaches which seemed to them to fit in more with the realities of the case. So, we have to decide very clearly whether the approach is going to be the *pitta*, *vayu* and *kuff* one, or any other.

Then again there is this question that many people of India practise some kind of medicine, whatever they might like to call it, including homoeopathy, electro-homoeopathy and others. There may be nothing against them; they may be very good. But anybody can put up a board and practise without any knowledge of medicine, or even in that particular type of medicine. That is an extraordinary thing.

14. Bile, wind and phlegm, the physiological humours whose harmonious presence in the human system is considered in Ayurveda as essential for good health.

It is a dangerous thing which we should forbid. There must be certain standards which people must reach before they can experiment with human life.

The conclusion I arrive at is this. First of all, modern system of medicine deals with many aspects of public and private health, surgery, etc., which are practised by other systems, and we have to keep them. Secondly, the approach to any system must be on scientific lines. Our approach must be as friendly as possible, as respectful as possible, but also as critical as possible. We should imbibe and accept all knowledge that we have got and profit by it in regard to medicines, etc. But so far as the basic approach is concerned I cannot see how we can combine the two approaches, the modern treatment of disease and the older one which prevailed in the Middle Ages in Europe, in Asia, in India, and which is to some extent represented by the background of Ayurveda and Unani, that is, the *pitta*, *vayu* and *kuff* approach to this problem. I do not wish to come in their way. But I would insist that adequate training in modern medicine should be given to every person. I do not mind, after he has got that training, what system he practises. I would like both the Ayurveda practitioner and the Unani practitioner to have this training. If he has got that training and is prepared to abide by that training, he will function more or less rightly. That would apply to homoeopathy too. Indeed, where homoeopaths and the like practitioners are concerned, in a large measure, the training is more or less the same. I believe so—I am not sure. So, that training should be a common background for all. For people to say that a certain system is cheaper than the other serves no purpose, for after all the cheapest thing is to give treatment to a patient at no cost at all.

The modern system of treatment, I believe, lays far more stress not only on preventive health measures but also on more natural treatment, though drugs do come in and have become popular no doubt. But the tendency towards preventive methods and natural treatment is there. Fortunately, although I have many good friends as doctors, they have not experimented on me too much in my life, that is, neither doctors of modern medicine, practitioners of Ayurveda, Unani *hakims*, homoeopaths, nor anybody else dealing with medicine. And I believe that the less of medicine and drugs that one takes the better for any individual. Of course, honestly I cannot rule it out. There must be an occasion when one has to take medicine. But, above all, we must pay greater stress on prevention of disease and on the general raising of public standards of health.

NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION
V. Culture

1. Character, Culture—and the Congress¹

A country's greatness depends on the strength of its national character. It is high national character alone which gives the people inherent strength to face difficulties cheerfully, to work hard to surmount them and to go forward. You should develop a strong character and a sense of responsibility towards your work.

The national character is the backbone of a people. If it is of a high calibre, they will progress despite difficulties. In India, we can face difficulties only when people first understand them, and then intelligently try to work them out. Success or failure is altogether another thing. Even if there is failure at times, a really inspired people, a people with a strong national character, do not flinch before odds or throw up their hands in despair and accept defeat. They carry on a gruelling battle with difficulties and ultimately succeed. In India also we have to impress upon people that an attitude of defeatism or dependence on others will not take us anywhere. The people have to become self-reliant and develop a sense of responsibility to the work before them.

Whatever political system a country follows is of secondary importance. Ultimately the successful working of any system, be it capitalist, socialist or communist, depends on the amount of work put in by the people.

Any policy must have the people's strength to be effectively implemented. But this strength cannot be acquired until the young men in their formative school and collegiate stage take to their work with enthusiasm and learn it well.

India today needs trained people in so many branches of life. The students, therefore, should make the best of the opportunity before them and specialise in their respective subjects. Only then can they fill their place in the life of the country creditably and play their part efficiently.

Often people discuss culture. The other day I heard Mr Purushottamdas Tandon speak on culture at a meeting.² I am in agreement with most of his views on culture. But the most important thing to be clearly understood about culture is its international character. The fundamentals of culture are not confined to the boundaries of one nation, and it is these fundamentals which have more importance. Superficial things about culture should not be stressed, although they also have their place.

1. Address to a gathering of students at the venue of the Congress Session, Nasik, 22 September 1950. From the *National Herald* and *The Hindu*, 23 September 1950.
2. Tandon, in his presidential address to the Congress Session at Nasik on 20 September 1950, said that culture should not be confused with religion and in India there should be one culture and various communities should join hands in giving shape to and developing it. In another speech on the same day, he urged the people to adopt a composite Indian culture and follow the past glorious heritage of India.

Human qualities are respected and honoured in every country. In no country is deceit or fraud respected. In fact, the good qualities of a people are emulated by others. So in India also they should not confuse superficial things about culture with its very fundamentals. Our heritage has a high place in our hearts. We have fully to respect and honour the cultural traditions that have come down to us through the ages. But it would be folly if we stick to what is old, considering it as holy truth. Culture is not static, it is continually changing in every country. If the people do not change their mental attitude to changing times, to new forces, they become backward.

This has been proved in the life of the Western nations. After the Industrial Revolution and with the advent of the machine age, the life of the people changed, their values got a new orientation and all this had its effect on their national culture.

I have no doubt that as the machine age takes deeper roots in India, the life and culture of the people will also change. But this will not mean that the basic, fundamental aspects of their culture will receive a setback. This will continue to remain the same. I will ask you, therefore, not to waste your time and energy in consideration of superficialities of culture.

I was rather puzzled to see the attitude of certain people who forecast that the Congress as an organisation was nearing its end. There was some wild speculation regarding likely rifts in the leadership, or growth of dissentient groups in the Congress. People with an eye on the forthcoming elections even glibly talked that the chances of the Congress retaining its position as the national organisation had become thin.

My thoughts went back to the whole history of the Congress, the mighty organisation built up during the last thirty years, and I smiled at the folly of the detractors of the Congress. These people rather came to conclusions too hurriedly without realising the inherent strength of the Congress. I am prepared to declare here and now that the Congress organisation is very much alive and kicking. It is the mightiest political organisation in the country. In fact, there is no other organisation which can take its place today.

The Congress is not only a political organisation but has become part of the people's life. It may be that it has its ups and downs. Sometimes its strength rises and sometimes it falls, but inherently no permanent weakness can come over it. Even if some mistakes are made, there is no reason to be discouraged. For, after all, in the life of strong and mighty organisations mistakes are often committed. But unlike other small parties, big organisations have the capacity to rectify the mistakes and overcome all difficulties. The whole history of the Congress proves the capacity of Congressmen to acknowledge their mistakes, whenever they are committed, and to work to repair the damage done.

Today also the Congress faces a similar situation, and I am confident that it would rally its forces and triumph in the end. The Nasik Congress should open the eyes of all people to the fact that the Congress is still powerful enough to set its own house in order and meet any challenge.

People should pay serious attention to the resolutions passed at the Nasik Congress. It is not enough just to read and forget them. They have to be worked upon, otherwise they would remain 'paper resolutions' only.

Dispel all fear from your hearts that the Congress has become weak. Remember that even if it receives a momentary setback it has the capacity to meet it and go forward. Congressmen should bear this in mind always and remember that there is not time yet to slacken in their efforts. The future of the Congress is in their hands; they can make or mar it. But I am confident that Congressmen have the capacity today to carry aloft the torch of liberty in the future.

The youth of India today did not have the opportunity to witness the part played by the Congress in the struggle for freedom. Their knowledge of it comes mostly from books. This will make clear to them how the earlier generation carried the torch of liberty and progressed forward. Ultimately men come and go but the country and the cause remain. It is now for the younger generation to prepare themselves to take over this torch, keep it aloft burning and march forward. They should at all times remember only one thing that failures should not daunt them or dampen their enthusiasm.

During the struggle for freedom Congressmen often stumbled and fell, rose up again and continued the march forward. If the people keep the thought of the ideal they have to follow always uppermost in their minds, there is no obstacle which they cannot surmount.

People should rise above all petty considerations of provincialism and parochialism. You should always keep your minds open to learn from the achievements made by the people in countries like the Soviet Union, the United States and Britain. You should emulate the fortitude of the people of Japan and Britain who have, in a determined way, solved their difficulties created by the last war, which had shattered their economies completely.

Your minds are often affected deeply by what happens in Pakistan. You are hurt by the mad propaganda against India carried on in Pakistan. But you should remember that there are people in Pakistan who react to things in the same manner. So here you cannot adopt the practice of propagandists in Pakistan which would surely hurt the people in Pakistan and lead to nowhere.

Our duty is to make the country strong. Our duty is not to abuse others or fling mud at them. That lowers the prestige of a country. Strong nations meet every challenge in a forthright manner without resorting to cheap tactics or letting anger have the better of them.

People should learn the great lesson the inscriptions on Asoka's pillars teach that a man by respecting the religion and culture of others increases the value of one's own. If the religion or culture of others is run down, to that extent the value of one's own religion and culture is lowered.

India has old ties with Indonesia, although her people profess the Muslim faith, and the number of Hindus there is very small. Yet the fact that Indonesia is a Muslim

country does not affect our relationship. So, religion cannot be a barrier to establishing cultural ties with other countries.

The world, especially Asia, is passing through revolutionary times. A great revolution has been effected in China, our neighbour and a vast country, inhabited by forty-five crores of people. You cannot remain unaffected by these changes. Whether you like the Chinese revolution or not, the fact of the matter is that it is very much a reality today and its impact on the world is bound to be significant.

There is often a tendency among people to shout slogans. Slogans have their value but cannot become a substitute for hard, persistent work, which alone can take you forward. When the people were fighting the battle for freedom the issue was a simple one before them—attainment of independence. Now that we are free, the issues are different, requiring quick decisions from day to day. So, people should change their old attitude to things and always be on the alert to face new problems as they come. Also, there is a great need of cooperation between the public and the Government in the tasks ahead.

There was an animated controversy at yesterday's session of the Congress.³ But sufficient attention to the circumstances that necessitated controls was not given by members. Controls become inevitable when there is scarcity of essential commodities. We cannot accept defeat and say that we are incapable of working controls. You cannot plead for giving up controls on the ground that they give rise to corruption and bribery. On the other hand, we have to create the necessary strength in us to work controls satisfactorily. Controls are being splendidly worked in Britain. There is no reason why in India, given the necessary cooperation of the public, the Government cannot remove the drawbacks of controls.

There was an amendment to the resolution on the economic programme moved at the Congress session yesterday. It suggested substitution of the objective of the Welfare State as defined in it by that of a "cooperative commonwealth". There is not much difference between the two. The objective of the welfare State does not conflict with that of the cooperative commonwealth. In fact, it would help to realize it.

In the end, I would urge you all to develop an intellect as sharp as a sword's blade to take quick and right decisions on all problems that might face you in the future. *Jai Hind.*

3. During the debate on economic policy at the Congress Session at Nasik, Tarachand Maheshwari said that Congress and Congressmen had become unpopular and objects of ridicule because of Government's policy of controls. Jagat Narain Lal said that controls were not necessary for planning and Bansilal Loharia characterised Government's policy as that of "grow more, eat less and die early." Seth Achal Singh wanted deletion of provisions regarding controls from the resolution on economic policy. The President declared that the proposed amendments indicated the degree of feeling of the members on the subject and the Government could not everlook these feelings.

2. To Purushottamdas Tandon¹

New Delhi

October 10, 1950

My dear Purushottamdas,

For sometime past I have been wanting to talk to you or to write to you about a subject which has been much in my mind.² You have been speaking frequently about culture, more especially about Indian culture, and you have said that while there may be many religions and they should have perfect freedom, there should be one culture. If a person has a separate culture, he belongs to a different nation, and has no place in India; that culture should not be mixed up with religion; that India had one common culture flowing like a stream from ancient times, enriching itself during the various phases of her history.

I hope I have correctly repeated what you have said. Now all this is very confusing to me and I do not quite know what it means. I am writing to you, therefore, in the hope that you will help me to understand. I may or may not agree with your approach to this question. But I should like to understand exactly what you mean. I have also spoken about culture on many occasions and I may do so again.

I am writing not with any desire to have an argument and not for any publicity. This is only to satisfy my own mind and perhaps clear it up a little.

What is culture? Necessarily, I use the English word, though, in your Hindi speeches, you must use a Hindi word, probably *sanskriti*. I have just looked up *The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary*. This defines culture as "the training and refinement of mind, tastes, and manners; the conditions of being thus trained and defined; the intellectual side of civilisation." Another definition is: "acquainting ourselves with the best that has been known and said in the world."

A third definition, taken from Funk and Wagnall,³ is: "the training, development, or strengthening of the powers, mental or physical, or the condition thus produced; improvement or refinement of mind, morals or tastes; enlightenment or civilisation."

These definitions refer to common features or qualities which may or may not be found in any country. They are not limited by national or territorial boundaries. Obviously you do not refer to these when you talk about Indian culture. You must refer to something that is peculiar to India and which must be a distinguishing feature of an Indian, or else he ceases to be an Indian. That is, you refer to a national culture.

1. J.N. Collection.

2. See *post*, p. 97.

3. Dictionary published by Funk and Wagnall Publishing Company, New York.

I believe it is true that nations, or most of them, have certain distinctive features, more especially ancient nations like India and China. Probably it is a way of life or a way of looking at things. It is a mental approach derived from long tradition and racial experience as well as environment, geography, climate, etc. This includes both the mental climate of a people as well as their physical habits, such as food, clothing, social customs, etc. Language, of course, is an important part of all this, but it is only a part.

In Europe we find a certain basic cultural tradition derived from classical Greece and Rome and then branching off into national cultures, like that of France, England, Germany, Italy, etc. There is a commonness about all these countries and there are also their particular and distinctive features. Normally they talk about European culture because of that strong common foundation. They also talk about French culture.

In olden days when communications between countries were limited, each country developed in its own distinctive way. Ever since there has been a tremendous growth in various forms of communication, a certain uniformity has set in, although there is still a difference in the mental climates of different countries. During the last two hundred years or so, a new development has taken place owing to industrialisation and the coming of the machine age. There is no doubt that this has affected people's lives more than almost anything since the dawn of history. It has not only affected their way of living but also their way of thinking. It is immaterial whether the change is for the good or bad. The important fact is about the change. Hence a culture, basically derived from these technical applications of science, has rapidly spread over large parts of the earth's surface and has produced political and economic changes of great magnitude. It has affected people's external habits greatly, their food, clothing, speech and other forms of external behaviour. If literature or arts are any test, these changes are very remarkable.

In certain countries like the United States of America, there is a very marked standardisation and regimentation of behaviour. This is not due to any laws or compulsion of the State, but to mass education after a certain model and a deliberate social attempt to have this standardisation. In spite of this, the differences in Americans are quite remarkable. They differ in a variety of things, both external and of the mind.

Taking the dictionary meaning of culture, which I think is the correct meaning and represents the development of human personality, the wider and more inclusive our approach, the less exclusive we are, the more of opportunities for cultural growth will come to us. Any form of exclusiveness leads to limitation of mind and therefore limitation of cultural growth.

I am putting down some odd ideas without sequence, in trying to grasp what exactly we mean by this word 'culture' and what we should aim at. India is a vast country. The differences between the extreme south and the extreme north are tremendous in climate, physical environment and, consequently, in the people

themselves. There is also no doubt that there is this tremendous variety, which is the natural growth from circumstances. Are we to suppress this variety in spite of climate and environment or are we to retain it and impose something else on top of it? It might be possible for the United States of America with their high technical development to have a large measure of uniformity. In India, so long as we do not have that technical development, it will be much more difficult.

Culture, I take it, is an inner growth; it cannot be imposed from outside. That inner growth can be influenced greatly, more especially in early childhood, by the environment, by educational processes and by other such like means. But whatever the means adopted, the growth must come from inside. To tell a man to be cultured or to change his culture appears to me to have no meaning. The only thing we can do is to produce conditions which gradually influence him in the direction of changing his cultural outlook.

In India we have a great variety of human beings. This variety is something connected with religion. There are the Parsis, who are a definite unit from every point of view. There are the Jews. There are the Anglo-Indians and there are others. Apart from this, there are Bengalis, Marwaris, Gujaratis, Tamilians, Andhras, Malayalees, Punjabis, etc. Without any attempt at invidious comparison, I would say that a Marwari is different from, let us say, a Punjabi. There is of course a certain national commonness. But the whole mental outlook is likely to be different, apart from physical habits.

What then are we aiming at and what do you mean when you talk about Indian culture, which must be accepted by every Indian? Suppose I want a highly developed industrial civilisation in India. Am I sinning against the ideal of Indian culture and must I cease to be an Indian because of that? A socialist society, again, has a definite cultural background and outlook, which is opposed to what might be called a capitalist society. Do both of these come within the scope of your Indian culture?

Coming to religion (because a religious outlook does influence culture), are we to object to Christians or Jews considering Jerusalem their holy city or Muslims looking with reverence to Mecca, or both being influenced by Christian or Muslim tradition?

These are some odd and disjointed ideas for your consideration. Do not be in a hurry to reply. I know you are busy now. But when you have leisure, do write to me.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

CONGRESS ORGANISATION

I. The Presidential Election

1. To Vijayalakshmi Pandit¹

New Delhi
August 6, 1950

Nan² dear,

I have received two or three letters from you during the last week or two. Meanwhile much has happened and your telegram came the other day. It appears that we have at last shaken up the self-complacency of people in the West. That is some achievement, though it does not go very far. I wrote a frank letter to Attlee some days ago,³ pointing out to him that the policy the U.S.A. and the U.K. were pursuing seemed to lead to nowhere, even if they win in a military sense.

There is some talk here about my attending the next session of the U.N. General Assembly.⁴ Obviously this session is going to be important and perhaps even vital. Personally I am not attracted and Lake Success is not the kind of environment that suits me. On the other hand there is something to be said for my going.

One thing that comes in the way is the annual session of the Congress which is going to be held on the 13th and 14th September.⁵ This means that I am likely to be in Nasik till about the 16th September.⁶ I could of course come immediately after. It is getting difficult to go out of India for any length of time. Things go wrong here in my absence and just at present there is an abundance of such problems. The Congress itself is facing a deep inner crisis. Of course it has had that for a long time past. But with the coming of this annual session and the election of the President,⁷ this crisis has come to a head. Purushottamdas Tandon, Kripalani, Shankarrao Deo and some others are standing for the Presidentship. My name has also been proposed.⁸ But I am going to withdraw. No one who is proposed is capable of dealing with the situation. Some are more or less inoffensive; others may be definitely harmful. Tandon has taken up an increasingly communal and revivalist line. I feel that, with all my affection for him, his election would be definitely harmful. Recently he presided over a refugees conference, which passed

1. J.N. Collection. Extracts.

2. India's Ambassador to the U.S.A. at the time.

3. See *Selected Works* (Second Series), Vol. 14 Part II, pp. 353-356.

4. The fifth session of the General Assembly was due to begin from 19 September.

5. 12 and 13 September had been fixed for the annual session of the Congress at Nasik, but later the Working Committee decided on 20 and 21 September 1950.

6. Nehru in fact reached Nasik on 16 September and returned to Delhi on 23 September 1950.

7. Elections for a new Congress President became due when B. Pattabhi Sitaramayya's term came to an end in 1950.

8. Nomination papers proposing Nehru's name for the Congress Presidentship were filed in Lucknow on 31 July 1950 by seven members of the U.P. Assembly.

fantastic resolutions.⁹ Most of the U.P. Ministers have jointly supported Tandon. Pantji has remained quiet, but of course he supports him. In fact a great campaign is carried on in the U.P. for Tandon's election, for the U.P. has most votes. On the other hand, South India generally objects to it. The election of the Congress President will take place on the 27th of this month....¹⁰

...The Bengal situation is giving us a good deal of trouble. Not that anything special is happening, but even the normal condition is bad. What is worse is the tremendous shouting by people about it. This afternoon there was a meeting of the Congress Party in Parliament to discuss the Bengal situation. I got rather irritated at various speeches that were made and let myself go. I fear I am not much of a politician. However, perhaps my outburst did some good....

With love from
Jawahar

9. The All India Refugees Conference, at its meeting at New Delhi on 29 and 30 July 1950, suggested three alternatives for a permanent solution of the problem of the Bengal refugees: unification of the two Bengals; planned exchange of population with compensation for land assets; and yielding of territory by Pakistan to accommodate the displaced persons. Another resolution demanded substantial effort by the Government to provide shelter and compensation to refugees.
10. In fact, the election took place on 29 August.

2. To Purushottamdas Tandon¹

New Delhi
August 8, 1950

My dear Purushottamdas,

For sometime past I have been greatly troubled about the Congress Presidentship. Naturally we discussed it here amongst some of us. I have a dislike for getting entangled in any elections and normally my only interest would have been that a strong and effective President should be chosen. The Congress is in a bad way and, unless some steps to rejuvenate it are taken, is likely to fade away. As it is, it seems to have lost such inner strength that it possessed and we are concerned chiefly with faction fights and manoeuvring for position and place. It is sad to see this great organisation function in this petty way.

The problem that troubled me, however, was somewhat different. You were one of the candidates for the Presidentship and there were some other old colleagues. Most of these are friends of old standing, you the oldest of them. I need not tell you of my affection for you and my high regard for your integrity. Nevertheless

1. J.N. Collection.

I have been troubled and distressed in mind. It has been our misfortune during the past two or three years or so to have drifted apart to some extent. I am referring not to our infrequent meetings, but rather to the way our minds had been functioning. Probably you think that much that I say or do is wrong. For my part, I have often read your speeches with surprise and distress and have felt that you were encouraging the very forces in India which, I think, are harmful.

We have many major problems in India, but I feel more and more that perhaps the most important of them is how to hold fast to certain basic ideals of the Congress, as it used to be. One of these, which is of supreme importance today, is to fight against communalism. I see this communal spirit growing and spreading in India, together with something that I would call revivalism. I know all that has happened in Pakistan and that this is the reaction to it in India. But that is partly an explanation; it does not help. It has brought out all the intolerance, pettiness and narrow-mindedness in our people and I fear that India can never progress, if we think and function in this way.

Your presiding over the refugees conference recently held in Delhi also distressed me, because that refugees conference gave expression to views, which struck me as excessively intolerant, communal and impractical. We are all interested in helping and rehabilitating the refugees and it may be that we have not done as much as we should have done. But that should not lead us into wrong directions. I think the major issue in this country today, if it is to progress and to remain united, is to solve satisfactorily our own minority problems. Instead of that we become more intolerant towards our minorities and give as our excuse that Pakistan behaves badly. What happens to Pakistan is not my primary concern. But I am most intimately concerned with what happens to India and this progressive decline in some of the basic things of life is distressing.

Unfortunately, you have become, to large numbers of people in India, some kind of a symbol of this communal and revivalist outlook and the question rises in my mind: Is the Congress going that way also? If so, where do I come into the picture, whether it is the Congress or whether it is the Government run by the Congress? Thus this larger question becomes related to my own activities.

I would have gladly welcomed your election to the Congress Presidentship. But when I look at this matter impersonally and from the larger point of view, I feel that this election would mean great encouragement to certain forces in India which I consider harmful. Hence my difficulty and my distress.

Another aspect of this question has been before my mind. Am I to remain silent over all this or should I express my opinion in some way? My first impulse was to remain silent, but the more I have thought of it, the more it has appeared to me that this course of action is not fair to the country or to me or others concerned. We cannot build up our public life in this way and if, later, I have to express my opinion, would not people say that I had no business to remain quiet at an earlier stage? I feel therefore that I should express my opinion in some form or other, before the Congress election takes place.

Some people, without my knowledge, had put forward my name for the Presidentship. I was quite convinced that it would be improper for me to accept this great honour and responsibility so long as I remain Prime Minister. That would have been a gesture only with no real meaning.

I am writing to you today, because I feel I owe it to you to tell you how I feel. In spite of such differences as may creep in our political or other approaches to our major problems, nothing, I hope, will affect our friendship and affection for each other.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

3. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
August 9, 1950

My dear Vallabhbhai,

Thank you for your letter of 9 August about Tandonji and my letter to him.²

Much that you say I agree with entirely. I have known Tandonji not for thirty years but at least fifty years, since I was a small boy, and we have had and still have great deal of affection for each other. We have often differed in public affairs and argued about them. But in view of our paramount objective and aim we pulled together. During the last three years, however, other questions have come to the forefront and our difference has grown. I have had a number of talks with him, though not recently, about various subjects. We know and understand each other thoroughly, and unfortunately we realise that we differ. Partly because of this, I gave up taking any part in U.P. Congress affairs. I have expressed myself very freely in the U.P. Provincial Congress Committee, in provincial conferences in the U.P. and in private workers' gatherings, often when Tandonji was present. He thinks I am wrong and I think that he is taking up a wrong attitude or rather pursuing a wrong policy. His general attitude at the time of the language debates in the

1. J.N. Collection. Also printed in *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50*, Vol. 10, pp. 205-206.
2. Patel wrote that he was deeply distressed by Nehru's letter of 8 August to Tandon who, he considered, held a high and unique position in the U.P. Congress and commanded profound respect throughout India. Tandon had also been "dear and near to you" for the last thirty years.

Constituent Assembly³ distressed me greatly. We opposed each other quite frankly. It was not the language question but the whole approach that mattered.

I was not in India at the time of the last Congress election and took no part in it whatever.⁴ But long before the last election, when I was asked by one or two U.P. friends, who were common friends of Tandonji and myself, I told them that much as I respected Tandonji it would be impossible for me to vote for him because of the policy he was pursuing. In most of his speeches he has condemned the policy of the Congress Government in many ways.

I have no doubt that Tandonji exercised a restraining influence on the refugees conference.⁵ Nevertheless, his presence and presidentship gave a certain importance and prestige to that conference and the decisions of that conference were wholly objectionable. Apart from the other decisions, they have threatened some kind of action after a certain period.⁶

We are up against very difficult problems and the Congress mind is perplexed and is turning towards what I consider a totally wrong direction. That was evident enough in the two-day debate on the Bengal situation in Parliament. That debate turned largely on the refugees conference resolutions. I expressed myself strongly on these issues⁷ because I think this particular approach is fatal for India.

We can hardly allow personal considerations to come in the way of public policies. To me it appears that the most important thing today is to stop this inner rot in the Congress. If that goes on, there is no hope for the Congress and little

3. On 14 September 1949, Tandon criticised sharply Gopalaswami Ayyangar's proposals for continuance of English in the Union Government's work for fifteen years and in the State Governments' work till adoption of Hindi or a provincial language by law and use of English numerals in Devanagari script. Calling the proposals as "palpably retrograde", he commented that they were coloured by the notion that India's freedom was achieved on the strength of the English language and none of the provincial languages including Hindi was sufficiently developed for use in administrative work, and would have the effect of encouraging the use of English in the country.
4. Nehru was in London to attend the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference when Pattabhi Sitaramayya was elected President on 24 October 1948 defeating Purushottamdas Tandon. For Nehru's views on the candidates for the Congress Presidential election of 1948, see *Selected Works* (Second Series), Vol. 7, Section 9.
5. Patel had written that Tandon had sternly put down all utterances disparaging to Nehru and the Congress at the refugees conference and had even threatened to walk out if extreme demands were made. He added that despite the bitterness and disillusionment among the refugees, Tandon was able to moderate their demands.
6. The conference stated that the treatment meted out to minorities in Pakistan called for a radical change in Government's policy. It asked the Government to vastly expand their efforts to solve the problems of the refugees and suggested imposition of a capital levy for the purpose. If the Government did not show substantial results within four months, a standing committee appointed by the conference would be free to adopt such measures as it might deem fit.
7. See *post*, pp. 259-288.

for the country. There can be little doubt that in the public mind Tandonji is associated with this new turn being given to the Congress. Can we remain silent when something that we consider is very wrong is being done? The whole future of the Congress and the country is at stake.

I would very gladly at any time have a frank and friendly talk with Tandonji.⁸ I do not think there is any misunderstanding between him and me as regards any facts. It is about basic policies, and I know from fairly long experience that there is a difference on this issue. I can hardly expect him to change his fundamental outlook, as he is unlikely to change mine. Nevertheless, there is no difficulty whatever in our meeting or discussing matters. I met him the other day in Allahabad. I did not have a separate talk with him of a serious nature. We met with others and I addressed a gathering of workers there when he was present.

I feel that in this crisis in our national affairs we have to give a clear lead to the public. It is not fair for confusion to continue. Respective viewpoints should be put forward as concisely and clearly as possible so that the public mind may function and decide. I do not mind very much, in the ultimate analysis, what the public decides, even though I may not like it. But the public should appreciate the different viewpoints and realise the consequences of any decision it takes.

As I told you, I have to issue some kind of a statement on withdrawal of my candidature. In this statement I have to mention these important matters. I do not see how I can possibly ignore them.

I have drafted a statement⁹ which I am sending you.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

8. Patel suggested that Nehru should have a "heart-to-heart talk" with Tandon for a better appreciation of each other's attitude. He felt that it would be contrary to the relationship between Nehru and Tandon to dispose of this matter by correspondence.
9. See the next item.

4. Withdrawal from the Presidential Contest¹

Some friends, without my knowledge or consent, have put forward my name for the Presidentship of the next session of the Congress. Others, whose opinions I value, have pressed me to accept it. Previous to this it had not struck me as a possibility that I might be Congress President again. In view, however, of the

1. Draft statement sent by Nehru to Vallabhbhai Patel along with his letter of 9 August 1950. J.N. Collection. Also printed in *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50*, Vol. 10, pp. 207-208. This was redrafted and sent to Patel on 11 August 1950. Changes made in the second draft are shown in footnotes. The second draft was issued to the press on 11 August 1950.

complexity of the situation that exists today and the desire of some friends, I gave full thought to this matter. As a result, I am convinced that it would not be proper for me to stand for election so long as I am Prime Minister.

The Congress has somewhat different functions to perform now than in the old days when it was the embodiment of the struggle for the freedom of India. But even so it has great responsibilities to discharge and it is of the utmost consequence that it should retain its faith in its objectives and ideals and that its organisation should be disciplined and capable of undertaking effective work on a large scale. Therefore it is important that the President should be able to devote himself to this heavy and onerous work. I cannot possibly do so. While my time is all taken up in my work as Prime Minister, it would not be fair to the Congress or to me for me to make a gesture and stand for the Presidentship.

All of us whose lives have been intertwined with the Congress for a generation or more, are deeply attached to that great organisation and consider it a high privilege to serve it. All of us are distressed at the weakness that is coming into the Congress from many directions. I have personally, in common with many others, been greatly perturbed at the fading out from people's minds of many of the basic principles for which the Congress has all along stood. If this foundation goes, how long can the superstructure remain, and even if it remains who will profit by it? Therefore it seems to me of the utmost consequence that the old principles of the Congress should continue to guide us and should be clarified and emphasized again.

During the recent debate in Parliament on the Bengal situation I have ventured to lay stress on some of these principles for which the Congress has all along stood. I was surprised that even some Congressmen should have drifted away so far from them and put forward proposals which used to be completely alien to the Congress mind and which, indeed, the Congress had all along opposed in the past.²

I hope the Nasik Congress will undertake the task of clarifying the Congress position and declaring afresh that the old ideals hold and the old approach to political and other problems is still important. There is a sickness in the body and soul of the Congress which even a very large membership cannot heal. It requires an inner treatment and more basic cure.

(Meanwhile, there is the question of the Congress Presidentship. I am not particularly interested in individuals, important as they are. Many of those who are standing for the Presidentship are old and tried comrades for whom I have affection and respect. But)³ in the present crisis in Congress history principles are more important than individuals and I earnestly trust that it is on the basis of these old principles that (our elections and our work will be approached.)⁴

2. In the statement issued to the press on 11 August, this sentence was revised to read as: I was surprised that even some Congressmen should have drifted away far from them and spoken in language which used to be completely alien to the Congress mind.
3. The portion within brackets was omitted in the press statement.
4. The portion within brackets was reframed in the press statement as: all decisions will be taken and the work of the country carried on.

5. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
August 11, 1950

My dear Vallabhbhai,

Thank you for letter of 10 August.²

I fully appreciate what you say. But I hope you will also appreciate my difficulty. I feel that I must give some indication about my own position. It would not be fair to the public and to my colleagues that I should spring a surprise upon them at a later stage. As I have told you, I may find it difficult to continue as a member of the Congress Working Committee or even of Government.

I have thus to balance these two aspects of the question. I tried to do so in the statement I drafted.

It is not my habit to take much interest in elections, or at any rate, to interfere in them. I have kept apart from electioneering, except on the mass scale when I have toured about in favour of Congress candidates. But is it fair on my part to remain quite silent when I feel strongly about a certain issue? There is no question of my condemning Tandonji with or without a hearing. We know each other sufficiently well to understand each other and to agree or disagree, as the case may be. To raise vital issues after a decision on them is not fair or democratic, more especially when certain far-reaching consequences are likely to flow from that election. I have tried to raise these issues as objectively as possible.

I have, however, carefully reconsidered my draft statement and have varied it. I enclose a copy of this new draft, which I am issuing to the press.³

Yours,
Jawaharlal

1. J.N. Collection. Also printed in *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50*, Vol. 10, pp. 209-210.
2. Patel suggested that Nehru should issue only the first two paragraphs of the draft statement. He felt that the informal talks which Nehru was having with Congressmen were bound to be interpreted as against Tandon and that it would be unfair "to condemn him without a hearing." The Nasik Session would be the time to test him when the old principles and ideals would be restated; if he adhered to them he would have to abide by them and act accordingly.
3. See the preceding item.

6. To Kala Venkatarao¹

New Delhi
August 11, 1950

My dear Kala Venkatarao,²

I write to inform you that I wish to withdraw my name from the list of candidates for election to the Presidentship of the Nasik Session of the National Congress.

I am issuing a statement³ to the press on this subject. I enclose a copy of it for your information.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.
2. General Secretary, All India Congress Committee, at the time.
3. See *ante*, pp.94-95.

7. To Purushottamdas Tandon¹

New Delhi
August 13, 1950

Priya Purushottam,

I have just received your letter of August 12th.² Thank you for it. I shall not at present discuss the various matters that you have mentioned in your letter, though sometime or other I should like to talk to you about them or write.³

You will have seen the statement I have issued about the Congress Presidential election. At no time did I intend mentioning your name in it. If by any chance I had mentioned, surely it would not have been in any language except that of affection.⁴

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

1. J.N. Collection.
2. Tandon, in his reply to Nehru's letter of 8 August, invited Nehru to take up the work of rejuvenation of the Congress. Refuting the charges of communalism and revivalism brought against him, he said that he did not consider the Vedas or the Koran as the last word in human thought and had openly advocated Hindu-Muslim marriages. While rejecting dogma, he was in favour of reviving some of the past spiritual values of India. As regards his presiding over the refugees conference, Tandon wrote that he had exercised a restraining influence over the deliberations.
3. See *ante*, pp.83-85.
4. Tandon had assured Nehru that not being elected Congress President due to Nehru's statement would not diminish his personal affection for Nehru.

8. Assessment of the Candidates¹

Jawaharlal Nehru: I am afraid I must take some time to tell you the position. When the question of the Presidential election first came up, there were three names, Kripalani, Shankerrao Deo and Tandon. I frankly felt that I should support Shankerrao Deo. Tandon is an old friend of mine. I have regard for him. I have faith in his integrity. I have known him from the time I was ten years old. If today he came and told me something on a matter of which he had personal knowledge, I would trust him implicitly; but if he told me something about a matter on which he had no personal knowledge, I would hesitate because I do not trust his judgement. Ordinarily, Tandon cannot be considered a communalist but the Partition has so much affected him that it has affected his judgement. What he is saying and doing today is, in my opinion, what will strengthen the communalists in the country. He may not be a communalist but today he has become the symbol of communalism in the present context in the country and I have frankly said that it would not be possible for me to work with him and that I would not be in a Working Committee of which he would be the President. Rajaji told me that my attitude was not correct and that if I felt so, it was my duty to tell the Working Committee so that the Working Committee would know my position correctly. I therefore asked Pattabhi to call a meeting of the members of the Working Committee. He did so. It was not a formal meeting but most of the Working Committee members were there² and I told them what I had in my mind.

G. Ramachandran: Do you still stick to that position?

JN: I do. Then, some of my friends asked me whether my attitude would be as rigid if it was Kripalani and not Tandon. I frankly said 'No'. There are differences between me and Kripalani and if he were elected, I said, I anticipate some trouble. Nevertheless, my attitude to Kripalani was totally different from my attitude to Tandon. In the case of Tandon, if he were elected, it is the very basis of the Congress policy that would be in peril. That would not be so in Kripalani's case. I said, I would not say that if Kripalani were elected, I would not work with him. There may be difficulties but that is a different matter. I thought that there would be no difficulty whatever in Shankerrao's case. Therefore, I did tell friends that I do not object to Shankerrao at all. Then, some days ago, friends including Hare Krushna

1. Record by G. Ramachandran, Joint Secretary, All India Village Industries Association, of a conversation with Nehru, New Delhi, 23 August 1950. J.N. Collection. Extracts.
2. An informal meeting of the members of the Working Committee present in Delhi was held towards the end of July 1950.

Mahtab came to me and said that the position had altered and that Kripalani had larger support in the country. I did not then hesitate to say that in that case Kripalani should be supported. I do not look at the matter personally at all.

GR: Are we not today in a position to know definitely which of the two candidates has a better chance as against Tandon?

JN: That is just what I am saying. It does seem that Kripalani has wider support. But what do people want me to do? I do not want to get mixed up in a personal way in this matter at all....

I have made it quite clear that I am not taking a personal attitude in regard to Kripalani. He too is so angry in relation to the problem of the refugees that his criticisms are sometimes not constructive. Rajaji showed me some of the articles in the *Vigil* which have appeared recently. I know they are not his articles; but they have appeared in the *Vigil*. One was about the speech Syama Prasad Mookerji made in Parliament and *Vigil* seems to greatly approve of it. But all this does not bother me.

GR: Do you think Kripalani will bend before capitalist or communal influence?

JN: I do not think so. I do agree that if Kripalani has larger support in the country we should strengthen him....

9. To Awadheshwar Prasad Sinha¹

New Delhi
August 23, 1950

My dear Awadheshwar,²

Your letter of the 23rd.³ I have no desire to enter into this controversy about the Congress Presidential election. I have tried for many years to keep out of Congress election controversies. They do not interest me and I find the whole atmosphere surrounding them not to my liking.

1. J.N. Collection.
2. (1907-1989); participated in the struggle for freedom, Harijan uplift and temple entry movements; Member, Congress Socialist Party, 1934-48; Member, A.I.C.C., since 1935; Secretary, Bihar Kisan Sabha, 1935-41; President, All India Kisan Sabha, 1941-42; Secretary, Bihar Provincial Congress Committee, 1948-50; Vice-President, Bihar unit of I.N.T.U.C., 1949-51; Member, Lok Sabha, 1952-56.
3. Sinha wrote that he differed with Tandon on about the same lines as Nehru, yet he proposed to vote in his favour for he felt that he was the most disciplined of all the candidates and of unrivalled integrity. He hoped that, if elected, Tandon would get Nehru's cooperation on all vital issues. He added that in case Nehru disagreed with this view he should not keep quiet.

Of course sometimes such elections make a great difference and I may have strong views about them. Nevertheless, I prefer to keep out of it, as far as possible.

I laid stress on some principles in my statement.⁴ I think that one of the most important questions before us and the Congress today is the general attitude of Congress towards the communal question. The communal mentality is spreading in the Congress fast and I am quite sure that if this grows, it will ruin the Congress and the country. So far as I am concerned, I am entirely opposed to it.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. See *ante*, pp. 94-95.

10. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
August 25, 1950

My dear Vallabhbhai,

I am writing to you after some hesitation. I have tried to keep away, as far as I could, from this Congress Presidential election business, although it affected me deeply. I thought that having made my position perfectly clear to some friends and pointed out certain consequences, I had done my duty. A few persons came to me and said that all kinds of rumours were afloat and I should say something more in public. I refused to do so although sometimes I realised that these rumours were not correct and were misleading. To start making corrections would have involved me in interminable argument. If a friend came to me—very few such persons came—I explained briefly what my opinion was. This was firm enough when I spoke frankly to members of the Working Committee. Developments since then have confirmed it and made it perfectly clear to me that if Purushottamdas Tandon is elected, then I have no further place in the Congress executive, and consequently also as Prime Minister. It is not Tandon personally that I object to. But he has become a symbol of something which I consider exceedingly harmful to the Congress and the country. His election thus would have meant, whether consciously done or unthinkingly, support of these very ideas and forces.

On my way back from office late this evening, I dropped in at Rajaji's place. In the course of our conversation he mentioned that you did not think that I would act up to what I had said in the event of Tandon's election. That, in fact, I would adjust myself to the new situation. I was a little surprised to learn this for I had

1. *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50*, Vol. 10, pp. 215-216.

thought that I had made myself perfectly clear. It was this conversation that led me to think that I should write to you so that there might not be any misapprehension left. I am absolutely clear in my mind that, in the event of Tandon's election, I should treat it as a vote of no confidence in me by Congressmen or at any rate by those who vote in the Presidential election. As a result of this, I cannot function in the Congress Working Committee or other executives. As a further consequence, I cannot continue as Prime Minister.

Apart from the logic of this, I am certain that I shall have no heart in holding on to my present position. That would not be fair to myself or to the Congress or the country. There is far too much self-delusion and hypocrisy in our public life. We say one thing and then quietly ignore it and act in a contrary way. We pass fine resolutions and then forget them. I know I am myself guilty of this in common with others. I do not wish to add to this self-delusion and I think I shall be much happier as a free man, not bound by office of any kind.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

11. To V.K. Krishna Menon¹

New Delhi
August 25, 1950

My dear Krishna,

What you wrote to me some time ago and what you write in your letter of the 21st August² is logically perfect. Nevertheless, it just cannot be done, at any rate, as you suggest. Firstly because I am not made that way and you have to accept me as I am and not to try to improve me too much. I am not a political boss and I cannot function as such. I have a considerable influence over masses of people. I can make a difference to an election campaign and so on and so forth. But I cannot run a political machine.

I realise fully, however, the importance of the elections, of the Congress and of the Parliament that emerges from the elections. At the same time the rapidity

1. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, N.M.M.L.

2. Krishna Menon wrote that the Congress Presidential election was important for the survival of India as a democratic country and suggested that Nehru, shedding "personal feelings and sense of embarrassment", should become the President. He added that Nehru could not give up the Prime Ministership, charge of the foreign office and leadership of the Congress "without danger of disintegration or ignominy to the country." The success of the Congress in the forthcoming general elections would be mainly Nehru's contribution and it was essential that the selection of candidates and the campaign were well directed.

with which the Congress is declining is surprising and distressing. It is not declining because of outside pressure. There is no group outside yet which can effectively challenge it. It is declining because of some inner rot. Whether it is past cure or not, I do not know.

It was suggested that I should be Congress President. But I declined that. I did so because I would have been saddled with additional responsibility without power. I am not clear in my mind how I am going to function vis-a-vis Congress during the next few months. A great deal might happen before the elections come off. I have tried my utmost to hurry these general elections and I am continually insisting that they must take place sometime early next year. But I am afraid I shall have to acknowledge defeat. The position now is that with a mighty effort we might have them about May next. But there is so much to be done before that time that the Election Commissioner doubts if we will succeed. If it is not May, then inevitably, it has to be in November because we cannot have it during the rainy season. The fact of the matter is that most people want to have the elections as late as possible.

During the next nine months or more before the elections, a great deal is likely to happen and, for the moment, I can hardly think so far ahead. It is true that it is quite essential that proper persons should be selected as candidates. Our present Parliament is very poor in human material. But then I suppose that it reflects the average in India.

Whether I am Congress President or not will not make too much difference to the elections. What is necessary is that the board controlling the elections should be a proper one. To be Congress President now would mean to invite failure and to be discredited completely a few months later.

But all this is governed by what might happen in the course of the next few weeks. The Congress Presidential election, which is taking place in the course of the next few days, has brought matters to a head. The three candidates are Purushottamdas Tandon, Kripalani and Shankerrao Deo. Not one of them is suitable. Shankerrao Deo is negatively good. Kripalani is cantankerous and frustrated. When he was President last, he did not function well³ and the Congress went down. It was at Gandhiji's suggestion that he had to resign. Tandon has some virtues, but is completely hopeless. He has become tied up with communal and revivalist tendencies and has become a symbol for some of the most reactionary forces in

3. Elected Congress President in November 1946, Kripalani wanted important decisions by the Congress members of the Interim Government and later by the Central Government to be made in consultation with the Working Committee. He recommended economic and other sanctions and, if necessary, use of the army against Pakistan to ensure the safety and honour of the Hindus there and transfer of minorities between the two countries if Pakistan proved obdurate. He warned against following a policy of appeasement of the Muslim League and resigned on 15 November 1947 alleging basic differences with the members of the Central Government and their disregard of him.

India. Right from the beginning I have made it clear to a considerable number of persons that I consider Tandon's election very harmful. I suggested Rajaji at one time. He would not agree. Tandon is being supported fully by Vallabhbhai Patel. This in spite of the fact that I informed him and others that if Tandon is elected, I could not be in the Congress Working Committee and very probably I would resign from the Prime Ministership. Perhaps Sardar Patel thinks that I was not serious enough or that I would adapt myself to new developments. He is mistaken if he thinks so and I have tried to make that clear to him.⁴

The result of all this is that if Tandon comes in there is going to be a big row and many upsets may take place. I have committed myself so far that I cannot possibly continue as I am if Tandon is elected. If I did so, I would be completely helpless and no one would attach much value to me or to what I said or did.

That is the position that has arisen and one has to face it. You may disapprove of what I said or did or of previous happenings. But that is not much good now. We have to consider the future from this present situation. Indeed within a week or so, the result of the Presidential election will be known and other developments will follow.

I could not anyhow submit to many things that had been happening and Tandon's election would be the final blow. Even more so, the manner of his election. That is perfectly clear. But there is another aspect of it. As things are going on, the Congress is heading downhill with speed. It is just possible to patch up and keep going. But then the position would be much worse six months later. It is better, therefore, to face the issue sooner rather than later so as to allow time for some kind of recovery in whatever direction this might be possible. Of course my going out of the Congress Working Committee and even more so my resigning from the Prime Ministership will create a rather dynamic situation here. I do not disappear into thin air and other things will happen. You will no doubt be alarmed at the prospect especially in regard to foreign affairs. There are risks of course. But they have to be faced and there is not much choice now.

There is one thing about which I should like to warn you. Do not be hasty in any action that you might take. Wait a while and see what happens here. It would be unbecoming for you to take a leap if you learn that I have indulged in a jump. There will be plenty of time for you to decide and it would be far better for you to watch developments for some time.

Love,

Yours,
Jawaharlal

4. See *ante*, pp.96 and 100-101.

12. To Asaf Ali¹

New Delhi
August 25, 1950

My dear Asaf Ali,²

I have just received your letter of the 23rd August. Thank you for it. I want to tell you that whatever development might take place here and whatever I might do, you should not rush into any kind of step suddenly. All I want you to do is to take your time and think about it and see how matters develop. Haste would be unbecoming and possibly not very beneficial.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.
2. Governor of Orissa at the time.

13. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
August 26, 1950

My dear Vallabhbhai,

Thank you for your letter of today's date. We have already had a talk about this matter and said much that we had to say.

I think I have made one grave mistake, that is, I should have been more explicit in public about my views. I thought it was enough to be explicit to friends and to members of the Working Committee and to avoid a public argument. I wrote clearly enough to Tandonji. Now the mere fact that I did not say publicly what I felt deeply is an argument against me.

Ever since this matter was discussed, and even before, I was firmly convinced that Tandon should not be Congress President. Further, that if he was elected as such, I could not join the Working Committee. From this followed certain inevitable consequences which would lead to my leaving the Government. I made this perfectly clear repeatedly to you, to Rajaji, to Tandon, to the President² and to members of the Working Committee. I had no doubt about it. If, in spite of this, Tandon is supported and is elected then it seemed to me clear that I was not wanted, or to put it differently, Tandon's election was considered more important than my

1. *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50*, Vol. 10, pp. 216-217.
2. Rajendra Prasad.

remaining in the Working Committee or the Government. That position has crystallised in the Congress mind.

I cannot possibly continue to function as I have done when I receive a public slap on my face and an expression of Congress disapproval of what I stand for. The resolutions that the Nasik Congress passes will no doubt be important but they cannot get over this patent fact. There is no point in my being Prime Minister in these circumstances. I shall be frustrated and disheartened and totally ineffective.

The question of my resigning early or late is a minor matter. The point is that I cannot avoid it. To avoid it is to be false to myself and the Congress.

As it is I feel increasingly incapable of effective work.

I shall not take any step without informing you. I do not wish to act in a hurry. But I have a strong feeling that I have exhausted my utility, for the present at least, for the Congress, and the Government.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

14. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
27/28 August 1950

My dear Vallabhbhai,

I received your letter² this morning or forenoon. I did not answer it immediately. Partly I was engaged, but the real reason was that I wanted to give it as much quiet consideration as I could. I am writing this letter long after midnight.

I do not think it will serve any useful purpose for me to discuss the events of the past two months or more. At no time during these two months and much earlier did I have any doubt in my mind that Tandon's election would be bad for the Congress and the country and should be opposed. Whenever any occasion arose for it, I made this clear. Further, I made it clear that in the particular context of events today his election would affect my position greatly and make it difficult for me to continue in the Working Committee and as Prime Minister. It was with

1. *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50*, Vol. 10, pp. 220-222.

2. Patel wrote on 27 August that he was shocked by Nehru's letter of 25 August for he was left with the impression after his talks and correspondence with Nehru and talks with Rajagopalachari that Nehru would wait for the Nasik Session before taking any decisive step in the event of Tandon's election. He added that while he favoured Tandon, his continuation as President would depend on his ability to adjust himself to the decisions that might be taken at Nasik. Tandon's election itself could not be construed as a defeat of Nehru's policies.

the specific purpose of making this clear that an informal meeting of the Working Committee was called. I spoke to them quite frankly and left no doubt in anyone's mind there.

I am exceedingly sorry that I did not leave a clear impression in your mind. The subject was a delicate one as we had the misfortune to differ and therefore I did not wish to refer to it repeatedly. Having, as I thought, explained my position to you fully, there was no need to do so again and again.

It is true that I agreed to wait till the Nasik Congress, but I did so in a different sense than the one intended by you. For me this only meant postponing the announcement of my decision, not of changing it or waiting for the resolutions of the Congress. My decision was that I could not serve in the Working Committee if Tandon was President. That held whatever the Congress might decide. That decision was taken for two major reasons: that Tandon had pursued during the past two years and was still pursuing a policy which, to my thinking, was utterly wrong and harmful and his election would undoubtedly give an impetus to this policy, and I must dissociate myself completely from it. Secondly, because the election was becoming more and more a clash between varying policies and Tandon became a kind of symbol of one and was as such being supported widely by Hindu Mahasabha and R.S.S. elements. To join the Working Committee for me in these circumstances would be not only some kind of surrender to that policy, however I might explain or limit it, but would also be, in the circumstances, improper and undignified for me.

From this flowed other consequences—whether I could continue as Prime Minister. My idea was—and I explained this to members of the Working Committee—to wait till the Nasik Congress and then inform Tandon (as President) not to include me in the Working Committee. This had nothing to do with the decisions of the Congress, or perhaps it would be more correct to say that it had very little to do with it.

In view, however, of other developments in this unfortunate campaign I began to feel that I should not wait till the Nasik Congress and should make my position clear even earlier. There has been so much confusion and crossing and double-crossing that a clear statement seemed to me called for. That, however, is a minor issue and, if so desired, I can refrain from any action till the Nasik Congress. But I do not see how that action is going to be affected much by the Congress. You mention my later preference for Kripalani.³ I told you exactly what happened. When asked, I clearly gave my preference for Shankerrao. When asked what I

3. Patel wrote that at their talks at Dehra Dun on 5 and 6 July 1950, both had ruled out Kripalani, while Nehru was prepared to accept Shankerrao as a 'lesser evil'. He added that he was not taken into confidence when Nehru recently opted for Kripalani, whom Patel regarded as having played in the past, with reference to the points Nehru held against Tandon, "a more destructive and critical role against you" than Tandon had ever done.

would do if Kripalani got elected, I said that I feared conflict and trouble but I did not look upon Kripalani as a symbol of something which I disliked greatly.

I am sorry I have inflicted a longer letter on you than I had desired. There is no end to arguments. On this issue my mind has been absolutely clear and I only regret that I did not, at an earlier stage, address the public. That was a lapse. But you will appreciate that what restrained me was a feeling of delicacy. It is after all not so much the election that counts but the feeling of my own friends and colleagues in regard to a matter to which I attached great importance. Because of that I feel helpless and incapable of useful or effective actions in the post I hold, whether in the Working Committee or the Government.

I am afraid the joint statement you have suggested⁴ will do little good. It does not represent what I have in mind—indeed, it goes against it to some extent. In any event, it is too late to issue statements now.⁵

Yours,
Jawaharlal

4. Patel wrote of his willingness to issue a joint statement with Nehru to the effect that differences in regard to the merits and suitability of the Presidential candidates were natural but that all of them were bound by the policies and principles of the Congress and would have to conform to any further policy decisions to be taken at Nasik. Any talk of the success of one candidate or the other being a vote of no confidence in any particular person or policy was beside the point.
5. The polling took place on 29 August. Tandon won, securing 1,306 votes against 1,092 votes for Kripalani and 202 votes for Shankarrao Deo.

15. Draft Letter to Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
September 28, 1950

My dear Vallabhbhai,

I have been greatly worried for some time past about certain matters. I have refrained from speaking or writing to you about them, because we have had enough to trouble us. But I feel that I should not delay much longer and should bring these to your notice. Possibly, you have heard about them or, at any rate, know something about them already.

It has been widely stated, and newspapers have referred to it, that undue pressure was brought to bear on certain States' Ministries and others in connection with the Congress Presidential election. Further that officials and the like took part in this business.

1. J.N. Collection. Extracts. The letter was not sent.

More particularly, it is stated that this took place in Rajasthan and Pepsu. Some of the delegates from these two places came to see me at Nasik and complained of this pressure. I was told that people were summoned from Rajasthan and Pepsu and were told that they must vote for Tandonji. Jainarain Vyas, who has been in disfavour for so long, was asked to come and Ghanshyamdas Birla and your Secretary, Shankar, spoke to him on this subject. It is stated, and public reference has been made to this on many occasions, that assurances were given to him about the case against him and about the future composition of the Ministry in Rajasthan.²

It would be perfectly right for you in your personal capacity as a Congress leader to advise people as to what they should do in the Congress election. I cannot say that Birlaji is not entitled to give advice, although in the context of things his advice may be considered to mean something special. But if Shankar spoke about these matters in any way, it was improper. More so if he gave any kind of an assurance about the future. Most people will naturally think that he speaks on your behalf and conveys your wishes. It would be undesirable for a permanent official to interest himself in any way, except distantly, with a Congress election, but to give assurances on behalf of Government makes it peculiarly undesirable. The States Ministry has a very special position and is unlike all other Ministries. It is supposed to have the power to make and unmake Ministries and otherwise to influence events in the States very greatly. Whether Shankar, when he spoke, did so on behalf of the States Ministry or in his personal capacity, I cannot say. But whatever he may have said must have led his hearers to believe that it had your backing or official backing. I have little doubt that you know little about the matter and, perhaps, enthusiasm overran discretion. But the fact remains that this matter of Rajasthan and Pepsu has been widely talked about and references have been made in the public press. From the Congress point of view this is harmful. But, whatever the truth in the reports may be, they bring discredit on the Government also.

I have been greatly troubled about this. Naturally, I hesitated to bring this matter to your notice. But I have come to the conclusion that it would be unfair to you and to me not to do so.

This is a recent occurrence which is in people's minds and is being talked about and written about. But there is a larger and more important question involved....³

2. Patel wrote to Nehru on 25 October that Nehru should decide the best course to dispose of certain criminal and administrative cases pending against Jainarain Vyas and some other ex-Ministers of Jodhpur State. He said that the trend in favour of the non-Ministerial group, which eventually won the Congress organisational elections in Rajasthan, was clearly foreseen when Vyas had met him on 8 June 1950, and added that in the meantime investigations had cleared Vyas of the criminal charges.
3. A portion dealing with the functioning of the States Ministry and not printed here formed part of Nehru's letter of 19 October 1950 to Patel. See *post*, pp.184-186.

CONGRESS ORGANISATION

Then there is the fact that all this tremendous burden, and together with it the other great burden of the Home Ministry, rests on you. Your shoulders are broad enough, but it is inevitable that you cannot have the time or energy to pay special attention to the many important matters that arise. The result is likely to be that much is disposed of without your knowledge or with only a brief reference to you.

I should like you to give thought to these matters so that we can discuss them at a later stage.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

CONGRESS ORGANISATION

II. The Nasik Congress

1. The Need for Clear Objectives¹

The election to the Congress Presidentship has aroused much interest and even excitement among not only Congressmen but others. I was naturally interested in it, for the greater part of my active life has been bound up with the Congress and what happens to the Congress is of the greatest moment to me as to innumerable other persons in India. All kinds of forces, inside and outside the Congress, made this election have a greater significance than it might normally have had. Communal and reactionary forces have openly expressed their joy at the result.

It is thus not a personal or individual matter, but something of high consequence both for the Congress and the country. It has become necessary therefore for the Congress to declare and for every Congressman to know exactly where we stand and what our policies are. National and international affairs demand that the Congress must declare its policy in the clearest language so that there is no room for misunderstanding.

The Nasik Congress has this duty to perform and I am venturing to issue this statement so that delegates may give thought to some matters before we meet together at Nasik.

What are our principal problems? Broadly speaking, they may be placed under three heads: international, economic policy, and communal. In regard to each of these three major aspects of our policy, the Congress has had a definite outlook and approach. Conditions have changed and a great deal has happened in the course of the last three or four years. Do these events necessitate a change in our policies and our general approach to public affairs or do we still adhere to those policies of the Congress on the basis of which we have been working for all these years?

The Congress approach to international affairs was stated in general terms. We have now to deal with them realistically in an explosive situation, full of dangerous possibilities, which changes from day to day. About a month ago I spoke in Parliament at some length on our foreign policy² and we have endeavoured to follow the lines explained at that time. I shall not, therefore, repeat what was said on that occasion. India's burden and responsibility have grown and we have to make fateful decisions from time to time. These decisions should have the backing of a clear mandate from the Congress. I should like, therefore, the Congress to consider the broad lines of this policy which we have declared and pursued and to give its approval. That approval can only be in general terms, for it is not possible to lay down any detailed policy which fits in with a changing, dynamic situation.

1. Statement to the press, New Delhi, 12 September 1950. From the *National Herald*, 13 September 1950.

2. See *post*, pp. 333-360.

Far the most important of our problems is that of economic policy, for on that depends the future of our country. We have, of course, not made great progress in this respect. Our opportunities were limited and we were always struggling against heavy odds. But, whatever the past may have been, we should be clear in our minds as to what our pattern for our future should be.

In following our ideals and giving effect to our policies, we have always to adapt ourselves to the facts of the situation, to our resources, both actual and potential, and to the many complicated factors which are at play in the India of today. But while we so adapt ourselves, we have to keep our objective clear and our approach must be on the general lines laid down by the Congress. I am clearly of opinion that we must aim at what has been given the name of the Welfare State. We cannot allow ourselves to be kept back or diverted from our aim because of vested interests, and must judge every step from the point of view of the good of the masses. Any realistic approach to this problem must be well-planned and this will naturally lead to a planned and more or less controlled economy. We have a high-powered Planning Commission, consisting of able, experienced and earnest men, at work. People have criticised it for not showing quick results, not appreciating the essence of planning and the complexity of the task. Our resources are limited and we cannot plan for something in the near future which we are not in a position to achieve. We should be idealists, but we have to be at the same time in touch with reality. We do not want violent upheavals or sudden changes in the whole structure of our economy, for these will inevitably bring about confusion and suffering in their train and delay our progress, instead of speeding it, for a long time to come.

The way is not easy and nothing can be done by a mere declaration or by some magical method. Only objective thinking and hard work will achieve results. This leads us inevitably, for the present, to a mixed economy which may be progressively changed, leading ultimately to a truly cooperative commonwealth. Whatever our policy, the basis of it is in increasing agricultural and industrial production, which will enable us not only to meet the needs of the present but also give us room for future expansion.

A prosperous peasantry has been a primary aim of the Congress. In order to attain this, the Congress laid down the policy of putting an end to the Jagirdari and Zamindari systems, and all intermediaries in land. This has to be given effect to as speedily as possible. While the land goes to the tiller, we aim at the growth of agricultural cooperatives, which will improve production and give economic freedom to our peasantry.

The third problem I have called communal, though that is much too limited a word. It applies chiefly to what has been called the Hindu-Muslim problem but it includes other religious minorities also. Congress has been opposed to the encouragement of a communal, parochial or other narrow outlook. It has fought communalism on all fronts. During the last thirty years of Congress history, perhaps

there is no other aspect of national affairs to which Congress has attached greater importance. This policy of the Congress has been accepted and declared by Parliament and has been embodied in our Constitution. But it is a patent fact that, ever since the Partition, the spirit of communalism and a certain revivalism have been encouraged in India. Organisations which dared not preach them in earlier years now flaunt them in public and even challenge the very basis of our Constitution. What is still more distressing is the fact that this spirit of communalism and revivalism has gradually invaded the Congress, and sometimes even affects Government policy. The importance of this has been emphasised by the reactions of the communal and revivalist press to the Congress Presidential election. We cannot shut our eyes to these dangerous symptoms.

It may be that this spread of the communal spirit in India is a reaction to the intense communalism of our neighbour country, Pakistan. This may be an explanation of what is happening in India, but is it any justification? In any event, is it wise to let it grow? I hold that this communal approach is bad for the progress of any country in the modern world. I am convinced that it will lead to grave injury to India, not only from the point of view of high ideals and old established policy, but also from any present-day practical test.

Early in August, I spoke in Parliament on the Bengal situation and the Indo-Pakistan Agreement of April 8th, 1950.³ That Agreement was something much more than a set of decisions. It represents a new spirit and new approach which, I venture to say, was in keeping with the traditions of the Congress as well as the needs of today. It embodies a policy which I should like to pursue with all my strength in whatever sphere I may function.

We have, unfortunately, many conflicts and disputes with Pakistan as a legacy of the Partition. I hope that we shall solve them, but whatever they may be, they must be considered on the purely political level and without any intrusion of communalism.

We have repeatedly declared that ours is a secular State. Indeed no modern State which claims to be progressive can be anything but secular. The Government of a country like India, with many religions that have secured great and devoted followings for generations, can never function satisfactorily in the modern age except on a secular basis. If that is so, then this approach should govern all our activities and the State must encourage it in every way. Because of our disputes with Pakistan, I fear that we have often forgotten this and are being infected by the communal slogans and methods of Pakistan. That way lies danger.

We have to treat our minorities in exactly the same way as we treat the majority. Indeed, mere fair treatment is not enough; we have to make them feel that they are so treated. We want, quite rightly, Pakistan to do this and our complaint is

3. See *post*, pp. 259-288.

that Pakistan has not done so. Whatever Pakistan may or may not do, it is our duty to function with the strictest impartiality as between various communal or religious groups in India and give them absolutely equal opportunities for progress. We have to make allowances for fear and suspicion and to remember that the responsibility for this lies always far more on the majority than on the minority.

In view of the prevailing confusion and the threat of false doctrine, it has become essential that the Congress should declare its policy in this matter in the clearest and most unambiguous terms.

There are, of course, many other matters of importance, such as the refugee problem. But that does not raise any question of policy, though opinions may differ as to how to deal with it. It is our duty and responsibility to rehabilitate these unhappy, displaced persons who have suffered so much and because of circumstances utterly beyond their control.

I think much of the evil that has crept into the Congress has been due to the lure of power and the prospect of elections to public bodies. Whenever a Congress election is held, whether it is in a district or a province or on an all-India scale, behind that election looms the shadow of the general elections to come. It is supposed that those who will get into Congress committees now will form election-running and parliamentary boards, will choose candidates and will themselves have a chance of being so chosen. The result of this has been that the Congress organisation has forgotten to do all its proper work and dreams only of the general elections and who should be nominated as a candidate. If we could have separated this election-running and parliamentary activity of the Congress from its basic work, much of the trouble we have had would not have occurred, and the deterioration that has taken place might have been avoided.

I think there is still time to take some steps about this matter. The work of selecting candidates for the general elections can be separated from the normal work of Congress committees. If this is done, I believe that, in spite of prevailing conditions, health may yet return to the Congress.

2. To Vijayalakshmi Pandit¹

New Delhi
September 12, 1950

Nan dear,

Today I issued a statement² to the press which will appear in tomorrow morning's papers. I enclose a copy of it. In another two days' time I shall be going to Bombay and from there to Nasik. The Congress position is a peculiar one.

1. J.N. Collection. Extracts.

2. See the preceding item.

I have little doubt that almost any resolution that I put forward will be accepted. We have got into a habit of passing resolutions to please some people and without attaching much importance to them. Of course, even the passing of resolutions has some value from the public point of view, provided we work up to them.

Among many people who supported Tandon, there is now a feeling that they should do their utmost to please me and to prevent me from taking any further step. Hence their desire to pass resolutions sponsored by me.

But I am quite clear that even if my resolutions are passed, I shall not join the new Working Committee. How far I cooperate with it in the future will depend upon circumstances and its general composition. Later developments will also be governed by events. Congress resolutions may be considered a mandate to the Government. I am not clear therefore at present as to what I am going to do about the Government....

With love from
Jawahar

3. To Vijayalakshmi Pandit¹

New Delhi
September 14, 1950

Nan dear,

I am writing this letter on the eve of my departure for Nasik. Early tomorrow morning I am going to Bombay. From there I shall proceed to Nasik. There is considerable excitement about this Nasik Session of the Congress. I suppose it is important in many ways, not only national but in a sense personal to me. Oddly enough, I am not excited at all. This is partly due, I suppose, to my being engaged in a ceaseless round of work and not having too much time to worry about other matters. Partly to a dulling of the senses which produce excitement. One gets used to this kind of thing when it occurs so frequently.

Anyhow, Nasik is likely to be interesting. I do not think there will be too much excitement. But much depends on Nasik, not so much on the resolutions, although they count, but rather on what is said and whispered away from the platform. Many people have a feeling that the Congress is falling or, at any rate, holds no promise and is now controlled completely more or less by reactionary elements. Therefore they feel like leaving Congress and having a free field for themselves. For some

1. J.N. Collection. Extracts.

time past there have been plenty of purges in the Congress because of some so-called lack of discipline. I am told that about two thousand persons have been purged in the U.P. in the course of the last year or more. This was chiefly on account of local or panchayat elections. In any event, there is no doubt that most Congress Committees are controlled by strong cliques. Also that provincial Governments try to control Congress activities and elections. This is not a good sign....

The new Chinese Ambassador² arrived in Delhi last evening and met me this morning. He had a much bigger welcome at the railway station than any foreign ambassador has had. Indeed, it was a popular welcome and some hundreds of people gathered there, chiefly students. That is the way the wind blows here while Americans are taking up their uncompromising attitude towards the new China. I had a friendly talk with the Ambassador. He brought me two huge vases as a gift from his Foreign Minister.³

The change in relations between India and China during the past few weeks has been rather remarkable. I think this began slowly after my visit to America last year when they realised that I was not exactly anybody's stooge, as they had imagined. Our championing China's cause in the United Nations has gone a long way also. Panikkar⁴ has done a good job and gets on very well with the Chinese Government. I have no doubt that the friendly influence we have exercised on China during the past few months has helped the cause of peace. They listen to us, even though they might not agree, because they feel that our advice is disinterested....

The latest vote of the U.S. in the Security Council on the subject of China's presence when the Manchurian bombing was discussed⁵ has distressed us greatly. It is so completely unreasonable and improper. If this is the U.S. attitude, then I fear they will progressively lose the sympathies of others and gradually isolate themselves....

With love from
Jawahar

2. Yuan Chiang-hsien.
3. Chou En-lai (1898-1976); prominent Chinese communist leader; founded Chinese communist youth group in Paris, 1922; Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of People's China from 1949 till his death.
4. K.M. Panikkar, India's Ambassador to China.
5. On 11 September, a Soviet proposal to invite a Chinese representative when the Security Council discussed the Chinese charge of U.S. bombing, on 27 and 29 August 1950, of strategic locations in China near the Manchurian border could not be adopted, the U.S. voting against it. Earlier the U.S. had admitted that a Chinese airstrip had been bombed by mistake and suggested that a commission comprising one member each from India and Sweden might investigate the incident.

4. Resolution on Foreign Policy¹

The Jaipur Congress, in its resolution on foreign policy,² reaffirmed the principles that had guided the Congress in previous years, and formulated a policy which should be pursued in the new circumstances that had arisen. Since then, India has become a Republic and has, as an independent sovereign nation, continued her association with the Commonwealth of Nations. She has also continued to participate fully in the activities of the United Nations. In furtherance of her aim, she has developed diplomatic contacts and friendly and cooperative relations with a large number of independent nations. She has avoided any entanglement in military or similar alliances which tend to divide the world in rival groups and thus endanger world peace. She has maintained her freedom of action in foreign affairs and in the economic development of the country.

Recent developments in the Far East, leading to war in Korea, have led to an intensification of the international crisis and have brought the prospect of a devastating world war nearer. India, in accordance with her basic policy, associated herself with the United Nations in resistance to aggression. At the same time, she has laboured for peace and for the prevention of the war in the East from spreading beyond Korea.

The Congress approves the policy pursued by the Government of India and is strongly of opinion that every avenue of a peaceful settlement should be explored. While aggression, in any shape or form, has to be resisted, it must be remembered that the aim of the United Nations to which India, in common with other nations, is committed is the maintenance of peace and not the encouragement of any activity which leads to war.

The United Nations was the outcome of the passionate hope of mankind for peace and cooperation among nations and for the avoidance of war. It was the basic feature of this organisation to bring together all countries, howsoever they may differ from each other, on a common platform so that they might develop the habit of cooperation and of settlement of disputes by peaceful methods.

If important nations are excluded from this great world organisation, it loses its distinctive feature, and its significance and power and authority for good are lessened. The Congress is, therefore, of opinion that their great neighbour, China,

1. Resolution drafted by Nehru at Nasik, 16 September 1950. J.N. Collection. Changes made by the Congress Working Committee on 17 September are shown in footnotes. The resolution was passed without amendment at the plenary session on 20 September 1950.
2. See *Selected Works* (Second Series), Vol. 8, pp. 341-342.

should be properly represented in this assembly of the nations of the world so that she may cooperate with the other nations in the maintenance of peace.³

While aggression had to be resisted in Korea, the objective of the United Nations should be clearly stated. That objective must be the establishment of a free and independent and united Korea whose future is to be determined by her own people.

This Congress earnestly hopes that the great nations of the world will not permit [momentary passion or fear]⁴ to endanger the cause of peace for which they all stand, and will not encourage any activities which add to the bitterness and hatred which unhappily fill many people's minds today. The world crisis demands from every country forbearance and restraint, the banishment of fear, and a ceaseless endeavour in search of peace.

3. In the resolution passed by the Working Committee, these two sentences were reframed as follows: If important nations are excluded from this great world organisation, it loses its distinctive feature, and its significance and its power for good is lessened. The Congress is, therefore, of the opinion that its great neighbour, China, should be represented in this assembly of the nations of the world through her present Government, so that she may be in a position to cooperate with the other nations in the maintenance of peace.
4. The words within brackets were replaced by the words 'fear and passion' by the Working Committee.

5. Achievements of India's Foreign Policy¹

Comrades,

There have been several amendments to the resolution. But they hardly touch the core of the problem. For instance, a contrast was made by some speakers between the way the Security Council had treated the Kashmir issue and the way they had jumped into the fray when there was aggression in Korea.² It is a perfectly legitimate argument, but it does not arise in this context.

1. Speech in reply to criticisms of the resolution on foreign policy in the Subjects Committee of the Congress at Nasik, 18 September 1950. From the *National Herald* and *The Hindustan Times*, 19 September 1950.
2. Mahabir Singh said that the U.N. had not only failed to declare the aggressor in Kashmir but had sidetracked the issue. He contrasted this with its "prompt" action against North Korea and said that India should withdraw her support to the U.N. if this state of affairs continued.

Again, reference was made to large-scale bombing of various parts of Korea.³ We are all distressed, and I am distressed by it, but it is very difficult for me to know exactly what has happened, apart from the fact that bombing is taking place. You cannot carry on a war without using the weapons of war but, of course, if there is excess then we should like to stop it.

Suppose, for instance, the atom bomb is used; naturally there will be a big reaction to it because of its tremendous consequences. And large-scale bombing of places where there are no military objectives does strike one as uncalled for, but unless really we know more about it, it is difficult to say anything precisely. Anyway, in a resolution of this kind, that particular subject should not be brought in, because we are dealing with broad issues affecting the world.

One part of the resolution is a general statement on what has been India's foreign policy for the last few years, that is to say, a policy which aims at non-alignment with any group of nations as against another group.

I am glad to say that with no country are our relations what may be called unfriendly. With some they are more friendly than others but that is natural. The Government's policy is the logical outcome of the kind of lead the Congress has given the country not for the last three or four years but for the last twenty years or more. I think we have met with a fair measure of success.

It has been said that India's present policy does not gain her any particular benefit from any one group or party. If we are out for benefits, we can undoubtedly get tremendous benefit by giving up something that we value. We can get tremendous help in money and in other ways if we do not value our independence adequately and sufficiently and are prepared to give up or lessen our independence of action.

India does not wish to tie herself up with any nation or group of nations for reasons which I have explained on a number of occasions. I believe that the country very largely approves of that policy.

The war in Korea is bad enough for Korea and the Far East, but the real danger comes from the fact that the Korean war may spread and perhaps become a third world war. That is a terrible prospect. Perhaps, many people in India do not quite realise the dangers and errors that are likely to accompany such a world war.

India, of course, suffered tremendously on account of the two world wars but those wars were still distant for her. I have no doubt that the Bengal famine was largely a result of what had happened in the last war and the country's economy was broken up by that war. Nevertheless, the fact remains that the people of India have had no personal experience of war. It is a good thing not to have a personal

3. Nathulal Jain asked why India had not protested against the bombing of "peace-loving people" of Korea by the U.S.A. Manchersha Awari said that India could not approve of the bombing of the civilian population in Korea, whether by the U.N. or by the North Koreans.

experience of war but sometimes it is a handicap because one cannot judge what war means.

Today a world war is a terrible thing to contemplate and I have no doubt that whatever the result of that war, the world as we know it will cease to be. It will be a changed world and a world which has been destroyed greatly and which, whatever ultimate way it may go, will be suffering from such terrible under-production and starvation that any kind of progress will be very, very difficult for a generation or two afterwards.

If that is so, surely it is of paramount importance to do what one can to prevent such a war. Nobody thinks or ought to think that India is strong enough in any way to influence world policies to a large extent. Nevertheless, however strong or weak she is, she can play her little part in it and sometimes even a little makes a difference. We are convinced that if a big war comes it will be fatal to the world and, therefore, to us. Ever since the Korean war started we tried our best, as much as we could, to prevent it becoming a world war. I do submit that the policy we have pursued has borne some little fruit.

First of all, I think the great nations as well as others realise that we are moved by a sincere approach to this problem of peace, that it is not a weak policy of fear or some secret intrigue with the other party that makes us function in this way, but for various reasons we function in this particular way with integrity of purpose and sincerity. Therefore, what we say is, at any rate, listened to and, to some extent, respected. Whether it is accepted or not is another matter.

I would also say that to some extent again—I do not wish to exaggerate it—India's attitude has influenced the policies of other countries in the last two months or so and has tended towards restricting this war to Korea. That too is a gain because every day and every week gained is something.

When I was asked two months and a half ago about the possibility of the Korean war spreading, I had said—of course, one could only guess—well, fifty-fifty.⁴ Today, the chances of that war spreading in the near future are far less.

The great majority of the people in every country want peace and do not want war. Yet they get entangled by governmental policy and by fear and suspicion of other countries and so, step by step, they seem to march towards the abyss. In such circumstances what can India do?

I have no doubt that if a time comes when any of the Great Powers decides that war is inevitable, war will come in spite of us and in spite of others. But if they do not decide that, and if they still feel that it may be avoided, war will be avoided and in making them feel that it can be avoided, sometimes we can help.

India has helped a little in that direction. You will remember that we made an appeal to the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States of America

4. Nehru said this at a press conference on 7 July. See *Selected Works* (Second Series), Vol. 14 Part II, pp. 320-341.

about two months ago.⁵ That appeal was nothing new; it was merely a continuation of the diplomatic policy that we have been pursuing for some time past in regard to the new China—the People's Government of China. That appeal was not made as a gesture of appeasement of anybody or in a spirit of bargain about something else. It was a straightforward suggestion made because we felt then, we felt subsequently, and we feel now, that it is of the highest importance from every point of view that this great neighbour of ours, China, should be properly represented in the United Nations. That has nothing to do with our liking or disliking the Government of China at the present moment. It has to do, first of all, with reality. If you ignore such a patent reality, you are likely to go wrong.

At the present moment the representative of China in the Security Council is a representative of the old Government of China which at the present moment does not have even a foothold in the continent or mainland of China—not a scrap of land as far as I know. They exist in the island of Formosa. It does seem to be exceedingly artificial and wrong for the United Nations and for the Security Council to go on calling a representative of that type a representative of China.

I would personally have no great objection at present to the Government of Formosa sitting there in the United Nations. That will create a difficulty but anyhow that will be based on a fact. For the moment they control Formosa. But to call such a person a representative of China is factually wrong and if you base your cause on a falsehood and do something that is wrong, then the subsequent steps you take are also likely to go wrong.

Many great men fathered the United Nations, but perhaps the person most responsible for it was President Roosevelt, a very great man whose aim in the last days of the war was somehow to produce something which would lead to enduring peace and the advance of freedom. He dreamt of this United Nations idea and the basis of that idea was that the great nations should cooperate in it. At that time the three great nations on the Allied side were the U.S.A., the U.K., and the U.S.S.R. There was France also but it was still under German occupation. There was China but part of it was under Japanese occupation. Roosevelt came to the conclusion that it was quite essential for those three countries to pull together in the postwar world. Subsequent history was different and Roosevelt's dream faded out. There is no use going into whose fault it was. Historians will write about it when passions cool down.

But one thing is quite clear: that the whole concept of the United Nations in Roosevelt's mind was that the Great Powers should cooperate and not fight each other. He realised that they were differently constituted, that there was difference in their economic and social systems, but he felt that, in spite of that, they would cooperate amongst themselves.

5. See *Selected Works* (Second Series), Vol. 14 Part II, pp. 347-348.

One of the basic features of the Charter of the United Nations is the power of the veto given to five countries. France and China were brought in at that stage; China was brought in because, I believe, Roosevelt wanted to honour China and Asia and not because China was a big Power.

It is perfectly legitimate for anyone to show how undemocratic and absurd the veto is. Nevertheless, it was put in there because it represented reality, because Great Powers like the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. could hardly be expected to come into an assembly where a number of small countries of Central America or some other parts of the world could just come together and ask the Great Powers to do this or that.

It is a very difficult thing for the great nations to take a risk of that sort and, therefore, the veto became essential in that state of the world. Otherwise, there would be no United Nations at all. So they accepted that as representing a certain unfortunate reality.

But, remember, the veto meant that the United Nations could not or should not try to coerce any of the big Powers, because if they tried to do so by voting strength that Power would veto it. It meant, in other words, that any attempt to coerce a great Power inevitably meant a world war and the idea was to avoid that world war and keep the dispute and conflict on the level of the conference table and not the field of battle.

The United Nations has stumbled along since then and although it has made many mistakes and shown much weakness, it has done a fine job. It is of the highest importance that the United Nations should continue in spite of its mistakes and in spite of stumbling and falling occasionally.

But the United Nations will not continue if the Great Powers go to war with each other or if the Great Powers are pushed out of the United Nations. It may continue but it will not be the idea that lay in the mind of Roosevelt. It will be something else.

If that argument is correct, then it becomes important that a country like China must be properly represented in the United Nations, both from the point of view of fact and the result of the argument I have placed before you and, thirdly, out of consideration for the East, where China is intensely interested. To try to decide any problem in the Far East without China would really show extreme lack of wisdom.

The other day China filed a complaint before the Security Council alleging that an American plane had bombed Manchuria. The United States very rightly offered that she would inquire into it. It was not a big thing by itself, if properly handled, as the bombing, if it had taken place, must have been accidental. When the issue came up before the Security Council, it was stated on behalf of the People's Government of China that their representative should be heard. *Prima facie* it did seem very obvious and very natural that when there was a complaint, the complainant should be heard. And yet, to my intense surprise, some countries did

not consider it so natural that all this kind of thing could proceed not from a proper consideration of the issue but rather from fear and passion, which was very unfortunate.

Some speakers have said that I am anxious to establish Indian Missions all over the world and that I think more of foreign affairs than of domestic and internal affairs. I fully realise that there is enough to be done within the country but in spite of that we have been pushed and dragged into foreign affairs simply because an independent India is a country that cannot keep apart from foreign affairs, whether we like it or not.

We are not a small, petty country. What we say and do inevitably affects the world and if it does not affect it today, it will affect it tomorrow. Other countries want to establish relations with India and India has to do the same. Today there are a number of countries where India is not officially represented but that is because India asked to be excused for the time being. For various reasons, having become independent, it becomes indispensable for India to spread out in this way and for her to be entangled in what is happening at the United Nations and elsewhere. And we get more and more entangled in spite of ourselves and we cannot escape that burden.

Today, particularly in this matter of the Far East, we cannot obviously influence events by our military or economic power, because we have not got either. How then do we influence events? We influence them, strangely enough, by something which is rather potential than actual—the potential resources of India, the potential quality of India—and it so happens, without our wishing it, that many of our neighbouring countries look to us, consult us and are affected by our decisions and advice and so, to some extent, the world looks upon us as representing the centre of Asian feelings.

Some time ago, in Parliament, I ventured to address a gentle admonition to the countries of the West. I said that they often fail to understand the Asian mind, they do not even take the trouble to understand it and their method of approaching Asia very often lacks all subtlety.⁶ That statement attracted a good deal of attention and made people think because they know that what I said was said in all friendliness, not in a spirit of opposition or running down, but really in a spirit of trying to find a way in which they can cooperate together.

I would say in this connection that often enough our people in India, when they talk about the United Kingdom or the U.S.A. or the U.S.S.R., also talk loosely and lack all subtlety. They throw about phrases that they have been using for the last twenty years or more, not appreciating that the world has changed. We talk about British imperialism, American imperialism trying to conquer Korea or Russian imperialism doing this or that.

6. See *post*, pp. 345-347.

I am not out to defend any of these countries. I think I can criticise them in many ways, just as I can criticise my own countrymen, but I do feel that for any responsible organisation to use loose, inaccurate and sometimes incorrect language is wrong. It shows loose thinking or lack of thinking. It shows we are living in the past. I am quite convinced that nobody in the United States wishes to conquer Korea and make it their domain for the simple reason that it will do them a lot of harm, if nothing else. Why are they there? Because they are afraid of something happening. And that applies to every country. Somehow, we are going round and round in a world of fear. There is nothing worse for an individual or nation than fear.

6. Selection of Candidates for General Elections¹

In view of the fact that considerable dissatisfaction has often been expressed at the manner of selection of Congress candidates for election to the Legislatures, and some Congressmen in the Legislatures have sometimes functioned contrary to the declared and well-established Congress policies, it is necessary that great care should be taken in making such selections and suitable machinery for this purpose be devised. Every Congress member of the Legislatures is expected to maintain the high traditions of the Congress in all his public activities and to support and further the policy and programmes of the Congress, more especially as laid down by the resolutions of this Congress. Every candidate for election should undertake to do so and should satisfy those who select him of his capacity to carry out his undertaking. Candidates should be chosen not only for their ability but also, more especially, for their integrity and steadfastness in pursuit of Congress ideals and objectives. Any intrusion of party faction or attempt to further the interests of a particular group in the Congress by means of elections to public bodies is injurious and must be prevented.

1. Note drafted at Nasik for the consideration of the Congress Working Committee, 18 September 1950. J.N. Collection. The Committee discussed the matter and left it for decision by the new Working Committee to be formed by the Congress President.

7. Resolution on Communalism and Indo-Pakistan Relations¹

The Jaipur Congress drew the particular attention of the country to the menace of communalism² and called upon the people to put an end to all communal and separatist tendencies which had already caused grievous injury and which imperilled the hard-won freedom of the country. Anti-national and socially reactionary forces have continued to function and come in the way of India's progress.

The Partition of India caused deep wounds in the political, economic and emotional life of the country. Passions were roused and many difficult problems arose, leading to continuing tension and ill will between India and Pakistan. These problems can only be solved satisfactorily with patience and goodwill, tolerance and firmness, keeping always in view the honour and interests of India. These interests of India, as of Pakistan, require peaceful and cooperative relations between the two countries. This Congress, therefore, commends and approves of the proposal made by the Government of India to the Government of Pakistan for an agreement between the two countries that all disputes should be solved by peaceful methods and without resort to armed conflict. For this reason, among others, the Congress records its approval of the Indo-Pakistan Agreement of April 8, 1950, which represents a peaceful and effective approach to the solution of a very difficult problem and which is in keeping with the traditions and policy of the Congress. It is with this approach and in this spirit that such problems can be most effectively dealt with and can yield enduring results.

Whatever disputes and conflicts may exist now or may arise in future between India and Pakistan they should be considered as political problems between the two countries and should be treated as such.

In no event should the spirit of communalism or the misuse of religion be allowed to mar and distort the consideration of our internal problems. We cannot forsake our own policy in a spirit of retaliation. We have not only to treat our minorities with full justice and fairness, but should make them feel that they are so treated.

This Congress, therefore, declares that it is the basic policy of the nation, as reaffirmed in the Constitution, that India is a democratic State which, while honouring every faith, neither favours nor discriminates against any particular religion or its adherents, and which gives equal rights and freedom of opportunity to all communities and individuals who form the nation.

1. Resolution drafted by Nehru and passed by the Congress Working Committee on 18 September 1950 and at the plenary session on 21 September 1950. From J.N. Collection and the *National Herald*, 19 September 1950.
2. See *Selected Works* (Second Series), Vol. 8, pp. 136-137.

It is the primary duty of every Congressman to carry this great message and to live up to it and to combat every form of communalism or separatism in India.

8. No Compromise on Communalism¹

I have hesitated a little to move this resolution, as a similar resolution was moved at the Jaipur Session two years ago. That might give members the impression that the resolution is of a formal nature and has thus to be passed. This will be a wrong approach, as I consider the resolution a very important and significant one. It is a question that affects the very life of the Congress organisation, its whole texture and ideals.

If I have any right to speak on this question after serving the Congress for the last thirty-five years, I must say that I am ashamed at the way this question has been looked at by Congressmen of late. My whole life has been intimately connected with the Congress and this tendency has greatly pained me. I cannot raise my head before the world because of the narrow parochial tendencies that have crept in the Congress.

This resolution is of vital importance. On it depends the future of us all. The principles underlying the resolution are the very fundamentals and the life-breath of the nation. If the country does not follow the non-communal path, it will be ruined. It is a question of India's future. Whatever happens, we cannot leave the path that Mahatma Gandhi laid down thirty years ago.

This is a principle so vital that over it we might have to shed blood and fight each other. We have to choose the path and take the determined step once for all. I am sure there are people in the Congress who are determined not to deviate from the path and they are determined to uphold these principles here inside the house, in the street outside, and everywhere. There cannot be any compromise on this issue.

Congressmen should search their hearts on this question. You have to take a clear-cut stand on it. You will be duping yourselves and others if you took it lightly and did not understand its true significance in the context of present circumstances.

It is for you to accept or not to accept the resolution. But there should be no vacillation. You should not delude yourselves. You are treading on dangerous ground and every step that you take will determine your future. If it is a wrong step you will certainly fall and perish. There is, therefore, no place for a wavering

1. Speech while moving the resolution on communalism before the Subjects Committee of the Congress at Nasik, 19 September 1950. From the *National Herald*, the *Amrita Bazar Patrika*, and *The Hindu*, 20 September 1950.

stand or for entertaining any doubts about the question. You have to take your stand with eyes open and with full knowledge of the responsibility involved in it.

When I was listening to the speech of Mr Patil, I could see the sarcastic way in which innuendoes were made² about my recent statement.³ I want to tell you that I made that statement with a full sense of responsibility. I must make it clear that the statement was sincere and it came out of the core of my heart. Facts are facts and they cannot be ignored. If you shut your eyes to the realities, you will be deceiving yourselves and millions of your countrymen.

The fact that Congressmen resent criticism clearly shows that a rot has set in within the organisation and it is probably growing everyday. Congressmen may congratulate themselves but what really matters is the opinion of millions of people outside and not what a few people say inside the *pandal*. You cannot shut the mouths of millions of people outside.

I would like to know why the Jaipur Congress should have adopted a lengthy and strongly-worded resolution on the subject of communalism, if Congressmen were really honest and behaved towards the minorities properly. Again, why had the Jaipur Congress found it necessary to adopt a resolution on standards of public conduct,⁴ if Congressmen were really honest and not corrupt? These resolutions were adopted because the evil existed in the Congress and today that evil has by no means disappeared. On the contrary, the situation has further deteriorated.

Congressmen today have to remember that they can leave the path shown to them by Mahatma Gandhi only at the cost of their complete extinction. One fundamental thing which Mahatma Gandhi has taught us is to own up our mistakes. As long ago as 1919, Gandhiji, at the Amritsar Congress, had insisted that the resolution relating to Congressmen owning up their mistakes and rectifying them be given precedence over the one that dealt with the condemnation of the reactionary Rowlatt Act. Today also Congressmen are faced with a similar task of owning up their mistakes.⁵

On this question of communalism you cannot waver. If you want me to lead the Congress, you have to pass this resolution unequivocally, with the least ambiguity in your stand.

India is passing through a delicate time but Congressmen do not seem to realize this fully. At this crucial juncture, you have to meet the challenge of communal reactionary elements both inside and outside the Congress. You may even have

2. Speaking just before Nehru, S.K. Patil stated that admonition of Congressmen by their leaders was often unnecessarily strict and sometimes uncalled for. The Congress was a much better party than any other party and its members were not less moral than others.

3. See *ante*, pp.113-116.

4. On 19 December 1948.

5. Later, S.K. Patil explained that his remarks were with reference not to Nehru's statement, but to a statement of Algurai Shastri on the previous day.

to shed blood in doing so, as there is no middle course to be followed, or a compromise to be made.

You should not let your stand be affected by what is happening in Pakistan. I can tell you much more than what you know about not only the atmosphere in Pakistan but also what your enemies are doing even now in India. But it is a different question altogether.

The fundamental question is what you are doing in India, what your stand is in regard to the communal forces in the country. You have to decide what should be your policy and whether you should bring in religion and considerations of parochial tendencies into politics. You have to think deeply over this matter. As for India's attitude to Pakistan, it is a matter of maintaining relations with another country and one which stands on a different plane altogether.

You must look round and see what is happening in the world. Momentous changes are taking place. You can shut your eyes to these facts only at your peril. Unfortunately, the debate on the resolution on the Congress Constitution has shown that Congressmen have entangled themselves in minor constitutional and technical points and have completely forgotten whither the world is going.

At this critical juncture, the Subjects Committee and the plenary session will have to choose the path. A wrong path at this hour will lead to disaster.

Do not look at the question of communalism through any coloured glasses. Be true to yourselves when you take a stand this way or that. And let it be a final stand, which, once taken, must be followed.

9. Communalism and Pakistan¹

The question of Indo-Pakistan relations cannot be allowed to affect our attitude on communalism, which is an internal matter. Speakers have laid undue stress on this aspect of the question.² Whatever happens in Pakistan will be treated at a political and governmental level.

1. Reply to the debate on the resolution on communalism at the meeting of the Subjects Committee of the Congress, Nasik, 19 September 1950. From the *National Herald*, 20 September 1950.
2. Bhanushankar Yagnik and Hridaya Narayan Chowdhury felt that unless the communal policy of the Pakistan Government was changed, communal forces would continue to receive a fillip in India. Shatrughana Saran Sinha said that the root cause of communalism was the communal policy of Pakistan. Algurai Shastri moved an amendment to delete the paragraph from the resolution approving the Agreement of 8 April 1950 as the way in which Pakistan had behaved on various issues showed that she was not interested in its implementation.

The Government of India are fully alive to their responsibility in this regard and will take every measure necessary to deal with the situation that may arise. They have decided to solve all Indo-Pakistan disputes in a peaceful manner through the well-known international method of negotiations. It is another matter if such negotiations fail. In such circumstances, nations of the world do resort to arms to settle their disputes. That is the last resort, and its consideration does not arise at the moment in regard to the Indo-Pakistan disputes.

It is true that the resolution has two parts—communalism and India-Pakistan relations. It would have been better if they had not been mixed but they overlap and that is why they have to be put together. But that, on no account, should make anybody think that our attitude to communalism will depend on what is done in Pakistan. Our relations with Pakistan are of a political nature—relations with a foreign country. Whether they are good or bad, peaceful or warlike, is altogether a different question.

It is, however, true that what is done in one country has its repercussions in another. The people's sentiments are certainly affected by events that take place, say, in Peking or New York or Pakistan. But no Government can base its policy on the repercussions created by such events.

We cannot let Pakistan dictate to us what policy we should follow. That will be like handing over the reins of power to another Government. For this reason I say that on no account should this question of Indo-Pakistan relations affect our attitude to communalism.

India has never accepted the two-nation theory of the Muslim League. Creation of Pakistan has not affected our attitude in this regard in the least. We cannot call ourselves democratic if we change our stand. If we do so, it will be a dangerous thing. If Pakistan continues to adhere to the communal basis of Government, it will suffer in the long run. It can then never call itself democratic in any sense of the word. But for India it is more dangerous to follow such a policy.

We have deeper roots than Pakistan has in so many respects. We have been following a certain democratic tradition and principles which are diametrically opposed to any sort of communalism. If under the force of circumstances or out of fear we change our ways we will be pulled by different forces, with the result that in following both of them we will exhaust ourselves and get nowhere.

I know that many Congressmen do not consciously let communalism affect their minds. But it seems that indirectly communalism is seeping through into their minds, involuntarily, as it is. Congressmen have to beware of this and not let their minds be poisoned in this manner.

There are several amendments which want deletion of the clause ruling out war for solving Indo-Pakistan disputes. Congressmen obviously take the question of war lightly. There is another amendment that the words "as far as possible" be added to the relevant sentence which says that peaceful methods will be followed

for solving all issues.³ It is self-evident that we will follow these peaceful methods as far as possible.

The diplomatic procedure for solving inter-State disputes is one of negotiation. If this fails, nations resort to mediation and arbitration, failing which they send their disputes sometimes to a tribunal. War is the last resort.

In the present context we have also to see the fact that both India and Pakistan are members of the United Nations. The United Nations Charter completely rules out war for solving inter-State disputes. If we do not follow this principle, it will amount to violating the United Nations Charter to which both countries are committed.

As to the Delhi Pact, no doubt it is true that the Pact has not produced cent per cent results and has not restored full confidence in the people regarding the situation in East Bengal. But it is also true that gradually conditions there are improving. The exodus from East Bengal to West Bengal has fallen considerably as compared to the position before.

The Government have statistics about each and every person who either left West Bengal or entered it by rail, steamer or air. It is of course difficult to keep statistics of those who come on foot. But this is clear that Hindus are returning to East Bengal in a larger number than before. It may be that those who return to East Bengal come back again.⁴ But that in itself is a measure of the success of the Pact that people can return and again come back and bring their belongings too. In this respect both Bengals have benefited. Nobody should think that the Delhi Pact is the last word to stop the exodus from East Bengal. It is the first step and you have to fully appreciate the spirit behind it. That spirit has helped both the minorities in the two Bengals.

It is wrong to rouse passions or shout that the only way to deal with Pakistan is through war. If the resolution says that armed conflict is ruled out for solving Indo-Pakistan disputes, it does not mean that India forfeits all right to defend herself against any attack on her honour or her borders. India is maintaining a huge army and spending crores of rupees which could be spent on other urgent needs of the country.

If conditions are created relating to any question where there is no other way out than war, India will certainly make use of her armed forces. But everybody will admit that war is a dangerous thing, especially in these times when the world is passing through a difficult stage. So all other avenues for solving the issues have to be fully explored before one talks of war.

3. Swami Krishnanand suggested that all disputes between India and Pakistan should be solved by peaceful methods "as far as possible" and sought to delete the words "without resort to armed conflict" in the resolution. He said that all questions could not be solved by peaceful means alone and at a certain stage resort to arms could not be avoided.
4. Narendra Nath Sen said that a large number of refugees trying to return to their homes in East Pakistan were again coming back to India compelled by conditions there.

Loose talk of war gives people in Pakistan a handle to create a scare there against India. That enables people there to start a campaign that India is preparing to attack Pakistan. This does not help the minorities in Pakistan in the least.

The so-called friends of the Hindu minority who shout from housetops that Hindus cannot stay in East Bengal, that they must come over, and that India must go to war against Pakistan, are doing the greatest harm to the minority community. That demoralises the minority and creates a wave of panic. What the Hindu minority needs most is a sense of confidence and a spirit to resist all attempts to be pushed out. They have fought a mighty imperialist Power in the past and have not learnt to flinch before odds. So why should they be made victims of panic now?

It is true that dacoities are still being committed in East Bengal and lawless elements have sometimes the upper hand. But it is mainly due to the inability of the East Bengal Government to maintain law and order because of that Government's inherent weaknesses. The economy of East Bengal which has been uprooted also affects the situation. The Government of India have written to the Pakistan Government over this question but have not yet received any reply.

Another charge levelled against the Government is that of appeasement of Pakistan,⁵ but I can proudly say that whatever mistakes the Indian Government might have made in the past three years, they have never succumbed to odds or flinched before anybody out of fear. This is true of their relations with Pakistan also. At no stage have they adopted an attitude of appeasement towards Pakistan.

The amendment which suggests that "Bharat" be called "Vishal Bharat" in the Hindi resolution may convey an imperialist meaning. It is unnecessary and that is why in English we have retained the term India. On the political side and in international affairs, the word India represents the country. Partition does not affect the country's old status. Burma was cut off from India, but for that reason the name was not changed. So also after Partition we cannot change the name. The country's commitments to others as also the debts others owe it remain.

The old structure has continued and it is, therefore, necessary to retain the name. After all, the name India also has originated here even though it might have been distorted a bit in its pronunciation.

I appeal to you to pass the resolution without dissent.

5. Choithram Gidwani accused the Government of following a policy of appeasement towards Pakistan.

10. Resolution on Economic Policy¹

The economic progress of the country is the most urgent task before the nation in order to advance towards the attainment of the Congress objective. That objective is the establishment of a Welfare State wherein there is economic democracy, a national minimum standard in respect of the essentials of physical and social well-being, a rise in the standard of living of the people, full employment, elimination of exploitation and the progressive narrowing down of disparities in income and wealth so that there may be equality of opportunity to all for self-development and the growth of personality.

Every step towards this goal must be judged from the point of view of the good of the masses and vested interests should not be allowed to divert us from the larger good. Ordered progress will necessarily have to be planned and this implies a planned and more or less controlled economy.

The Congress has repeatedly emphasised the necessity for planning and the Working Committee, in a resolution passed in January 1950, recommended to the Government of India to set up a statutory planning commission. This Congress welcomes the establishment of the Planning Commission by the Government of India.

The Second World War seriously impaired the economic structure and strength of the country and the Partition and the tragic events that followed independence disrupted the country's economic life still further. Progress has thus been greatly hampered by limitations in respect of finance, capital equipment, trained personnel and raw materials. These limitations necessitate a careful husbanding of available resources and the laying down of strict priorities in regard to development schemes. It is of the utmost importance, in existing conditions, that measures should be devised to secure increased production and every factor militating against this aim should be discouraged. Capital formation will have to be increasingly shouldered by the common man and the small savings of large numbers of people will have to be an essential feature of the ways and means of the country's development programmes. As long as there are conditions of scarcity, the need for control on essential articles will continue. Such controls should be effective and must be so worked as to avoid undue inconvenience to the people and eliminate evasions. Anti-social elements, seeking to exploit controls to their advantage, should be drastically dealt with.

1. Resolution drafted by Nehru and passed by the Congress Working Committee at its meeting at Nasik, 19 September 1950. From J.N. Collection and the *National Herald*, 20 September 1950.

Immediate action is necessary more especially in regard to the following matters:

- (1) Basic and essential lines of development such as power and irrigation and prior allocation of available resources for this purpose.
- (2) Early realisation of self-sufficiency in food.
- (3) An adequate supply of essential raw materials for industry.
- (4) An orderly and progressive reduction in the general price level.
- (5) Full and efficient utilisation of installed capacity in industries; reducing costs of production to a reasonable level and, at the same time, providing conditions in which the workers can put forth their best efforts.
- (6) Expansion of opportunities for gainful employment by planned development of village and small-scale industries, on cooperative lines, as far as possible, and on the basis of the highest attainable technical efficiency. Priority should be given in this respect to khadi and the handloom industry.

No system of planned economy can succeed and no large-scale advance is possible unless there is full public cooperation. It is, therefore, necessary to evoke public enthusiasm and harness it for the promotion of nation-building activities to raise the low productivity in industry and agriculture. Efforts should, therefore, be made to utilise the experience, energy, free time and other resources of the people on a voluntary basis and on a nation-wide scale. In any such scheme, Congressmen should give their full and active support.²

2. An amendment moved by Jagjivan Ram suggesting abolition of zamindari, jagirdari and other forms of landlordism as among the objectives of the resolution was incorporated in the resolution by the Subjects Committee of the Congress at Nasik on 20 September. The amended resolution was passed at the plenary session on 21 September 1950.

11. To Vijayalakshmi Pandit¹

Nasik

September 19, 1950

Nan dear,

... I have been in Nasik for four days now. They have been fairly strenuous days and yet, on the whole, I have had a relatively peaceful time. This is a little odd

1. J.N. Collection. Extracts.

because others are greatly excited. We have already passed some resolutions in the Subjects Committee.² Most of them have been framed by me. Probably, therefore, there will not be any particular trouble over resolutions. There is a tendency to please me within limits, and therefore the resolutions have gone through. But that, of course, does not remove the basic difficulty. I shall be here now for three days and then go back to Delhi *via* Bombay. I expect to meet Justice Douglas³ there on my return.

As I have told you, I do not intend to join the new Working Committee. I must say that the new lot of members of the A.I.C.C. are not, repeat not, brilliant. The level of the debate is very low. Some of our U.P. people have played an undistinguished role. There is, of course, our old friend, Shibbanlal Saksena. In spite of his extreme crudeness,⁴ I have some liking for him. He is most irritating, but there is a basic honesty in him. Algurai Shastri has been functioning quite a great deal here and doing so with remarkable stupidity.⁵

I found Nasik quite chilly which was a surprise. There has been a fair amount of rain here.

Talking about rain, the amount of rain we have had in India during the last few weeks is something astounding. There have been floods all over the place. Two days ago, Ahmedabad had 23 inches of rain in as many hours. The normal annual rainfall of Ahmedabad is 23 inches. You can well imagine the state of Ahmedabad at present. All the mud huts, etc., and there were thousands of them, have been washed away.

I have received your letter here with which you enclosed the letter from Stanley Jones to you and the report of his interview with Truman. It is interesting to see various people trying to find some way out of the muddle.⁶ But they appear to

2. From 18 to 19 September 1950, the Subjects Committee of the Congress passed resolutions on foreign policy, foreign possessions in India, the new Congress Constitution and communalism.
3. William O. Douglas (1898-1980); Judge, Supreme Court of the U.S.A., 1939-75; at the time on a visit to India in connection with his planned expedition to the Himalayas in 1951.
4. During the debate on the resolution on foreign policy, Saksena wanted the U.S.A. to be condemned for starting "an imperialist war" in Korea. Earlier, he described the April Agreement with Pakistan as inadequate and called for whatever measures might be necessary to stop forthwith the exodus from East Bengal.
5. Algurai Shastri said that Nehru's speech while moving the resolution on communalism amounted to "coercing the Congress into accepting his standpoint" and charged that Nehru had learnt not to brook any criticism. Referring to Nehru's emphasis on peace with Pakistan, he said that "peace-mongering" had been overstretched and become worse than "war-mongering." Earlier, criticising the proposed changes in the machinery for selecting candidates for elections, he said that the members of the Working Committee were not "angels" who could override provincial parliamentary boards.
6. Vijayalakshmi wrote on 11 September that Einstein, Ralph Bunche, Robert Hutchins and Arthur Compton, whom she had met recently, wished India to be provided an opportunity to mediate in the Korean war.

me to be rather helpless. I do not see what I could do by in some way joining this band. One of the principal questions before the U.N. is that of China's entry. The U.S.A. have evidently taken up a definite attitude of opposition, at any rate, till the November elections⁷ are over. That appears to them an adequate reason. I suppose there is something in it. But then they must realise that other Governments have also to pay regard to public opinion. China is naturally greatly excited. They have some public opinion too, and from every point of view they are more interested in Korea, Formosa, etc., than any other country. And yet the U.S.A. insist on ignoring them. The whole thing appears to me to be fantastic. As I stated in the Subjects Committee yesterday, the most that can be said is that the Government of Formosa is at present represented in the U.N. or the Security Council, and represented as a major Power with a veto.⁸

We have passed a resolution on our foreign policy in which special stress is laid on China's entry into the U.N. I spoke clearly on this subject also. So, we are fully committed to this and there can be no quibbling about it so far as we are concerned. That means that the U.S.A. and India are directly opposing each other on this issue. I am sorry for that, but there is no help for it....

With love from
Jawahar

7. Congressional mid-term elections were due in early November.

8. See *ante*, pp.120-126.

12. China, Pakistan and Communalism¹

The United Nations General Assembly has voted against the Indian move to secure the admission of the People's Republic of China into the United Nations.² But the decision of the U.N. Assembly does not alter realities. Despite the rejection, the People's Government of China continue to function and the State of China is a reality.

1. Speech on the resolution on communalism and Indo-Pakistan relations at the plenary session of the Congress, Nasik, 21 September 1950. From the *National Herald*, and the *Amrita Bazar Patrika*, 22 September 1950.
2. A resolution to this effect moved in the General Assembly on 19 September 1950 by B.N. Rau, Permanent Representative of India at the United Nations, was defeated by 33 votes to 16, with 10 abstentions. Instead the General Assembly adopted a Canadian resolution setting up a committee consisting of seven members, to be nominated by the President and confirmed by the Assembly, to consider the question of Chinese representation and to report back with recommendations. Meantime, Nationalist China was to continue to sit in the Assembly.

Although the United Nations decision rejects India's proposal, it does not take into account the real situation in China. The resolution it adopted is completely divorced from reality. If the United Nations is still dreaming of the old China, which is more or less defunct now, it is shutting its eyes to facts. The new Chinese Government has come into power not by a stroke of chance, but after a long war of thirty years. To say today, when there is not even a single vestige left of the old Kuomintang in China, that the Kuomintang's representative should continue to sit in the United Nations is ignoring facts. Such a decision can never claim to represent reality, and hence it loses the importance that attaches to such decisions.

India suggested to Pakistan, about ten months ago, to solve all disputes between the two countries peacefully, without resort to arms. Pakistan's reply to the suggestion was that India should not approach matters in a round about way, but should specify the disputes and take them up accordingly. India agreed to it and specified the disputes, which include the evacuee property issue, the canal waters dispute, Kashmir and the Bengal question. India also said that if her suggestion was accepted, the atmosphere in the two countries would clear and become conducive to the solution of all disputes.

A month ago, India again drew Pakistan's attention to this suggestion and the answer is awaited.³ If Pakistan accepts this suggestion, it will clearly mean that an agreement between the two countries has been reached and the way opened for peaceful consideration of all questions.

India has decided to adopt the international procedure of negotiation to solve Indo-Pakistan disputes. According to this procedure, States resort to negotiations whenever a dispute arises. If negotiations fail, there is mediation and if even that fails, arbitration is resorted to. Failing agreement such disputes then go up to independent judicial tribunals. That is why we have reiterated this principle of negotiation in the resolution. Similarly, it is urged in another resolution that the evacuee property question be decided by a tribunal on which should be represented experienced judges of both the countries.⁴ These are attempts to solve these disputes peacefully. If they also fail, we will then think of some other method.

Our disputes with Pakistan have to be treated on a different political plane. That is a matter between two independent States. On no account could the attitude of Congressmen or others towards communalism in India depend on what happens in Pakistan. In India, we have been following democratic principles for the last thirty years. These principles cannot be shelved or given a go by just because of certain happenings in Pakistan. That will mean the very negation of democracy.

3. See *post*, pp. 316-317.

4. The resolution on displaced persons passed at the plenary session of the Congress at Nasik on 21 September 1950 stated that if a solution of the evacuee property problem was not arrived at between India and Pakistan in the near future, it should be referred for arbitration to a tribunal consisting of representatives of India and Pakistan of high judicial standing.

Whatever happens in Pakistan, we have to remain firm in our support of democratic principles.

I am not prepared to accept, for a single moment, the theory trotted out by certain sections of Congressmen and others that democracy means that whatever the people feel regarding any matter is to be accepted, and that is the crux of democracy. If injustice is done to minorities in Pakistan, is it a valid reason to adopt a similar attitude here? Even if some people say so, can it be accepted in the name of democracy? If that is called democracy, then I say: to hell with such a democracy. Democratic principles are not a matter of convenience to be treated as suits the whims of anybody.

It is true that people's passions are roused by happenings in Pakistan, but democratic principles cannot be thrown to the winds just because of that. The biggest lesson that Congressmen have learnt is never to compromise their principles. Even if lakhs of people demand subversion of these principles today, Congressmen have to fight them, not once but even a thousand times, if need be.

What has happened to the minds of Congressmen? Do they want today to bow down before what a mob says and compromise their principles? I have not learnt this lesson to bow down before anybody. I do not agree that democracy means that Congressmen should do what the large majority of people ask to be done.

The majority has a right to dictate its terms. If the majority today wants a path to tread which is opposed to the one they have been following all these years, and if this involves compromise of democratic principles, it can do so. If Congressmen also start thinking in those terms, it is open to them to have the government of their choice. But, strictly speaking, this compromise will be opposed to the principles of democracy and will be fought by democratic people whatever the majority says.

Congressmen have to beware of these dangerous tendencies at this difficult period in world history. I am Prime Minister today because you have chosen me. If you want me as Prime Minister you have to follow my lead unequivocally. If you do not want me to remain Prime Minister, you tell me so and I shall go. I will not hesitate; I will not argue. I will go out and fight independently for the ideals of the Congress as I have done all these years.

I am greatly surprised by the way some Congressmen argue this question of democratic principles. The argument that Congress principles have to be compromised for considerations of elections or other organisational matters is a fantastic thing to say. If the Congress compromises its principles, what will remain? The Congress, then, will become nothing but a corpse. I do not need such a corpse. Congressmen today must realise that they will be betraying complete cowardice if they succumbed before any section of people in the interests of getting a few more votes or ensuring their support. During the thirty years of freedom's battle, such ideas have never affected our minds.

Our dream was to make this country a strong and prosperous nation in the world. It was at no time our aim to work for some sort of an independent status and become

a second-rate country. But if democratic principles are compromised today, India cannot become a great country.

In passing the resolution on communalism, which is a very important and significant one, you should fully realise the responsibility that it devolves on you. By merely passing the resolution you cannot achieve anything. What is important is to see that the resolution represents reality. Let Congressmen, therefore, search their hearts and find out whether their minds react to the communal questions in the way laid down in the resolution or otherwise. If their minds react differently, then I must say the resolution will be divorced from reality. So you should pass this resolution with your eyes open, with a full consciousness of the issues involved and implement the resolution to its last word in your daily lives. If, however, you have any doubts in your minds, you reject the resolution. But let not anybody delude himself.

No doubt in the resolution the Hindu-Muslim question has been mixed up with the Indo-Pakistan relations, but it stands on a different footing. The question of communalism is an internal matter and our own direct concern. If it is to depend on what Pakistan does, then it will be tantamount to our surrendering the reins of government to another government. People will only harm themselves if they allow happenings in Pakistan to rouse their passions and let anger have the better of them. You have to look to your own responsibility of how you behave towards the minority. It is ultimately the majority which has to create confidence among the minorities. But the test lies in the minority itself feeling secure. That holds good in the case of the minority in Pakistan also. However strongly the Pakistan Government may stress that the minority there is given equal treatment, ultimately the minority itself has to declare that it feels secure. Unless this declaration is forthcoming, any claim that equal treatment is being given to it by any government will be false.

Therefore, Congressmen should give their full consideration to the resolution before accepting it. You are free to do so. But if you accept it, you should understand the responsibility devolving on you. In that case you cannot let narrow parochial tendencies cloud your vision. Nobody has succeeded in sitting between two stools. So let us not reduce ourselves to this position and fall by devoting lip-service to the resolution on the one hand and letting our minds be affected by communal considerations on the other.

As regards the fear complex in the people, I feel that it is due mainly to the fact that Congressmen have lost that fervour and strength of mind that Mahatma Gandhi created in them. Mahatma Gandhi taught them to face all odds fearlessly. His appeals to nationalism sent a wave of enthusiasm and created in the people courage and determination to face a mighty imperialist Power. We won our freedom without arms. Today, we have a splendid army, navy and air force and yet a sort of fear complex is exhibited by the people. The threat of danger from Pakistan is repeated times without number. But I would like to tell you that the strength

of a nation does not lie in armed might alone, essential though it is, but in the strength of mind of each citizen, his courage and determination to stand by his country and face difficulties. So Congressmen must do their best to revive that old enthusiasm and courage among themselves and the people.

It is this strength of mind of the people which has made the Congress a splendid organisation. Our membership is not large. Today the membership of several trade unions in other countries is much larger than that of the Congress, yet I would say that the inherent strength and power represented in the Congress organisation is unequalled in the world. If the minds of young men are imbued with the same zeal and have the same strength as existed among Congressmen before, no power in the world can subjugate India. The people cannot today say that it is the business only of the army to defend them and they would do nothing to protect their country and themselves.

Fissiparous tendencies will weaken not only the organisation but the country also. By being petty and narrow-minded, we shall not be able to make India a mighty and prosperous country. People have to face reality and not let their fanciful ideas about things determine their actions.

The working of the Indo-Pakistan Pact has not completely satisfied us with regard to the position of the Hindus in East Bengal. But there is no doubt that the Pact has produced certain very healthy results. The position has gradually improved and there are indications today that it will further improve. What may happen tomorrow which may change the whole picture, I cannot say. But the Delhi Pact is not the last word in solving this problem. It is only a beginning made towards a peaceful solution of it.

The alternative to the Pact is war which cannot be treated lightly. In the present circumstances war will prove ruinous both to the victor and the vanquished. Not only will Pakistan suffer terribly in the event of war but India also.

I am pained at the way certain refugee leaders have been creating panic in the minds of the minority in East Bengal by constantly asking them to come over. That has a very harmful effect on the morale of the minority. If their morale is gone, then to that extent troubles will increase.

I appeal to the people to rise above petty considerations of things and consolidate the newly-won freedom. The strength of a country lies in its unity and for that reason it is very important that people should refresh their minds about what Gandhiji taught them. The Congress became a mighty organisation because all sections of the people supported it in the earlier stages, without distinction of caste or creed. When disunity was created in the later stage of the struggle by communal forces, to that extent the strength of the Congress also went down. You have to learn this lesson from our past history and guide your actions in the future in its light.

13. To Chief Ministers¹

New Delhi
September 27, 1950

My dear Chief Minister,

You must have followed with interest the proceedings of the Nasik Session of the Congress. This Session was important in many ways and the resolutions that were passed there deserve particular attention. Some of these resolutions are guides for not only Congress policy, but Governmental policy. Indeed, they are in the nature of mandates.

2. I would specially refer you to two resolutions: one on communalism and Indo-Pakistan relations and the other on economic policy. These two related to our day to day problems, which every Government in India and every officer of that Government has to face. It is therefore necessary that these resolutions should be carefully studied by every Government and its officers. They do not contain much that is new. Indeed, they are a reiteration of our old policy. But it was necessary for this emphasis to be given to our old policy in the new context of things and, more especially, because it has sometimes been challenged. So far as Congressmen are concerned, and it is they who are responsible for our Governments, Central and Provincial, they are bound by the directions issued by the Nasik Congress. Those directions are not only specific on some matters but, what is more important, lay down a method of approach to our problems which must be understood and acted upon.

3. In regard to economic policy, the Congress, as was natural, has laid stress on planning and welcomed the formation of the Planning Commission in the Centre. There has, unfortunately, sometimes been some criticism of the Planning Commission and some lukewarm regard to it. I am surprised at this because if there is anything to which Congress has attached importance, it is to planning. The Nasik Congress has again made this clear. I am quite convinced that without a planned approach we are doomed to failure. As for the particular Planning Commission that we have appointed, it is, I feel sure, as good as any which could have been appointed. It is to be a small body, or else it becomes a conference which discusses a great deal without doing anything. But, though small, it consults large numbers of other people at the Centre and in the States. I am glad to say that it has generally received full cooperation. But on rare occasions this has been lacking. No department of Government should refrain from giving the fullest cooperation to the Planning Commission. It can only do so if it does not believe in the basic policy of both the Congress and the Government. That is to say, it can only do

1. Also printed in G. Parthasarathi (ed.), *Jawaharlal Nehru: Letters to Chief Ministers 1947-1964*, Vol. 2 (New Delhi, 1986), pp. 204-207.

so if it goes in a different direction from that of others. That surely is most undesirable. It must be remembered that our economic policy is going to be a planned one with all that this means. There is no other choice and no other way. Planning means coordination all over India and not separate bits of planning, and the main directing agency for planning will be the Planning Commission of the Centre.

4. After a long debate and much argument, Congress has definitely declared in favour of controls for essential articles so long as they are in short supply. This must put an end to all argument on this question. One of the reasons why we have failed in making controls successful is the continuous talk in some circles that controls are going to be removed. This talk does not achieve the result aimed at by it, but merely undermines to some extent the system of controls and weakens it. If it is fully realised that controls are going to continue, then we must work to that end fully and in cooperation with each other.

5. The main criticism of controls is that they lead to corruption. We have talked a great deal about removing corruption both in controls and in certain other activities of Government such as licences, imports, etc. Our success in tackling this problem has been very limited and certainly we cannot congratulate ourselves on it. What are we going to do? Are we to confess failure? Surely not. We must find out why we have not succeeded more. We pass laws and ordinances and nothing much emerges out of them. When we take some action, the courts often nullify that action. If the law is not strong enough or effective enough, we must think in terms of changing it. Obviously we cannot accept a position which shows us to such disadvantage. No government can plead inability to deal with vital social evils. If it is incapable of dealing with them, then it has ceased to perform one of the main duties entrusted to it.

6. We should examine our laws wherever necessary. But I have a feeling that, apart from the laws, we have not set about this matter with the same earnestness and zeal with which we have tackled some other problems. Vested interests come in the way and our machinery is not competent enough. If the machinery is not good, it must be changed. The object of that machinery is to yield results and not to tell us that it is beyond its power to do anything.

7. Our control machinery took shape in the course of the last World War. It was neither good nor honest. It was a temporary expedient of the British Government. We have continued it more or less. We have to examine now its efficiency and to remove people in it who are not efficient or not honest. A smaller and more efficient machinery would yield much greater results.

8. This applies to all our machinery of Government which deals with the public and which is liable to succumb to temptation. There must be a measure of ruthlessness in dealing with such matters. The public services are not an end in themselves, but are meant to serve the public. If their service is not good, or is positively harmful, then they have to be changed.

9. Our public services in the higher grades are generally good and efficient and it is unfortunate that the sins of a few should taint the many. It is therefore in the interest of the public services as well as of the public generally to remove the taint.

10. Whatever course we may adopt, we shall be judged by the results. Our excuses, however good they might be, will help us little. I shall be grateful to you if you will consider these matters with your colleagues in your Government from the point of view that I have suggested. We have to meet the challenge and the sooner we meet it effectively, the better.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

CONGRESS ORGANISATION**III. Formation of a new Working Committee**

1. To V.K. Krishna Menon¹

Nasik

September 21, 1950

My dear Krishna,

The Congress Session is over and I have just come back about midnight from the closing scenes. So far as the resolutions were concerned, they were more or less what I proposed. The whole atmosphere also was one of an attempt to please me because of the fear that I might keep out. Apart from this, the general public reaction to me was impressive. It might interest you to read a private report of an observer a copy of which I enclose.²

The question now is as to whether I should join the Working Committee or not. Every kind of pressure is being brought to bear upon me to do so and many of our people from the U.P. are frightened at the prospect of my not doing so. Nevertheless, I do not intend doing so for the present at least; but I shall give my cooperation, where necessary, and see how matters develop.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

1. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, N.M.M.L.
2. Not printed.

2. To Vijayalakshmi Pandit¹

Nasik

September 21, 1950

Nan dear,

I have just come back from the Congress *pandal* after the final scenes of this Session. It may amuse you to read a report, compiled by an observer, of this Session. I enclose a copy.²

Every kind of pressure is being brought to bear upon me to join the Working Committee. Tandon is seeing me about it tomorrow morning. Pantji has spoken and so have a number of others, including many U.P. delegates, who tell me that they are frightened at the prospect of my not doing so. For my part, I still think that I should not join for the present at least. Apart from this, I shall promise cooperation and see how matters develop....

With love from
Jawahar

1. J.N. Collection. Extracts.
2. Not printed.

3. Groupism in the Congress¹

Question: Reports have appeared in the press of the existence of two groups in the Central Cabinet and so far no contradiction of such reports has been issued. What are your comments?

Jawaharlal Nehru: If you want a contradiction I contradict it here and now. I have not the least notion, if you talk about two groups, as to who belongs to which group. I know there are differences in approach but it is not correct to say that there are two groups. Intelligent people are not normally 'yes men'. They think and put forward their viewpoints. When the differences are very great, it is difficult for them to pull together. To talk about two groups is therefore wrong.

I am not denying the fact that there may be cases of difference of opinion. We have to balance two factors—the necessity of pursuing more or less uniform policy in the Cabinet and the need for representation of various points of view when the country is facing difficult problems.

Q: Are you joining the Congress Working Committee?

JN: The answer will be given by the Congress President when the Committee is formed.

It is true that for a considerable time past it was not my intention to join the new Congress Working Committee for a variety of reasons. In the main what compelled me to come to that decision for the time being was my desire to find out the best way of serving the Congress organisation, because I do feel that the Congress continues to fulfil an exceedingly important part in our political and economic structure and that it should be strengthened and made more effective for carrying out the policies laid down. I do feel that perhaps I can serve the cause better by not being a member of the Working Committee, though, of course, I would be always available for consultation by it. But ever since the Nasik Congress, other considerations have come into play and I have given further consideration to the matter. We have discussed it and ultimately it is for the Congress President to form his Working Committee.

Q: Are you joining the Committee or not?

JN: I do not know. I do not think that it would be right to consider this matter from a personal or individual point of view. Of course, individuals represent policy.

1. Remarks at a press conference, New Delhi, 30 September 1950. From the *National Herald* and *The Hindu*, 1 October 1950. For other parts of the press conference, see pp. 56-58, 243-247 and 405-407.

To that extent individuals may count, but an individual does not matter very much. In this context, I may say that so far as the present President is concerned, I do not agree with his outlook in regard to many things but we have been close colleagues for nearly thirty years.

Q: If you both belong to the same organisation, how can you disagree?

JN: That depends upon the conception of the organisation. The Congress has been in the past something infinitely more than a mere party organisation. It has been the common front with certain broad policies keeping all together and including in its scope people who differed considerably in other matters. Whether in future it would continue to be the same or not is a matter to be considered later.

Obviously in an organisation of this type differences are tolerated sometimes in regard to individuals or groups but conditions may arise when those differences are too great to be tolerated. Top-ranking Congress leaders have discussed various suggestions on the subject of the formation of the new Working Committee. Incidentally many names were considered for inclusion in the Committee. The Congress President is now giving his final consideration to this matter.

Q: The Nasik Congress has been acclaimed in the press as 'Nehru's triumph' and an overwhelming vote of confidence in you. Am I right in assuming that you want that vote of confidence reflected in the composition of the Working Committee? Otherwise you will resign from office.

JN: It is perfectly true that the Congress accepted a very great deal of, and almost unanimously, various proposals in regard to foreign and domestic policies that I put forward. So far as I am concerned as the Prime Minister, my policies have been completely approved by the organisation that has put me here. If they had not approved, the consequences might be that I change my policies or they change the Prime Minister. Therefore, your particular question does not arise.

Any person who disagrees with the basic policy laid down in the Nasik Congress will find it difficult to carry it out. Intelligent people often differ among themselves to some extent and yet an organisation and Cabinet pull together following the basic policy laid down there. If they cannot agree on the basic policy then, of course, other developments follow.

Q: Did you prepare a list of names for inclusion in the Working Committee?

JN: I prepared no list at any time. Perhaps we have discussed various personnel for the Committee and various suggestions have been made. The Congress President is considering them.

Q: Is it a fact that you wanted the inclusion of Mr Rafi Ahmed Kidwai?

JN: Surely, I cannot go into individual names.

4. To K.G. Mashruwala¹

New Delhi
October 10, 1950

My dear Kishorilal Bhai,

Thank you for your letter of the 7th October,² which I have read with care. Everything that you say, naturally, has weight with me. It is a little difficult for me to discuss all these matters in a letter, but I can assure you that I have given the greatest thought to them. Individuals make a difference but ultimately we must judge everything impersonally. I have tried to do so and I shall continue to do so. We are facing very difficult situations, both nationally and internationally. I feel often enough that we are growing narrower and narrower in our outlook and hence creating an ever-growing hiatus between the Congress, the Government and the people. This is a serious matter and I am trying to give all my thought to bridge it as far as we can.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Mashruwala wrote that Nehru and Tandon should work together.

5. To Purushottamdas Tandon¹

New Delhi
October 13, 1950

My dear Purushottam,

Thank you for your letter of today's date which I have just received.

May I say how disturbed I am that I should have been the cause of delay in your forming the Working Committee? This was not my intention.

1. J.N. Collection.

You are perfectly right in saying that the ultimate responsibility of selecting the members of the Working Committee rests on the President of the Congress. In practice this is shared to some extent and during the three or four occasions when I had to form the Working Committee, I abided largely by the advice of my colleagues, even when it went against my own inclinations and wishes. Nevertheless the responsibility is that of the President. I have no right to insist on the inclusion or exclusion of any name. But, inevitably, certain consequences flow from such inclusion or exclusion—consequences which are impersonal in character—and each one of us has to exercise his own judgment in regard to them. I have given anxious thought to this matter and it was as a result of this that I put my viewpoint before you and our other colleagues. I am anxious, as you are, to strengthen the Congress and to purify it. I am equally anxious to secure as large a measure of harmony as possible. But apparently we differ in our approach. This has become even clearer to me during these recent discussions.

I am grateful to you for your invitation to me to join the Working Committee. For about a quarter of a century I have had the honour to be a member of it. I have valued that association, and it is no small matter for me to do something which involves a present break. And yet the conviction forces itself upon me that in the circumstances I can serve the cause of the Congress, as I conceive it, and that of the country, better by not being formally associated with the Working Committee. I do not think it would be right for me to act against my own feeling and conviction in this matter. If I did so, I would become ineffective and incapable of doing anything worthwhile.

I feel, therefore, that I should not join the Working Committee at present. But, as I told you, I shall be happy to give such cooperation as I can to you in the difficult tasks that face you.

I hope you will appreciate my difficulty and forgive me for not accepting your invitation.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

6. To Purushottamdas Tandon¹

New Delhi
16 October 1950

My dear Purushottam,

I have been feeling distressed and depressed about various developments and

1. J.N. Collection.

I feel I must write to you what I have in my mind. Not to do so would be injustice to you as well as to me. I am afraid I have been the cause of some distress to you as well as Rajaji and perhaps others also. Because of me, you had to delay the announcement of the Working Committee for many days.² I had no wish that this should be delayed, but somehow I did become the main cause for the delay. I have also caused much unhappiness to Rajaji for a different reason. I cannot undo what has been done. But at any rate we must try to look at things straight now.

I feel that all this confusion, embarrassment and distress has been caused because we avoided considering various subjects and matters in issue frankly and objectively as we should have done. One wrong step leads often enough to another. As you know, I have felt strongly in regard to some of the matters we discussed. Though we may not have gone into any detail, I think I made myself clear enough in regard to my principal approach. Owing to a number of circumstances, I agreed ultimately to joining the Working Committee. I did so with great reluctance and doubt and at the last moment, when Maulana³ telephoned to me today, I begged him, if possible, to leave me out. Having acted against my own logic and inner urge as well as my intuitive feeling in the matter, I feel as if I had done something wrong, that I had indulged in something approaching disloyalty to myself. That makes me feel unhappy. Personal reactions have their importance, but they must be set aside so as not to influence too much a dispassionate consideration of any matter. I have tried to be as dispassionate as possible.

In the two discussions we had in the course of the last two or three weeks some names were mentioned, but obviously we were concerned with more vital matters than particular individuals. Individuals sometimes become symbols of such matters and hence their importance at the time. Behind our discussions lay differences, different objectives perhaps, and different methods of realising those objectives. This does not mean that there was not much in common also. But sometimes that commonness of outlook is overshadowed by what becomes, in the context of things, important. As a result of our talks, two powerful impressions stood out in my mind. One was of this difference in outlook, the other was the reluctance on your part to go out of your way to meet my wishes. The two of course are closely akin to one another, and yet an attitude counts and makes a difference.

You were perfectly right in writing to me in one of your letters that it was your prerogative as President to form the Working Committee. Appreciating that, I told you yesterday that I would not like to take part in any further consultation in regard to the personnel of this Committee. So I have no right to complain. But I cannot help my reactions. When I heard from you the names of the members of the Working Committee, I felt even more pointedly than before how differently

2. On 15 October, Nehru gave his consent to join the Working Committee and on 16 October Tandon announced a Committee of twenty members.
3. Abul Kalam Azad.

we looked at things. On a previous occasion, I had given a fairly clear indication of the type of Committee that I considered desirable in the circumstances. Your decision, which you had every right to make, goes contrary to what I had indicated. And so, while I have no right to object, I cannot help reacting to it. I told you as much on the telephone today when I said that I felt like a square peg in a round hole. The more I think of it, the more I realise that I can be of little use in this Committee and my effectiveness, such as it is, will be severely limited. I dislike being an ineffective member of any organisation, much more so of a committee with the great traditions of the Working Committee, with which I have been intimately associated for a quarter of a century. I have, therefore, this tussle in my mind and I want you to have a glimpse into it. I would hate to be in the Committee just in order to pull in a different direction most of the time. You have spoken of harmony in the Committee. I am not likely to be a harmonious element in this particular Committee.

Most of us want harmony. But our ways of looking at it or of achieving it appear to be different. I have long felt, and I have stated in public, that the Congress organisation was deteriorating and disintegrating and, at the same time, losing that vital touch with the public which gave it strength in the past. The youth of the country find no inspiration in it and look elsewhere. Many persons who have played or who are capable of playing a vital and important part in Congress work have drifted away or do not look towards the Congress. If an organisation ceases to attract such persons and the youth of the country, that organisation has little future.

I know that you are anxious to purify the Congress, as you put it. That is necessary provided it is done with a proper outlook. But even so, it is equally necessary to revive that vital spark which gave us strength in our younger days and to make people feel that the Congress has an open door for all worthwhile people. I fear that there is a widespread impression, justified by many facts, that that door is more or less closed, except when it is slightly opened to push out somebody. Our committees are governed by cliques and factions and any person who disagrees with us finds little welcome.

The major question, therefore, for me has been how to tackle this problem which is both political and psychological; how to stop this drift; how to open the door again for those against whom it has been progressively closed. In other words, to create an impression in the country that the Congress is that great joint front working for worthwhile causes, as it was in the old days; to create a future for the Congress and not merely to live on its past. Our country today, by and large, is suffering from a sense of frustration; there is no future which draws it forward and gives it hope and faith. We move in our petty spheres with petty ambitions and petty conflicts. I do not know if it is possible to get out of this rut. But it is certainly worth trying. If even that is denied to us then life loses its main purpose. It used to be the privilege of the Congress to give shape to this future. It does so no more and we think progressively of the day to day problems which engross us.

If the Congress organisation is to prosper, then it must be reformed both from below and from above. The top counts a great deal, for it sets the pace. During the last two or three years that top has functioned badly. Our A.I.C.C. office has not dealt with its work in the manner it should have done and I believe that many of our local troubles have increased because of this lack of proper functioning at the top. There has been far too much manoeuvring for positions and far too much desire to keep the other fellow out. Complaints have poured into our office. They have been dealt with inadequately or have not been dealt with at all. Much can be done or prevented from being done by the A.I.C.C. office. In any event it is essential for the organisation that there should be faith and confidence in the working of this office.

From this point of view, I fear that the new arrangement is not satisfactory. I am not concerned with individuals but rather with the impression that is bound to be created and which goes a long way in raising or lowering the tone of an organisation. We have not got a smoothly running machine which any person can work. The machine has cracked up and requires a good deal of repair and servicing.

Thinking as I do, I cannot grasp how I can function effectively in this set-up. I can remain more or less a silent spectator, except for occasional expression of views. That is not fair to me or to you and it is not a sufficient justification for me to be there. It would only have an irritating effect on all concerned and disturb the quiet harmony of proceedings. I could only remain there if I felt that the situation was going to be grasped in the way I wanted it to be grasped and that a new turn will be given to the Congress organisation so that the existing conflicts and frictions may tone down and the feeling of deep grievance which many good people have should be removed. That is a difficult task no doubt, but there appears to be no other way.

Presently, the question of elections will be upon us and the business of selecting candidates. I have always recoiled with distaste from this business and I have had no share in it. But the issues before us and before the election are too serious for any of us to be indifferent. It was because of this that I mentioned elections in the statement I issued before the Nasik Session of the Congress.⁴ The matter may come up in the Working Committee, possibly in connection with the revision of the constitution. But that is a formal approach. What do we or what does the Working Committee intend to do in the matter? Are we to have a closed-door policy, such as has prevailed in many Congress committees for some time, or are we to view this and other questions afresh and with a different mind? This is another aspect of the question to which I have referred above. In all these matters I can only be effective if I agree with the method of approach and the objective before us; otherwise I am totally ineffective and can take no useful part.

4. See *ante*, pp. 113-116.

I am opening my mind to you and I should like to do this also to the Working Committee when it meets so that all of us may know where we are and where we are going to. It is not much good to bypass these matters and to hope for the best. I want your permission, therefore, to raise these questions at the first meeting of the new Working Committee. After that meeting, I shall have to consider what the position is and how far I fit into it.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

7. To C. Rajagopalachari¹

New Delhi
October 16, 1950

My dear Rajaji,

All the time since the Nasik Congress and before, I had no feeling of distress or even of worry. I ventured to suggest to you the other day not to worry. I was not worrying at all. But I have now been experiencing that feeling of distress both on my own part and yours. I am dreadfully sorry that somehow, on account of me, you should have been put in a false and embarrassing position. I apologise. But then we all seem to be in that position.

I am writing a letter to Purushottamdas Tandon² and I enclose a copy of it for you. Please keep this to yourself. I am, however, sending copies to Vallabhbai and Maulana also.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

1. J.N. Collection.

2. See the preceding item.

8. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
October 16, 1950

My dear Vallabhbhai,

I have written a letter² to Purushottamdas Tandon today. This letter speaks for itself. I am enclosing a copy of it for you. I am also sending copies to Rajaji and Maulana. I am requesting them to keep it entirely to themselves.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

1. *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50*, Vol. 10, p. 225.

2. See *ante*, pp. 151-155.

COMMUNALISM

1. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
August 15, 1950

My dear Vallabhbhai,

I am told that there was a Hindu Mahasabha meeting today in Delhi. It was a public meeting, though not largely attended. Strong speeches were delivered as usual and a pledge was taken by some or many people to work for the undoing of the Partition. My information is thus far limited and you will no doubt have fuller information.

I am troubled by this open and repeated challenge to the Partition which the Hindu Mahasabha is throwing out. It is, of course, in direct contravention of our Agreement with Pakistan where it has been clearly stated that anyone carrying on a propaganda of this kind will be severely dealt with.² It is also in contravention of the normal behaviour of one State to another and therefore tends to injure our foreign relations. I do not quite know how you can deal with this matter. But not to deal with it and ignore it also seems wrong in view of our commitments and the general behaviour of nations to each other.

I am writing to you to draw your attention to this matter, so that you might give it your consideration.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

1. J.N. Collection.
2. The Agreement of 8 April 1950 stated that the two countries would "not permit propaganda in either country directed against the territorial integrity of the other or purporting to incite war between them and shall take prompt and effective action against any individual or organisation guilty of such propaganda."

2. Detention of Trouble-makers¹

With reference to Home Secretary's² letter attached, I think that there is justification in our laws to keep in detention people who create trouble with foreign

1. Note to the Principal Private Secretary, 23 August 1950. J.N. Collection.
2. H.V.R. Iengar.

powers. The speeches of the Hindu Mahasabha leaders demand the liquidation of Pakistan. I can imagine no greater offence to a foreign power than to make such a suggestion. The Preventive Detention Act specially mentions foreign powers.³ At the Hindu Mahasabha meeting pledges were taken to this effect.

3. Section 3 of the Preventive Detention Act, which came into force on 25 February 1950, empowered the Central and the State Governments to detain any person to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the defence and security of India and the relations of India with other countries.

3. To K.G. Mashruwala¹

New Delhi
September 9, 1950

My dear Kishorilal Bhai,

I have just received your telegram about Akshaya Brahmachari.² I am myself greatly distressed about his fast and indeed about the whole Ayodhya affair.³ I have in the past repeatedly spoken to Pandit Govind Ballabh Pant and others in the U.P. about this matter. They have always told me that they would do their best. But evidently they have not done very much, perhaps because they do not feel themselves strong enough to do it or whatever the reasons may be.

My views are thus perfectly well known to the U.P. Government. I feel that any interference by me at this stage will have no value. I am sorry to be so helpless in such a matter, but that is so.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.
2. A sadhu of Ayodhya and a member of the U.P.P.C.C. He had been on fast from 30 January to 4 February 1950 in protest against what he considered to be the U.P. Government's appeasement of Hindu communalists in Ayodhya. As, despite the assurance of the Home Minister of U.P., no action had been taken to remove the grievances of the Muslims, he went on a fast again from 22 August. He broke his fast on 22 September on the advice of Vinoba Bhave and Mashruwala.
3. See *Selected Works* (Second Series), Vol. 14 Part I, pp. 443-445, and Part II, pp. 293-297.

THE EARTHQUAKE IN ASSAM

THE EARTHQUAKE IN ASSAM

1. To C.D. Deshmukh¹

New Delhi
August 18, 1950

My dear Deshmukh,

After our discussion in Cabinet today about the urgent need for economy, it is particularly inappropriate for me to forward to you further demands. Nevertheless, I am sending you a letter from the Governor of Assam.² Assam, as you know, has had a big earthquake and a good deal of damage has been done in the northern Lakhimpur area.³ This poor province has had the worst of luck in every matter, and yet from every point of view, political and economic, it is a vital province. It is an international frontier and the tribal question is important. A part of the province has hardly any administration and the tribes have been neglected. Undoubtedly they deserve every kind of help. What we can do is another matter. But I would gladly give up many other items of expenditure in favour of helping these tribal folk.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 37(31)/48-PMS.
2. Jairamdas Doulatram.
3. A severe earthquake rocked Assam on 15 August, affecting an area of 15,200 square miles and a population of 462,000, specially in upper Assam.

2. Telegram to Jairamdas Doulatram¹

We are anxiously following reports of consequences of great earthquake. We want to help you in every way possible. If you want me to do anything, in addition to what has already been done, please let me know.

It might be desirable to enroll a considerable number of volunteers for relief work. Able-bodied young men might be taken in and given just a few days' training and sent in small batches to affected areas. They must be carefully chosen and must be tough.

1. New Delhi, 28 August 1950. File No. 137/50, President's Secretariat.

3. Face Calamities with Courage¹

It is five long years since I visited Assam.² In the meantime, great changes have taken place in India and abroad. An important change has taken place in India's boundary on account of partition of the country. In the context of these changes, Assam's strategic importance has increased immensely. Assam is bounded by foreign countries such as Tibet, China, Burma and Pakistan. A new problem has, therefore, arisen in regard to India in general and this beautiful Assam in particular.

The people are generally acquainted with our relations with Pakistan. Tibet is now in the news.³ A new and strong republic has been set up in China. Some people might like the birth of the present China under the new regime, others might not. But the fact has to be admitted that a historic change has taken place there. Our relations with China have been friendly since ages past. On account of these events in the neighbouring countries, Assam has indisputably come to occupy an increasingly important position in the politics of India today.

My friend Gopinath Bardoloi is no more.⁴ I am sorry to miss my old colleague and friend. Just as India had to lose Mahatma Gandhi, Assam is now deprived of its leader. It is a tragedy but such things should not occasion surprise. We have to face these calamities and rise up to the situation.

A nation grows stronger only after it has undergone trials and tribulations. Germany and Japan, which had fallen to a great extent after the war, are now slowly rising. The Soviet Union has risen by her own efforts. Britain also had been on the verge of ruin and yet she has survived and is regaining her strength through the endeavours of her people.

Many of our people seem to think that since India has attained freedom, they do not have to labour much. This tendency is bad. The country cannot be expected to change through magic into what you want it to be. It is through hard work that you can realise the fruits of your freedom. Mere enactment of laws and regulations will not give us what we want. The people must look at their problems in a broad perspective. You should not look to New Delhi or Shillong for the solution of the variety of problems that face you. The country is confronted with numerous problems created by Partition. We must not be discouraged by them but learn to tackle and solve them boldly. The entire map of India has greatly changed.

1. Speech at a public meeting, Guwahati, 4 September 1950. From *The Hindu*, 5 September, and the *National Herald*, 6 September 1950.
2. Nehru had visited Assam from 13 to 21 December 1945 as part of his election campaign.
3. See *post*, Section 10.
4. Bardoloi, the Chief Minister of Assam, died on 6 August 1950.

The vast number of States have been integrated. But we have the economic problem which concerns intimately the common man. The prices of essential goods are soaring high and greatly affecting our economy.

A country does not prosper if its people do not work for increasing its wealth. The rapid industrialisation of America should be a lesson to India. But instead of working, some of our students and others indulge in strikes. These youngsters can, I am sure, achieve nothing for the good of the country and the people. I would much rather like to see these people go down or go down myself. When the State is passing through a serious calamity the people should not tolerate such strange behaviour of the youngsters.

The tendency of some people to think in terms of this State or that is deplorable. It will injure the basic cause of India as a nation and it will surely lead us to ruin. If all the States pool their resources and pull together, the country will grow stronger and stabilize her position as one of the great nations in the world. The people must regard each State as a part of India. One State is not isolated from the others forming India and nobody can afford to isolate any part thereof.

There is no denying the fact that provincialism and communalism have grown in disturbing proportions. That is the path of destruction of our independent country. You should remember that India is a secular State where people of various faiths can live provided they are loyal and peaceful citizens.

India is not following a policy of appeasement towards Pakistan. There are two alternatives for solving Indo-Pakistan problems: first, compulsory transfers of population and war and, second, peaceful settlement through pacts and agreements. The first alternative will lead both countries to destruction. This is, therefore, ruled out. I have therefore adopted the second course, of negotiations and agreement. It is not a policy of appeasement; it is entirely a peaceful method. This method has given satisfactory results though much more remains yet to be done.

The Government of India view the Kashmir question from a purely political viewpoint, unlike Pakistan which looks at it from a communal perspective. It is wrong to judge the Kashmir question on the basis on which some other Indo-Pakistan questions are viewed. Of course, Pakistan's stand has always been just the opposite of what India has been maintaining. We do not follow any wrong method merely because Pakistan has chosen to adopt it.

People will appreciate the policy pursued by India in other respects also. We stand for world peace. That is what Mahatma Gandhi taught us and we have to follow it implicitly. It is true that India has neither the strength nor the resources to help one country or another in terms of war, as in Korea. But India has to contribute something so that the cause of peace is vindicated. I want India to play a great part in shaping the affairs of world politics and thus contribute to the cause of peace. I want that the part India is to play is worthy of the greatness and the traditions that are associated with her history. If we fail in this, I have no doubt, India will go down in the estimation of the world. You must give up petty quarrels and cultivate a wider outlook.

The people of Assam have suffered a severe earthquake and menace of floods. You should face the calamities bravely and rise to the occasion. Offers of relief to Assam are coming from all parts of the globe. The Pakistan Government have offered 10,000 maunds of rice to the people of Assam. This is no small thing.

I assure you that I will do my best to mitigate your distress but you must also work hard for your own relief. You are aware of the various hardships the people of this country are passing through and of the difficulties of the Government of India and of the States on account of rehabilitation of lakhs of refugees. Therefore, you all have to work unitedly, because when the house is on fire nobody can sit idle. The youth should prove worthy of the occasion and spread out in the affected areas and assist the agencies carrying out relief work. In an emergency like the one through which Assam is passing, the work has to be done on almost a war footing. I hope that if the work is done in the proper way, your difficulties will soon be tided over.

I warn those who want to take advantage of people's hardship in this period of crisis and indulge in hoarding and blackmarketing that they will be severely penalised. The provisions of the new ordinance to deal with the hoarders and racketeers will be firmly enforced.

May I appeal to all of you for patience and courage in this hour of sorrow and distress.

4. Help to Victims of the Earthquake¹

Friends and Comrades,

I am going to speak to you tonight about Assam, where recently a great earthquake brought death and disaster to many and to some extent changed even the outward features of the land. I have visited this border province of ours on several occasions in the past, when I was more carefree and had some leisure to float about on the broad bosom of that noble river, the Brahmaputra. Now, I went there summoned by the earthquake on a less pleasant errand.

Look at the map of India. You will find Assam on the north-eastern corner bordering Tibet and China and Burma and Pakistan. Thus, from the international

1. Broadcast to the nation over All India Radio, New Delhi, 9 September 1950. A.I.R. tapes, N.M.M.L. Nehru also made a similar broadcast in Hindi.



IN ASSAM, SEPTEMBER 1950



WITH THE ABORS AND MISHMIS, ASSAM, SEPTEMBER 1950

point of view, this province of ours has a very special significance. In the old days also it was a frontier province, but the North East frontier was not considered particularly important and all our attention was concentrated on the North West frontier. Now, changing conditions have made this northern-east corner vital to us in many respects and I have no doubt that its importance will grow. From being a neglected outpost of an empire, it has become the meeting place of many nations and it might become in the future a highway between some of those countries and ours.

Within the borders of Assam and adjoining it are large tribal tracts, where many tribes in various stages of development have lived for ages past. Do not imagine that all these tribes are backward. Some of them are certainly backward in many ways, but others have developed their own peculiar institutions, often of a democratic nature, and are in some ways fairly advanced. All of them are very attractive, or so I have found them.

Ever since I first visited Assam many years ago, I have been attracted by the beautiful valley of the Brahmaputra and the mountains and forests that lie beyond. The people there have their own distinctive features. They are simple, unsophisticated and likeable. There is a very unusual combination of semi-tropical scenery and snow-capped mountains. The Brahmaputra, after a long journey through Tibet, rushes down through mighty gorges into the Assam valley where it becomes a placid river, sometimes spreading out almost like the sea.

Perhaps many of you think of Assam in connection with tea. These tea gardens, well tended and attractive looking, cover a large part of Assam. Apart from this, the chief cultivation of the State is paddy. Orange trees and pineapples and bamboos and palms and the beautiful and graceful areca tree, from which our *supari* comes, abound in the State.

In this peaceful State, rather slow moving, came the sudden shock of the earthquake. It was the evening of August 15th, when all over India some kind of celebrations had been organised for the Independence Day. Soon after half past seven, the earth trembled and shook and heaved up or subsided and houses tumbled down and great landslides occurred in the hills. Frightened people rushed about in the dark, not knowing what the fate of their neighbours might be. It took some time for people to get information of what had happened, because telegraph and telephone wires broke and the other normal means of communication were disrupted. Slowly news trickled through and we realised the extent of the disaster. Or perhaps it would be more correct to say that we do not yet realise the full extent of what has happened because several parts were completely cut off and it has not yet been possible to reach them.

It is said that the epicentre of the earthquake was somewhere in Tibet, near a place called Rima, some miles from the Assam frontier. We know nothing of what has happened in Tibet or on the mountainous regions of the border. As a result of the landslides, rivers were blocked up for a while, and when they broke

through, they came down with a rush and a roar, a high wall of water sweeping down and flooding large areas and washing away villages and fields and gardens. These rivers have changed their colour and carried some sulphurous and other material which spread a horrible smell for some distance around them. The fish in them died. The remains of villages, animals, including cattle and elephants, and large quantities of timber floated down these raging waters. Paddy fields were destroyed, stocks of grains were washed away and some tea gardens also suffered great damage.

It is difficult to estimate the damage that has been done.² The loss of human life was not so great as it might have been in a more populous area. Probably not more than a thousand people have perished. Most of these died by being crushed by the landslides or swept away by the rivers in sudden flood. Some may have died or may be dying now for lack of food. There are large areas still, more especially in the North Lakhimpur district, east of the river Subansiri, which are very difficult of access and are water-logged. Even when one crosses this angry river Subansiri, and that is a difficult task, one has to face a combination of flood and forest, and internal movement is not easy. There are numbers of people marooned in different parts of this area in North Lakhimpur. Beside this area there are the hills which are even more inaccessible and about which we have practically no information yet. There is no doubt, however, that the tribal people who live there have suffered and are suffering greatly.

The damage to public buildings and public works has been very heavy. National highways have been torn and twisted and have sometimes a strange, vertically wavy appearance. Bridges have been washed away or broken, railway lines have snapped or are twisted. Some of these roads and tracts will have to be realigned completely for long distances.

When the earthquake came, three parties, consisting of the Assam Rifles and some of our army men, were on their way to our frontier outpost. One such party, comprising twenty-five men of the Assam Rifles and sixty porters, was suddenly buried in the heavy landslides. They managed to escape, however, through rolling down the rocks except for four porters who lost their lives. But they lost everything they had—food, clothing, utensils, arms and ammunition, wireless sets, etc. They were marooned for a number of days without food. Ultimately a rescue party reached them. The second and third party also had strange and exciting experiences and had to be rescued right on the borders of Tibet. Some of them in fact could not come back at all, because the bridge over the river had been washed away and the only way for them was into Tibet. In the same way some Tibetans were cut off and marooned on the Indian side of the border and could not go back.

2. The total loss due to the earthquake was estimated at about Rs one crore, besides damage to about one lakh dwelling houses and six tea gardens.

These are the difficulties which we have had to face. The Government of India naturally wanted to give the utmost help. The Air Force sent a number of Dakotas for dropping food in those areas which were cut off. Everyday our aircraft fly often through bad weather, taking rice and other foodstuffs, and drop them for these starving people. We have now sent some smaller planes also for reconnaissance work as well as to land some of our officers in these marooned areas, if that is possible. In addition to our own aircraft, two small planes belonging to the tea companies have also done excellent work in carrying and dropping food in these areas. Then there is our Army, which is rapidly trying to build up new roads and bridges and give such other help as they can. They are now organising small parties of stout-hearted men and strong swimmers who will brave the raging torrents and enter into that difficult region which has been cut off from us since the earthquake. Our railwaymen and engineers are working hard to get the railway to function again. The restoration of communications is of the first importance.

Meanwhile, the Brahmaputra, spreading as far as eye can reach, flows along in an angry mood. It has changed its course at places and, at Dibrugarh, is cutting away into parts of the inhabited city. Some buildings and roads have already been smashed and consumed by its swirling waters. Our engineers are hard at work to stop this continuous erosion. Not much more can be done at present. Later, more permanent methods will have to be employed.

Volunteer relief societies, local as well as from outside, are doing good work. I should specially like to mention the fine work being done by the staff and students of the Medical College at Dibrugarh. Here, in Assam, is a chance for every able-bodied man and woman of the State to help in relief and reconstruction. And so, while I know that Assam badly needs every kind of help from other parts of India, I called upon the people there³ to rely upon themselves and to help each other and their province at this time of crisis.

I have told you briefly of conditions in Assam now. How can we help, as help we must, to the utmost of our capacity? It will do no good for large numbers of people to rush to Assam, for they will only become a burden there. Selected persons with special knowledge or capacity might be able to help. We can all help by subscribing generously to the Governor's relief fund. I shall gladly accept and forward any subscriptions that are sent to me. That is the least we can do.

We can all help also by strictly conserving the nation's food supply and preventing all waste or misuse. Every State Government must enforce its procurement schemes so that all available food can be utilised to the best advantage, not only in Assam but in other areas of scarcity. Even in Assam, while there is scarcity and famine and starvation in some areas, most of which are cut off from us for the present, there are other areas which are surplus. Effective procurement schemes must function there immediately as elsewhere.

3. In his speeches during his visit to Assam from 4 to 7 September 1950.

Those who desire to profit by this emergency and hoard foodgrains or try to sell them at high prices in the black market must be considered enemies of society and should be dealt with as such. There can be no greater crime than for a person to make a profit at the cost of death to his fellow men. There has been often enough a certain timidity in this matter and the law with its interminable delays and complications frightens people. But the law is good enough and is meant to prevent evil and help in good deeds. It is men of strength that we need to enforce the law without fear or favour.

Disaster has descended upon many parts of our country. Assam has suffered most, but other States have had great floods and great losses. The only way to meet this is with a stern determination not to allow either nature's vagaries or men's follies to come in the way of the work we have to do.

On such occasions one inevitably thinks of the precarious hold that life has. A slight tremor of the earth's surface, a faint ripple, causes mountains to tumble, rivers to change their courses, and houses to collapse, and men to die. Whether it is long or short, life has the same inevitable end, but, while it lasts, we can make it worthwhile or futile, noble or petty and mean. It is not by submission to evil or surrender even to nature's challenge or a mere passive looking on at what happens or empty prayer that life can be made worthwhile. The challenge has come to us in many ways in this country. It is up to us to answer that challenge in every department of life and public affairs with faith and confidence in ourselves and in our country. *Jai Hind.*

5

CHILDREN AND YOUTH

1. Balkan-ji-Bari¹

I send my good wishes to the Balkan-ji-Bari² on the occasion of the silver jubilee celebrations³ of this organisation. From what I have known of the Balkan-ji-Bari I have found that it has done excellent work among the children and deserves every support. The children of a nation are the first charge of that nation and organisations like the Balkan-ji-Bari help considerably in laying the foundations of good citizenship. More particularly it should be the function of this organisation to look after the children of underprivileged persons. It is unfortunate that we have many underprivileged persons in India, but till such time as they exist we should pay special care to their children.

1. Message, New Delhi, 2 September 1950, sent to Balkan-ji-Bari, Bombay. File No. 8(194)/50-PMS.
2. Balkan-ji-Bari, meaning "children's garden", was started in Karachi as a child welfare society in 1925. It was revived in Bombay in 1948 after Partition to promote cultural activities among children.
3. The silver jubilee function organised in Bombay on 5 and 6 November 1950 was attended by Nehru.

2. The Need for Discipline¹

A question is often raised as to whether students should take part in politics. As far as I am concerned, students should take part in politics subject to certain provisos. Student organisations should not take part in politics, for then they would cease to be student organisations and function for some other purpose completely diverse from the well-being of the student community. I am in favour of students taking part in politics individually or in groups in their personal capacity. In a fast changing world no one can keep our young people from politics.

There is, however, one important factor for students to consider before engaging their minds in politics. They should remember that they are the future citizens of the country, and the sole responsibility of running the affairs of the country will eventually fall on their shoulders. For this task they must equip themselves first with knowledge and training, and finally with experience. After their academic career they have to face the realities of life and the knowledge they have gained at colleges and universities helps them to become responsible citizens.

1. Speech at the inauguration of the first convention of the National Union of Students, Bombay, 15 September 1950. From *The Hindustan Times*, 16 September 1950.

It does not mean that only experience makes a man. Advice is necessary. But there is a limit to giving advice. I find students—and their organisations as well—giving advice, sometimes aggressively, to the Government, the United Nations and to the world at large. While giving such advice they do not take into consideration their lack of experience but display only theoretical knowledge which they have gained at educational institutions.

Politics in India have a very limited meaning today. In the past students used to gather and pass resolutions against the British Government. Today, in the same way, student organisations have a tendency to oppose and criticize the national Government. I would urge the students not to become pawns in the political game and thus fail in their duty to their parents and the country.

One of the world's ailments today is that there are too many old men at the helm of affairs—too many in the rut unable to adjust themselves to the changed conditions. The world will be a better place if the younger generation, active and intelligent, takes over. However, to attain this, youth require training which is uninterrupted by political or ideological influences. If they do not develop mentally or physically during their period of training, they will never do so later. To whatever position they may be pushed up, if they lack experience and knowledge they will speedily fall back.

To reach that degree of worthiness so as to take charge of the country's affairs, great preparations are necessary. Therefore you must plan and train for the big tasks that are ahead of us. Your training does not stop when you leave college or university. Mental development is a continuous process. It is not only the college or university that should give students a capacity for self-training but the training extends through one's entire life.

Preoccupation with power politics during student life is in conflict with your training. It then becomes a gamble for the future. The primary responsibility of the student is to train his body and mind with as close association with public affairs as possible.

I notice a degradation of human personality in the Indian scene and it distresses me to see various forces, negative and destructive, hampering the progress of the nation.

Every country, whatever may be the ruling political ideology, is guided by certain principles and standards. Standards may not be the same throughout the world. But when standards fall, along with them the nation, the community and the individual go down too.

Work, hard work, not for years but for generations, should be the order of the day if any nation wants to survive. Hard work is essential if the nation is to advance in the economic sphere and if people have to advance well. I am pained to see lack of discipline and character in India. The choice before the country is between becoming a progressive, first-rate nation and a disintegrated, tenth-rate nation. I can never think of India becoming anything but a first-class nation, maintaining

a high standard in both internal and external affairs. To become a first-class nation, however, India needs first-grade men. We require the best scientists, engineers, doctors and administrators. You should develop an integrated personality. You will have to live as a whole and efficiently. Ultimately we become good citizens to serve ourselves and the country.

There should be a healthier criticism of Government. The press in this matter is a predominant factor as it moulds public opinion. Certain papers lack standards and decency and indulge in vulgar and indecent criticism. Such criticism does not do any good in moulding growing minds but drags them to lower levels.

I appeal to you to help in the mighty enterprise of building a new India. In India, we have abundance of human material which can be properly utilized. We have to build dams and industries. But these are relatively superficial tasks. The real thing is the building of human beings who will make the nation strong and progressive.

Political activity will become barren unless it has some standards or values. Laying of a sound human character is not complete by itself. A conflict between constructive and destructive forces is going on in the country. I have no doubt that in the ultimate analysis the constructive forces will triumph, though I cannot logically prove it. Take up the challenge of the destructive forces and do not fall prey to disruptive tendencies. The National Union of Students² should work in a cooperative spirit so that when the time comes they may throw their full weight in the cause of the progress of the nation.

2. The National Union of Students, a non-political federation of college students' unions, primarily concerned with the cultural and educational needs of the students, was formed in 1950 with the support of Congress and Socialist leaders. It ceased to function by 1958.

MATTERS OF ADMINISTRATION**I. Indian States**

1. The Rajasthan Public Security Ordinance¹

I have just seen the Rajasthan Public Security Ordinance, 1949, which was promulgated on the 9th of September, 1949.² I have not read the whole Ordinance with any care, as it is a fairly lengthy one. But I have read Chapter IX. This seems to me to go far beyond any security ordinance that I have yet seen. The definition of a "prejudicial act" is extraordinarily wide, but the most extraordinary thing is that this "prejudicial act" includes: "40(d)—to bring into hatred or contempt or excite disaffection towards the Government of Rajasthan or the Government of India or the Government of any Indian Province or Indian State or any Minister of any such Government."

This would mean that no normal criticism of governmental activity is permissible. What is amazing is that even Ministers are protected by the Ordinance.

There are some other sections in this chapter which also seem to me very widely worded. But, for the moment, I shall not refer to them.

Will you please draw the attention of the States Ministry to Chapter IX of this Ordinance, which, as worded, seems to me to go against the basic provisions of our Constitution? In Rajasthan there is no popular Assembly and no other means of criticising or checking governmental action. Because of a ruling of the Speaker of Parliament, apparently matters affecting these States cannot be referred to in Parliament. Thus it has become practically impossible for any popular appraisal or criticism of actions of the local Government. That criticism even is suppressed by this Ordinance.

This appears to me to be a very extraordinary state of affairs and I should like to find out from the State Government how they justify this. I do not know whether the States Ministry comes into the picture. Is such an Ordinance referred to them for their approval or are they also not directly concerned?³ In any event, a heavy responsibility rests with the States Ministry. The present position in Rajasthan and like States is one which can only be described as completely irresponsible with that irresponsibility protecting itself and trying to perpetuate itself by ordinances and the coercive apparatus of the States.⁴

1. Note to the Principal Private Secretary, 28 September 1950. J.N. Collection.
2. This Ordinance, promulgated for two years, followed the similar legislation already in force in old Rajasthan.
3. Nehru was told that the Ordinance was drafted by the Government of Rajasthan before all the Part B States were directed to send their Bills and Ordinances for the prior approval of the Ministry of States. The Ministry had already directed the State Government to redraft it.
4. Two cases of prosecution under the Ordinance pending in courts in Rajasthan were withdrawn on the orders of the Ministry of States following Nehru's intervention. The Ordinance itself was revoked in 1954.

2. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
October 1, 1950

My dear Vallabhbhai,

...I cannot express any opinion about individuals and their cases.² But I have long felt that the right policy to adopt in Hyderabad would be one of generosity and clemency to the largest possible extent. I have spoken about this on several occasions to V.P. Menon and to Vellodi,³ and on general principles they have agreed. I have also felt unhappy at the expenditure of very large sums of money in these cases. Most of these cases have lasted for years under peculiarly distressing circumstances for the accused and their families, and the punishment thus far has been severe enough. There is no doubt that the general effect on the Muslim public of Hyderabad has been bad and most depressing. I do not myself see what particular good we are going to get out of these processes.

I do not understand the seizure of the properties of some of these persons by the Custodian of Evacuee Property.⁴ The men are in prison and being tried and their families are outside in Hyderabad without any way of maintaining themselves. The least that could have been done was to make some provision for those families. We spend vast sums of money on lawyers and meanwhile this human suffering and even starvation goes on.

I would beg of you, therefore, to give your particular attention to this matter during your visit to Hyderabad. I hope you will be able to see Padmaja and get a first-hand account from her.⁵

Yours,
Jawaharlal

1. J.N. Collection. Extracts.
2. Nehru forwarded to Patel a letter from Padmaja Naidu in which she pleaded for mercy for the Muslim officials of Hyderabad in jail since 1948 and awaiting trial for their activities before and after the police action. Meantime two of them had been sentenced to death and another to long-term imprisonment for carrying out the orders of the Laik Ali Government. She wrote that a gesture of forgiveness by Patel "for those who sinned so grievously" would, apart from relieving their misery, help check the "dangerously explosive" communal situation in the State.
3. M.K. Vellodi, Chief Minister of Hyderabad.
4. Miss Naidu wrote that everything owned by the two officials on whom sentences were passed had been seized by the Custodian of Evacuee Property; as a result their families were on the verge of starvation.
5. Nehru sent a copy of this letter to Rajagopalachari suggesting that he might also write to Patel on the subject. Rajagopalachari replied on 1 October, "I am wondering whether it will do any good my butting in. I am disinclined. You have written strongly and Padmaja's own moving appeal is there."

3. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
October 19, 1950

My dear Vallabhbhai,

Thank you for your long letter of the 13th October about conditions in Hyderabad.² I have delayed answering it because there was not much to be said in answer. You have gone into this question thoroughly during your visit to Hyderabad and know much more about it than I do.

While I cannot say much about individual instances or cases, I can judge a little about the general atmosphere of the place. I have known many people in Hyderabad State for a long stretch of years. These are various kinds. There were of course those who belonged to the State Congress. But I also knew a considerable number of others, Muslims and Hindus. Those people were in the administration there as well as in some profession. I was therefore fairly well acquainted with the Hyderabad atmosphere in previous years and I have been able to judge of it even in these changing times because of these contacts. Much has happened during these years which has changed the face of Hyderabad almost completely. Still it is possible to follow these changes and more particularly what passes in people's minds there. I have not been happy about this at all, as I have sensed repeatedly that things were not well and sometimes were even deteriorating. Padmaja is, as you say, a very sensitive person and has a tendency to dramatise. She may even grow rather hysterical. But allowing for exaggeration, I think that her reactions have considerable basis in fact. They are, as a matter of fact, reactions shared by a considerable number of persons there.

What I have noticed in the course of the last two years or more is a big hiatus between the administration and the people. The administration did its best, at the top at least, but it remained completely apart from the people not only in the official way but more so in the human way. It did not therefore understand or appreciate the feelings of the people. This applied even more so to the Muslims of Hyderabad who had been completely broken up by events. Many of these Muslims were examples of a particular and rather attractive culture, which had grown up in Hyderabad both among Muslims and Hindus. Some of the young men among them

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Patel wrote on his return from Hyderabad that clemency in cases of "blatant inhuman cruelty" would be unjustified and would not be upheld by public opinion in Hyderabad. He thought that Padmaja Naidu was unnecessarily hysterical about the situation and added that cases were proceeding against only eight officials, all of whom were facing serious charges. Forwarding Patel's reply to Miss Naidu on 13 October, Nehru added, "I am not particularly satisfied with this reply, or with the way things are being done in Hyderabad."

were very much above the average. All these persons were suddenly frustrated and there was very little in the way of a gesture of friendship and welcome. The past pursued them and us and this past was represented, more especially, by innumerable trials and detentions and the rest of it.

You will remember my telling you of the President of the International Red Cross speaking to me about this subject about a year and a half ago in Switzerland.³ He pleaded with me earnestly for some gesture of amnesty and friendliness for these people in Hyderabad. I gave him some answer in explanation. But that answer did not even satisfy me. There is no doubt that horrible deeds were performed in Hyderabad by the Razakars first of all and later, immediately after the police action, by the Hindus against the Muslims. Something equally horrible, or perhaps more so, occurred in Delhi in September and October 1947, and in East Punjab and of course in Western Pakistan, on an enormous scale. It was astonishing how decent people committed inhuman atrocities. We survived that and we did not go about searching for the culprits. They live amongst us today, many of them, as respected citizens. A madness had seized the people, fear and a lust for vengeance. We paid ultimately the heaviest penalty of all for it in the death of Bapu.

In Hyderabad, something of a like nature happened, perhaps on a smaller scale. It is difficult and not desirable to punish vast numbers of people. The punishment of the change in Hyderabad and the frustration and fear that this brought about, was a very big one. The future became dark with no hope in it. The main problem was not to punish a few or more, but to remove this overhanging sense of fear. Many people in England and elsewhere thought so and spoke to me about it whenever I went there. There was a feeling there that we were needlessly hard and harsh in our dealings with various people in Hyderabad.

You mention that out of a total number of Razakars detained in prison, that is, out of 15,654, nearly all have been released except twelve. But these thousands were kept in prison for a long time. Of course, particular cases of persons tried for serious charges had to be dealt with by the law.

The amount of money we have spent on these trials is something prodigious. That money would have brought rich results, if spent in constructive activities in Hyderabad.

About Government servants, at least one or two cases have come up before me of persons I have known intimately and for whom I had considerable respect. But they were not good enough to carry on.

You mention the activities of the Custodian of Evacuee Property and say that

3. See Nehru's letter to Patel, 4 June 1949, *Selected Works* (Second Series), Vol. 11, pp. 185-186. Nehru met Paul Ruegger, President of the International Committee of the Red Cross, in Geneva in May 1949.

there is no truth in the statements made.⁴ Probably not. Nevertheless, the application of these measures have, to my knowledge, brought totally undeserved suffering on completely innocent people.

I really do not know what exactly can be done or should be done. It is a question of approach to this problem. Looking at it in some perspective, I feel that we are not solving the problem, but laying the seeds of future trouble. I have an idea that because of the sense of hopelessness that seized many of the younger Muslims, some of them at least turned towards communism. Others, though they did not do anything themselves, became sympathetic to the communists there. Thus indirectly the communist movement was encouraged and drew some strength from these sources. This might continue unless the whole atmosphere changes. It is obvious that the communist problem in Hyderabad requires steps in addition to the police or military measures that we may take. This fact has been recognised and an attempt has been made, with some success, to change the agrarian system. It is this approach that is more important than any other. But to add to it there must be also the approach of friendliness to those who are down and out and full of fear.

We have sent some good administrators to Hyderabad, but we have also sent large crowds of minor officials. Many of these minor officials have been of very low grade and have not functioned properly or with integrity. Many of them have been completely alien to Hyderabad and neither know the language nor the customs. They have been thus an imposition and the feeling of a foreign occupation has grown among the people. Some changes for the better have undoubtedly come. But I rather doubt if they have gone far enough.

Historically and culturally, Hyderabad represents certain traditions. It is always a rather dangerous thing to uproot deep historical and cultural forces. Or rather, it may not be difficult, but it is very difficult to replace them by something constructive and substantial.

I do not know what has been done about the Osmania University. There was a great deal of talk many months ago about making it a national university directly under the Centre. I liked this idea. Indeed I considered it very important, because the University is a very fine one and capable of becoming one of our finest institutions. I am quite sure that it would be ruined if it became the battleground for local politics.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

4. Patel wrote that the property and accounts of the undertrials had only been frozen to prevent "transfers to other parties in order to defeat any sentence or the fine that might be imposed on them." He added that the wife of only one official was not getting any allowance from the Government and instructions had been given for adequate provision to be made for the maintenance of the families of all the undertrials.

4. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
October 19, 1950

My dear Vallabhbhai,

I have just written to you about Hyderabad.² As I was writing that letter, other thoughts came into my mind. They have been there for a long time, but owing to changing circumstances and the necessities of the situation, I did not mention them to you. I should like, however, to share these thoughts with you now, so that you can give some consideration to the matter.

The States Ministry has a heavy responsibility, far heavier than that of any other Ministry. It deals with one third of India or more than one third, and for that vast area it functions not as a Ministry dealing with a particular subject, but covering every conceivable subject. Thus, whether the questions are financial, economic, political, military or communal, they are dealt with by the States Ministry and not, to any extent, by our separate Ministries which specialise in particular subjects. The States Ministry has a large authority not only to lay down policies, but also to see to their execution. That authority is exercised under the general supervision of the Cabinet, but in effect, only a very few matters of high policy are brought before the Cabinet.

An analogy is sometimes drawn between these Part B States³ and the old provinces. But the old provinces have an autonomous and representative machinery of Government which is fairly advanced. States in the B category have not got these except possibly for two or three cases like Mysore and Travancore. Ministries appointed in many of these States have no particular sanction of the people behind them. At the same time they are not under the control of the Cabinet or of the Government of India as a whole. Presumably, they function under the States Ministry and are responsible to it. A recent ruling of the Speaker laid down that questions relating to normal administrative functions of these States could not be asked in Parliament. That is to say, these Part B States were treated on a level with the old provinces, although they were essentially different and have no representative Government. This creates a peculiar position. The Governments and Ministries of these States, though sometimes called popular, are by no means so and derive no sanction from their own people. A few of them are completely official. Most of them are not official and therefore not directly responsible to the Government

1. J.N. Collection.

2. See the preceding item.

3. The States and territories forming the Union of India were classified into four categories depending on the form of government and the level of constitutional development obtaining in each of them. Part B States were Hyderabad, Jammu and Kashmir, Madhya Bharat, Mysore, Pepsu, Rajasthan, Saurashtra and Travancore-Cochin.

of India as a whole. They are practically irresponsible and there is no way of influencing them or of changing them except under private pressure from the States Ministry, or by the force of some compelling circumstance.⁴

The State of Hyderabad stands in a class apart. Not only is it very big, but it has very difficult and special problems. The manner in which it came under our control, though swift and simple, created many of these problems, and we inherited many others. We had a Military Governor⁵ for sometime, then a Civil Governor who developed into a Chief Minister. In fact, he is an official nominee of the States Ministry and it is rather a misnomer to call him a Chief Minister in the usual sense of the word. This State has extraordinarily complex political, economic and communal problems, and then there is the communist menace. A Ministry, nominated by the States Ministry, in consultation with local people, is now in charge, but such a Ministry practically can only function as an organ of the States Ministry. I can understand the inherent difficulties in Hyderabad and perhaps there was no other way out at the time. But what I am worried about is that this vast State is practically under authoritarian control.⁶ Our Cabinet knows very little of what is happening and major decisions are made either by the Hyderabad Cabinet or by the States Ministry without any reference to our Cabinet. Those decisions may be right. What I am concerned with is the whole system of Government that has developed not only in Hyderabad but in many of the other States.

There is a good deal of trouble in Rajasthan, Madhya Bharat and Pepsu.⁷ Vindhya Pradesh is carrying on, but not very satisfactorily. Everywhere the position is difficult and complicated and you have had to carry a heavy burden. We have developed in these States a peculiar form of Government which is certainly not democratic and is at the same time not directly under the Government of India. Thus, these States, or many of them, are rather like the centrally governed areas, but without the Central Government having much say. That is a very peculiar position. Ministries are made and unmade, laws are passed, big financial transactions are undertaken, economic policies are laid down, and much else is done without

4. Patel replied on 26 October that Central subjects in Part B States had been taken over by various Central Ministries under Article 371 of the Constitution and the exercise of power under that Article was subject to review by Parliament. He added that the States Ministry only laid down broad policies in regard to matters relating to provincial administration and admitted that its responsibility was greater in case of States like Rajasthan and Pepsu which had no legislatures.
5. Major-General J.N. Choudhury.
6. Patel wrote to Nehru on 26 October that a transition from military to civil rule had been achieved in Hyderabad and the largest political party in the State associated with the administration and added that the progress could not be said to be slow "considering the difficulties we had to face."
7. The Congress ministries in these States were faced with the problem posed by the existence of rival factions in the party.

the Government of India coming into the picture, except in so far as the States Ministry functions almost as the final authority.

This does not appear to me to be a healthy position, though it may have been inevitable to begin with. I am not myself clear as to what we should do about it. But I feel fairly sure that we are not functioning rightly.⁸

I have put some of the ideas in my mind before you, so that you can give them quiet consideration and, sometime later, we might discuss them.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

8. Patel wrote on 26 October that the States Ministry was concentrating on improving the law and order and agrarian conditions in the States which demanded greater attention and thought the exercise through one Central Ministry of the Government's responsibility towards all Part B and C States was necessary until they had achieved political and administrative stability.

MATTERS OF ADMINISTRATION
II. Scheduled Castes and Tribes

1. To C.D. Deshmukh¹

New Delhi
August 18, 1950

My dear Deshmukh,

I think I wrote to you a few days ago forwarding a representation on behalf of some members of the Congress Party for additional scholarships for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, etc.² I have now received a further letter from Dr Panjabrao Deshmukh³ which I enclose. I confess that all my sympathy goes to these people and looking at it from a long distance point of view, it is very necessary that we should give them opportunities to raise themselves by education and otherwise. There is, as is evident, a strong feeling on this subject in the Congress Party. They want to bring a deputation to me also. I hope it will be possible to do something in this matter.⁴

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 33(55)/48-PMS.
2. The representation asked for the creation of a scholarship fund for scheduled castes and tribes and other backward classes with a grant of Rs one crore to be utilized over a period of three years.
3. He was a member of the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and other Backward Classes Scholarship Board, 1949-51, and of the Standing Committee for Education of the Government of India, 1950-51.
4. Deshmukh, in his reply on 22 August, referred to the difficulty in making available such a large sum and doubted whether the creation of a separate fund was "a sound proposition." He agreed to increase the amount provided in the year's budget for the purpose from Rs ten lakhs to Rs twelve lakhs, and gave an assurance that adequate provision would be made in the next year's budget estimates for a reasonably large amount which would cover actual requirements.

MATTERS OF ADMINISTRATION**III. Visits of Officials to Pakistan**

1. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
September 12, 1950

My dear Vallabhbhai,

Thank you for your letter of the 11th September² regarding the imposition of restrictions on Government servants going to West Pakistan.

There is no question of our being sensitive to the Pakistan Government's reactions, or at any rate there is no particular importance to be attached to how the Pakistan Government feels. The whole point is whether we should treat our Muslim employees of Government differently from our non-Muslim employees. There are not very many Muslims in our Service, at least in the senior grades. Any attempt to discriminate against them indicates that we do not trust them in their work and consider them as a class apart from other Government servants. That seems to me unfair to them and unfair to the State.

I referred this matter to Rajaji and he reacted very strongly. He felt that any such discriminatory treatment was very bad.

From the practical point of view, it has no great significance, because there are so many contacts still between India and Pakistan and so many ways of obtaining information that an odd person going from here to there makes no difference. If a person is so inclined, he can give information otherwise. To distrust our own employees and make them feel that they are distrusted would be bad for them and bad for the Service.

As a matter of fact, for some time past, we have been considering a relaxation of the permit system.³ There is no permit system, as you know, in Bengal and people can come and go when they like.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

1. J.N. Collection.
2. Referring to a letter of 8 September from S. Dutt, the Commonwealth Secretary, to H.V.R. Iengar, the Home Secretary, which stated that Nehru was opposed to the Home Ministry's proposal of imposing restrictions on Government servants obtaining permission to visit their relations in West Pakistan, Patel wondered "why we should be so sensitive to Pakistan Government's reactions in this case." He thought that it was incumbent on the Government "to close all leakages and loop-holes" as far as possible and suggested that the State Governments should scrutinize each individual case of their employees intending to visit West Pakistan.
3. The Government of India introduced a permit system, with effect from 19 July 1948, to restrict the return of Muslims who had migrated to West Pakistan, as it was felt that the return of such people in increasing numbers was bound to adversely affect the settlement plans for refugees. While the Indian High Commissioner could issue permits for short visits only, permits for resettlement would be issued in consultation with the State of destination of the applicants. The permit system was to be withdrawn when conditions settled down.

2. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
September 14, 1950

My dear Vallabhbhai,

Thank you for your letter of the 13th September² about the imposition of restrictions on Government servants going to West Pakistan.

I still feel that any special step that we might take in regard to this will not only be misunderstood but may be positively harmful. There is no doubt about it that Government has the right to stop anyone from going to Pakistan or to prevent him from doing many other things. It is not a question of right, but a question of exercise of that right. First of all, any such restriction could only apply to West Pakistan and not to East. Secondly, everybody will understand that it is only for Muslim officers and not for non-Muslims. In effect, therefore, it would be discriminatory. As it is, the few Muslim officers we have in the Centre or in the provinces suffer from a sense of frustration and apprehension. There are quite a few such officers in the U.P., probably more than other States. I know that this is the case in regard to them. To make them feel that they are distrusted and their loyalties questioned can hardly be good either for them or for the State. If there is any such case of suspicion, it should be dealt with as a particular case and necessary action should be taken.

Government have many ways of judging of the conduct of their officers and servants. In doing so, it should be their function not to make the officer feel that he is not trusted. That would defeat the very object in view. There is no question of our interfering with the ordinary duty of Government to take elementary precautions. Such elementary precautions do not seem to me to include the introduction of a discriminatory practice in regard to our officers.

Our State Governments are sufficiently alive to the position. In fact, in my opinion, they are over-alive to it and sometimes do things which they should not do. To send a particular circular to them on this subject would be almost in the nature of condemning a class and pursuing it. Surely State Governments or any government has a right to refuse leave when they think it necessary in the public interest. It is not for us to give them that right and in fact to tell them that they must exercise that right.

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Patel wrote that it was not his intention to place a general ban, but the State Governments should have the discretion to refuse leave in cases where "they felt that there was any likelihood of valuable secret information being passed on to Pakistan." He added, "I do not think that any question of discrimination between Muslims and non-Muslims or distrusting their loyalty arises. After all, the security of the State is a vital matter and I do not think that we should subordinate it to any other consideration."

Any person going to West Pakistan has to get a permit and a 'no objection' certificate. The procedure is often of a formal character, though not always. That itself is a restriction and somewhat comes in the way. Also it gives full intimation to Government of the fact of his desiring to go to West Pakistan. That surely should be enough.

Any kind of circular that we might issue to State Governments in this matter, however secret, is bound to come out some time or other and be referred to in the press. The result will be bad and will not redound to our credit.

I showed your letter to Rajaji and he tells me that he also had a similar letter from you. He did not quite understand from your letter that it was about a matter that I had discussed with him some days ago. I believe he has written to you accordingly. I discussed this again with him and he agreed with me completely.³

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. Patel replied on 16 September that he still felt that some general instructions of the nature he had suggested could issue, but in deference to Nehru's views he was prepared to drop the idea. Enclosing copies of two letters from Rajagopalachari, Patel wrote that "in the first letter he was inclined to agree with me; in the second letter he has asked me to defer to your strong views and acknowledges that much can be said on both sides."

MATTERS OF ADMINISTRATION
IV. General

1. Appointments in Specialised Services¹

I have given the most careful consideration to the note of H.M. Home.² It is true that I have formed some views on this subject because it has repeatedly come up before me. I have formed those views not only on general grounds but also on the particular merits of this case after reading the reports of the U.P.S.C. H.M. Home in his previous note had indicated his views and I thought that I might in brief emphasise certain other aspects of the case. Of course, any opinion held may be changed on further discussion or further facts being pointed out.

The general considerations are of two kinds. Specialists in scientific and technical matters are not usually looked upon from the same point of view as administrative officers. A specialist reaches the top of his profession in that special line. He may still serve under some administrative officer who is in a sense above him. To remove him from his specialist post is not good for him or for work in general. This does not apply to administrative officers who go up from step to step to the top post available to them, provided they are competent. The seniormost posts, of course, have to be judged from the point of view of efficiency and special aptitude rather than seniority.

If such specialists are dealt with in the same way as normal administrative officers, then they are likely to look forward all the time to a superior administrative post rather than to stick to their special subject. At the present moment there are in Delhi a number of first-rate scientists and specialists employed chiefly in administrative work. This has often been criticised in Cabinet. I think that this practice is not a good one and should not be encouraged.

For this reason a different standard is usually employed in judging appointments of scientists and technical men. Normally they are appointed for long periods to a particular post where they can show results by research work, etc. If they are moved about repeatedly, there can be no proper research work.

The second aspect is that a specialist of this kind usually does his best work at a fairly advanced age. I believe the normal age for retirement for such persons in European countries is sixty-five and this is often extended. The experience and know-how of a specialist is of particular value to a country and his retirement may

1. Note, 24 August 1950. J.N. Collection.

2. Patel disagreed with Nehru's note of 22 August, not printed here, in which he had supported Amrit Kaur's recommendation for extension of service for a senior official on his retirement. He wrote that only the U.P.S.C. should consider cases of scientific and technical posts covered by regulations of service rules, as "this is exactly the type of work" for which the U.P.S.C. had been set up, "as against individual views or patronage of Ministers."

mean a loss of something which the country can ill afford to lose. We are particularly poor in first-rate experts and specialists of this kind and we shall, therefore, try to utilise them for as long as we can.

Recently two of our medical men who were superannuated here have been employed elsewhere. General Sokhey³ has been employed by the World Health Organisation in Geneva. Dr S.R. Pandit, who was Director of the Pascal Institute, Shillong, is also, I believe, going to W.H.O. I believe there are some other cases too, not only of medical men but other scientists. As a matter of fact, there is a great world demand for first-class specialists. We get these demands from the international organisations and high salaries are offered. We try not to encourage them, and in fact have refused to permit some people to go because we felt we could not spare them. I understand that the present Director General of Health Services could easily join W.H.O. and they would welcome him there.

It was not my purpose to doubt the capacity of the U.P.S.C.,⁴ but rather what I wished to point out was that any such Commission, mainly formed for the administrative services, may not be able to employ somewhat different standards for the specialised services. I think that in other countries they have other methods of selection for these experts and others. It may even be better to have to engage people on contract. We shall presently have to deal with appointments such as for Sindri Fertiliser Works or other governmental business undertakings. These have to be run on business lines and we should follow more or less the business method of appointment there. Our governmental activities are spreading out and cannot be considered from the old administrative point of view only.

Service interests and the public good must of course not come against each other. The whole purpose of this service is to do public good. It is also true that a service should be contented and assured of security and prospects. But, again, service in specialised branches of knowledge is of a different kind than an administrative service. In India the scope for such specialised services is growing and there is no question of lack of opportunity to the person who is competent. Here competence and experience are even more important than in the routine services.

This general question has come up once or twice before the Cabinet and some of the Chief Ministers have also written to me about it. As our specialised and social and industrial activities increase the old system does not function satisfactorily. To give an instance, the new Housing Factory in Delhi required some technical experts. The matter was referred to the U.P.S.C. In the normal course

3. S.S. Sokhey was Director, Haffkine Institute, Bombay, 1932-49.

4. Nehru had noted on 22 August, "The U.P.S.C. is an excellent institution, but probably not suited for dealing with scientific and technical persons." Patel replied that Nehru, besides supporting the Health Minister's recommendation, had expressed some doubts about the capacity of the U.P.S.C. to advise in these matters.

they laid down some terms and advertised. After about eight months they came to the conclusion that no suitable person was available on those terms. Then they had to go through the same routine again, changed the terms and advertised. Presumably another eight months go by. Meanwhile an important and expensive enterprise of Government suffers for lack of trained supervision. Private business could not carry on in this way. They would have chosen a person fairly quickly on contract, tested him and either kept him or dismissed him. In such cases the procedure of the U.P.S.C. involves great delay and is therefore not suitable.

Under the Constitution it is open to the President to lay down other methods of selection for certain specialised branches. I would personally think that whatever special selection board is appointed by the President, it should contain a member of the U.P.S.C. also so that contacts and uniformity might be maintained.

In any kind of work of a scientific or technical nature, and specially building up of a scheme or project, certain continuity is desirable. Rapid changes interfere with progress of that work because that work is not routine work, but requires a certain training and aptitude for it. In view of H.M. Health's strongly held opinion that the present Director General of Health Services, Dr Raja,⁵ is not only doing good work but his presence is very desirable for the continuation of that work, it seems to me that we have little choice in the matter. From such information as is available, H.M. Health's opinion has been confirmed. She is in charge of her Ministry and of the work of that Ministry. While her opinion should not be a final opinion, it must have very great weight and it is only for very extraordinary reasons that it should be overruled. While the U.P.S.C. might make an excellent original choice, their opinion about the continuation of a person in service is of less value than that of a person who has had personal knowledge of the kind of work done. The U.P.S.C. will naturally judge largely by academic qualifications and the type of work a person has done and the position he has occupied. There will be no personal experience there.

As a matter of fact, the post of the D.G.H.S. is not one which is initially filled by the U.P.S.C. I believe it is sanctioned directly by the Minister of Health. It was sent to the U.P.S.C. because there was a question of an extension.

I do not think there is anything contrary to any rules or regulations in our extending the period of service of Dr Raja even though, unfortunately, the U.P.S.C. are not in agreement with this.

I would, therefore, accept the view of the Minister of Health and recommend the extension of Dr Raja's term by another two years so that he may complete the important work he is doing now.

5. K.C.K. Ettan Raja; Director General of Health Services, 1948-52; Officer on Special Duty, Ministry of Health, for the development of the All India Institute of Medical Sciences, New Delhi, 1952-56.

2. To B.C. Roy¹

New Delhi
October 7, 1950

My dear Bidhan,

Our Minister for Information & Broadcasting, R.R. Diwakar, has brought to my notice some correspondence that has passed between Mrs Zinkin² and Amal Home.³ It appears that Amal Home has been insisting on foreign press correspondents supplying to him copies of their dispatches after filing, for information of Government. In the course of a letter to Mrs Zinkin he says that "while ordinarily Government would neither expect nor ask foreign correspondents to submit copies of their dispatches to the Director of Publicity, Government, in special circumstances, reserve to themselves the right to ask for such copies."

This subject, I think, was mentioned when I was in Calcutta last⁴ and I have a faint recollection that I talked to you about it. (Not this particular matter, but the subject). We have naturally had to consider how we should deal with foreign correspondents and their dispatches on many occasions during the past three or four years. We came to the definite conclusion that we should not ask them to supply us with copies of their dispatches, and at no time have we done so. Such demand for copies is not the normal procedure in countries other than the so-called totalitarians or where censorship prevails.

The demand, therefore, made by Amal Home was opposed to the policy we have laid down and to which we have strictly adhered and to the assurances given by us to foreign pressmen. You will appreciate that it is embarrassing for us to give assurances to foreign pressmen in Delhi and to be told that they are not being carried out in Calcutta or elsewhere. I hope, therefore, that you will issue clear directions on this subject stating that no demand should be made on such foreign correspondents for copies of their dispatches.

Apart from being the general rule followed in most countries, this is good policy. It is exceedingly unwise to do things which irritate pressmen. Our Directors of Publicity are supposed to go out of their way to oblige pressmen, to give them available information and generally to see that they understand and appreciate the Government's point of view. If they proceed in a manner so as to irritate and antagonize pressmen, then they fail to do what they are expected to do.

1. J.N. Collection.
2. Taya Zinkin (b. 1918); came to live in India in 1945 when she married Maurice Zinkin of the I.C.S.; correspondent of *The Guardian* and *The Economist*, 1950-1960, and later of *Le Monde* and the *Wall Street Journal*; wrote *India Changes* (1958), *Caste Today* (1962), *Reporting India* (1962), *India* (1965), *Gandhi* (1965), and *Challenges in India* (1966), and, together with her husband, *Britain and India, Requiem for Empire* (1964).
3. Director of Publicity, Government of West Bengal.
4. Nehru visited Calcutta from 14 to 16 March 1950.

This can only lead to adverse comments in the foreign press, and to general irritation all round. I find from the many papers that have been sent to me that there has been a great deal of irritation, chiefly about copies of interviews being shown before filing. I do not understand what all this is about. We do not deal with newspapermen in this way here. If we talk to a pressman, we have to rely on what he says. We may give him something in writing or we may ask him to show us his report of an interview, but we cannot and should not ask for dispatches to be shown to us before they are sent off.

We have had previously some complaints about the way pressmen have generally been treated in Calcutta. This does us no good, whatever the facts may be. Could you kindly look into this matter?

Yours,
Jawahar

3. To Ajit Prasad Jain¹

New Delhi
October 10, 1950

My dear Ajit,

In another letter I have written to you, I have mentioned that I do not see any sense of urgency about our work. Hard work, no doubt, is put in, but that sense of achieving results quickly is not evident. We cannot somehow get out of official routines. This is bad enough from the point of view of the whole Government, but it is particularly unfortunate in the case of refugees and rehabilitation.

When the Rehabilitation Ministry was started,² I tried to emphasise that this Ministry should be completely different from others. It was not routine work; it was urgent social work, and therefore it must be looked upon and provided for differently. In spite of my wishes, it gradually drifted into the old governmental channels with the same sets of officers, etc.,—Secretary, Joint Secretary, Deputy Secretaries, Superintendents, Assistants and how many more. Papers went through this ladder of officers and responsibility was divided and decisions were delayed. Ultimately, when the Rehabilitation Ministry did come to a decision, Finance or someone else held it up.

Finding that my purpose had not been served, I appointed a Rehabilitation Board within the Ministry, but autonomous. We directed them specially to keep away from government routine. But, again, the machine was too big for them and swallowed them. Ultimately, we abolished the Rehabilitation Board.

1. J.N. Collection.

2. The Ministry of Relief and Rehabilitation started functioning from September 1947.

So, there we are and we somehow cannot get out of old methods of dealing with urgent social problems. These old methods have nothing to do with social problems. Even in regard to State-owned industry we find that the old methods are expensive and dilatory. The Rehabilitation Ministry is essentially one which deals with social and human problems, often of a very urgent nature. If even this Ministry can only work in the old ruts with repeated notings on files, then it is not surprising that our work is slow. In spite of this, I recognise that a great deal has been done by the Rehabilitation Ministry. But I wonder if we cannot improve the whole set up.

There is the question of economy now troubling all of us so much. Personally I have long been convinced that all our Government of India offices are overstaffed and this leads not only to greater expenditure, but also to inefficiency; not that the people are not working hard enough, but the system is wrong. The same papers are dealt with by many persons. I think it is this system that requires change and speeding up, so that only persons with some responsibility should deal with papers and there should not be too much noting which merely adds to the burden of work without producing results. I have been wondering if we could not make some radical change of this type in the Rehabilitation Ministry. Many people should not deal with the same paper. Some responsible person should deal with it and if anything goes wrong, he will be held at fault for it.

There is the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation.³ Presumably, the Finance Ministry deals with this. What part have you got in it? This Corporation should have been run on strict business lines or, if you like, as a bank is run. But we work it like a Government department in the normal way. I think this also might be improved.

If we looked at these questions in the way I have suggested, I think we would have both economy and greater efficiency.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. The Rehabilitation Finance Administration, an autonomous corporation under the control of the Ministry of Finance at the Centre, was set up in June 1948 to provide financial assistance on reasonable terms to displaced persons to enable them to settle in business or industry.

4. To Baldev Singh¹

New Delhi
October 10, 1950

My dear Baldev Singh,²

I have your letter of the 9th October enclosing a note from the Commander-in-Chief.³ We have already decided, quite clearly and specifically, that we are not going to take what are called civil defence measures. Indeed, we criticised some such steps that had been taken in Punjab some months ago. The Commander-in-Chief should be told quite clearly that this continues to be our position and that we are entirely opposed to any measures such as defence against air-raids, etc. It is evident that the Commander-in-Chief has been impressed by what he has read about the steps being taken in the United Kingdom. The case of the United Kingdom differs completely from India's. There is certainly not only a chance but a dangerous chance of the U.K. having to face enemy bombing in case war comes. So far as we are concerned, there is no near chance of our being involved in any war. Even if there is a world war, we shall try not to be involved in it. We cannot, of course, guarantee what might happen at later stages.

The international situation is a very dangerous one from the point of view of large-scale war. India has taken up a definite position in regard to it and we propose to adhere to that position. It may be said with a fair measure of certainty that even if war breaks out on a wide scale, India will not be endangered at least till we take some new step. There is thus no question of our being taken by surprise. Any so-called civil defence measures that we might take now would be entirely contrary to our policy and would indeed be injurious to it. Instead of stepping up public morale, it would create panic and thus also cause injury. There should, therefore, be no talk at all of civil defence measures anywhere and no reference to it.

The situation vis-a-vis Pakistan is not good, chiefly because of the hysteria that has seized the Government and people of Pakistan. I do not think they would be foolish enough to indulge in any kind of aggression. We should, of course, be prepared to meet any aggression if and when it occurs. Even from that point of view, any civil defence measures of the type mentioned are completely undesirable.

This is not a question of expenditure. We oppose this on larger grounds of policy and public morale and the good of the nation.

I am returning the C-in-C.'s note.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Minister for Defence.

3. General K.M. Cariappa.

5. To Sampurnanand¹

New Delhi
October 21, 1950

My dear Sampurnanand,

Your letter of the 18th October reached me today. Why you have apologised for it, I do not know; nor do I understand why you call it either the first or the last time that you may write to me in this way. Anyhow, the speed with which I reply to your letter should convince you that I appreciate your writing to me.

It is rather odd that I should remember distinctly your letter to me written over eight years ago, to which you refer, but I have no recollection of what I said in reply.² Your quotation from that reply must be more or less accurate, because undoubtedly I felt that way. I still feel that way, except for the fact that I do not quite know what we are sticking to, and also that sticking process itself has got rather unstuck in many ways.

You are perfectly right in calling me to order when I say that every official whose integrity is in doubt should be dismissed forthwith.³ It is not so easy as all that, as I know. But the real difficulty, as far as I can make out, is in driving the guilt home.

I also agree with you about the mistake we made in allowing the old structure of Government to continue almost unchanged.⁴ As a matter of fact, that mistake was almost inevitable in the circumstances and in the nature of our struggle. It seems to me that the very ease with which we succeeded had its own drawbacks and we cannot get over them. We have called ourselves a revolutionary body and undoubtedly we were so. But we functioned only partly in the revolutionary sense. Gandhiji, with his genius, found a method of action or inaction, which was peculiarly suited to the passivity of India's mind and habits. We succeeded, but that passivity itself came in our way and now again obstructs us. In the ultimate analysis, our failings are not of this method or that, but are inherent in us as a people. We are

1. Sampurnanand Papers, National Archives of India.
2. Sampurnanand, Minister for Education and Labour, U.P. Government, wrote that he had expressed his inability to attend the A.I.C.C. meeting at Bombay in 1942 because there was little chance for a non-member of the Working Committee to make his opinion heard, unless he adopted the obstructive tactic of moving an amendment to every official resolution. "While appreciating my point of view you wrote back in reply, 'those of us who have stuck together for so many years cannot afford to drift apart'."
3. Sampurnanand, in his letter of 18 October 1950, referred to Nehru's remarks at an informal discussion that he would like every official with doubtful integrity to be dismissed forthwith, and asked whether he was able to dismiss anyone in that way.
4. Sampurnanand stated that at the time of taking over the reins of Government "we forgot that we were a revolutionary body" and added that a new pattern of Government should have been evolved brushing aside the old structure.

changing of course, but much too slowly. Our social background and structure are conservative, unchanging and static, apart from lacking unity.

Nevertheless we might have done better at the time of the change-over. But the fact remains that we did not, partly because we really did not intend to do so, though some may have thought of it; partly because immediately the change came, there also came enormous upheavals.

The system is perpetuating itself, because we are allowing it to do so.⁵ I do not think the system itself had that strength or has it even now. We lack the strength or the common purpose to change it. Undoubtedly some advantages have come to us, because of having a running machine. But equally undoubtedly the disadvantages have been great and have tied us up. We might have changed our Public Service Commissions and we should have done so. But what is the quality of the other people? Not very promising. If our Congress organisation is in a bad way, it is not entirely due to the functioning of the State apparatus, but to inner defects. In China corruption has been rooted out because of a strong party with a crusading spirit.

Am I laying exclusive emphasis on the ideal of a Welfare State?⁶ I have mentioned it on a few occasions, because it was challenged in public by prominent men, challenged not from any ideological or spiritual ground but from purely materialistic considerations. We have to evolve a philosophy of life which will give content and meaning to our activities. We have in fact to have a picture of the future, for which we can work. Without a future, we go to pieces in the present. But whatever philosophy of life we may evolve, surely bread and houses are a part of it.

You accuse me of not having spoken to my old friends in the U.P., if I had any complaint to make.⁷ There may be some truth in this, but I do not feel that you are wholly right in your criticism. Indeed, I have had a feeling of being ignored and rather cast out by the U.P. Being somewhat sensitive, I did not wish to push myself in, when I was not wanted. During the last year and a half, practically no

5. Sampurnanand wrote that public servants having the pre-1947 mentality continued to be recruited and trained to keep up the conventions of bureaucratic red tapism and self-interest. He added, "We should have done away with these Public Service Commissions and introduced into the services new personnel drawn from the ranks of public workers."
6. Expressing surprise at Nehru's "laying so much exclusive emphasis on the ideal of the Welfare State," Sampurnanand wrote that "bread and houses alone have never inspired men to noble deeds of sacrifice" and that a philosophy of life was needed to give content and meaning to Indian nationalism.
7. Sampurnanand wrote that the tallest among the leaders in U.P. had "proved to be the king among his peers. If therefore you felt at any time that U.P. politics were no longer what they used to be, you could easily have spoken to some of your old friends and straightened things out.... If things are as they should not be, you cannot escape your share of the responsibility."

approach of any kind on any topic almost has been made to me from the U.P. When I have gone there rather rarely, I have found an atmosphere which stifled me. Of our old colleagues and comrades the only two who remain in the U.P. are you and Pantji. Others have spread out elsewhere. (I am not including Tandon, because with all my affection for him, our thoughts ran in different directions.) I have hardly seen you during these two years or more. Pantji has come here from time to time. I had some long talks with him. Gradually, I began to feel that we went along parallel lines, which did not often meet. I felt also that he was a little uncomfortable and unhappy during our talks. So I hesitated to repeat these performances.

This is not a new development. Ever since the late thirties I have felt progressively out of the U.P. Congress politics, although I functioned there to some extent. At first I had to withdraw from our local Allahabad politics. Then gradually my Congress work in the U.P. was limited to occasional attendance at P.C.C. or Council meetings. During the first Congress Ministry, I decided not to interfere except when a matter was referred to me. When I came back from Europe in 1936, I felt a stranger in the then Congress circles. Of course when a crisis came, we all pulled together.

You refer to my criticism in public of State Governments.⁸ I have tried hard to avoid this and have seldom referred to it except in the most general terms applicable to the whole of India. When I go to U.P., a host of memories overwhelms me and my normal defences are swept away. And so I speak almost automatically what comes to my mind. I say things sometimes which I should not say and the fault is mine. But the emotional stress, under which I labour, is considerable.

I referred at Aminabad to the *Bakrid* day incident⁹ because it was fresh in my mind. I was speaking about communalism and the Hindu reaction. I gave this as a recent instance. I have found that there is often an attempt to justify or excuse such incidents and that seems to me completely wrong. We have to deal with a public which, because of circumstances or whatever else it might be, has gone completely astray on this subject. If any impression has got to be produced on them, then one has to hit hard and be uncompromising. I was not really thinking of criticising the Government as such but rather of the responsibility of Government. No Government can stop such an incident. But I should like every Government to speak with far greater vigour than it normally does.

8. Referring to Nehru's remarks during his speech at Lucknow on 3 October 1950 about the *Id-uz-Zuha* incident which "seemed to make out that the U.P. Government was lax in the discharge of its duty and the incident was the consequence of culpable negligence," Sampurnanand wrote that criticism by Nehru in public of State Governments was unfair. He added that utterances of leaders like Nehru were liable to be distorted and exploited by those who wanted to weaken the Congress.

9. See *ante*, p. 22.

Two facts in the U.P. have pained me excessively. One is the succession of incidents at Ayodhya. I think that the early handling of that issue was weak in the extreme and subsequent consequences have flowed from this weakness. These consequences take us very far and far beyond the confines of the U.P. The second thing is the fact of over 200,000 Muslims quitting their homes and lands in North Western U.P. early this year for Pakistan.¹⁰ That by itself was a demonstration that Muslims in the U.P. are full of fear and have no security. We talk a great deal of Hindus in Pakistan having no security and there is truth in what we say. I suddenly saw the same thing in reverse in the U.P. and without any sudden cause. It demonstrated, as nothing else could have done, the state of the Muslim in the U.P. I know that Government did their best, and law and order was maintained. I know also that every outrage was condemned. Nevertheless, the fact remained that in our Province such things could happen and such an atmosphere of fear should spread among large numbers of people. I have no doubt in my mind that the responsibility for it must rest, in some measure at least, with the Congress. Indeed some of the speeches¹¹ that I have read of Congressmen in the U.P. were completely of the Hindu Mahasabha variety.

We have a multitude of problems and difficulties and at the back of them is the basic fact of our cultural backwardness and our incapacity to work hard. In the political sphere there is a definite pulling in different directions between the more or less conservatives and the more or less radicals. It is difficult of course to draw a hard and fast line. Certainly let us sit down calmly and sift the causes of our present day weaknesses and impurities. Haven't we tried to do so during the past few years in the U.P. at least? We have not succeeded. Still we have to go on trying. With all our devotion to the organisation which has nurtured us, when we find that organisation itself becoming a creature of cliques and factions, then enthusiasm wanes.

It is quite extraordinary to notice the difference between our external position today and our internal condition. India is functioning on the international plane in a way which is surprising both our friends and our opponents. Internally, we tend to disintegrate. We all talk about putting an end to the frustration that has seized our people, and yet we continue to act in a way which adds to that frustration.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

10. See *Selected Works* (Second Series), Vol. 14 Part II, pp. 293-297.

11. Nehru appears to have had in mind such speeches as those of Purushottamdas Tandon and Vishambhar Dayal Tripathi.

1. Message to Owen Dixon¹

Thank you for your message of the 15th² which I received today. I have given its contents anxious thought and am communicating to you frankly my considered reactions to it. I must confess to you that your message surprised me greatly. The main proposal in it in regard to conditions governing plebiscite is completely novel and has not been previously mentioned at any stage during the last two years or more.

2. We have not opposed at any time an overall plebiscite for the State as a whole but you made some alternative suggestions because you came to the conclusion that there was no prospect of an agreement as to conditions preliminary to such a plebiscite. On this basis I informed you that India was prepared to discuss alternative plan involving partial plebiscite³ provided Pakistan was also prepared to do so.

3. We have always recognised that any plan for a plebiscite should be such that the people concerned would be enabled to express their feelings freely and without fear. But your present proposal of setting up a new administrative body to carry on the functions of Government is entirely opposed to our basic stand on the Kashmir issue. None of us here got the impression during our talks with you in Delhi that anything like this was in your mind. All that we discussed were the conditions governing the overall plebiscite. What you have suggested now goes far beyond anything that we could possibly consider or accept or what, in my view, the requirements of a fair and impartial plebiscite would justify. Your proposals would involve the supersession of the lawful Government of the State for a period. We cannot agree to this in any way and for any period.

4. Your proposal envisages the participation of Pakistan in the plebiscite and the calling in of Pakistan troops. Both would, in effect, constitute a surrender to aggression.

1. New Delhi, 16 August 1950. J.N. Collection. Owen Dixon, the U.N. representative, was at this time in Karachi.
2. Owen Dixon informed Nehru that he sought to include in his plan for a partial plebiscite in Kashmir a provision requiring the setting up in the plebiscite area, until the polls, of a U.N. administrative body empowered to exclude any troops and also to requisition them, if necessary, from any party. Referring to doubts expressed by Pakistan about the provision being acceptable to India, he asked for Nehru's views on it, before arranging a conference of the two Prime Ministers to consider the plan further.
3. At the tripartite conference with the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan held at New Delhi from 20 to 24 July 1950, Dixon proposed a plebiscite only in areas where the wishes of the inhabitants were uncertain, notably the Kashmir Valley; the areas where their wishes were known should be allotted to India and Pakistan as the case might be. Dixon was informed of India's acceptance of the plan on 2 August 1950.

5. It has always been our view that, in the event of a plebiscite, the people of Kashmir should decide their future for themselves. Kashmiris who have gone out of the State should, of course, be entitled to return for this purpose. But we do not think that others have any claim to participate in plebiscite campaign.

6. Whatever steps might be taken, we have always made it clear that the security of the State cannot be endangered. We have had painful experience of aggression and we cannot afford to take further risks of this kind. On no account can we permit any Pakistan troops to enter the plebiscite area.

7. Before concluding I should like to make one further observation. In paragraph 1 of your message you say that for certain reasons the Prime Minister of Pakistan has expressed to you the unwillingness of his Government to receive or consider any alternative proposal or plan.⁴ Later on, you say that Pakistan is ready to attend conference on footing that her presence in your intended plan of provision for limited plebiscite will not prove an insuperable objection. There seems to be contradiction between two positions and I am puzzled by it. This hardly justifies any optimism regarding genuineness or desire of Pakistan to seek settlement on basis of alternative principle of partial plebiscite.

8. There are many other aspects of this matter which deserve consideration. But I do not wish to lengthen this reply. Should you, however, come to Delhi, I would gladly explain our position fully to you to avoid any possibility of any misunderstanding.⁵

4. Dixon stated that Pakistan was unequivocally of the view that the future of the State of Jammu and Kashmir should be decided by a plebiscite under the agreed U.N. resolutions but after he assured Liaquat Ali that consideration by him of an alternate plan involving partial plebiscite would not prejudice Pakistan's position, the latter had agreed to consider it.
5. Dixon replied on 18 August that Nehru's objections to his suggestion made at New Delhi of temporarily entrusting the Government of the State to a U.N. administration to ensure a free and fair plebiscite did not appear to him to apply to his plan providing for partition and partial plebiscite. The view that the lawful Government of the State would be superseded during the period of plebiscite did not take sufficient account of the relative size of the area involved in partial plebiscite. He added that Pakistan could not continue to be described as an aggressor as she would be entitled to occupy territory allotted to her under the plan.

2. Meeting with Owen Dixon¹

I met Sir Owen Dixon at 4 p.m. today at my house and he was with me for about an hour and twenty minutes. Much that he said was a repetition of what he had

1. Note to Secretary-General, Ministry of External Affairs, 20 August 1950. J.N. Collection. G.S. Bajpai was the Secretary-General.

told Shri G.S. Bajpai, the day before. The interview was friendly. It was not argumentative, because there was not much room left for argument and we had arrived at a final stage.

He began by saying that he did not wish to trouble me much and to take up my time and he had come to say good-bye. I told him that I was exceedingly sorry if any kind of misunderstanding had arisen in his mind as to what I had said on some previous occasion. It was evident that we did not agree, but there was no reason why we should misunderstand each other. I had been greatly surprised to get his telegram from Karachi making a proposal about the transfer of Government, because such a thing was totally inconceivable to me. I must have failed in explaining my position to him adequately on previous occasions.

He referred to our talks previously, when Mr Liaquat Ali Khan was here, his mentioning to me about Shaikh Abdullah's suggestion to him which hinted at some kind of a coalition Government in Kashmir with Ghulam Abbas² in it, and his (Sir Owen Dixon's) suggestion of a Government in Commission, so on and so forth.³

Ultimately we both agreed that this chapter was closed. The overall plebiscite could not be held for lack of agreement as to the conditions preceding it and the partial plebiscite was also to be ruled out if the conditions he had proposed were considered essential. Therefore the question of plebiscite as a whole was ruled out.

What might happen in the future was difficult to say except that the *status quo* continued for the present. Sir Owen Dixon said that he would be going back about the middle of next week and would stay a few days in England *en route* to Lake Success, where he would present his report. He intended the report to be factual and, as far as possible, to avoid criticisms of Governments. Before going, he would have to deal with the press and issue a statement.⁴ This might be issued on

2. Initially an active supporter of Shaikh Abdullah, he participated in the movement against the rule of the Maharaja in 1932; but later moved away and revived the conservative Muslim Conference, 1940; was arrested in October 1946; went to Pakistan on release in 1948 to head the Muslim Conference there; became head of the 'Azad Kashmir' Government, 1949, but resigned in December 1951 following schism in the party.
3. At the New Delhi conference, Dixon proposed three alternatives: (i) a coalition government formed by Shaikh Abdullah and Ghulam Abbas or the portfolios being shared by members belonging to the two sides; (ii) an administration comprising trusted persons holding high judicial or administrative office, half of them representing Hindus and the other half Muslims, with a chairman deputed by the U.N.; and (iii) an administration composed entirely of U.N. representatives.
4. Dixon declared at Karachi on 22 August 1950 that he had failed to bring about an agreement between India and Pakistan on conditions necessary for an overall plebiscite and his subsequent proposal for a partial plebiscite and partition of the State was also rejected. He, however, thought that the two Governments would be able to solve the problem through negotiation.

Wednesday or possibly Thursday at the latest. In this statement he would have to say something about his first attempt to have an overall plebiscite in accordance with the Security Council Resolution and a subsequent attempt in favour of a partial plebiscite. In both these attempts the initiative was his, but unfortunately he had failed to get an agreement.

He discussed the question of Observers. I said that probably it would be desirable for some of the Observers to continue for sometime at least. So far as we were concerned, we did not think in terms of war and I did not expect any serious crisis arising at the ceasefire line. But he said there could always be incidents, which might grow. That certainly was a possibility.

3. Mediation by Owen Dixon¹

Jawaharlal Nehru: I do not know how many of you, gentlemen, are acquainted with *Alice in Wonderland* because, as Alice said, this thing Kashmir gets curiouser and curiouser. Perhaps the other book is more appropriate, *Alice Through the Looking Glass*,² where everything becomes gradually inverted and loses its natural shape and appears in a different form completely. It seems to me, looking back over this Kashmir episode for the last two and a half years, that all kinds of attempts are made for us to leave the real world and enter a world behind some looking-glass where everything is inverted.

There is not much for me to say about Sir Owen Dixon's statement. It is a brief statement and he has not entered into any details. He has indicated, as you remember, first of all that there was a good deal of discussion for four or five days in regard to the holding of an overall plebiscite in the whole State of Jammu and Kashmir. For a long time past there has been agreement on this question of holding an overall plebiscite, the principle of it.

It is as well to remember that this whole idea of a plebiscite originated from India and so far as we are concerned it has been a thing between us and the people of Kashmir and the United Nations in which Pakistan has no say, although no

1. Press conference, New Delhi, 24 August 1950. From the *National Herald*, 25 August 1950, and File No. 43(102)/50-PMS. Extracts.
2. The two well-known stories of Lewis Carroll.

doubt they might be interested. This has been stated again and again in the course of these conversations and resolutions that have been passed.

So for the first four or five days we discussed every aspect of this question. This plebiscite idea had been accepted all round. We had got jammed during the past year or more over the conditions that should govern the plebiscite, or over other matters that should happen before the plebiscite started. You know most of these. There was a question of the 'Azad Kashmir' forces and there was a question of the Northern Areas³ and there was a question of demilitarization and all these things had persisted. There had been no agreement about them and as a result of four days' talks with Sir Owen Dixon the old disagreements on those issues continued.

Then Sir Owen Dixon came to the conclusion that it was not worthwhile pursuing any further this idea of overall plebiscite and our talks practically ended there.

Later he said that he felt that before going back he might explore other avenues too and he made a general suggestion to us, "Would you be prepared to consider and explore other avenues?" We said, "Certainly we are prepared to explore any avenue which would lead to a settlement." He put forward two or three approaches to it. Ultimately one remained and that was, roughly speaking, a partial plebiscite. He has himself indicated it. We said that we did not like it and that it could be criticised in many ways. Nevertheless, we were prepared to consider this in case it might offer some way for a solution. This was the broad approach. It was not a definite proposal by itself. It was just a vague talk. We said further that it was no good even considering it broadly unless Pakistan is also prepared to consider the proposal in the same way. Thereupon Sir Owen Dixon went back to Karachi.

We had made it clear to him that we would be prepared to consider without any commitment any proposal that he makes, but on this condition that Pakistan is also prepared to consider it. That is to say, as we said to him, there has been a tendency on the part of Pakistan not to commit itself to anything; to ask the other party to make various commitments, take advantage of anything said by the other side and not to say anything itself.

We said, "What is the good of our discussing anything unless any proposal that you put forward is, apart from its details, apart from any final commitment, in its broad aspects accepted by Pakistan as a matter worthy of discussion at least." We were informed by Sir Owen Dixon that Pakistan rejected this completely without committing itself even to the idea of considering it in that context, because they thought that it might weaken their other position. Nevertheless, he said, having made it clear that they rejected it completely, they were prepared to talk about it. We pointed out to Sir Owen that that was a very unsatisfactory state of affairs.

3. The sparsely populated and mountainous region in the north of Jammu and Kashmir State.

Then he indicated certain other conditions that he had in mind in regard to the proposal for a partial plebiscite. The major condition was—there were other conditions too—a complete transfer of the present Kashmir Government to an U.N. authority. Now I confess that that took us completely by surprise. Because in the course of the last two and a half years or more any such proposal had not been made at all and, if it had been made, it would have been given short shrift by us at any time. It struck us as an astonishing proposal from many points of view. So we said that we could not possibly consider that. That was the end of the proposal. That in brief is the story.

So that, so far as Sir Owen Dixon's talks with us were concerned, he came to the conclusion after four or five days' talk that an overall plebiscite was not possible. Exploring the possibility of a partial plebiscite, he came to the conclusion that in the present context that too was not possible. So there we are. We go back to where we started from.

In Mr Liaquat Ali Khan's press conference yesterday, he has laid stress on two resolutions of the U.N. Commission. One, I think, is dated 13th August 1948, and the other 5th January 1949.⁴ Those resolutions were accepted by us and we stand by those resolutions completely today. That is to say, those resolutions were accepted by us after certain correspondence with the Commission in which we asked for some elucidation which was given to us and on the basis of that we accepted them.

Our point is that the various new proposals that have been made are contrary to those very resolutions as elucidated to us. Just let me give you one instance. We laid the greatest stress throughout on the sovereignty of the Government of Jammu and Kashmir over the whole State all the time, including that part of the State which happens to be occupied by Pakistan forces. That was agreed to. In fact, the Plebiscite Commissioner, when he was to be appointed, was to be appointed by the Kashmir State Government, and he was to report to them apart from reporting to the Commission. You see the whole background. Now to be told that that Government itself, which is supposed to appoint him and receive the report, is to go and the Plebiscite Commissioner himself becomes the Government and reports to himself seems rather odd and Alice in Wonderland business.

Take again the other factors. I would ask you to read the August 13th Resolution and the Government of India letter on that Resolution, pointing out what our interpretation given in the course of conversation was and their reply accepting the interpretation that we had put. It is not merely our interpretation, but they have

4. Liaquat Ali had said that the two U.N.C.I.P. resolutions, taken together, provided for a ceasefire and demilitarisation of the State preparatory to the holding of a plebiscite and the sole reason why the State had not been demilitarised was India's refusal to withdraw her forces. India had sought to jump the ceasefire line by demanding control over the Northern Areas.

accepted that interpretation. If we proceed on that basis, whether it is in regard to the withdrawal of troops or any other matter, every single thing that was agreed to then is sought to be reopened.

Take this question of what subsequently came to be called demilitarization. The whole question arose thus: First of all, Pakistan troops had no business to be there and they had to withdraw; they had nothing to do with Indian troops or anything. In the very first major resolution of the Commission, they said in a mild language that Pakistan had created a new situation by the fact that it had sent its troops there.⁵

It was indeed a very new situation that had been created and therefore they had to withdraw. It was a mild way of putting it that they had committed aggression and that they must go back before any other step is taken. Therefore the Commission decided that the Pakistan troops had to go as well as the Pakistan nationals, the auxiliaries and the tribal folk. That was step number one.

Then they said that, when the Commission says that the Pakistan nationals and the auxiliaries and the tribal folk have gone, and the Pakistan regular forces are actually going away, India should reduce the number of her troops there because the danger to security is less. The object of sending Indian troops was to drive off the Pakistan troops, and if those troops are gone then the necessity for such large numbers becomes less.

At no time was it suggested that the question of the withdrawal of Pakistan troops or ours was on the same level. At no time was it suggested that India should withdraw all her troops because it was recognised that the defence of Kashmir was our responsibility, because it was recognised that there was aggression and there was danger of aggression whatever might be said of precautions taken, and we could not leave the door of Kashmir open to aggression. Therefore, it was decided that the Pakistan troops, etc., should withdraw and Indian troops in the State should be reduced in bulk—that was the word used, whatever it may mean—let us say, more than half.

But, and this is an important 'but', it was laid down by us clearly and admitted by the Commission that the number of Indian troops to be left there must always be looked upon from the security point of view, that is, we could take no risks, but we were prepared to withdraw them in large numbers. Taking everything into consideration at the time—whether the Pakistan forces or the 'Azad' forces were disbanded or not—the limiting factor always was the security of Kashmir.

5. The resolution of 13 August 1948 stated: "As the presence of troops of Pakistan in the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir constitutes a material change in the situation since it was represented by the Government of Pakistan before the Security Council the Government of Pakistan agrees to withdraw its troops from the State." The Commission in terms of the resolution was to secure the withdrawal of tribesmen and Pakistan nationals also from the State.

All these were certain admitted facts on which we were proceeding all along. Then a difficulty arose. We got jammed about the 'Azad Kashmir' troops—their disbandment and disarmament. That is one thing. The other was the Northern Areas. In regard to the Northern Areas too, it was as long ago as August 1948, immediately after the August 13th resolution—as far as I can remember, on the 20th August—that we drew their attention not only to the other facts, but to the Northern Areas in a separate letter,⁶ and they answered, "Yes, this matter had escaped our attention, but we recognize its importance and we shall deal with it later."

So right from the beginning our position has been perfectly clear on this subject and largely it was accepted by the Commission. When Mr Liaquat Ali Khan says that we are trying to go back on any international agreement or anything that we had agreed to, I do submit to him that he is completely wrong. There is nothing that we have agreed to in the course of our talks in the last two or three years that we are not prepared to honour, and I might add that we have agreed to much that normally we would never have agreed to, but we have agreed to it because of our great desire for a peaceful settlement.

There are some things which we have made perfectly clear right from the beginning of this Kashmir story that we can never accept. Whatever happens we are not going to accept anything which is harmful to Kashmir and which is against our pledges and which is derogatory to the dignity of India. We have said that the Kashmir people will decide their future. Whatever may happen, it is the people of Kashmir who are going to decide their future.

I mentioned to you about this Alice in Wonderland business. It seems to me quite extraordinary that the aggressor comes; for the sake of peace we go on agreeing to one step after another; gradually the aggressor wants equality with us in everything and, a step further, it wants predominance in everything. It is an astonishing position from every point of view of international or national law or practical effect.

No Government of India—I am not speaking for myself for the moment but for any Government of India that might exist now or later—can agree to the type of proposal that has been put forward of pushing out the present Government of Kashmir just to please Pakistan. This would be doing something which would appear to everybody in Kashmir, in India, and to the world that Pakistan has succeeded in its aggression and that, because in our desire for a settlement we were even prepared to recognise certain elements of the present position, it was being made a jumping-ground for further claims and demands—demands to dominate other places or to push out the present Government of Kashmir or India from places to which we were entitled by law, by Constitution and by fact and from every other point of view. As a matter of fact, I am not quite clear, but the kinds of

6. See *Selected Works* (Second Series), Vol. 7, p. 301.

proposals that were made to us might well have required all kinds of legal and constitutional changes.

Most of you, gentlemen, know very well the present Government of the Kashmir State. You know they are very, very far from being stooges of the Indian Government. Undoubtedly we agreed to their functioning there two and a half years ago, but we agreed because they represented a solid fact there, that is, they represented popular organizations, popular acceptance, and goodwill. We did not put them down there from the air, and they remain there by their own strength and not just because of a legal sanction given by us, although legal sanctions are important.

As I have referred to some of the older Resolutions, I might perhaps draw your attention to some of the old phrases also. I will read out to you some extracts from a letter that I wrote to the Chairman of the U.N. Commission⁷ on receipt of the Resolution of August 13, so that some parts of it might be clarified.

“I place the following for consideration before Your Excellency: That the Resolution should not be interpreted or applied in practice so as to bring into question the sovereignty of the Jammu and Kashmir Government over the portion of their territory evacuated by Pakistan troops.”

Now the position is that even the sovereignty over the other place in which they are sitting is being challenged and attempts are being made to uproot them for the time being. Then the letter runs on:

“That from our point of view the effective insurance of the security of the state against external aggression, from which Kashmir has suffered so much during the last ten months, was of the most vital significance and no less important than the observance of internal law and order, and that, therefore, the withdrawal of Indian troops and the strength of Indian forces maintained in Kashmir should be conditioned by this overriding factor. Thus, at any time the strength of the Indian forces maintained in Kashmir should be sufficient to ensure security against any form of external aggression as well as internal disorder.”

Observe again.

7. See *Selected Works* (Second Series), Vol. 7, pp. 301-304.

“That as regards Part III,⁸ should it be decided to seek a solution of the future of the state by means of a plebiscite, Pakistan should have no part in the organisation and conduct of the plebiscite or in any other matter of internal administration in the state.”

It is more than two years ago that we said this.

This is the answer of the Commission to this letter:

“The Commission requests me to convey to your Excellency its view that the interpretation of the Resolution as expressed in Paragraph 4 of your letter coincides with its own interpretation.”⁹

And this was paragraph 4 of my letter:

“If I understood you correctly, Part II of the Resolution¹⁰ does not envisage the creation of any of the conditions to which we have objected in paragraph 3(1) of this letter. In fact, you made it clear that the Commission was not competent to recognise the sovereignty of any authority over the evacuated areas other than that of the Jammu and Kashmir Government.”

Now you will observe that as long as two years ago we made our position perfectly clear. In accepting that Resolution of the Commission we went a long, long way in giving up our position. Naturally, the position for us to take would have been that we are not prepared to discuss this matter or deal with this matter at all till the whole State is freed from the aggressor and the invader. After that is the time for discussion; otherwise there is always the pressure of the aggressor, as one sees now. Because of our desire for settlement we were prepared to discuss this matter and at every step advantage was taken of that. In August 1948, we made our position perfectly clear and that has been our position throughout.

Then again in August 1948, I sent another letter and that was about the Northern Areas. This was what it said:

8. Part III of the Resolution of 13 August 1948 called upon the two Governments to reaffirm that “the future status of Jammu and Kashmir shall be determined in accordance with the will of the people” and that both Governments would ensure “fair and equitable conditions whereby such free expressions will be assured.”
9. This was conveyed to Nehru by the Commission on 25 August 1948.
10. Paragraph A3 of Part II of the Resolution stated that “pending a final resolution, the territory evacuated by the Pakistan troops will be administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the Commission.”

"You will recall that in our interview with the Commission on the 17th August, I dealt at some length with the position of the sparsely populated and mountainous region of the Jammu and Kashmir State in the north. The authority of the Government of Jammu and Kashmir over this region as a whole has not been challenged or disturbed, except by roving bands of hostiles, or in some places like Skardu which have been occupied by irregulars of Pakistan troops. The Commission's Resolution, as you agreed in the course of our interview on the 18th, does not deal with the problem of administration or defence in this large area. We desire that after Pakistan troops and irregulars have withdrawn from the territory, the responsibility for the administration of the evacuated areas should revert to the Government of Jammu and Kashmir and that for defence to us. The only exception that we should be prepared to accept would be Gilgit. We must be free to maintain garrisons at selected points in this area for the dual purpose of preventing the incursion of tribesmen, who obey no authority, and to guard the main trade routes from the State into Central Asia."¹¹

The reply of the Commission was:

"The Commission wishes me to confirm that, due to the peculiar conditions of this area, it did not specifically deal with the military aspect of the problem in its Resolution of 13th August. It believes, however, that the question raised in your letter could be considered in the implementation of the Resolution."¹²

Now I come to the Resolution of 5th January, that is just after the ceasefire.¹³ The whole idea was that the Plebiscite Administration was to be appointed formally by the Government of Jammu and Kashmir. The Plebiscite Administrator would derive from the State of Jammu and Kashmir the power he considers necessary for organising and conducting the plebiscite and further he would report the result thereof to the Commission and to the Government of Jammu and Kashmir, the whole conception being the continuance of the Government of Jammu and Kashmir and the Plebiscite Administrator looking after the plebiscite, not in regard to governmental functions. And now it is proposed that the Plebiscite Administrator himself becomes the Government, not only in regard to the plebiscite, but in regard to every other function of Government. That is a complete change-over—it may be for a period of six months or thereabouts.

Now, apart from the fact that we cannot agree to this, I am not aware of any Government anywhere which could accept such a proposal unless it was in a state

11. See *Selected Works* (Second Series), Vol. 7, p. 301.

12. This was conveyed to Nehru by Korbelt on 25 August 1948.

13. Ceasefire was declared by both India and Pakistan with effect from midnight on 1 January 1949.

of disruption. And the Government of India is neither in a state of disruption, nor does it propose to accept any proposal which is not only so contrary to its dignity and to the facts of the situation and to everything that has gone before during the last two years, but—and this is important—which is bound to give rise to all kinds of trouble because it is so patently a proposal of appeasing the aggressor and doing things at the aggressor's bidding, as if you wanted the aggressor to succeed. It means nothing else. Any such proposal would be an open declaration that you want the aggressor to succeed with all the psychological and other consequences that flow from it.

There is so much talk of a fair and impartial plebiscite in Kashmir. We do want it, but it is humanly impossible to have an election or a plebiscite which might be called an absolutely—a hundred per cent—fair one. By supporting one idea too much and banging it into the voter's head too much and things like that we influence the electorate. We put up with that kind of things in elections. All that you can do is to make it easy for every point of view to be expressed fairly before the voters. You do not go about changing Governments in order to ensure that the election should be fair. And if you go about doing that, you are doing the very reverse, because you have yourself come in the way of a fair plebiscite: by doing that you create conditions which make that plebiscite unfair and unreal, because that action itself has that consequence. I say definitely that if this proposal, apart from our totally being unable to accept it, is accepted the obvious effect of it would be to make the plebiscite unfair. Because then every voter will begin to think—whether that was the intention or not is another matter—that a certain pressure will be exercised on him. Fears will be roused by the very fact that the Government has been pushed out. Governments are not easily pushed out in that way. You can very well imagine the kind of conditions that it will be creating for the plebiscite itself. In Pakistan the whole atmosphere will be full of this, that they have kicked out the State Government and that they have kicked out the Government of India from Kashmir. The one thing which will make this plebiscite completely unfair, completely artificial and completely unreal is to give effect to the proposal to change the Government of the State. That is why I said that it is a case of Alice in Wonderland. Everything is put upside down. Proposals are made for justice which are grossly unfair and unjust; proposals are made to bring about a fair plebiscite which make it more unfair than it could possibly be otherwise.

We have always said, "Have any kind of supervision you like, bring in a hundred or a thousand observers, make them stand at every street corner, on the roadside, at the crossroads or at every polling booth, wherever you like. Do what you like about it." But this business of the observer becoming the Government is another matter.

Another thing is implied in it. As I pointed out, we have before talked about the Indian Army being in reduced numbers in Kashmir for security purposes. Now this new Government of the day proposed does not want to tolerate any Indian

Army, State Army or State militia and in fact I am not quite sure that it will tolerate even a policeman. It is a complete uprooting of everything. Why? Because we must have a 'fair plebiscite'! This really seems to me an extraordinarily illogical approach to the question and, so far as the Government of India is concerned, it is just impossible, whatever the consequences might be. There the matter ends.

If the overall plebiscite according to Sir Owen Dixon is out of the question—Sir Owen himself, for a variety of reasons, did not think it a very feasible proposition (probably he will deal with it in his report to the Security Council)—and if to a partial plebiscite conditions are attached which are absolutely impossible for us to accept, where are we? Both an overall plebiscite and a partial plebiscite go out. So we start from the beginning. I think it is about time that we started from the beginning and went back to some fundamental realities in regard to this Kashmir matter. There has been too much of proceeding along, what I consider, wrong premises. If you start from wrong premises, it will lead you to wrong conclusions. So I hope this will at least remove some of the cobwebs that have grown around Kashmir; it will clarify the situation and we would consider it as it is and not as some people imagine it should be.

Question: In view of Liaquat Ali Khan's assertion that the occupation of Kashmir by Indian troops was an act of aggression and could not therefore be regarded as legal, how do you propose to counter this argument in the Security Council?

JN: That is where *Alice in Wonderland* comes in. I do not know whether the Security Council have read *Alice in Wonderland*. However, it is a fact that right from the beginning our trouble has been the avoidance by the Security Council of solving this very basic question. After all in our original complaint to the Security Council we were accusing Pakistan of aggression.¹⁴ It was a straightforward issue. What did we ask? We simply asked the Security Council to tell Pakistan not to help the raiders. It is a very simple request. Either our facts were correct or they were not. If they were correct, then the natural consequence followed from it that they should ask Pakistan to stop it. We made no wider proposal which might do anything injurious to Pakistan. All that we asked for was, "Please ask Pakistan not to aid or abet the raiders." That question still remains unanswered. Pakistan denied having sent any help to them or having sent their army. Then the Security

14. On 1 January 1948, the Government of India informed the Security Council of the existence of a dangerous situation between India and Pakistan "owing to the aid which invaders consisting of nationals of Pakistan and of tribesmen...are drawing from Pakistan for operations against Jammu and Kashmir, a state which has acceded to the Dominion of India and is part of India," and requested it "to call upon Pakistan to put an end immediately to the giving of such assistance which is an act of aggression against India."

Council passed a resolution¹⁵ calling upon both parties as far as possible not to do anything to worsen the situation. We both of us assured them that we would not. We could not help if an aggressor comes but stop him, but we would try not to worsen the situation. That was at the beginning of 1948. Sometime round about May, that is, four or five months later, we told them in the Security Council of this continuing aggression.¹⁶ At first we had complained about the tribal raiders, but later we said that Pakistan troops were also there. But this was ignored. We complained to the Pakistan Government but they denied it stoutly. If you keep any files of Pakistan newspapers, please read them. Even after the Commission arrived here you will find in those papers anger expressed at India's statement that Pakistan troops were in Kashmir. They made angry denials of this fact and said that we were defaming Pakistan. As a matter of fact we had some Pakistan prisoners of war. We had an exhibition of Pakistan war material used. This patent denial was extraordinary. When the Commission came and they wanted themselves to visit the areas of military operations, it was obviously impossible to hide the fact as to who was fighting and whom. It was then in the middle of 1948 that it was admitted privately to the Commission (though we came to know of it only later) by the Pakistan authorities: "Yes, we have got Pakistan regular armed forces in Kashmir." Of course, they said: "We have sent them there to protect ourselves in case of an Indian invasion on Pakistan through Kashmir." An even surer method of invasion would have been to go to Tibet, march through Central Asia and come down through the Karakoram Pass. So then they admitted something which up to even forty-eight hours before they had violently denied.

They had been denying it throughout in the Security Council, their newspapers were angrily denying it all the time, till they admitted it. There was no necessity for them to send the Pakistan troops because our attacking Pakistan through the mountain passes is patently absurd. If the worst came to the worst—so that we have to attack Pakistan—we go straight; we do not go round about; no military commander would think of it. But leave that out. After both the parties have given an assurance that we would not do anything to worsen the situation, surely the sending of your regular army was completely going against that assurance. The least they could have done was this. Suppose they felt they were in danger, they should have informed the Security Council, "We are in danger and we are very sorry we have to send our army there". Instead they went on denying it while they were sending the army. This is a most extraordinary behaviour.

That was our case. The Pakistan case is, as Mr Liaquat Ali Khan stated, that we have committed aggression in Kashmir. I am perfectly prepared for that case

15. On 17 January 1948.

16. Gopalaswami Ayyangar had stated before the Security Council on 19 April 1948 that short of obtaining an official declaration of war by the Pakistan Government and the use of their regular army openly for conducting military operations in Jammu and Kashmir, the fighters had been and were still obtaining all other help and assistance on Pakistan territory.

to be considered on its merits—practical, legal, constitutional, on any basis. And it is because that point is not considered that all this trouble has arisen.

Q: Could the country have a firm declaration from you that the aggressor would not be appeased any further and that the Security Council would be urged to give its verdict on the aggression and told that the plebiscite is an internal affair?

JN: I read out a part of the resolution where it is said that it is no business of Pakistan. Well, it seems to me that the time has come—if and when the matter goes to the Security Council, and if they really wish to deal with this question practically and keeping the realities in view—for them to consider it from the basic point of view and not to ignore those things. If we come up against a blank wall in regard to a plebiscite, it is because every time Pakistan wants, by pressure, to create conditions of special advantage to it in regard to the plebiscite. What could be more advantageous to Pakistan than to be able to say: “See, we have kicked out the Kashmir Government and the India Government from Kashmir.” And it is patently ninety per cent of victory for Pakistan then and there, quite apart from the plebiscite. Where does the plebiscite come in? Even before that the Government of India and the Kashmir Government are pushed out of the place. So it is clear that in these conditions there can be no plebiscite.

So far as we are concerned, and even apart from our pledge given previously, our whole method in regard to Kashmir is that the people of Kashmir will have to decide and they are doing it. They are doing many things there which they think fit and proper. Sometimes we disagree with them, yet they do them and we allow them to do them because they have an autonomous Government. They confer with us on several issues, but we do not interfere in their day-to-day administration. We cannot push them out. So I agree that this question should be considered from the basic point of view and no other.

Q: Don’t you think the Security Council should decide quickly who the aggressor is as it did in the case of Korea?¹⁷

JN: I do not quite know what you mean. Certainly decide the facts, and the sooner they are decided the better for all of us. But how to decide in the way the Korean case was dealt with, I do not know. Do you want the U.N.O. to send forces?¹⁸

17. On 25 June 1950, the Security Council passed a resolution calling for immediate cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of North Korean forces to the 38th parallel.
18. By a resolution on 7 July 1950, the Security Council created a unified command under the United States and consisting of member States providing military forces and other assistance in defence of South Korea. India abstained from voting on the resolution.

Q: Pakistan has always claimed that the plebiscite should be to decide whether Kashmir should join India or Pakistan. Have we accepted that position, and, if so, has Pakistan an equal status in this dispute?

JN: Our first declaration at the time of the accession of Kashmir to India was that the people of Kashmir will decide about their own future. Later, in some of the resolutions of the Kashmir Commission it has been said that the people of Kashmir will decide by plebiscite whether they will accede to India or Pakistan, and we have accepted that. Not that we like that particular phrasing, but in our desire for a settlement we accepted that. But in accepting it we made it always clear that they cannot come and interfere in the plebiscite. Let the United Nations come and see that the plebiscite is as fair as possible, but Pakistan cannot interfere. The point that we have laid stress upon throughout—it is not mentioned here—is that the plebiscite area, whatever it is, should be left to decide for itself; that is to say, no outsider either from India or Pakistan should go and interfere at the time. We are perfectly prepared to keep out of it completely, and we said Pakistan should certainly keep out of it too. And even though we had certain rights to be there and Pakistan had none, we are prepared for both the parties to be completely out—whether it is an overall or a partial plebiscite—from the plebiscite area and leave it to the people to decide.

I tell you frankly why we laid stress on this. It is because we wanted to avoid this plebiscite being utilised for communal purposes and communal propaganda and communal rioting. There would be no decision on the merits of the case then and knowing as we do what has happened elsewhere previously round about—in the Frontier Province and elsewhere¹⁹—we did not want it to happen here. In fact, it is quite possible, if we let loose everybody there, there would be no plebiscite at all, there would be just rioting and trouble. And, ultimately, should we go back to where we started from, without a plebiscite? So we said there should be propaganda, that it should be perfectly free in regard to the accession, in regard to the future of Kashmir, with this big proviso that it should not be carried on on a religious basis. Let it be on an economic, political or any other basis, but the religious appeal should not be made because that way leads immediately to trouble and that would not be a real decision. And to that we added that no man or woman from outside the plebiscite area should go there during that period, whether from India or from Pakistan.

Q: In view of the fact that the offer of holding a plebiscite was a self-imposed obligation, would you like now to withdraw the complaint from the Security Council and depend on your own resources to enforce your rightful claims?

19. Communal rioting had begun in the Punjab in March 1947 and in the N.W.F.P. in July 1947.

JN: There is no necessity for us to withdraw anything from an international tribunal. What we agreed to, we agreed to. What we did not agree to, we will tell them that we did not agree to.

Q: Knowing full well that the tribunal has failed to be just and its representatives have been acting against its decision, don't you think it advisable to withdraw the complaint altogether?

JN: I do not think it is necessary.

Q: Have you any faith at all that this Kashmir problem will be solved by the U.N.O.?

JN: It is going to be solved. I think the United Nations have undoubtedly performed a very great service in this matter even in spite of our many differences of opinion. The ceasefire came and there has been no resumption of military operations. That itself is a considerable gain.

Q: If this question goes back to the Security Council, would you take the stand that the aggressor must be named and removed from Kashmir before the will of the people is ascertained?

JN: If it goes to the Security Council, the whole question would be before it and we will say—as we have said previously, but will say now with even greater force—that it is no good the Security Council considering this question in an isolated way. The basic matter should also be considered. We are not out just to satisfy our wounded vanity by blaming this or that person. We have avoided that because we wanted some way out. But to forget the basic factors leads to no solution. Therefore everything should be taken together with a view to solution, not with a view merely of blaming. The original facts and other facts should be considered in their context.

Q: Dixon has said that from the start the burden of formulating plans or proposals had rested upon him.²⁰ Is that correct? Did you not put forward anything?

JN: That is a perfectly correct statement. That was almost inevitable in the circumstances because, for one thing, for two and a half years all kinds of proposals

20. This was stated by Owen Dixon at Karachi on 22 August 1950.

have been put forward and the matter has been thrashed out repeatedly from every point of view, but then it remained where it was. It was for Sir Owen Dixon to make any fresh proposals. In fact, there was really nothing fresh about his proposals, because everything has been in the mind of someone or the other and has been discussed. He spent four or five days discussing the overall plebiscite which had been discussed threadbare by us with the Commission and other matters like the 'Azad Kashmir' forces and this and that which had come up and which we had not solved. Now we can consider that afresh if you like, but it is not possible to have a new approach to it and that is why after four days he came to the conclusion that it is not a feasible approach, and he left it.

Then, as regards other matters, roughly speaking, that approach took into consideration certain facts that had happened since this aggression took place in Kashmir: like the occupation of some territory by the invading forces, certain migrations from that area and from this area—all kinds of things had happened and conditions had changed somewhat. And the easiest way of approaching that was to proceed on the basis of changing facts, and see how we could deal with the changed situation. That was the new approach of Sir Owen Dixon in our talks. There can be variations of that approach, but that is the main approach. When he put this to us, it was not a novel approach to us. He put it to us almost immediately after the other thing had failed. We told him that we were, of course, prepared to consider this, but on the basis of Pakistan also considering it in the same way. You see, Pakistan would not say a word about making any proposal. If we made any type of proposal, that part of it that was favourable to her was seized upon and the rest was rejected. That was used as a jumping-ground for the next step. That was the difficulty.

Now, we said that we were prepared to discuss it and even to that Pakistan said 'No'. They made it perfectly clear. You will see that from Sir Owen Dixon's statement itself. Even to the extent that we were prepared to discuss they were not prepared. They said finally, it is true, that they will not have it anyhow, but even if we discussed it what would be the result? They wanted commitments from the other side leaving themselves completely free.

Q: Do you put the blame on Pakistan for the failure of the mission?

JN: I put the blame hundred per cent on Pakistan for the whole Kashmir trouble.

Q: If the Security Council makes proposals for a limited plebiscite in the Valley alone because of the difficulties in holding an overall plebiscite, would you be prepared to discuss such a proposal?

JN: Well, with some variations that was exactly what we discussed.

Curiouser and Curiouser



Pandit Nehru described the Kashmir situation as becoming 'curiouser and curiouser'.

A CARTOON BY SHANKAR, SHANKAR'S WEEKLY, 3 SEPTEMBER 1950



WITH MELVIN T. JOHNSON, CHIEF OF CARE, NEW DELHI, 26 SEPTEMBER 1950

Q: What were those variations?

JN: I cannot tell you because the matter was not discussed in detail. We never got beyond the preliminary approach to it. First of all, Pakistan did not agree and this suggestion was suddenly sprung upon us about the change of Government, and so they were not discussed at all.

Q: Did these variations surprise you?

JN: Well, that was not a variation, that was the main thing.

Q: Is it a fact, as the Prime Minister of Pakistan has stated, that you are holding up the no-war pact?

JN: You will remember that a proposal about some kind of a no-war pact was made by me to the Prime Minister of Pakistan long ago.²¹ In answer to that I got a reply to the effect that it is all very well, but it is far better to settle individual disputes than to talk vaguely about no-war. I said that is perfectly true. Let us settle our disputes, but if we were to wait till we have settled every dispute, then we have to go on waiting. My point in having some kind of no-war arrangement was that an atmosphere could be created which would help in settling the disputes. So we talked as to which came first—settling of the disputes or a general agreement that disputes should not be settled by war. And that matter remained there. Then came the Bengal trouble and this matter receded into the background and it has been there since then. And that is the position. So far as we are concerned, take even Kashmir for instance, we have no intention, in spite of this failure of Sir Owen Dixon's mission, to indulge in military operations. We still want to settle the question peacefully. Of course, if we are attacked, that is a different matter. May I also add in this connection one thing. Mr Liaquat Ali Khan was asked, I believe, as to the effect of this failure on the other issues between India and Pakistan.²² Well, naturally every little thing has some reactions but so far as we are concerned we shall deal with every other issue on its merits and not allow it to be affected by this particular failure over Kashmir for the present, whatever the issues may be, whether it is Bengal or evacuee property or any other issue. We shall go on dealing with them, trying our best to come to settlements.

Q: Have you anything to say on Liaquat Ali's statement that the states were to accede as a whole and not in part and so he could not agree to the division of Kashmir?

21. See *Selected Works* (Second Series), Vol. 14 Part I, pp. 31-34, 65-67 and 70-71.

22. Liaquat Ali had said that real friendship between India and Pakistan was not possible so long as the Kashmir question was not settled justly and fairly.

JN: Well, in some British enactments reference was made to the Indian states acceding here or there. Nobody at that time was thinking in terms of partition of states. The question did not arise at all and, as you know, a vast number of states acceded here or there in toto. There is nothing fundamental about such matters. The world has changed and is changing; we have to take things as they are.

Q: Do you consider it worthwhile for India to spend sixty crores a year over Kashmir?

JN: We are not spending sixty crores.

Q: How much is it then?

JN: I could not tell you exactly. Directly not too much but indirectly a fair amount. You may, if you like, consider the question in terms of money but there are certain things which cannot be weighed with money, or in terms of financial burden. You may, if I may put it differently, buy peace at a cost provided you get what you want. Suppose you pay a price for peace and then you don't get it. Where are you then? All these various attempts at solving the Kashmir problem—regardless of our agreement or disagreement with them—seem to me not helpful to peace at all, but to continuing struggle and conflict in various directions. So we do not improve the situation at all.

Q: If it is not good for India to spend this amount how is it good for Britain to spend such huge amounts on armaments as has been announced?

JN: You address that question to Mr Attlee, not to me.

Q: Would you say that Shaikh Abdullah's Government has supported the proposal for partition and a partial plebiscite in Kashmir to which you have given your consent and would not this proposal run counter to the one-nation theory?

JN: You will notice that what we said to Sir Owen was that we were prepared to consider every proposal that he made including this. And mind you, it was never put on paper at all, and even orally it was general and vague. We said we are prepared to consider it and I told him that in considering it we are not going to consider it from the communal point of view. We made it perfectly clear to him that we are going to consider it from the point of view, as he puts it, that if in any area the people were obviously of a certain opinion and there was no doubt about their preference, then we may accept it as a fact. And naturally we kept Shaikh Abdullah's Government informed.

4. Message to Owen Dixon¹

Thank you for your letter of the 23rd August.² I have gone into your suggestion with my military advisers. We do not consider that it is desirable now to arrange a meeting of Chiefs of Staff of India and Pakistan. But we are prepared to reduce, of our own accord, the strength of Indian forces now in Jammu and Kashmir by twenty to twenty-five per cent. The suggestion that the ceasefire line may be maintained merely by use of checkposts and other similar measures, does not appear to be feasible. So long as the Kashmir dispute is not settled, effective measures are necessary to ensure the security of the State against possible aggression. If, as we hope, Pakistan also desires a settlement of the dispute by peaceful means, there should be no danger of incidents along the ceasefire line that might endanger peace, and U.N. Observers can help in the loyal observance by both sides of the ceasefire agreement.

1. New Delhi, 27 August 1950. File No. 52/312/NGO-54, M.E.A.
2. Dixon advised the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan to arrange a meeting of the Chiefs of Staff of the two countries to bring about mutual reduction of their armed forces stationed in Kashmir and maintenance of the ceasefire line through checkposts and similar measures instead of stationing armies near the ceasefire line.

5. To B.V. Keskar¹

New Delhi
September 26, 1950

My dear Balkrishna,

...About the Far Eastern issue, it is clear to me that everything is dependent upon China's admission to the U.N. We have taken up a clear and definite attitude in regard to it and we must pursue it in every way. The recent U.S. resolution about which Acheson spoke a few days ago, seems to be entirely misconceived.² Some parts of it isolated from the rest are not so objectionable, but taken as a whole and in the context of today, it is not a move towards peace but would only create more trouble and suspicion.

Regarding the Kashmir issue, we do not know how the Security Council will function. There has been an amazing amount of blatant propaganda in Pakistan

1. J.N. Collection. Extracts. Keskar was a member of the Indian delegation attending the General Assembly session at New York.
2. See *post*, pp. 395-397.

about it. There are daily threats of all kinds³ and the tribal people are brought into the picture as if they are on the point of invading Kashmir.⁴ The Pakistan newspapers are full of curses and imprecations. Meanwhile, from such accounts as we get, relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan have still further deteriorated. Liaquat Ali Khan's recent speech in which he openly condemned the King of Afghanistan⁵ has been bitterly resented there.

Pakistan goes on saying about Kashmir that we have gone back on previous decisions and promises. This is completely untrue. We stand by every assurance and promise that we have given. We stand by a plebiscite, whole or partial, but we have always laid down specifically that we are not going to allow Pakistan into Kashmir for any purpose and we are not going to suppress the Government of Kashmir. We were perfectly prepared for the Plebiscite Commissioner to take all necessary measures for the plebiscite, but that does not include taking charge of the Government.

The Dixon Report⁶ has not reached us in full but some large parts of it have appeared in the press. Apart from saying something about Pakistan's aggression in Kashmir,⁷ it is against us on the whole. He talks about the Kashmir Government arresting people and detaining them.⁸ This is not only true for Kashmir but for India and Pakistan. It must be remembered that war was going on in Kashmir and all kinds of spies and conspirators were about. But we told Dixon that no action would be taken about arrests and detention during and before the period of plebiscite without the approval of the Plebiscite Commissioner, that is, that the Plebiscite Commissioner has full authority so far as the plebiscite was concerned but not in regard to Government as such. Dixon now says that no fair plebiscite can be held unless the Government is changed. The opposite is at least as true if not more

3. On 31 August, Abdul Qayyum Khan, the N.W.F.P. Premier, spoke over Radio Pakistan of "one and only practical step to finish India's obstinacy and intransigence." On 9 September, Ghulam Abbas declared that a "bold decision could ensure liberation of Kashmir." The *Pakistan Times* stated on 15 September that only "revolutionary fervour" remained to fall back upon if U.N. efforts failed.
4. On 8 September, the tribals of Waziristan passed a resolution offering to rush to the aid of their "oppressed Kashmiri brethren."
5. On 10 September, Liaquat Ali described Afghanistan as "a tool in the hands of the enemies of Pakistan and Islam," and criticized Zahir Shah for accusing Pakistan of perpetrating atrocities on Pathans.
6. Owen Dixon, in his Report submitted to the Security Council on 15 September, announced the failure of his mission and concluded that the only prospect of solution lay in direct negotiations between the parties.
7. The Report characterised the entry into Kashmir of Pakistani tribesmen and regular forces as contrary to international law. But Dixon would not agree with India's contention that Pakistan be declared an aggressor and said that he had not been commissioned to make a judicial investigation of the issues.
8. Dixon commented that the State Government was exercising "wide powers of arbitrary arrest" and this could affect the freedom of the Kashmiris to exercise their vote.

so. The change of government is such a big move in favour of Pakistan that it might influence the plebiscite tremendously. It would mean a great initial victory of Pakistan in Kashmir and people would imagine that this was the beginning of their final victory. Whatever happens we are not going to agree to the Abdullah Government being pushed out in this or any other way....

There have been tremendous floods in Kashmir⁹ during the last ten days. Indeed there is no record of such floods previously. Practically the whole Valley became a great lake and tremendous damage has been done. The city of Srinagar partly escaped great loss because of the work of our Army which threw itself into relief work and building bunds, etc. The floods are subsiding now but the damage remains. The worst part of this is the great loss of foodgrains and crops. We were expecting a fine harvest. All this has been ruined now.

There have been floods also in the Punjab, U.P., Bihar, Orissa, Saurashtra, Ahmedabad, not to mention Assam.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

9. Unprecedented floods inundated the Kashmir Valley resulting in a loss of lives and property and damage to about a quarter of the total paddy crop.

6. Owen Dixon's Report¹

In his summary of India's case against Pakistan, Sir Owen Dixon refers in his report to the following.

- (1) The allegation, so often repeated by India, that Pakistan was an aggressor who had no *locus standi* and whose troops had no title to be within the State;
- (2) That, during the period of preparation for and the taking of the plebiscite the territory to the west of the ceasefire line (the so-called 'Azad Kashmir' territory) should not be under the immediate governmental authority and direction of Pakistan or be administered by the 'Azad Kashmir' Government;
- (3) That there must be no impairment of or prejudice to the recognition of the sovereignty of the State of Jammu and Kashmir over the Northern Areas;

1. Statement at a press conference, New Delhi, 30 September 1950. From the *National Herald* and *The Sunday Statesman*, 1 October 1950, and File No. 43(102)/50-PMS. See the next item for the proceedings of the conference.

(4) That, if there was a very great reduction of troops on India's side of the ceasefire line, there would be danger of further incursions from the other side of the line.

Pakistan's Aggression

2. As regards (1), Sir Owen observes that he "was prepared to adopt the view that when the frontier of the State of Jammu and Kashmir was crossed...by hostile elements, it was contrary to international law, and that when, in May 1948....units of the regular Pakistan forces moved into the territory of the State that too was inconsistent with international law."

Sir Owen's proposals and conclusions as regards the remaining three points have to be considered in the light of this observation.

Demilitarisation

3. Taking point (4), namely, demilitarisation, first, as Sir Owen Dixon has done, Sir Owen says that the plan presented by him was rejected by the Prime Minister of India. India's objection was not to the withdrawal of the forces of the Indian regular army, but to the quantum of such withdrawal. According to Sir Owen, there could be no need for troops on the Indian side, except for the purpose (a) of aiding civil power in maintaining order, where the population was mixed in the south and south-west of the State, and (b) of guarding the northern approaches to the Valley against possible incursions through certain lines of approach mentioned by him. This fails to take account of the possibility either of incursions by marauders, a possibility which, with the experience that India had of what occurred in the autumn of 1947, cannot but be regarded as real, or of Pakistan, with her better lines of communications, herself staging another invasion. Throughout the discussions since the commencement of the dispute, before the Security Council, with the U.N. Commission on India and Pakistan and finally, when the McNaughton proposals² were first mooted to the two parties, and then debated in the Security Council, India has taken the stand that the reduction of the forces to be maintained by her in the part of the State of Jammu and Kashmir under her control must be determined with due regard to the security of the State against a recurrence of events

2. General A.G.L. McNaughton, the Canadian President of the Security Council, after informal talks with the representatives of India and Pakistan, proposed on 22 December 1949 simultaneous and progressive demilitarization by both sides, administration of the Northern Areas by local authorities, subject to U.N. supervision, and appointment of a U.N. representative with wide powers to carry out the Council's decision as regards the conducting of a plebiscite. As the proposals made no distinction between the aggressor and the aggrieved, India suggested amendments seeking complete disbanding and disarming of the 'Azad Kashmir' forces and control of the Northern Areas after the withdrawal of the Pakistani forces.

of which she has been a victim in the recent past. Nothing had occurred, since Sir Owen's arrival in the subcontinent, to justify a change in India's attitude. The assurance of the Prime Minister of Pakistan that Pakistan would not commit her forces to an attack in Kashmir could not, in view of Pakistan's past record, be accepted as sufficient. In any case, even if it were assumed that the regular forces of Pakistan would not be committed to another invasion, no such assumption could be justified in respect of tribesmen, who have been consistently threatening and even now are threatening *jehad*, or of Pakistan nationals, who in the past had taken part in fighting and who are now being incited by many in Pakistan to "liberate" Kashmir by force. Nor could it be assumed that the kind of aid that Pakistan had rendered to the original invaders of Kashmir would not again be forthcoming. India's insistence, therefore, on retaining, on her side of the ceasefire line, the minimum number of forces that, according to her military advisers, might be necessary for the security of the State, is a precaution imposed upon her by her obligations, and cannot fairly be regarded as either unreasonable or unexpected.

4. Sir Owen has also referred to India's refusal to agree to the withdrawal or disarming and disbandment of the Jammu and Kashmir State forces and of the State militia which were also part of his proposals for "demilitarisation". In this respect also the stand taken by India was entirely consistent with what had been urged by her previously before the Security Council and the U.N. Commission. These two measures could not but be regarded as the establishment of parity of treatment between forces legitimately maintained by the lawful Government of Jammu and Kashmir and the so-called 'Azad Kashmir' forces, which Pakistan had augmented, trained and armed. To accept these proposals would have been to acquiesce in what Sir Owen Dixon himself has described as something "contrary to or inconsistent with international law" or, to use the expression that India has constantly employed, "aggression".

5. Sir Owen has sought to justify his proposals for demilitarisation on the Indian side on the ground that, "If bodies of troops belonging to one side remained in populous areas ...if the State militia went about under arms and the State police were left to exert whatever influence arises from their position in such community ...there were the gravest dangers to a free expression of the will of the inhabitants...." It was not suggested on behalf of India that members of the Indian Army or State forces or the State militia should roam about the State armed in order to prevent a free expression of the will of the inhabitants during the plebiscite. India was and is prepared to take, in consultation with U.N. representatives, all measures that may be necessary to prevent the presence of troops and militia from interfering with the free expression of the will of the people. This could be achieved in a number of ways, for example, by the stationing of forces in localities outside centres of civilian population and confining them, during the period of the plebiscite, to barracks. Since India is prepared to reduce the total number of forces inside the State to the minimum necessary for security, this process of isolating the forces

from the civilian population should prove easy of achievement. To conclude, what India objected to was not a reduction of forces or to their disposal, during the plebiscite period, in a manner that would not interfere with the free exercise by the people of their vote on the question of accession, but to a reduction of forces in such strength that the balance left would be insufficient to maintain the security of the State and to measures, such as the disbanding and disarming of the State forces and the militia, which unnecessarily infringed the sovereignty of the State.

Northern Areas

6. Through all the stages of the dispute India has maintained that, after Pakistan forces have withdrawn from the Northern Areas, the responsibility for the defence of these Areas should revert to India and for administration to the lawful Government, namely, the Government of Jammu and Kashmir. What Sir Owen proposed was that, instead of the existing Political Agents, who, it may be remarked, have been appointed by Pakistan, there should be a Political Agent, or Agents, appointed by or under the authority of the Security Council of the United Nations, after consultation with India and Pakistan. Consistently with her claim that Pakistan has no lawful position anywhere in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, India could not accept the requirement of consultation with Pakistan. Moreover, the plan contemplated that the existing administrative officers in these areas, whom Pakistan had appointed, should continue to function. This would have meant recognition of Pakistan's right by virtue of her aggression to retain, in the Northern Areas, officers who have not only not been appointed by the lawful Government, but who must, considering the circumstances, be repugnant to that Government.

7. As regards India's claim to place garrisons of military posts in certain places on the northern side of the ceasefire line, Sir Owen's only comment is that Pakistan could not be expected to agree to this. Since, in the Indian view, Pakistan has no right over these Areas, her objection to the Indian claim could not be regarded as a valid reason for the abandonment of the claim. India sought to press this claim, not merely to assert her legal rights, but from the practical standpoint of the security of the State. After the withdrawal of Pakistan's regular as well as irregular forces from the whole of this region which, in the present international situation, has assumed a new strategic importance, there would be a military vacuum if India were not to maintain forces at certain points in the interests of security.

Administrative Arrangements

8. These relate to preparation for the plebiscite in (a) the 'Azad Kashmir' area, and (b) the portion of the Jammu and Kashmir State, on the Indian side of the ceasefire line. To the proposals made by Sir Owen Dixon with regard to these two matters, India's objections were not directed against the principle of U.N.

surveillance. India fully agreed that there should be supervision by U.N. representatives during the period of the plebiscite, and for a reasonable period of preparation in advance of the actual plebiscite, in order to ensure a free expression of opinion by the inhabitants. For the so-called 'Azad' area, the objection was to continuing the District Magistrates and subordinate officers appointed since the disturbances in 1947, whose political opinions and associations might prove a real obstacle to the creation of conditions in which refugees who had left this area could return and the population as a whole could vote freely on the question of accession. India merely wanted that, where necessary, such officers should be replaced by others chosen locally. Similarly, India's objections to Sir Owen's proposals for administrative arrangements to be made on the Indian side of the ceasefire line were not objections to the creation of machinery or procedure designed to ensure a free and impartial plebiscite. India did not object to the appointment of United Nations officers, who would be posted with or attached to each District Magistrate, or to the empowering of this officer to see administrative records of proceedings or to their duties including observation, inspection, remonstrance and report. India merely desired that the powers of the U.N. officers should be so defined as not to interfere with the authority or the functions of the State, beyond what might be considered reasonable for ensuring the freedom of the plebiscite.

9. Sir Owen refers in his report to plans which he put forward for bringing into existence, for the plebiscite period, a single government for the whole State. The first plan, namely, bringing into existence of a coalition Government, had been discussed in the Security Council early in 1948 and rejected by India as impracticable, owing to the impossibility of combining, in an effective government, persons so opposed to one another in outlook and background as Shaikh Abdullah and Mr Ghulam Abbas. With her own experience of the coalition Government that preceded the Partition in India, in 1947, India could not but be painfully aware of the paralysis that overtakes the functioning of a government from an admixture of incompatibles. The holding of any kind of plebiscite would have been made impossible by the acceptance of this proposal. The second and third plans both involved the supersession of the lawful Government of the State, for, as Sir Owen has stated, "existing Ministers" would have continued "to hold office" but would have been relieved of their responsibilities "for a fixed period before the poll, perhaps six months before it."

10. Sir Owen concludes the portion of his report dealing with his efforts to arrange for a plebiscite for the entire State with the remarks:

I became convinced that India's agreement would never be obtained to demilitarisation in any such form, or to provisions governing the period of the plebiscite of any such character, as would in my opinion permit of the plebiscite being conducted in conditions sufficiently guarding against intimidation and other forms of influence and abuse by which the freedom and fairness of the plebiscite might be imperilled.

Since Sir Owen has qualified the conclusion by relating it to his opinion, one can only say that his opinion is not shared by the Government of India. Before the Kashmir dispute was referred to the Security Council, India, of her own accord, offered that the future of the State should be settled according to the wishes of the people. It was in pursuance of this offer that India agreed to an overall plebiscite. Her agreement was subject only to two conditions: first, that the security of the State should not be imperilled again, and second, that the sovereignty of the lawful Government should not be challenged or infringed. India never has sought that these two conditions should be so interpreted or applied as to interfere with the freedom of the plebiscite. She has offered to reduce her forces in the State to the minimum necessary to safeguard it against fresh aggression. She has always been prepared to agree, for the duration of the plebiscite and for a suitable period preceding it, to the appointment of U.N. representatives enjoying powers which, though derived from the Government of the State, would be sufficient to ensure that every national of Jammu and Kashmir casts his vote freely and without fear. That is still India's position.

Alternative Proposals

11. Sir Owen has repeatedly said that India submitted no alternatives to the proposals that he put forward. Inasmuch as Sir Owen's proposals were based on the assumption that, without practically denuding the Indian side of the State of troops, and without supersession of the Government of Shaikh Abdullah adequate means could not be devised to ensure the freedom of the plebiscite, there was no common ground between India and Sir Owen on which alternative proposals could be based.

Partial Plebiscite

12. The Security Council Resolution of the 14th March 1950 required Sir Owen to place before the two Governments any suggestion which in his opinion was likely to lead to the solution of the Kashmir dispute. After the failure of the Delhi Conference to produce agreement on the question of an overall plebiscite, Sir Owen devoted himself to an attempt to negotiate a settlement on the basis of a partial plebiscite, limited to an area which included the Valley of Kashmir. India agreed to consider a settlement on this basis. The principles on which India was prepared to have such discussions were: first, that the areas of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, where there is no apparent doubt as to the wishes of the people in those areas, should go to India or Pakistan without a plebiscite; secondly, that the plebiscite should be limited to those areas where there is doubt as to the result of the voting; and thirdly, that the demarcation should have due regard to geographical features and to the requirements of an international boundary. Sir Owen offered to prepare

a plan, complete except for details, for holding a partial plebiscite in a limited area, including or consisting of the Valley of Kashmir, and partitioning the remainder of the State. He would then call a conference and lay the plan before the two Prime Ministers for acceptance or rejection. The Prime Minister of India decided to fall in with Sir Owen's suggestion, provided that Pakistan told Sir Owen that the fact that the plan was based on a partial plebiscite and partition would not in itself necessarily prove fatal to its consideration by Pakistan. What India was unwilling to do was to enter into any new conference that it knew was foredoomed to failure.

13. As Sir Owen's report indicates, Pakistan stood firm on the overall plebiscite and, on his assurance that neither he nor any other authority of the United Nations would regard the Prime Minister of Pakistan or his Government as in the least degree derogating from or prejudicing that position if he complied with the request to examine and take into consideration the plan which Sir Owen was ready to prepare and submit, the Pakistan Prime Minister agreed to attend a conference, but only on the condition that India would agree upon certain specific practical measures which would ensure the freedom and fairness of the plebiscite. Sir Owen sought to satisfy this condition by providing that an administrative body consisting of United Nations officers should be set up in the limited plebiscite area and should carry on the functions of Government in the area until the poll was declared. This body was to have power, if it thought fit to do so, to exclude troops of every description, with freedom, if they decide that any troops were necessary, to request either party to provide them. Sir Owen sought India's acceptance of this proposal, as a preliminary to holding the conference. India could no more accept this condition than Sir Owen's earlier proposals for an overall plebiscite which have already been discussed. Not only did his condition involve the supersession of the lawful Government of Shaikh Abdullah for a considerable period, it placed Pakistan, the aggressor, on the same footing as India, as regards the right to furnish troops for use in the plebiscite area. Worse still, by giving to the proposed body of U.N. administrators the right to exclude troops of every description, it deprived India of the means to fulfil her obligation to safeguard the security of the State. At no time, during the discussions of this alternative plan with members or officers of the Government of India in Delhi, did Sir Owen hint that his plan would include such a condition. The Government of India thought that all that would be required would be an application to this area of the administrative proposals that he had made for supervision of an overall plebiscite in the area of the State on the Indian side of the ceasefire line. Had Sir Owen been prepared to consider a plan for supervision of the partial plebiscite on this basis, the Government of India feel that a settlement would have been possible.

14. Referring to the objections of India, Sir Owen has observed that they appear to overlook the real nature of a proposal for partition, that the question whether Pakistan had or had not been an aggressor had, in his opinion, nothing to do with

the results of a partition and the fairness and freedom of a partial plebiscite, and that to agree that Pakistan should take under partition part of the State must be to agree that, independently of any such question, she took not merely an interest in but sovereignty of the territory. India agreed to consider partition, not because she admitted that Pakistan has any claim to any part of the territory of Jammu and Kashmir but solely in the interests of peace. She agreed to do so in spite of her deep-seated objection to any surrender to aggression. That, because of this concession to the cause of peace, she should be expected to agree that Pakistan should, as regards the area of the plebiscite which is held by India, have the same status as India, seems strange. India's agreement to the plebiscite was never designed to please Pakistan; nor was it intended to be construed as an admission that Pakistan has an interest in the outcome of the plebiscite. We offered and agreed to the plebiscite not in the interests of Pakistan but in order to let the people of the State, or any part of it, determine their future. Should the people decide in favour of accession of Pakistan, India would scrupulously respect their wishes. But agreement by India that Pakistan has any interest in any part of the State can only follow and not precede the free declaration by the people of their wishes.

15. Sir Owen approached his task with integrity and singleness of purpose. India fully appreciates the spirit in which he worked. If India found herself unable to accept the proposals that he put forward, it was due primarily to the fact that India's basic position was not appreciated. India has consistently maintained that Pakistan's part in the Kashmir dispute has been one of pure aggression. Consistently with this view, which Sir Owen has not denied, though he described it differently, India could have insisted that Pakistan should leave the State and the future of the State should be determined by its people on both sides of the ceasefire line, in fulfilment of India's original offer, India calling in U.N. Observers, of her own accord, in order to satisfy world opinion of the freedom and impartiality of the plebiscite. But India has not insisted on this position to which international law entitles her. In the interests of peace, she has offered to treat the so-called 'Azad Kashmir' area as a separate unit for purpose of the plebiscite, to limit her rights in the Northern Areas to the garrisoning of certain posts, to persuade the Government of Jammu and Kashmir to impose certain restrictions on their sovereignty in order to enable U.N. representatives to exercise supervision over the plebiscite. What is expected of her is that in respect of the area under her military control and under the lawful Government of Shaikh Abdullah, she should accept the same treatment as Pakistan and the so-called 'Azad' Government on the ceasefire line. Such a demand has no relation to moral law or equity. It ignores even the practical consequences of its acceptance, namely, the upsurge, throughout the India-held part of the State, of a feeling of fear and despair born of the knowledge that aggression had triumphed, despair and fear that would conduce not to a free and impartial plebiscite but to a large-scale exodus of large elements of the population.

If past experience is any guide, such an exodus, with all its misery, would rouse passions in India that might well imperil peace between India and Pakistan.

16. Sir Owen has formed the opinion that, if there is any chance of settling the dispute over Kashmir by agreement between India and Pakistan it lies in partition and some means of allocating the Valley rather than in an overall plebiscite. India is prepared to consider this or any other proposal for a settlement. She had already given an earnest of her will to peace, not only in the concessions that she has made in agreeing to certain resolutions of the Security Council and the United Nations Commission on India and Pakistan, but, more recently, in a unilateral offer to Sir Owen Dixon to reduce the strength of her forces in Jammu and Kashmir by twenty to twenty-five per cent.³ This offer is being implemented now. It is Pakistan that throughout the dispute has remained entrenched in aggression and intransigence. If the Kashmir dispute is to be peacefully and honourably settled, then Pakistan must change its attitude, and expediency give place to right.

3. See *ante*, p. 233.

7. India's Basic Position¹

Jawaharlal Nehru: A hand-out² has been distributed regarding Kashmir. This deals with Sir Owen Dixon's report. I shall not therefore deal with that report in detail now.

I should like to say however what our basic position has been in regard to Kashmir right from the beginning. This has been governed by five factors:

1. That there has been aggression, an aggression of a shameless kind, and this has to be resisted. There should be no surrender to aggression.

2. That the future of Kashmir should be decided by the people of the State.

3. That the settlement should be arrived at, as far as possible, by peaceful methods which avoid evil consequences and new problems and conflicts.

4. That on no account are we going to admit the two-nation theory in regard to Kashmir, as we have not done for India as a whole. Therefore any consideration of this problem must not be based on that theory so far as we are concerned.

1. Press conference, New Delhi, 30 September 1950. From the *National Herald* and *The Sunday Statesman*, 1 October 1950, and File No. 43(102)/50-PMS. For other parts of the press conference, see pp. 56-58, 148-150 and 405-407.

2. See the preceding item.

5. That it is our legal as well as our moral duty to protect the people of Kashmir and give them security. Apart from this, flowing from the accession, we have given solemn pledges to this effect and we shall keep them.

Conflicts sometimes arise between these different factors which I have stated. For instance, in spite of our desire for peace, in resisting aggression we had to resort to military operations. Also because of our desire for a settlement we have gone far in accepting certain proposals which give an advantage to the aggressor.

It will be remembered that it was at our instance that ceasefire took place on January 1, 1949.

In the course of discussions in the Security Council, with the U.N. Commission or with Sir Owen Dixon, at no time have we resiled or gone back from any assurance or undertaking that we had given. We are prepared, even now, to adhere to everything that we have said previously.

The question resolves itself into:

1. Recognition of Pakistan's aggression. This was indirectly admitted by the U.N. Commission and has now been directly stated by Sir Owen Dixon.

2. Conditions governing a plebiscite. The main difficulty has been about these conditions. Right from the beginning we have insisted on the sovereignty of Kashmir State remaining with the present Government. This was admitted by the Commission and certain consequences flowed from it. Secondly, we have insisted on providing adequately for the security of the State. On no account can we afford to endanger this.

In the course of our discussions with Sir Owen Dixon, he put forward in writing certain proposals for holding the plebiscite in the Valley as a part of the overall plebiscite. I criticised some of them, but in the main I was prepared to accept them. Later, when the question of a partial plebiscite arose, I naturally thought that those same proposals would be considered for the Valley. Sir Owen Dixon, however, put forward something which was very far-reaching, namely, the complete supersession of the present Government for a period of six months or so, apart from a complete removal of our troops as well as the State troops and the State militia if the U.N. administrative body considered this necessary. Further he suggested that if need arose, some Pakistan troops might be allowed to come there together with, presumably, some Indian troops.

This proposal offended against every principle that I have stated above. To us it seemed a negation of all that we had stood for and a betrayal of the people of Kashmir to whom we had pledged ourselves. It was and is completely impossible for us to consider any such proposal, whatever the consequences might be.

Sir Owen Dixon advocates his proposal on the ground that this would insure a fair and impartial plebiscite. As a matter of fact, it would make the plebiscite grossly unfair right from the commencement. The supersession of the present Government of Kashmir, which is a legal and continuing Government, would itself

have been, in the minds of the people, a major victory for aggression and a surrender by us of what we had repeatedly proclaimed we stood for. It would have had other dangerous consequences in the State as well as in India. It would not have even led to a plebiscite because of these consequences and it would not have meant peace but possibly upheavals and war. But even apart from these considerations, if there is an iota of worth in a pledge and in our responsibility to our colleagues in Kashmir, then we could never agree to such a proposal. There is much talk of a plebiscite and we have stood by it throughout. But we have made it perfectly clear at all stages of the discussions that a plebiscite is to be on political and economic and like issues. It cannot be properly conducted if the State was converted into a bear garden of communal bigotry. If communal and religious passions are allowed to be incited, then there can be no fair and impartial plebiscite and indeed there can be no peace but war.

The picture of a plebiscite that Pakistan appears to have in her mind may be gathered from the spate of propaganda that has been carried on all over Pakistan, in press, public meetings, and statement of leaders and followers alike, ever since the Dixon report came out. There has been an amazing exhibition of communal fanaticism, of calls for *jehad* and holy war, of threats and imprecations. All decency has been cast to the winds and vulgarity and hysteria have held sway. No one has been spared. India of course is the major sinner. Sir Owen Dixon, who has been very far from partial to India, has been condemned.³ Lord Radcliffe⁴ has been accused of falsehood and forgery, Lord Mountbatten⁵ has been cursed as the fountain of evil. We have said little about these matters, but I wish to say here and now that these charges made against Lord Mountbatten, Lord Radcliffe, and Sir Owen Dixon are absolutely false and there is not an iota of truth in them.

Compare this well-arranged and well-publicised propaganda of Pakistan with what has been happening in India during this period since the Dixon report came out. We had enough cause to be dissatisfied with that report. But we have considered it coolly and I hope we have not lost our tempers or our reasoning capacity. Above all I hope all of us have behaved with decency and restraint.

3. *Dawn* reported on 25 September that it was widely believed in Pakistan that Owen Dixon, while in London on his way back, was advised to "balance" his report by saying something against Pakistan also. It criticized Dixon for his view on the tribal and Pakistani invasion of Kashmir and leaving it to the parties to settle the dispute themselves in spite of his finding that India was blocking the plebiscite.
4. On 24 September, the President of the Muslim League in Lahore called the Dixon report as "another instance of the anti-Pakistan mentality of its author who seems to have taken a leaf out of the book of Sir Cyril Radcliffe, the great betrayer of Muslim cause and rights."
5. In an interview to the Pakistan press on 27 August 1950, Kotu Ram, an M.L.A. of Bannu, charged Nehru with taking "shelter behind the hurried and underhand dealings of Lord Mountbatten who, in his efforts to create a permanent gulf between Pakistan and India Governments, had" Kashmir "accessed to India."

We have seen Pakistan's way. There can be little doubt that if Pakistan was given the chance, this method, in which Pakistan seems to excel, would be repeated with loud shouting and fury in the course of a plebiscite in Kashmir. Would that be a proper background for a fair and impartial plebiscite?

When Sir Owen Dixon asked India and Pakistan to reduce our armies in Kashmir, we agreed to do so to a considerable extent. We were not vague. We stated that we intended reducing it by twenty to twenty-five per cent.⁶ So far as I know, Pakistan gave no reply to Sir Owen Dixon. Another type of reply came later and that has been a succession of threats of war.

So far as we are concerned, we refuse to be deflected from our policy in Kashmir or elsewhere by these threats or hysteria of Pakistan. We shall follow the path of peace. If that peace is endangered in any way, we shall meet that danger with full confidence and strength.

In spite of what has been happening in regard to Kashmir, we have pursued our proposal to Pakistan about a no-war declaration.⁷ It will be remembered that this was originally made by us. When events took a serious turn in Bengal, discussions on this proposal were set aside for the moment. It has been renewed again in its simple form. We believe that it should be simple and with no strings attached to it.

We have further proposed that two of the major issues between us and Pakistan should be referred to a tribunal consisting of two judges each of the highest judicial standing from India and Pakistan. These two issues are evacuee property and canal waters. We are prepared to abide by the decision of this tribunal and we think that such a tribunal, considering the matters judicially, will arrive at an agreed decision. In the event of there being an equal difference of opinion, the matter can be considered then and some other way devised for the decision of such points as have not been decided. In any event the points of difference, if not fully decided, will be limited in scope.

We are prepared to extend this principle to such issues of like nature as may arise between us and Pakistan.

Thus we have not only offered a no-war declaration but have indicated a way of deciding matters in dispute.

Question: What is your comment on Sir Owen Dixon's observation that it would be better to leave India and Pakistan to themselves to negotiate terms for the settlement of the Kashmir problem?

JN: It is certainly difficult to give a precise answer. I have no doubt that if the problem can be solved as between India and Pakistan, we will certainly welcome

6. See *ante*, p. 233.

7. See *post*, Section 8, subsection II.

it. We have welcomed in the past the mediation of the Security Council, etc., but ultimately it is a problem of India and Pakistan and it should be solved by them.

Q: What have you to say on Liaquat Ali's statement that there is no chance of Pakistan and India settling the Kashmir dispute between themselves?⁸

JN: It is difficult to judge from two-line reports.

Q: The Pakistan Prime Minister is reported to have remarked that India and Pakistan will never agree on this question.

JN: When people use the word 'never', they forget the lessons of history. There is no 'never' in life or in history. I can hardly go into the future. The question will appear on the Security Council's agenda and some discussion will take place there. What happens afterwards will depend upon what the Security Council does.

India's desire has not been to make a settlement difficult. She wants the truth of the aggression in Kashmir to be acknowledged but not for the purpose of its coming as a barrier to a settlement. She does not want to do anything just to bring down Pakistan in the eyes of the world.

Q: At a previous press conference you said that you would stake your reputation on everything you have done in Kashmir. Who is to be the judge?

JN: I stand by the major steps that have been taken by us in Kashmir. If the public in India do not consider me right then they could choose somebody else to represent them.

8. Liaquat Ali said this in an interview to the correspondent of the *Ceylon Observer* at Karachi on 26 September 1950.

8. Cable to B.N. Rau¹

Your telegram 375 dated 21st October.² Kashmir.

We do not view proposal with favour and we do not see how it can possibly lead to any satisfactory result. We do not see how proposed committee can do

1. New Delhi, 24 October 1950. J.N. Collection.
2. Rau reported that Britain intended to propose to the Security Council the setting up of a committee of its non-permanent members excluding India to consider the best way of holding a fair and impartial plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir. The committee could take evidence from anybody and must submit its report before the end of the year.

other than go over familiar ground already repeatedly covered. Presumably its terms of reference will be limited to carrying out an impartial plebiscite for whole of Jammu and Kashmir State. Thus it will be precluded from what we all along have contended is the main question for Security Council to settle first, namely, our complaint that Pakistan is aggressor. Only from correct finding on this issue of aggression can correct procedural and other decisions follow.

Further it appears that any person can give evidence. This presumably means that all manner of people including representatives of so-called 'Azad Kashmir' Government, whom neither Council nor U.N. Commission recognized, will journey to New York to give evidence. This seems to us wholly impracticable and undesirable.

These are our immediate reactions. We should like to have further elucidation of the proposal from you. More particularly we would like to know:

- (i) whether committee's terms of reference will permit consideration of entire question including aggression and will include discussion of solution by partial plebiscite, and
- (ii) who will be asked to or permitted to give "evidence"? In the brief form you have sent it, it is not easy to understand or appreciate.

RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN

I. Implementation of the Agreement of 8 April 1950

1. The Follow-up Action¹

As there are a number of questions relating to the Indo-Pakistan Agreement of April 8th, 1950,² perhaps it may be convenient for the House if I give a somewhat fuller and more consolidated reply to this question than the honourable Member requires.³

The action taken by the Governments of India and Pakistan in furtherance of the Indo-Pakistan Agreement was as follows:

Each Government appointed a Central Minister⁴ whose main task was to see to the implementation of the Agreement. The two Central Ministers have already visited together many districts in East Bengal, Assam and West Bengal.

One representative of the minorities has been included in the West Bengal and East Bengal Cabinets⁵ respectively. There is already a representative of the minority⁶ in the Cabinet of Assam.

Minority Commissions have been set up in West Bengal, Assam and East Bengal.⁷ Commissions of Enquiry⁸ have also been set up to enquire into and report on the causes and extent of the disturbances in February-March and to make recommendations with a view to preventing recrudescence of similar troubles in future.

The Governments concerned have issued instructions to ensure easy travel for migrants between East Bengal on the one hand and West Bengal, Assam and Tripura

1. Statement in Parliament, 1 August 1950. *Parliamentary Debates, Official Report*, Vol. IV, Part I, 1950, cols. 7-14.
2. Signed by Nehru and Liaquat Ali in Delhi, it guaranteed equality of citizenship to minorities in the two countries and prescribed various measures to be taken by the two Governments for protection of migrants from East Bengal, West Bengal, Assam and Tripura and for restoration of normal conditions in these areas.
3. H.V. Kamath had asked about the action taken by the Governments of India and Pakistan towards the implementation of the Agreement. He also wanted to know about the exodus of Hindus from East Bengal.
4. On 3 May 1950, C.C. Biswas was appointed Minister of Minority Affairs by the Indian Government. A.M. Malik was appointed to a similar position by the Pakistan Government.
5. On 12 June 1950, Dwarkanath Barori was sworn in as a minister in the East Pakistan Cabinet; R. Ahmed was appointed as a minister in the West Bengal Cabinet on 4 July 1950.
6. Abdul Matlib Mazumdar.
7. Minority Commissions were set up in Assam, West Bengal and East Bengal on 3 May, 6 May and 25 April 1950 respectively.
8. Commissions of Enquiry were appointed in Assam, West Bengal and East Bengal in May 1950.

on the other, in accordance with the provisions in Section B of the Agreement,⁹ Liaison Officers have been appointed by each Government in specified border custom posts within the territory of the other. Legislation is being undertaken in West Bengal to facilitate restoration of property to returning migrants and also to set up trust committees for the purpose of looking after the properties of those migrants who decide not to return by the 31st December 1950.

Search Service Bureaus¹⁰ for the recovery of abducted women have been set up in both West Bengal and East Bengal respectively.

The immediate effect of the Agreement was a great easing of the tension which existed between India and Pakistan and, more especially, between West Bengal and Assam, and East Bengal. It gave immediate relief to millions of members of the minority communities in both countries. It also gave an opportunity to large numbers of people in both countries to migrate in safety and with their moveable property. In Western Pakistan and in India generally, it brought about a great improvement in the atmosphere.

A number of goodwill missions,¹¹ unofficially organised, have gone from one country to another and have been cordially welcomed. I should like particularly to express my appreciation of the Newspaper Editors' Conferences, both of India and Pakistan, for the good work¹² they have done. They have evolved a code of behaviour which, I am glad to say, is largely adhered to by most newspapers now. I regret that all newspapers do not act up to that code.

As is well known, large migrations took place before the Agreement. These migrations were in particularly distressing circumstances and were accompanied by lack of security. Usually the migrants could bring nothing with them. As a result of the Agreement and the removal of restrictions on travel and provisions for security as well as the opportunities given for bringing moveable properties, a stimulus to migration was given. While this migration of considerable number of Hindus from East Pakistan to West Bengal, Assam and Tripura, and of Muslims from West

9. Instructions in this regard were issued by the two Governments on 12 April 1950.
10. A Search Service Bureau for detection of cases of abduction or of missing women was set up by the East Pakistan Government in March 1950 and by the West Bengal Government a month later.
11. P.C. Ghosh and Shankerrao Deo visited various places in East Bengal on a fortnight's goodwill mission in May-June 1950. In June 1950, a similar mission led by Sunderlal toured West Pakistan and a traders' goodwill mission from West Pakistan visited East Punjab.
12. At a joint session of the Standing Committees of the All-India Newspaper Editors' Conference and the Pakistan Newspaper Editors' Conference held in New Delhi on 4 and 5 May 1950 it was agreed to abstain from propaganda against each other's country and not to publish material inciting war or suggesting its inevitability. A joint committee of editors from the two countries met in Dhaka on 25 and 26 June 1950 and adopted guidelines for publication of news and comments on communal incidents.

Bengal and Assam to East Pakistan continued, a stream of traffic in the contrary direction started and gained in volume. There has thus been, for many weeks past, a considerable two-way traffic. In the balance, however, there have been a larger number coming away from East Bengal than those returning to it. In recent weeks there has been a slow diminution in the numbers going in either direction. On some days during the last week or so, there have been more Hindus returning to East Bengal than those coming away from East Bengal. On the whole, more Muslims are coming back to West Bengal than those who are going away to East Bengal.

It is difficult to give precise figures of migrations. We have got accurate figures of movements by train into and out of West Bengal, as a record of such movements is kept at the border stations of Ranaghat and Bongaon within India. No accurate estimate is, however, possible of persons who have crossed the frontiers on foot. The State Governments concerned have made estimates of such migrants, both Hindus and Muslims, who have travelled on foot.

We have recently been supplied with the figures maintained by Pakistan of the daily movement by railway of Hindus and Muslims between East Bengal and West Bengal. These cover the post-Agreement period only. There is a considerable difference between the Pakistan figures and our figures for this period. Steps are now being taken to set up a joint checking agency for compiling figures of movement by train at the border stations.

I am laying on the table of the House figures of migrations¹³ between East Bengal and West Bengal, Assam and Tripura. It should be remembered that these figures necessarily include not only the normal traffic between the two countries but also many people going backwards and forwards. Thus the figures do not give the total number of persons involved, but those who travelled. It is clear that many of the Hindus, who returned from West Bengal to East Bengal, subsequently came back again to West Bengal. An attempt was made to calculate how many of such

13. The figures of migrations before and after the Agreement of 8 April 1950 were as follows:

	Migration from East Bengal to West Bengal, Assam and Tripura		Migration from West Bengal, Assam and Tripura to East Bengal	
	<i>Hindus</i>	<i>Muslims</i>	<i>Hindus</i>	<i>Muslims</i>
From 7 February to 8 April 1950	837,352	6,847	65,537	417,548
From 9 April to 3 August 1950	1,374,612	327,823	597,786	472,397

These figures did not take into account those who migrated between East and West Bengal on foot or by country boats, as well as those who travelled by train between East Bengal and Jalpaiguri.

persons returned in this way from East Bengal. Estimates based on two days' figures were that about twenty per cent of the Hindus returning from West Bengal to East Bengal came back again. From this it would appear that eighty per cent remained, for the present at least, in East Bengal.

A distressingly large number of cases have been reported to us, chiefly by refugees, of thefts, dacoities and molestation of women. It is exceedingly difficult to verify these reports. We have been sending them on to the Pakistan Government. We have also received recently a similar list from Pakistan of alleged incidents in West Bengal. These are being investigated.

An agreement has now been reached between India and Pakistan that homes for women who are recovered will be set up in both West Bengal and East Bengal under the management of social workers, the majority of whom will be members of the minority community.

Recent disturbances and migrations have largely upset the social life of the minority community in East Bengal. Economic distress has made life more precarious. I think it is true to say that there is no sense of security in the minds of the minority community in East Bengal. The problem is partly psychological. There has undoubtedly been an improvement in some ways, but much remains to be done.

I am meeting the Central Ministers and the Chairmen¹⁴ of the Minority Commissions of West Bengal and East Bengal next week to discuss these various problems with them.

14. Kalipada Mukherjee and Taffazal Ali respectively.

2. To Liaquat Ali Khan¹

New Delhi
August 5, 1950

My dear Nawabzada,

I have had several meetings with the two Central Ministers, Dr Malik and Mr Biswas,² and have also met the Chairmen of the Minority Commissions and the Chief Secretaries³ of East Bengal and West Bengal. We have discussed various

1. J.N. Collection.

2. C.C. Biswas and A.M. Malik held discussions with Nehru and other members of the Government in New Delhi from 3 to 5 August 1950.

3. Aziz Ahmed and S.N. Ray respectively.

matters with them. My colleague, Mr Gopalaswami Ayyangar, has also had long discussions with them. I do not propose to write about these discussions, as you will no doubt be informed about them. But there are some matters to which I should like to draw your attention.

2. I find that there is some vagueness about the functions of the Central Ministers.⁴ When we appointed them, I thought that our intention was for them to be in responsible charge, on behalf of their respective Governments, and to deal with matters arising out of the Agreement of April 8th. The position was undoubtedly rather novel. I find that on our side there has been some overlapping and consequent delay by the fact that provincial Governments often deal directly on this subject with our Government here. Our Central Ministers have largely devoted themselves to touring in both West Bengal and East Bengal and have no doubt done a great deal of good work in this way. But apart from this, they appear to have functioned merely as a post office.

3. I think it would be desirable for them to deal a little more directly with the problems that come up before them. First of all, I would suggest that all papers should normally go to them. That is to say that the West Bengal Government, in dealing with problems relating to the Agreement, should deal with our Central Minister as representative of the Government of India. He can either dispose of the matter himself or, if he thinks it necessary, refer it to us here. The provincial Government should, at the same time, send copies of communications, etc., to us here to keep us informed. But the normal channel should be through the Central Minister. This would be a much more expeditious and effective way of dealing with day-to-day problems. In the same way, I would imagine that your Central Minister, Dr Malik, would function as your Government's representative there dealing with the problems on the spot and making references to you whenever necessary.

4. There is to be of course constant touch between each Central Minister and his provincial Government and full coordination between them. Each should be kept informed of what the other is doing in regard to these matters.

5. The Central Ministers should give their advice or suggestions to the provincial Governments, or whenever they tour, many small matters can be disposed of on the spot without long correspondence, etc.

6. The Central Ministers should send frequent reports containing their own analysis of the situation as well as their recommendations. Where possible, it will

4. In terms of the Indo-Pakistan Agreement, the two Central Ministers of the Governments of India and Pakistan were to visit the riot-affected areas to help restore confidence among the refugees and facilitate their return home. They were empowered to participate in the meetings of the Minority Commissions, receive reports from them, and consult any person or organisation. Recommendations made by them were to be given effect to by the two Governments.

be a good thing if they send joint reports and joint recommendations. Where they disagree, they can easily note their disagreement. These reports could be sent direct to the Central Governments as well as to the provincial Governments concerned. Of course it is always open to each Central Minister to send his separate report to his own Government.

7. You will remember that I have often spoken and written to you about the question of requisitioning of urban houses. I mentioned this during our talks early in April 1950 and later, at Karachi. I wrote to you about this also, because this matter of requisitioning houses belonging to the minority community in East Pakistan had given rise to a great deal of feeling. It was an important reason for people to think that they were not wanted in Pakistan and were being pushed out. Indeed it became difficult for some persons to stay on when their house was requisitioned. It was equally difficult for people to go back when they had no house to go back to. I suggested, therefore, that every attempt should be made to derequisition some of the houses that had previously been requisitioned.

8. You were good enough to say that you would look into this matter and that you agreed that houses should not be requisitioned, unless there were special reasons for it. In particular, occupied houses should not be requisitioned and where a person had more than one house, he should always be left with at least one house.

9. To our surprise, we found sometime later that many more houses were being requisitioned. Last month, in July especially, information came to us repeatedly about a large number of houses being requisitioned all over Eastern Pakistan. This had a powerful effect in making people feel that members of the minority community were not welcomed in East Pakistan and the migrants should not return. In particular, complaints poured in the month of July. We communicated immediately with the Pakistan Government and I believe the West Bengal Government communicated with the East Bengal Government. To our great surprise, we were told by Pakistan that this was being done in agreement with the Government of India.⁵ Nothing could have astonished me more, because right from the beginning we have been pressing you for derequisitioning and it was exceedingly difficult for us to be told that we had agreed to large-scale requisitioning of houses.

5. On 1 August 1950, the East Pakistan Government announced that since the West Bengal Government had settled refugees on agricultural lands and in urban houses belonging to migrants, the bulk of refugees from West Bengal were not returning, fearing difficulties in getting back their properties. So to accommodate them, the East Pakistan Government were obliged to requisition vacant urban houses and this policy had the approval of the Government of India.

10. It has now transpired in the course of our talks that something that I had written to Chaudhuri Zafrullah Khan about land and cultivation thereon⁶ had been applied to urban houses. I have referred back to what I wrote and it is perfectly clear. This misunderstanding has thus been removed.

11. On enquiry, we were told that the East Pakistan Government issued an order on the 7th July for large-scale requisitioning and in fact, in the three weeks that followed in July, 811 houses were requisitioned in East Bengal. This figure was given to us by the Chief Secretary of East Pakistan. I was taken aback to learn this and I realised how powerful must have been the effect of this large-scale requisitioning on the mind of the minority community. We were told that this requisitioning has been done of empty houses only. That may have been the intention. But I have little doubt that there were many cases, when houses occupied by some relative or someone else were also requisitioned. To our knowledge, people were asked to vacate their houses at very short notice, causing great inconvenience, and some alarm. We were told that altogether 4,000 to 5,000 houses had been requisitioned in East Bengal in the course of the last year or two. Of these, some were Muslim houses; but the great majority belonged to Hindus.

12. Apart from the fact that houses which were empty were requisitioned, there was the other fact that these houses contained furniture, goods and chattels of the owner and there was grave risk of these disappearing. In West Bengal I am given to understand that altogether forty-six Muslim houses were requisitioned since February 1950, and out of these, twenty-four were derequisitioned. Thus ultimately only twenty-two Muslim houses were requisitioned and this was done for governmental purposes and not for refugees. I might mention that hundreds of Hindu houses were requisitioned by the West Bengal Government.

13. It is true that a large number of houses were forcibly occupied by refugees in West Bengal. The Government there forcibly ejected these refugees from two hundred and eighty-five such houses, in spite of a great deal of agitation against this kind of thing. After that, they toned down a little, but it is their policy to get these houses vacated.

14. The news of the large-scale requisitioning in East Bengal has had most unfortunate consequences in West Bengal, more especially when it is known that the requisitioning was for refugees. The refugees in West Bengal are agitating for a like procedure to be adopted in West Bengal and those who have forcibly occupied houses now find an argument not to leave them. All this of course powerfully affects

6. Nehru wrote to Zafrullah Khan on 30 June 1950 that agricultural lands in West Bengal belonging to migrants had been temporarily allotted to refugees for cultivation and would be restored to original occupants on their return. If the occupant returned before the harvest, the land would be restored to him after the harvesting along with one-third of the crop; meantime he would be adequately housed and given suitable subsistence allowance. Nehru added that if similar action was taken in East Bengal, India would have no objection.

the return of the migrants and generally creates difficulties all round. You will appreciate the importance of this matter from the point of view of giving effect to the letter and spirit of our Agreement.

15. I would earnestly request you to have early steps taken about this matter. I would suggest for your consideration the following:

- (i) There should be no further requisitioning of houses, except for very exceptional purposes and when Government itself requires them (not for refugees).
- (ii) The procedure for derequisitioning, after the owner comes back, should be very easy and swift.
- (iii) No houses should be requisitioned by Government, even for its own purposes, if the house is occupied by the owner or any member of his family or any other representative.
- (iv) There should be a careful enquiry before a house is requisitioned as to whether it is in fact vacant. The house should not be considered unoccupied if the owner has gone away for a few days.
- (v) A careful scrutiny should be made of the houses already requisitioned to find out if they were really empty or not at the time of requisitioning. The scrutiny should extend to the moveable property belonging to the owner that was in the house.
- (vi) The rent realised from houses that have been requisitioned should be paid to the owners.

16. I was told that in practice in East Bengal blank and signed forms were supplied for requisitioning houses to the inferior staff. These forms were pasted on houses which, for the moment, looked empty. Thus, whatever the policy of the East Bengal Government, the implementation of it was left to the judgement or pleasure of some very petty local officials. At any time this would have produced undesirable results. In existing circumstances, this was bound to lead to injustice and consternation.

17. There is one other matter to which I should like to refer and that is about educational institutions in East Bengal. Both practically and psychologically, the policy to be adopted in regard to such institutions has far-reaching effects and I would suggest to you that great care should be taken not to interfere in any way with such institutions.

18. We have to deal with difficult problems, but the greatest difficulty is how to produce the right impression on the minds of people. If we do not produce that right impression, then our efforts fail. It is because I think that this requisitioning of houses and the treatment accorded to educational institutions particularly affects the people concerned and makes them think in a special way that I have laid some stress on these two matters. There are other matters of course, but I do not wish to lengthen this letter. You will no doubt discuss them with the Central Ministers.

19. I have suggested to the Central Ministers that I would like them to spend a day here in Delhi on their way back from Karachi.⁷ They need not stay long here and the others accompanying them need not trouble to come back to Delhi. It would be helpful to us if we had a brief talk with the two Central Ministers after they had seen you.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

7. Biswas and Malik met Liaquat Ali at Karachi on 9 and 10 August 1950.

3. The Situation in Bengal¹

I beg to move:

That the Bengal situation, with reference to the Agreement between the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan signed on the 8th April 1950, be taken into consideration.

I have been thinking what would be the best way for me to deal with this motion before this House, because there are so many aspects of it and the House no doubt is interested in all these aspects. But, on the other hand, if I go into all these details it may be that we might lose sight of the main theme: we might lose ourselves in the trees and miss the wood itself.

People often talk of the success or failure of this Agreement. Many of our friends right from the first day the Agreement came to be signed were talking about the success or failure of it—many of them prophesying failure, many of them expressing, certainly in their mind, that it is bound to fail. It was rather an odd approach to this question. Nevertheless, there it was.

Now, what exactly does this talk of success or failure of this Agreement mean? My poor mind has tried to grapple with it and has not quite understood it. This Agreement was meant to deal with a particular and a very serious situation² that

1. Statement in Parliament, 7 August 1950. *Parliamentary Debates, Official Report*, 1950, Vol. V, Part II, cols. 398-417.

2. See *Selected Works*. (Second Series), Vol. 14 Part I, pp. 3-182.

had arisen, especially in East Bengal, West Bengal, Assam and Tripura and as a consequence of that it had affected the whole of India and the relationship of India with Pakistan. We met to deal with that particular situation which, of course, was the outcome of many other things that had happened previously. No one thought—certainly I did not think—that this Agreement was going to solve the major problem which might be called the Indo-Pakistan problem. Apart from everything else, the House knows that there are a number of other matters of great importance. There is Kashmir, there is the evacuee property, a problem which affects large numbers of people, and the canal waters question which has also assumed some importance. Now, obviously, all these major problems were not touched by this Agreement.

Therefore, this Agreement was meant to deal with a particular situation which had come to a head in East and West Bengal and surrounding areas. It was meant to stop a certain drift towards catastrophe. It was meant to bring some relief to vast numbers of people both in East Bengal and West Bengal, the minorities in both countries who were suffering tremendously, who were living in constant fear and, in fact, who were even prevented from migrating, more by force of circumstances, not by any statute or law. So the immediate object was to put an end to that grave tension and danger and to bring relief to millions of people and to produce an atmosphere which would take us towards the solution of many of those important problems that had arisen in Bengal, in the hope that as a better atmosphere came we could take measures step by step towards some kind of a solution. But remember that that solution ultimately depended not on agreements in regard to Bengal alone, but in the total context of Indo-Pakistan relations. Therefore, for people to talk of the success or failure of this Agreement seems to me to be completely beside the point.

Speaking, I hope, with due moderation, I would say that few things to my knowledge have succeeded so tremendously as this Agreement and anyone who talks about it as a failure is thinking on a different line or has not got the facts with him, or there is something radically wrong either with my thinking or that person's thinking, because I do not know what they mean. One may say—and one could rightly say—that the position in Bengal, in West Bengal or East Bengal, is not a satisfactory one. I agree entirely. One may say that all kinds of difficulties persist there, that minorities are by no means happy or secure. I agree. Let us face that problem; let us deal with it. But to say that the Agreement has failed does not convey anything to me. You may, perhaps, say that the Agreement has not solved the problem of Bengal completely. Well and good, it has not. I never thought that it would, although I did think that it would help us to bring a solution of the problem and in my opinion it has helped more than I expected it would help us. True, conditions in Bengal are not satisfactory; true, also, that they are infinitely more satisfactory than they were. You can draw the line where you like.

The real thing is that we have been suffering in India not only in Bengal but also in other parts and also in Pakistan, probably from a fever, from a sickness,

which did not begin even from Partition, but which Partition certainly aggravated. It began earlier than that. We thought, perhaps mistakenly, that we could get rid of that fever by that surgical operation which was Partition. Other forms of eruptions followed that Partition on a big scale, which affected the whole body of India and no doubt the whole of Pakistan. So, here is this deep-seated illness, the disease with which we are dealing which comes out in all kinds of shapes and forms and which will no doubt take a considerable time to heal. If we do not solve the problem quickly and suddenly, it is not surprising. We are dealing with enormous social and economic upsets in the minds of millions of people. It is not a small matter.

I may remind the House of one thing. We talk about migrations. There have been migrations on a tremendous scale since August 1947. But I should like the House to remember that this business of migration did not begin in August 1947. It began earlier than Partition. It began in Bengal a year before from Noakhali and other places. It began in the Punjab, especially from the Pindi and the Multan areas, in March 1947, many months before Partition. There was that disease, that mounting fever, at work which we tried to deal with in our way—whether it was right or wrong we need not discuss at the present moment—and that was by Partition. Partition dealt with it in a way and brought in other forms of eruption. We have been trying to face them and deal with them ever since.

I mention this background because people seem to think that the troubles that we have been faced with are easy of treatment and, perhaps, can even be treated by strong language, whether it takes the form of a resolution or a speech. May I also remind the House that during this period, if we look at this question objectively, we have had to face trouble not only created by or originating from Pakistan—and that we have taken notice of quickly enough—but plenty of trouble which has originated in our own country. And I think we will not be taking a balanced view of the situation in this country unless we look at both sides. I say so with all deference because when I read the various amendments of which notice has been given,³ it seems to me that not a single one of them has even tried to consider what has happened on this side. They have only looked at the sins of others, not at our sins, not at our failings. And I think if we do that we do the wrong thing. We not only do the wrong thing but we fail to understand the situation. And if we fail to understand the situation we must necessarily fail to deal with it. I find from reading these notices of amendments that most of them concern themselves with condemning the Pakistan Government. Most of them want us to do something vis-a-vis the Pakistan Government. Most of them, in fact, want us to make Pakistan to do something.

3. There were twelve amendments. All of them were withdrawn, excepting that of Shibbanlal Saksena calling for necessary measures to ensure "an honourable existence for the Hindu population in East Bengal". It was lost when put to vote.

Now, that is an interesting matter for you to consider. Pakistan is a foreign Government. One deals with a foreign Government, roughly speaking, in two ways. One is the way of negotiation with such pressure as can be exercised through negotiation, whatever the pressure may be, political, economic, diplomatic; but fundamentally it is the way of negotiation. The other is the way of war. There is no third way. There may be many types of negotiation. Or, there may be, of course, an intermediate stage, that is, neither war nor peace but breaking off of relations. These facts should be borne in mind. When honourable Members advise the Government to do this and that, that is, to make Pakistan do this and that, what exactly does it mean? Would any honourable Member advise me to do this and that, let us say, with respect to the United States of America or to the United Kingdom or to Russia? Not in this context; not in this way. We are dealing with a foreign country, and we have to deal with it in ways which international usage has laid down. I am not quite sure—it might be my ignorance but I might put the difficulty to you—how far it is right and proper for a House like this to discuss the condemnation of a foreign country. It might be right for aught I know, but normally speaking I believe it is not supposed to be done. But this is just the background.

Let us come to the actual facts of the case in so far as Bengal is concerned. There is no doubt about it that conditions in East Bengal and West Bengal are not normal. There is a feeling of frustration and insecurity in the minds of the minorities. Now, I shall express my own opinion for what it is worth, because one can't judge. I think that, on the whole, the Muslim minority in West Bengal—which also certainly, I think, suffers from a feeling of frustration and a certain insecurity—is relatively more secure than the Hindu minority in East Bengal. It is a relative matter. And I want you to remember that so far as the Muslims in West Bengal are concerned they are frustrated. I say so with certainty, and I say so with a certain measure of knowledge also, that that might apply to large numbers of Muslims in other parts of India too. Let us not by any means please ourselves by saying that we have done this and others have failed. For my part I am prepared to apply one test, and it is an adequate and sufficient test for me. I am prepared to apply the test to Pakistan and to India. And the test is: What does the minority think the majority is doing? Not what the majority thinks. So long as the minority of Pakistan itself does not feel secure and does not give a chit to the majority, so long there is something wrong there. I am prepared to apply it to India too. So long as the minority in India does not feel secure and is not prepared to give a chit to the majority, so long there is something wrong here. Because we must consider the picture on both sides evenly, objectively and fairly. If we do not do so we put ourselves in the wrong and take a lop-sided view of the situation.

There is so much talk of exodus. So many times it has been said that there is a one-sided exodus. I am amazed at it because nothing could be falser than that

statement. It has not been, for one day, a one-sided exodus—not for one day, not for one hour. How then dare anyone tell me that it is one-sided? It is not so, I say. True, there may be more on one side than on the other. True, in the balance, the numbers on one side may be greater. But to go on repeating that it is a one-sided affair is absolute falsehood and wrong and contrary to the facts. Look at the figures. I have supplied you the figures,⁴ and I stand by them. It is no use telling me that the figures are wrong. My figures are based on the normal ways of getting figures, that is, through the railway operators, the provincial Government operators. I have not got any particular agents of mine. It is the West Bengal Government's apparatus and the Railways Department's (Mr Gopalaswami Ayyangar's) apparatus that jointly and separately work to get these figures for us—the railway tickets sold, etc. We cannot check every individual case. But I think that is as good a way of getting at the numbers as any that might be devised. We cannot be sure of people crossing the borders on foot. That is difficult. We can only estimate that. But in regard to people who travel by air, by steamer or by rail we can be fairly certain, and we are fairly certain about them. So we give you these figures. Look at these figures carefully. If you take West and East Bengal for the moment and the proportion of the Hindu minority in East Bengal and the Muslim minority in West Bengal and then compare the figures of exodus from one side to the other, I think, you will find, relative to their population, the exodus was more or less the same. There is not much difference. What do we come to then? We come to this that conditions were produced for the minorities both in East Bengal and West Bengal which were not to their liking, which in fact exercised a powerful pressure upon them to leave their hearths and homes and migrate. Without going into a deep enquiry one can come to that conclusion. You know, and this House knows, that plenty of Muslims migrated from Uttar Pradesh.⁵ Again, without any enquiry one can say straight off that conditions were produced there which compelled them to migrate. It is no good saying that they were invited by a few persons to do so. The fact is that the conditions were such that they were afraid, that they felt insecure and went. When these conditions were reversed, well, they felt better, more secure now, and they are coming back. So you see these upsets, and all the failings of narrow-minded humanity at work, whether in regard to property, trying to take of others' property or pushing them out, or in other ways. And if you want to deal with this problem, you will not deal with it by saying: Here we are of spotless purity and conduct and there the people in Pakistan are

4. See *ante*, item 1.

5. A note laid on the table of the House on 1 August 1950 stated that about 250,000 Muslims had migrated from U.P. to West Pakistan. Of these, 5,000 had already come back and arrangements for the return of others were under consideration.

sinful and pushing out people. If that is said, I say it is an untruth. An untruth will not succeed and will not flourish.

Now, coming back to this situation, if you examine the figures of migrations, disturbing as they are, you will see that they continue to create a more and more difficult situation. Nevertheless, there is a great deal of improvement. I cannot say if that improvement is fast enough to catch up with the other disturbing features of the situation. I am disturbed, I am distressed. I am not content with things that are happening, that is true, but I am merely pointing out to you that, if you examine the figures as well as certain other factors to which I shall refer, the situation is an improving one. Whether that improvement is rapid enough to catch up with events, with other events, I cannot say and it may be that the West Bengal Government or any of our Governments may be faced with a more and more difficult situation with which they cannot easily deal with politically or economically. Therefore, we have to be wary and vigilant and try to do our best. Nevertheless, the position improves, both in regard to numbers, that is, the minorities will go back, and in regard to other matters too.

Now, I have said and I repeat that my opinion is that the Hindu minority in East Bengal feels—it is an important fact how they feel—insecure and, therefore, they cannot settle down, you might say, and there is a tendency to come away or even if they remain, they do not know how long they will remain; that is a fact, I think. I think also that gradually and slowly a certain feeling of normality is coming back in the relationship of peoples. I am quite sure that that feeling of normality has grown greatly in West Bengal; it is not fully normal yet but it has grown, although in the course of the last two or three months there were two or three rather bad incidents in West Bengal. Nevertheless, the Government and the people there have gradually got over them and thus a feeling of normality has grown. I cannot easily say how fast that feeling might grow in East Bengal; it is difficult to judge. On the whole conditions are still very insecure there. The insecurity comes not from major incidents but rather from a breakdown of the law and order situation there. There are dacoities, plenty of them, and often enough these dacoities take place in the houses of members of the minority community and we have had far too many complaints of molestation of women in connection with these dacoities. It is very difficult to say definitely how many of these complaints can be proved, because we get complaints naturally from refugees and we get complaints sometimes two or three weeks after the incident. Nevertheless, we try and we are trying to lay down the procedure whereby every complaint should be investigated fully, whether it is a complaint by us in regard to what happened in East Pakistan or by others in regard to what happened in West Bengal.

Two things might be said, apart from these incidents that have happened. There has been a very definite improvement in regard to two matters. One is the abduction of women and the other is the so-called forcible conversions. Our reports are that practically forcible conversions do not take place at all. Our reports in regard to

the abduction of women⁶ are that such cases have occurred some time ago, some months ago, and no fresh cases have been reported. The number reported even previously was relatively small and each case is being investigated. Some have been investigated and results achieved and a number have still to be investigated. Relatively the number is not great, although, of course, however small the number, one must have an effective machinery to deal with it. However, our opinion is that in regard to abduction of women and in regard to conversions, practically speaking, nothing is being done and no particular complaint is laid. Because of that and because of some other factors, I venture to tell the House that gradually there is a return to normality and because of the other factors, and specially the incidents, I have come to the conclusion that the normality is still far off, and so you can balance the two and I do not know how things might shape themselves; it depends on so many things in India and in Pakistan, our relations with Pakistan, apart from Bengal.

One other factor has to be remembered and that is this: the administrative apparatus of East Pakistan is acknowledged to be rather poor. After Partition, most of the efficient officers came away to West Bengal or elsewhere and left East Bengal with very junior and rather second-rate people to carry on the administration. Some others were imported there from outside, not in touch with the province, not understanding them. Generally, the administrative apparatus compared to West Bengal is very poor, and that is another difficulty that comes in dealing with the law and order situation there. I have no doubt at all that the Central Government in Pakistan has anxiously, and to the best of its ability, tried to give effect to this Agreement of April 8th, just as we have done here. I think the provincial Government of East Pakistan, on the whole, also tried to do so. I have not been quite clear about every act. Some acts have seemed to me to be quite wrong. I am by no means clear how the petty officials have behaved there; many of them have not behaved correctly there. You know, in terms of the Agreement, we appointed two Central Ministers of our Governments. Our Government appointed a Minister and the Pakistan Government appointed a Minister too and those two Ministers were specially charged with seeing to the implementation of this Agreement. We have had about two months'—or a little more—experience of their work; they have toured about a great deal and made various recommendations, and in the course of the last few days I have been seeing a great deal of them; both of them were here as well as the Chairmen of the Minority Commissions and Chief Secretaries of West Bengal and East Bengal. I should like to say that both these gentlemen, our own Minister, Mr Biswas, and the Pakistan Minister, Dr Malik, have, in my opinion, done extraordinary good work. I need not say much

6. Parliament was informed on 4 August 1950 that 179 cases of abducted and missing women had been reported to the East Pakistan Government. East Pakistan claimed to have recovered 23 women and all except one were returned to their relatives.

about our own colleague, Mr Biswas, because he is our colleague. But, I should like to express my appreciation of the work of Dr Malik, the Pakistan Minister, who has been working with him. So, we find a difficult situation, which honest people are trying to grapple with, trying to solve it, coming up against the difficulties, against evil designs of other people, against inertia of the people, against economic collapse, against the whole upset, we may say, of the social fabric, more especially in East Pakistan. With all these difficulties, we see a highly complicated situation. If you want me to say or describe it in a sentence or a phrase, I cannot do it. If you really say it is all the fault of Pakistan, I think you are wrong. Nobody, not even the bravest of us, can suddenly solve the problems. We are trying to do our best.

I should like to mention one thing which has troubled me considerably and that is the question of requisitioning of houses in East Pakistan. We attached importance to this right from the beginning and I mentioned it to Mr Liaquat Ali Khan that things were not satisfactory. Suddenly in July, that is, less than a month ago, we got a crop of complaints of requisitioning and we were surprised and amazed at this. We protested. To my amazement, we were told that these houses were being requisitioned by agreement with the Government of India. That surprised me. Then, when we enquired further, it was found that I was supposed to be the culprit; that is to say, a letter of mine to the Pakistan Government was pointed out.⁷ Now, that letter of mine dealt with agricultural lands entirely and completely. We were discussing the question of giving back the agricultural lands to the returning migrants. The Chief Minister of West Bengal Government had said that it was a little difficult for him suddenly to push out the people, refugees and others, who had been placed there to cultivate the land, because the lands could not be allowed to remain fallow on account of the food situation, and that he would get back the lands after they had reaped the harvest. Meanwhile, we had agreed to give every kind of accommodation, etc., to the returning migrants in this intervening period. There was argument about that between Pakistan and India. I had written to the Pakistan Government what the Chief Minister of West Bengal had said to me, that these people may be allowed to remain till they complete the harvest and then the lands will be returned. If the Pakistan Government wants to do likewise, obviously we cannot object to it. We were talking about agricultural land. They apparently extended that to urban properties and houses and started requisitioning on a large scale, on a very big scale. I think in the month of July, 811 houses were requisitioned all over East Bengal—a pretty large number.

I would like to draw attention to another aspect of the East Bengal situation. We talk about forty lakhs of people having come away from East Bengal since the Partition. Most of them, of course, came away long before this year, long before this Agreement. Half of them came before this year. Quite a number of them came almost immediately after the Partition because they wanted to come over and that

7. See also *ante*, pp. 256-257.

process, though slow, still continues. This process was largely a process of the middle class elements leaving East Bengal because of pressure of circumstances, because of all kinds of things. They were, in a sense, squeezed out by circumstances from East Bengal; they could not carry on their professions successfully, practice at the bar or the medical profession, and so on and so forth. The problem has been there. Many stayed there. In this last migration, many more middle class people came away. Even now, some middle class people remain there. After all, remember this that ten million people, nearly a crore of Hindus, are still in East Pakistan. It is a very large number. It is true that a very large number of middle class people have come over; it is also true that specially after these February-March disturbances people like teachers came over. Schools were closed; educational institutions ceased to function, so that the normal life of the minority community was completely upset there. There are children without schools and school masters without children and so on. All these upsets have taken place. It is impossible to get back to the pre-upset stage. That is very difficult. We cannot do it by any amount of juggling. I do not know what the future holds. It may be that some new equilibrium will be established. Some people say that not a single Hindu can remain in East Bengal. I am not a prophet; I cannot say. But I should imagine that, normally speaking, a very large number of Hindus will remain there. Something may happen tomorrow as between India and Pakistan which worsens our relations. That would be an upset and would widen the gap and make it more difficult. Something may happen which might bridge the gap. There are so many uncertain quantities in this that I cannot say. Normally speaking, I see no reason why a very large number of Hindus should not remain there, and a very large number of Muslims remain in West Bengal, although I know that the exodus is continuing on both sides. It is after all a matter for serious consideration.

The other aspect of it is that since April 8, since the date of the Agreement, there has been a continuous flow back of minorities who had migrated previously, both Hindu and Muslim. You have got the figures. Since I gave you the figures in the printed leaflet, the figures have changed because they are added to every day. The figures, up to the 3rd of this month, of Hindus who have gone back to Pakistan from West Bengal was 600,000. Six hundred thousand is a fairly considerable number. A number of them, no doubt, go there to get their goods and chattels, and come back. Our own estimate is—it can only be an estimate after some enquiry—that that figure is fifteen per cent of those who go. Out of these 600,000, we may say 100,000 have come back. Even so, half a million people remain. That is a fair number. If you examine the figures, again you will find that these people who go back take a large number of women—young women and children. People do not take their young women and children, normally speaking, if they are just going to get hold of their property.

There are two processes at work: one process, a very powerful one, making the minorities in East Bengal insecure and frightened, the future appearing dark

to them, and, therefore, tending to squeeze them out; and the other process of people going back, no doubt with mixed motives, partly, no doubt because they find no particular help given to them, and no particular opening in West Bengal. They want to go back partly on account of attraction of property and various other things. Nevertheless, obviously, the great fear that drove them out does not exist, otherwise that would overcome all the other attractions. So the question is what are we to do in the circumstances? What are the possible ways out for us?

The various amendments that have been proposed⁸ mostly refer to Pakistan doing something or our making Pakistan do something. Whether it is a question of exchange of population in that region or elsewhere, or some kind of territorial redistribution, or whether it is simply, as some people say, an annulment of Partition, I must confess that when I read these proposals and resolutions which very responsible people pass I began to doubt my own sanity or the sanity of the others. Something must be wrong somewhere; and as I naturally cannot easily examine my own mental apparatus, I suspect that the others' has gone wrong. Now, if people go ahead and talk in connection with the Bengal problem or the refugee problem, about an annulment of Partition, that raises a number of issues. One of them, of course, is that they are proposing something which involves a war and a conflict on a prodigious scale. And even if you go through such a war, what happens after the war is another matter—after, if you like, a victorious war. What then? But leaving that out, what I am interested in is: Is this approach of any help to the minorities? Now, with all deference, I would like each honourable Member to consider how either an individual member of the minority community, or the minority community as a whole, is going to be helped this way. A way that involves a big-scale conflict means that the first victims of that conflict are the minorities themselves, and we do not help them at all in this way. Secondly, that way involves the uprooting and upsetting of all things and does not produce conditions for rehabilitation about which we talk so much either here or elsewhere. In fact, you put an end to the whole idea of rehabilitation, or settling or solving a single problem of the minority community, in the hope that after you have removed all kinds of obstructions in the shape of a foreign State, etc., then you would deal with the problem. But meanwhile the minorities, or a good part of them, may cease to be. Every one of these proposals involves an upheaval and conflict, and sometimes, though not always, war. You do not help these minorities at all. Of course, you may say that in the national interest, taking everything together, it is worthwhile doing this or

8. Thakur Das Bhargava proposed exchange of populations if the Agreement failed to work within six months or, alternatively, return of all Muslim immigrants to East Bengal and recovery of full compensation from Pakistan in respect of properties left by Hindus in East Bengal. Jaspal Rai Kapoor suggested securing land from East Pakistan proportionate to the number of refugees coming from there. K.T. Shah wanted effective guarantees from Pakistan to ensure safety of its minorities.

that, and pay a heavy price for it. I can understand that argument, whether I agree with it or not. But you cannot say that it is done in order to help the minorities, in order to settle them or rehabilitate them. You cannot say that, because in fact what you suggest does not help them at all, but would cause the greatest possible distress and possibly much worse than distress. You will uproot them completely.

And take the other proposals, even of exchange of populations. I ventured to describe that some months ago, I think in this House, or maybe elsewhere, as a completely impracticable and fantastic proposal. I would like to repeat that. It is fantastic and impracticable and this Government will have nothing to do with that, more so because it is something which is completely opposed to the whole political, economic, social and spiritual basis for which we stand, and so long as this Government remains where it is, it will not have anything to do with it. It will not touch it with a pair of tongs or a barge-pole. Let us be quite clear about it. If you want to proceed with that, then you have to change the whole basis of not only this Government, but all that we had stood for all these thirty years and more, during the whole Congress movement and the whole freedom movement in this country. You will have to change the very basis upon which we had fought, the spiritual and other basis for which we stood. Other people, I can understand, who have never had that basic background, I can very well understand them floating about without any convictions or anchor or faith; but we have a certain anchor, and if that anchor goes, we go with it. We cannot change today and leave the anchor that held us all these years and that faith that has kept us going. Therefore let us be quite clear that these proposals are fantastic and impracticable, not only because they involve war or something approaching war, but also because in trying to work them out you destroy the minorities, you uproot millions and you spend the rest of your life and the next generations' life in trying to settle them down. And there is something even greater involved in this. It is a question of faith. It involves the whole spiritual background on which we have stood and which is even more important than the inconvenience and the distress which may be caused to us by taking any particular action. Therefore, I would beg this House to look at this question from this point of view and also from the practical point of view.

Now, people talk to us in regard to this Agreement and say that it has failed, that anyhow the Agreement has not done its job. Very well, but the Agreement is now a law which cannot be touched. Sometimes some of our own Secretaries to Government go on carrying on with East Bengal or West Bengal a tremendous amount of correspondence about the interpretation of this line or that line in the Agreement, as if that has become a final statute which has to be interpreted. I have no patience, I am sorry, with this kind of business and I have told them so. You leave aside the Agreement, let us consider the problem. What are you going to interpret there? I am prepared to say something else now that is more suitable.

After all, the importance of the Agreement is in its approach, not in this article or that paragraph of the Agreement. Where necessary, we can change the paragraph, and we can make a fresh agreement. The whole point is in the approach of the Agreement and the approach to the Agreement was such, as the House knows, that it thrilled the whole country; it made a difference to the world, it made a difference to millions and millions of people, Hindus and Muslims in India and Pakistan. That was the approach, the friendly approach, which made them feel that a great burden was going to be lifted from their shoulders, that we are going to settle these things by friendly discussions, by negotiations and so forth. Either that approach continues or this approach of hurling abuse at each other, trying to make out that it is the others' duty to do this or that. If we perform our duty, others are likely to perform theirs, and we will be in a position almost to enforce performance by them. But if we do not perform our own job and duty, then surely we have neither the might, nor the strength nor the power to make others do their duty. Therefore, I would beg the House to consider this matter from this point of view of the approach.

And again, it is not good having an approach which is neither this nor the other. I can understand, though I disapprove of it, the approach of defiance and of war and taking the consequences of all that. Well, a nation does that when it feels like it. Or, I can understand the approach of friendly negotiation, trying to get as much as we can out of it. But in a middle course, you lose the advantages of either. It means nothing at all. It becomes a weak man's approach. You do not get the benefits of the friendly approach nor those of the approach of defiance which does not weigh the consequences. Therefore, do not have a middle approach. And as far as I can see there can be no approach at this time, and under the circumstances there should be no approach of the warlike kind. Therefore, we come from that to the other approach. And having done that, let us not talk about it as something which we do not believe in, which we have no faith in, and one which we think is bound to fail but through the generosity of our hearts we permitted to function for a few months and then we shall see. That is not the way to deal with serious matters: it is not the way of dealing with grave matters of policy. If one disagrees with anything, let us fight it and put an end to it, politically or otherwise, but a kind of inner sabotage all the time like this is not going to do any good.

Therefore, I submit that so far as this Agreement is concerned, it has done a great deal of good. It has not solved the problem, nor was it expected to, and we have to deal with that problem in all its aspects, not in any way we like, but in the spirit of that Agreement and not its details. Because the alternative to that, the only valid alternative, is defiance, the alternative of conflict. In between there may be some light variations of emphasis. The position is a grave one. I do not wish in the slightest to underestimate the gravity of the situation, but I do submit that every single proposal which I have seen—I mean these amendments—will add to the gravity and the mischief of the situation and will not ease it. It is in this

spirit that I would have this House to approach this matter, remembering that it does not help very much for us, sitting in this House, to criticise a foreign Government. If we start this game, in their assemblies they will criticise us and, normally speaking, it is not a practice which honourable Houses like this should encourage. Sir, I move.

4. Overcoming the Crisis¹

For two full days we have discussed this grave problem and many moving speeches have been delivered. There have been various viewpoints expressed, often in forcible and passionate language. Whatever the other differences, on one thing we are all agreed, namely, that this is a matter of grave import and of the highest importance. My regret has been that this matter has not been dealt with, if I may say so with all respect, from a constructive point of view, but much more so from not only a destructive but rather a political point of view. So far as facts are concerned, there may be difference of opinion, and that difference can be partly removed by considering all the facts carefully and objectively.

But it is important that we consider more the approach to this question first, because that governs our interpretation of facts and how we proceed with the matter. This question covers many aspects. We have to deal with the international aspect, the national, the political, the economic, the social, the communal and, above all, the human aspect of the problem for it affects millions of our countrymen and naturally anything that affects them has to be considered, apart from other things, from the human aspect.

But in another sense, there is another aspect—an overriding aspect—which has to be kept in mind and that is the principles which should govern our approach. By what yardstick do we measure things? What are our ideals and objectives in regard to India? Because unless those objectives are clear, we are likely to flounder or lose ourselves in the morass of detail.

Now, listening to the speeches delivered here in the course of the last two days, I felt that this approach, on principle, was very varied. In fact I felt that there were different approaches entirely. It seems to me that we—this House as well as this country—ought to be fairly clear as to what our objectives are, what our aims are, what kind of India we are seeking to build up, so that whatever steps we might take may fit in with those ideals and objectives and that picture of future India

1. Reply to the debate in Parliament on the situation in Bengal, 9 August 1950. *Parliamentary Debates, Official Report*, 1950, Vol. V, Part II, cols. 597-622.

that we seek to build up. If we do not do that, we shall be in continuous difficulty, and I do submit that one of our major difficulties in the past has been this varied and often contradictory approach to such problems, with the result that neither approach yields satisfactory results, because there is a pulling in different directions, for you cannot have an approach which is, if I may say so, friendly and hostile at the same time. Each cancels the other, whether internally or externally in the international field.

Now, it may be said that those of us who have had the honour to belong to the great Congress organisation have had certain fairly definite objectives and ideals, at any rate in regard to such matters. We may differ, perhaps in regard to economic approaches, although even in regard to them there was a basic Congress approach. It may be generally said to be an approach in favour of equality, in favour of the underdog, in favour of raising up the people. But it is true that that was a general approach, not a detailed one. Subsequent Committees of the Congress have gone into details, but it cannot be said that the Congress as a whole, during these past many years, laid down the details of that approach; and so when political freedom was achieved, certain tendencies—rather divergent—came into the field in regard to that economic approach. But so far as this particular question with which we are concerned, or rather the background of it, the context of it, the ideals that should govern it are concerned, I submit that the Congress approach for many, many years has been exceedingly clear.

Of course, it is always open not only to this House but certainly to the country and even to the Congress to re-examine its previous approaches, and if necessary to vary them. It is open to them and we have to see whether conditions have arisen which compel us to re-examine that approach. But so long as we do not re-examine it and change it deliberately, naturally we are supposed to follow that basic approach on which we built up our movement for freedom, according to which we struggled for freedom and which we declared after the attainment of freedom and which this House had declared time and again on various occasions. So it is desirable that we should be clear about that.

I am rather sorry that in all likelihood this motion that I have made will be, to put it in the colloquial language, 'talked out'; because I should have liked—whether it is now or whether it is at a later stage—this House to come to grips with this basic approach and principle that should govern our looking at things and come to some clear decision. It is not fair to this House, it is not fair to this Government or to the unfortunate individual who happens to be the Prime Minister, it is not fair to any party concerned, for us to proceed sometimes in different directions because our basic premise may be different. We waste our time and energy in coming into meaningless conflicts of opinion. Therefore, it would be desirable for this House and for the great organisation that many of us here represent to lay down clearly what our approach to the present problem is—what the basic one is; the details may be filled in later.

Now, the Congress approach being clear—at any rate till it is changed—so far as this Government is concerned it is naturally its bounden duty to follow that approach and none other. I can understand my honourable friend, Dr Syama Prasad Mookerjee, expressing himself in a different language and approaching the problem in an entirely different way. He is not bound down by the Congress approach nor have his past activities been conditioned by that. Now, I may disagree—as I did—with Dr Mookerjee's approach to this problem. But I admit he has a right to follow his own approach and to give expression to it fully. But I do confess that I am greatly surprised and somewhat distressed at the fact that many of our colleagues in this House, who presumably are supposed to follow that basic approach on which we have founded ourselves through the major part of our life, tried to treat that casually and, in fact, to reject it, to bypass it and to ignore it, as if it did not exist at all or, perhaps, to think that in the present circumstances it has no more force left.

If it has no more force left in the present circumstances then it is for us to examine what is the force left in our past ideology and in our past working. Is there anything left, or are we simply here without any ideology, without any ideals or objectives, just going on from day-to-day as we react to individual circumstances? It is an important matter, because we are face to face with very grave issues, in India and in the world. We may ignore the world, if you like, but as the recent debate in this House showed, it is not a question of our ignoring the world, or the world ignoring us. If there is a war in the world, that is a matter which will affect our individual life and so many other things. Therefore, we have to be quite clear as to how we must look at these problems which act and interact and affect each other.

Now, Dr Mookerjee referred in his eloquent speech to a number of instances—I think he gave three specific instances²—and then he threw at us a vast number of figures³ which he said his workers had gathered. He also gave certain indications⁴ of how he thought we might deal with this problem.

2. Syama Prasad Mookerjee had on 7 August 1950 referred to a few cases of brutal treatment and indignities suffered by certain Hindu families in Barisal and Khulna districts after the signing of the Agreement.
3. Mookerjee stated that between 14 June and 3 August 1950, of the 15,900 Hindu refugees from East Bengal interviewed, ninety per cent were disinclined to go back to East Bengal, and many among those who had gone back were returning because of hard and oppressive conditions of living there. Of the 4,500 Muslims going to East Bengal interviewed, about forty per cent were going to live there but the rest wished to come back to West Bengal. Alleged cases of murder, extortion, assault, abduction and rape against Hindus during this period were also cited by him.
4. Alternatives suggested by him were unification of East and West Bengal by annulment of Partition, demand for one-third of the territory of East Pakistan and "exchange of population and property plus compensation in the eastern region."

Now, so far as those figures which he threw at us are concerned, it is difficult for me to deal with the matter, because I have no basis, I have nothing in the nature of evidence. We also keep in close touch through such agencies as the Government work with and many private agencies and thereby we gather our own impressions and our own figures. The West Bengal Government naturally helps us; our Deputy High Commissioner⁵ helps us; the Central Government apparatus helps us; the Railways help us. In addition to that, fortunately, there are many brave men who are working under difficult circumstances in East Bengal and in West Bengal who help us. So that we get all these facts and figures and impressions from them and we try to form a picture in our mind.

That picture and those figures differ very greatly from the figures that Dr Mookerjee placed before the House. I am unable to accept them and I do not see how the House can accept them. In any event one would require some kind of proof and I do submit that Dr Mookerjee himself, if he examined them, will not accept them, because they have no *prima facie* evidence or truth behind them. I am referring, for the moment, not to the instances of brutality, etc., but the individual instances that he referred to. He mentioned three cases and they were bad cases, bad in the sense that they were painful cases. I have no doubt that, as he referred to individual cases, those cases must be true; I accept them as individual cases. What I object to is talking about six hundred and one thousand incidents which are gathered from people who have suffered, who are excited, who often talk from horror, who often repeat and sometimes whose cases have been found, on analysis, not to be based on any evidence whatever.

Shrimati Renuka Ray and Shrimati Sucheta Kripalani also spoke⁶ feelingly about this matter. It is right that all of us, especially our women members, should feel this utter misery that our brothers and sisters suffer. But there are two aspects which I may place before the House. Shrimati Renuka Ray was rather angry,⁷ if I may use the word, that Shri Shankerrao Deo had said *kahani*, which she perhaps

5. Santosh Kumar Basu.

6. Renuka Ray said that the Agreement had not been able to engender a sense of security among the minorities in Pakistan but wondered whether the Prime Minister of India was expected to perform miracles. Sucheta Kripalani gave an account of her visit to various refugee camps.

7. Taking exception to Shankerrao Deo's description of Sucheta Kripalani's narration of conditions in refugee camps as a *kahani*, Renuka Ray said, "It is not a *kahani*, it is not a fable or a story. They are facts as they are and they are undisputed and poignant with misery."

misunderstood. Shri Shankerrao Deo was referring to *kahani* not in the sense of a fable, but in the sense of an incident, a story of an incident.

Anyhow, there is no doubt about it that such incidents have occurred and, as Dr Mookerjee gave three, I am sure many members of this House, certainly I, can add to that number. There is no doubt about it. But the point is: are we going to consider this grave matter in the light of certain deplorable and unhappy incidents and thus lose ourselves in a sentimental morass and lose grip of the situation? We are a responsible House dealing with a highly difficult, highly important matter, which may affect the fate of the whole nation and may have larger consequences. So, we cannot be swept away, as at a public meeting, by a sentimental approach and appeal. We know that. That is why we have met in all seriousness to consider this matter. If those things did not happen, then why should we have been so excited and so worked up? We know that of course; knowing that, what are we to do? That is the question.

Dr Mookerjee was good enough to invite me to visit Sealdah station.⁸ I would gladly go there and I shall go there when I have a chance and when I think a visit of mine will be of some profit. I do not want to go there merely to show off as a gesture. That is not fair to those unhappy refugees and it is not fair to me. During the last three years we had enough of tragedy, we have supped our fill of horror. We have seen with our own eyes things happen which have left a vivid impression in our minds for the rest of our lives. I do not think anyone who has gone through those experiences, whether in Bengal or Punjab, whether in West Pakistan or East Pakistan, or in this city of Delhi itself, will ever forget them. They will ever survive in our memory. We have had enough of them. We seek some ways to put an end to this business. If we cannot put an end to it, then surely our fate is going to be much worse not merely in human misery, which is terrible, but, what is worse, in human degradation, because this kind of thing degrades every party. It degrades the sufferer; it degrades the person who makes that man suffer. It is a process of utter deterioration and disintegration of all life.

Therefore, when these terrible things happened, for the first time in my life, in my public career, grave doubts came to me and the future of my country, which was rising like a star, looked dim. Not because of what Pakistan did. That was bad enough. But after all my future is going to be governed by what my people do; not by what Pakistan does, as their future will be governed by what their people do. No doubt what they do affects us. But ultimately it is my concern as to what

8. Nearly fifteen thousand refugees from East Bengal were then living in wretched conditions on the platforms of the Sealdah railway station at Calcutta. Trains from East Bengal arrived at Sealdah.

my people do. Doubts came to my mind and I saw the noble edifice that we were seeking to build being undermined and a weakening of its strength, and and of the nobility of outline of the structure that we had planned.

May I take the House into my confidence about a certain matter which is perhaps known only to a few of my colleagues? It is a personal matter and therefore I apologize for this intrusion. In the month of March last, when news came from East Bengal—and then there were all kinds of evil deeds in East Bengal and their flowing over to West Bengal and then all kinds of evil deeds in West Bengal and in the city of Calcutta and Howrah—I was greatly upset. I was upset, as the House can well imagine, not only as an individual caring for my people and certainly for their miseries but upset as Prime Minister, because I felt that in the ultimate analysis the responsibility was mine. The responsibility was mine, not directly, if you like, but in some indirect way, for those things that happened in East Pakistan, but the responsibility was mine very directly for things that happened in any part of India. So I thought about this a great deal.

I knew that the military and the police would do their job well or indifferently as the case might be. But there was something deeper afoot than that. It was not by soldiers and policemen that we could solve those problems; we could deal that way with any serious situation like that, certainly. How could I, I felt, affect the minds and hearts of these millions of people, my own countrymen certainly, and also, if possible, people across the border? I did not see my way clear, governmentally as Prime Minister. The House will remember that I offered to the Prime Minister of Pakistan to go jointly on a brief tour of East Bengal and West Bengal. He did not accept that offer.⁹

I was in this great difficulty and this painful prospect of not being able to do anything from my chair here in Delhi. Ultimately I came to the decision that perhaps I had exhausted my utility as Prime Minister and there might be other ways in which I could make myself more useful. Having come to that decision I announced it at a full meeting of the Cabinet and I told them that I felt that my duty then lay to go to East Bengal. I had not been allowed to go there in my official capacity. Perhaps I could go there as a simple citizen of India unofficially and nobody would prevent me. And perhaps my going—I could not attach too great a value to it—but perhaps my going might be a gesture which might affect some people's minds, might at least bring some relief to me. I also told the Cabinet of my distress at the way the ideals of the Congress for which we had stood were fading away to

9. Liaquat Ali rejected the proposal as unlikely to produce any useful result. See *Selected Works* (Second Series), Vol. 14 Part I, p. 60.

the right and to the left and I was being left with nothing to catch hold of, no anchor to hold. So I informed the Cabinet. And it was my full intention to do that.

It so happened that very soon after that events took a new turn. Mr Liaquat Ali Khan came here at my invitation and for six or seven days we discussed matters and out of that discussion emerged this Agreement of April 8th. Now, that Agreement put a new responsibility and a new burden on me. I was responsible for that Agreement, partly at least. That responsibility was later shared by the whole Government and this House. But it was my initial responsibility and I could not see my way then to resign from the Prime Ministership just when that new responsibility had come. So I held on as I did. Whether it was right or not, I do not know; whether it is right for me now to hold to this high office, I do not know. And the moment my mind feels that I can serve the country better in some other capacity, I shall adopt that different course.

So, when we consider this problem of Bengal let us for the moment put aside one or two things—not that they are not important, they are highly important—but in order to consider it in a more simple fashion. First of all, let us put aside these incidents that had happened. We admit them, we know them. We know that life is insecure in many places. We know all that. We have to find a remedy for them. The second thing is—and that is a very major question—the question of rehabilitation. In a sense that should almost overshadow most other considerations. I wish that this House in the course of this debate had considered that matter more constructively, offered suggestions for us who are groping sometimes in the dark in regard to it, and helped us. But that question was dealt with rather in a spirit of negation and criticism and destruction. I do not mind that. The House and every Member has a right to say that; he can do that. But it did not help me very much. It is a matter which this House, I hope, as a House or individual Members, will take great interest in, and we should welcome every kind of interest, every kind of help in it, because it is a question which the Government with all its faith and all the resources at its command cannot solve without a large measure of public support and cooperation and sympathy.

It is too big a question. None of our big questions can be solved by governmental decree, or even if we had all the money for it, unless we have a huge measure of public support. And who can give that support more than the honourable Members of this House? I should like some of the honourable Members to go—some of them have gone—but I should like more of them to go to West Bengal and more specially to East Bengal. Let them go and see and let them help in creating the right atmosphere.

So, in regard to this problem of rehabilitation, I am not going into that now although I consider it the most vital—if I go into it I lose myself in the details and the theme of the main argument goes. But I do want to tell you that I think that it is by far the most important of all the problems that have come up in this respect.

I gave this House a certain pamphlet¹⁰ containing some figures, etc., and many honourable Members¹¹ cited it. One honourable Member referred to it and said that because it does not contain information about East Pakistan, the rehabilitation, etc., therefore East Pakistan has done nothing; otherwise, Mr Biswas and Mr Malik would have given these figures. I do not think that that is a right criticism, because that paper was not meant to be an exhaustive paper on the subject. It was given under the Speaker's directions and it contained in a consolidated form answers to some questions that had been put by honourable Members. We did not try to give all the details of the position. In brief, I gave the answers myself. So it is not right to criticise it from that point of view. All the figures we have got were from the West Bengal Government and not from Mr Biswas or Mr Malik. The West Bengal Government sent us their figures about their activities and this, with some other information that we had, we had that statement prepared and it would be completely incorrect to say that we did not refer to the East Bengal activities, and therefore the figures are not found there. I know that there are some activities in East Bengal, but I cannot immediately tell you what they are in regard to rehabilitation.

Now, I shall put aside for the moment this question of rehabilitation, realizing its utter importance, and for the moment also having put aside the narrative of the ill deeds that have happened undoubtedly, I shall examine how we have to face the problem. Dr Mookerjee put forward three proposals. Those proposals, I take it, were taken from the recent resolutions passed by the Refugees Conference. Some Members of this House approved of one or more of those proposals and some did not approve of them. Anything that Members of this House put forward and what Dr Mookerjee puts forward are obviously worthy of full consideration. I had given every possible thought that I can and having given thought, I have not been able still to get away from a feeling of great surprise that any responsible person should put forward any of those proposals because, looked from any point

10. The note circulated by the Ministry of External Affairs on 8 August stated that in West Bengal, houses and lands were being returned to owners on their return from East Pakistan. The owners of rural lands expected to return after the end of the sowing season were to be given back their lands, which had been temporarily allotted to refugees. It also stated that 9,000 out of 22,000 Muslim industrial workers had been reinstated in Calcutta and both parts of Bengal were enacting legislation to set up committees to manage properties of migrants. Urban houses, even when occupied by owners, were being requisitioned in East Bengal, while figures were not available about migrants who recovered their properties on return to East Bengal, places of worship damaged or defiled there and women abducted or converted to Islam.
11. H.V. Kamath and Syamnandan Sahaya complained that the note contained no information about East Pakistan. Sahaya stated that the Government there had done nothing to rehabilitate migrants who returned.

of view, whether from the high point of view of any objective and ideals, or whether from the low point of view of the practical or the lowest point of view of the opportunist, I say each one fails and completely fails. Analyse them. Let us not in our feeling of anger at what has happened give leave to logic and reason, give leave to the practical aspect. I hope, of course, we should not give leave to the idealistic aspect, because I always attach great importance to it, but look at it from a strictly practical aspect.

Now, I mentioned in my opening remarks day before yesterday that the whole object of this Agreement of April 8 was to create a certain atmosphere. We have talked here of the feeling of insecurity that prevails in East Bengal. It is right. There is that feeling of insecurity, although I believe, and I hope it is not wishful thinking, I think that gradually that is lessening. But anything may happen which may increase that feeling of insecurity or decrease it. I am not a prophet and I do not know what will happen. Some Members¹² think that every single member of the minority community from there will leave East Bengal. Well, they have a right to have their opinion. I will only submit that I find no reason for thinking so. Further, I would submit that if I had reason for thinking so at present, I would try my utmost even so to prevent it happening and not to say a word or deed which would encourage that process to flow because that very process creates the terrible problem that we have to face.

On the one hand we point out that terrible problem and on the other hand we do things which increase that problem and create further difficulty.

This great contradiction has come in our way all this time. What is our approach to this problem? Are we going to approach it with a real desire to solve and so far as such problems can be solved by creating a feeling of security in the minds of minorities all over, whether in Pakistan or in India, or while we talk, while we complain of the lack of security, we carry on by speech and action in a way so as to add to that insecurity? All these things have happened. Honourable Members have said that people in East Bengal have not been led to come away because of newspaper articles or by public speeches,¹³ that there are other causes. Of course there are other causes. Who says any newspaper speech or an article can make a million people come away? Nobody can say that, but when there is this huge upset in people's minds and people are frightened and are full of fear, then every little thing counts which may move them in this direction or that; we are dealing with not only an economic upset or social upset but a psychological problem of the greatest magnitude.

12. Shibbanlal Saksena, Syama Prasad Mookerjee, Syamnandan Sahaya, A.C. Guha, and Thakur Das Bhargava.

13. Renuka Ray denied Shankerrao Deo's charge that the emotional speeches of Syama Prasad Mookerjee had led the minorities to leave East Pakistan.

Here was this Agreement of April 8. Now I think it is admitted all round that the psychological and the practical effect of that Agreement was to reduce the fear of the minorities all over. There is no doubt about that. It reduced their fear. Therefore it worked in the right direction and that is all that human beings can do to work in the right direction. It is not for us to think about the results but to create a right atmosphere so that this may help in solving the problem. If that Agreement had done nothing else, it created that tremendous atmosphere in removing from the people's minds fear of an immediate disaster. That was a great thing.

Similarly, many things that you and I may do, this debate here that we are having for the last two days will no doubt have effect elsewhere of adding to that insecurity or lessening it. It will have that, there is no doubt about that. Of the speeches that honourable Members make here, even though this is not a public platform, India listens to some extent and the world listens to what they say. Many people do not read newspapers and the many things that are said here may not reach them, but yet we know how impressions spread to millions of people, how a whisper spreads from town to town, from bazar to bazar and how it may be said, "Oh the Indian Parliament has decided this, etc." Those who do not read a newspaper still will know the ultimate effect of it.

If my honourable friend, Dr Mookerjee, delivers speeches which produce bad impressions in people's minds, that things are very insecure, things are becoming more insecure, worse and worse, that itself is undoubtedly something which adds to that insecurity; that undoubtedly comes in the way of any gradual return to normality. It may be, of course, that Dr. Mookerjee may try his best and I may try my best but the other factors may be stronger. We cannot control the Pakistan Government, we cannot do this or that. But my point is what we can control we should control and then, with the greatest strength, we can try to control the other party. So, there has been this contrary approach. All the time some people, some events, some factors have been working towards creating a feeling of normality gradually and succeeding to some extent and, on the other side, there have been factors contributing to this feeling of insecurity all the time.

May I take another matter? The very first of the proposals which Dr Mookerjee put forward was unification of India and Pakistan. It is put in courteous language. But what does it mean? It means, as every person knows, if we try to do it, war. It means not only war, which is bad enough, but it means going back to a state of affairs after the war, if you like, which would be full of trouble, because every student of major wars knows that wars do not solve problems. They give rise to new problems. We accepted Partition not willingly, not happily; but we accepted it because of certain facts of the situation in India which we could not ignore and which were coming in our way. It may have been right or wrong; but the fact remains. Now, all those facts come back; not only those facts, but an enormous number of additional facts which have flowed from the Partition. Take these great

migrations. They have made a very great difference. So that, when people talk about war, apart from the horrors and futility of war, do they not realise that they are going to produce something which will be very, very far from the solution of any problem that they seek to solve?

I shall refer to another matter here. My honourable friend, Shri Gopalaswami Ayyangar, yesterday pointed out that again and again in the agreements arrived at between India and Pakistan, we have agreed that we will not permit propaganda of this kind. On some of these occasions, Dr Syama Prasad Mookerjee himself was a party to these conferences. I should like to remind the House by reading a particular clause in the Agreement of 8th April in regard to this matter.

The two Governments further agree... that they shall not permit propaganda in either country directed against the territorial integrity of the other or purporting to incite war between them and shall take prompt and effective action against any individual or organisation guilty of such propaganda.¹⁴

Mark these words, and I say I have failed in my duty if I do not act up to them. I cannot act up to them because of a variety of circumstances. Because, primarily, we have a noble Constitution and laws which protect civil liberty in a variety of ways, which even protect uncivil liberty, which even protect licence.

Well, we take the risk. Therefore I cannot give effect to my pledged word and it hurts me if I cannot give effect to that.

Look at it in another way. This talk of unification, behind which lies force, compulsion and war, what does it produce in regard to the security and insecurity of the minorities? Can they become secure? Can they have a feeling of security when they constantly hear that there might be war? They cannot. If the Pakistan Government tells us that you threaten us by talk of war, what is our response and reply to be? We have none except to say that we dissociate ourselves completely, that our Government dissociates itself completely from this wrong and harmful propaganda, that we believe that the country does not support that propaganda and we shall fight it to the utmost. That is all we can say.

Then, normally, it does not require an agreement between two countries to say that we will not seek territorial changes of this type, a liquidation in fact of the country as such. No countries have agreements about it. Because without any agreement that is an acknowledged fact. Countries acknowledge these things. We have an Ambassador sitting at Karachi; they have an Ambassador sitting here. We acknowledge each other generally. We are represented in the United Nations, and all that. It naturally follows, not only, I take it, in international law, but in every other human and sensible approach to international problems, that one country does

14. Section C(8) of the Agreement of 8 April 1950.

not go on propagating the idea of putting an end to the Government or to the system of the other country. And yet, some of our people are irresponsible enough and forgetful enough of these major factors which I have mentioned, and indulge in this propaganda. Why? To solve the problem of exodus. Mark that.

May I mention, today as I am standing here, or maybe yesterday, a gentleman¹⁵ who is the President of that organisation of which Dr Mookerjee is a respected member, is going about East Punjab, right near the border, in the Pepsu, delivering speeches in his own particularly aggressive and pugnacious manner, asking for the annulment of Partition, and the joining of Pakistan and India by force.¹⁶

...But my argument holds because he puts forward the same proposition.

Is it not an extraordinary proposition? And this applies both to the first proposal and the third proposal. The first proposal was for the liquidation of Pakistan and the third proposal was for chunks of territory to be handed over, territorial redistribution, which involves major changes, which can only be brought about by war. Is it not an extraordinary proposition that individuals who are presumably responsible should go about telling the people this, endangering international relations, and embarrassing the relations between the two Governments and generally creating a feeling of insecurity in the country? Leave that out. Coming to the specific problem which has been so much discussed, the feeling of insecurity of the minority community in East Bengal, may I, in all humility, ask Dr Mookerjee or any one else: Do you add to the security of the minority community by putting forward these proposals?

I put it to you: What is the net result, whether you look at it from its reaction on Pakistan or on the minorities? The Pakistan Government, feeling that there are groups in India which want war against it, which want to eliminate and liquidate it, naturally, must react in a bad way and must react in a way which cannot conduce to the security of the minority communities in those areas. Take the minority communities. They also will feel: Trouble is coming; we cannot be secure. So that, this approach is the worst possible approach to the solution of the problem of creating security. It comes all the time in the way of it.

I have not a shadow of doubt in my mind that if all of us, Dr Mookerjee and other friends included, had set ourselves—forget the Pact for the moment—to create that feeling of security for the minorities in East Bengal, in West Bengal, etc., had

15. N.B. Khare, the President of the Hindu Mahasabha, addressing a press conference at Jalandhar on 7 August 1950 said that the Mahasabha stood for *Akhand Bharat* that is, undivided India, and it would not rest content until the divided portions of India were united.
16. Syama Prasad Mookerjee at this stage intervened and said that he had resigned from the Hindu Mahasabha long ago, adding "But I remain a strong Hindu nonetheless."

that approach and tried to work to that end, we may not have completely solved the problem, but we would have gone much further towards solution and solved it in the right way, solved it in a way which adds to our strength and adds to the strength of the minorities. Because, in the ultimate analysis, a people, a large group or a small group—you cannot protect them by police and military; it must have the strength to protect itself. And the whole object of our noncooperation and civil disobedience movement—what was the whole object of it? It was to create strength in our people and they did create strength in our people, and even the poorest peasant whose back was broken by centuries of labour, even he stood up, straightened his back and looked at his zamindar and others in the face.

So, the whole object was to create that morale in the people. Now, I do submit that everything that lessens that morale, whether in India or elsewhere, of the minority, is a disservice, a basic and fundamental disservice, because we are lessening their value as human citizens, as human beings—we are weakening them. This kind of propaganda that has been carried on is a disservice in so far as it preaches ideas that lessen their morale, it frightens them and it adds to the fear that creeps over the land. Therefore, I submit that the two proposals I have mentioned, that is to say, the first proposal about unification, and the second about large parts of territory being transferred, are not only completely out of the question, but are proposals which must be resisted to the uttermost by every person who thinks about this matter. What is more, it will now, today, tomorrow and the day after, be harmful to the minorities, injurious to them because it weakens them and creates greater insecurity for them. Therefore, in no sense can they be of service to them.

Now, I come to the third proposal and that is the one about the exchange of populations. Exchange of populations in this context can only mean forcible exchange of populations. So far as voluntary exchange is concerned, to some extent it is taking place. Obviously the doors are open and people come and people go. In fact, it is taking place at such a pace that we can hardly cope with it, and therefore there is the refugee problem. Now, on the one hand, we are told that we cannot cope with this problem at the pace it is taking place and, on the other hand, it is suggested that the pace should be increased, that the process should be made speedier. They say¹⁷ it should be a planned exchange, as if the addition of the word "planned" makes any difference. Plan it by all means. Who prevents people from doing it? Who prevents them from rehabilitating these people who are coming? But if we fail in this, could we succeed if the problem is much greater, if ten times the number suddenly come? We will fail, and calling it a planned thing makes

17. On 8 July 1950, Choithram Gidwani, President, All India Refugees Association, suggested "a planned exchange of population and property" to solve the problem of refugees coming from East Pakistan. On 7 August 1950, Radha Kumud Mukherjee made a similar suggestion and advocated "exchange of territory between India and Pakistan."

no difference. Planning depends on the planners, on the human material, and a hundred other factors. It is not confined to the question of money, though of course money is necessary. It is not a question of money alone; if we have the human material we can do it, but we have not got it and we stumble and fall. And so, this planned exchange, this exchange of populations means compulsion.

On the practical side it is clear that it means, number one, even the talk of it, if the idea germinates at all, the mere talk of it, again, is something that creates insecurity. It creates insecurity in the mind of those minorities everywhere, there, here; not in West or East Bengal alone, but in the whole of India. Also, because once you talk in terms of this process, you cannot draw a line. It spreads and the feeling of insecurity spreads, the feeling of frustration, and you have a vast problem of enormous magnitude which is likely to be beyond us. Certainly to face the problem that we have before us, it is bad enough. But this exchange of populations which some honourable Members indulge in, is a direct encouragement to the feeling of insecurity in the minds of the minorities of East Bengal as well as West Bengal and other places; because if there is going to be exchange how can they settle down there? When this exchange is decided upon, all those people, all those minorities, from the moment of that decision, become aliens in the country they are in. Then such responsibility as the government of the day may have vanishes. Then, if incidents occur today, far more incidents would occur, because the desire to protect them goes, there is no responsibility. And then people will think: There is going to be exchange of populations, of another ten millions of people going; let us, therefore, pack up and start immediately. The exodus will become bigger and bigger. People will think, let us go ahead of others; if we go with the millions, we might be crushed. Therefore, I say, these proposals are a direct encouragement of the exodus, they directly encourage the feeling of insecurity of the minority there. Is it not amazing that such proposals should be put forward?

These proposals which responsible Members put forward are proposals, apart from the principles behind them—I am not dealing with the principles now—but from the sheer practical aspect of them, the opportunist aspect of them, they are such that they increase the terrible problem, increase the miseries and the dangers of the minorities themselves. In fact, far from taking us towards a solution, they take us miles and miles away from any solution of the problem. That is why I ventured to say on the first day that when I consider this I do not understand, and I wonder if I am lacking in sanity or whether the other honourable Members are lacking in sanity; because I think I can—I think I may say so in all modesty—I can appreciate the point of view of the other, and I have an open mind; but I cannot appreciate this thing which finds no corner or nook in my mind. It seems to me completely devoid of sanity, reason, logic or any sensible approach to this problem. I say it is an approach which has nothing to do with the problem. This approach can only be due to one or two things. It is either an approach of despair where through anger and passion we look out for a way out and catch hold of anything

that somebody says, without realising its consequences. Or it is a definite political approach which has nothing to do with this problem. It is raised for political reasons, just to embarrass the Government, just to create difficulties in the way of this Government, just to come in the way of rehabilitation, in the way of normality coming back to the minds of the minority in East Bengal and elsewhere, so that the trouble may continue. I cannot find any explanation except these two; either it is passion and anger driving one unreasonably to this approach, or it is a deliberate political approach to create trouble.

I do submit that with this kind of approach to these problems, and especially with respect to the refugee problems as with other problems, they are creating trouble because in the course of the next six, eight or ten months the election is coming on and they are prepared perhaps to sacrifice the lives of these millions of people because of that wretched election. I beg this House to consider these matters.

I spoke about the exchange of populations, and I dealt with the practical aspect of it; let us now deal with the theoretical aspect of it.

Now, an exchange of populations must be a compulsory one. It must inevitably mean sending out people who do not want to go. It means, of course, as an honourable Member acknowledged,¹⁸ scrapping our Constitution. Scrap it if you want to, but know what are you doing. We have bandied about this word secular¹⁹ which I dislike. It means our giving up not secularism, which has no particular meaning, but giving up every kind of civilised approach to any national problem. I hope I may be permitted to say so with authority that you cannot compare this approach with any similar instance anywhere. It would be unique in the annals of history. It will be unique in its uncivilised approach and it will be a brutal and barbarous approach to the problem and, of course, completely at variance with anything that the Congress has stood for—at variance absolutely. Put an end to it, if you like, to all that the Congress has stood for and put an end to the Congress itself if you want to, but do so with your eyes open as to what you are doing before the eyes of the world. If any honourable Members put forth such proposals they shame us in the eyes of the world. I say they shame us in the eyes of the world because we are represented to be narrow-minded, petty-minded and parochial bigots, who would talk in terms of democracy and secularism but actually we have not got out of our narrow, parochial and petty outlook and therefore we are totally incapable of thinking in terms of this great country that we live in, or thinking

18. Thakur Das Bhargava, while suggesting exchange of population, said, "Emergency knows no law and in emergencies constitutions are suspended."

19. K.T. Shah said: "The State is a secular institution, it need not add the word to its description...our emphasis upon the term 'secular' is likely to mislead us, as I am afraid it has in the past to the extent that this problem of East Bengal has now come before us." H.V. Kamath said, "We worship an imaginary secular State and try to draw from it conclusions that we want to be drawn, about which we have already made up our minds."

in terms of the world and those people who are our citizens and yet to whom we will say: We push you out, because you belong to a particular religion. It is a fantastic proposition. It is a proposition, which if it dares to raise its voice, will be fought and resisted. It will be fought both nonviolently and violently. It is a proposition which, if once admitted, means the ruin of India, the ruin and destruction of everything that we have stood for. Therefore I say that if that proposition is put forward it will be fought to the uttermost of our strength everywhere, in houses, in fields, and in market places, wherever it may happen. It will be fought in the Council chambers, it will be fought in the streets, and we are not going to permit India to be slaughtered at the altar of these bigots.

So these are the three propositions that have been advanced for the solution of the problem. I put it to you: Is it reason to think of any of them? And yet honourable Members are advocating them. What am I to say to such honourable Members except this: because of the sufferings that we see, because of the stories we read, we have lost the capacity to reason for the time being. That is the position. So far as this Government is concerned we shall go on to the best of our ability, taking the help of people, taking the help of this country, but we shall not proceed on the lines indicated by some of the honourable Members in regard to these three propositions. That is quite clear.

Now some honourable Members talk about compensation for property, planned exchange of property and this and that. Property is an important thing in human life, no doubt, and we have been trying for the last two and a half years to settle somehow this evacuee property question between West Pakistan and India. We have not gone very far, although I believe I am right in saying that for the first time we see some glimmering of light which may take us towards a solution. My honourable colleague, Shri Gopalaswami Ayyangar, has worked hard on this problem and I believe he also feels that there is some glimmering of light and maybe some way out will be found. I can say no more about it. But when we are struggling with this problem for the last two and a half years they come and tell us, "Oh, in dealing with East Bengal and West Bengal property about five thousand crores would cover it." Have we lost all reason when we think in terms of these vague figures which may be right or wrong? Do you remember the First World War, the German reparations and all that? Let us have at least some slight semblance of approach to reason. Otherwise these figures have no value. At the present moment Pakistan owes us our national debt and they are going to pay it back in fifty years. Now suppose you write on a bit of paper one thousand crores and please yourself, what exactly does it mean? Where does it come out of? One can imagine some relatively reasonable figure being obtained or gradually realised but talking about thousands of crores, they do not exist. People seem to think that they can sign cheques off for vast sums of money. After all, the wealth of a country is its productive capacity, not the jewels you wear nor what the maharajas wear. If certain proposals are made they should be approached from the point of view of increasing

or decreasing the productive capacity of the nation. That is the thing which will make us consider it, not even a large number of empty houses, which you may get—hundreds, thousands or ten thousands. So we talk vaguely about these problems. The only possible solution of this problem—if we fail to find it, it would be our misfortune as far as I can see—lies in our pursuing the line of productivity. We have therefore to try to rehabilitate those who come and help them in every way we can.

Again, on this question of rehabilitation, money is required, certainly, but what is ultimately required is the capacity to work. Honourable Members will forgive me if I say that we cannot approach this matter with the mentality of a shopkeeper. He does not produce anything. He just throws his money this way or that and selling his goods makes a profit. We have to think of it from the point of view of production and how to make the displaced persons, our refugee brothers and sisters, productive members of the community. Let us give them loans, let us help them in every way but ultimately their becoming productive members of the community is what makes for real rehabilitation and is good for the country. We have to think more on these lines and of course there are other lines also. We have to proceed with this rehabilitation, not merely because it is our duty to do so but in the interest of the nation we cannot have these people just as they are, doing nothing and suffering. From the practical point of view, that is one aspect of the question which you must deal with. The other is to try our utmost to reduce this feeling of insecurity. In trying to do that, it means creating that atmosphere on our side and creating it on the other side also. I am quite convinced that the Pakistan Government wants to do that. They want to do it not for love for me or you but because of the facts and circumstances which compel them to do so. I am quite convinced of that. Shri Gopalaswami Ayyangar dealt with that,²⁰ as also other Members. It does not mean of course that in a hundred ways they will not give trouble to us. But I am putting the basic problem before you. They want to solve it because they realise, as every sensible person ought to realise, that any other course is ruin for them and is as much ruin for us.

Now, for the last three or four days our Central Government Minister, Shri Biswas, and the Pakistan Minister, Dr Malik, and others were here and we discussed many matters, and we came to a number of agreements.²¹ I will not read them

20. Gopalaswami Ayyangar said: "Things which had been put on the shelf for many long months have been reopened...with the prospect of our reaching a solution acceptable to both India and Pakistan."

21. These related to prompt investigation into incidents of communal violence and effective action against persons including Government servants responsible for them, imposition of collective fines on riot-affected districts, return of moveable properties and payment of compensation for requisitioning of properties to the returning migrants and reinstatement of them by private employers. These measures were discussed with the Pakistan Government by the two Central Ministers on 9 and 10 August 1950.

to you; there are four or five pages of them about various things, about East Bengal and West Bengal, about requisitioning of houses, and other matters, the normal matters that came up. We came to an agreement. This agreement requires the assent of our Government and the Pakistan Government. I hope that will come. So, step by step we try to solve the problem, step by step we advance, and as we advance we create a feeling of security among those who remain there. Whether it is enough or not I cannot say. If in spite of that people come, well, we receive them, we look after them. That is an easier way than saying, "Let all come. Because we can't look after some, let all come." I don't understand the reason of that. It isn't logic. Therefore, I submit that we should follow these two courses. One is in every way trying to produce a feeling of security in the minds of the minorities in both the countries; and those who come away, we look after them to the best of our ability, because any other course leads to a lack of security, any other course leads gradually to a worsening of the situation, any other course leads, or is meant to lead, to war.

My honourable colleague reminds me that there are three amendments that were proposed. In view of my submission to the House, I hope the House will throw out these amendments.

5. To Nellie Sen Gupta¹

New Delhi

August 10, 1950

My dear Nellie,

It is good to have your letter, brief as it is. I am glad that you liked my speech on the Korean affair.² I am afraid I have been delivering too many long speeches recently, in spite of a cold and a cough.

We think of you and our other friends in East Bengal very often. Need I tell you how concerned we are and how we would like to help. What we can do, we are doing. Ultimately an individual and a group pull themselves up through their own strength and morale. But I know very well your difficulties.

Very sincerely yours,
Jawaharlal

1. J.N. Collection.

2. See *post*, pp. 333-360.

6. To Liaquat Ali Khan¹

New Delhi
August 12, 1950

My dear Nawabzada,

Dr Malik gave me your letter of the 10th August² today. Thank you for it.

We have today accepted the various agreements³ arrived at after the discussions of the two Central Ministers with us here and with you in Karachi. We have suggested two or three very minor changes in the drafts. These embody points which have been separately agreed to. I hope that these agreements will be published, as arranged, on the 15th, and that they will help somewhat in easing the situation.

I do not know if you have read the speech⁴ I delivered in Parliament here in the debate on the Bengal situation. In the course of this speech, I dealt fully and frankly with Dr Syama Prasad Mookerjee's proposals and general attitude. In case you would care to have a copy of this speech, we are asking our High Commissioner⁵ in Karachi to supply it to you.

I agree with you that there should be a certain flexibility in the work of our Central Ministers. We have felt, however, as I wrote⁶ to you previously, that some directions from the Central Government would be helpful in enabling our Central Ministers to decide many points on the spot. Also that the procedure should be normally for the provincial Government concerned to deal with the Central Minister directly on the subjects concerning him. He would represent the Central Government for this purpose. Of course, he can make any reference. To make this clear, our Cabinet has passed a resolution⁷ empowering the Central Minister to act in this manner.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Liaquat Ali promised immediate action on an agreement relating to requisitioning of houses in East Bengal and into complaints of interference in the activities of a minority educational institution in Chittagong and wanted India to check propaganda by the West Bengal press and the activities of certain leaders like Syama Prasad Mookerjee.

3. A ten-point agreement incorporating these agreements was published on 16 August 1950 as an annexure to the Agreement of 8 April 1950. See also *ante*, p. 287.

4. See *ante*, pp. 271-288.

5. Sita Ram.

6. See *ante*, pp. 254-259.

7. On 5 August 1950.

7. To B.C. Roy¹

New Delhi
August 13, 1950

My dear Bidhan,

I had a visit from our Director of Intelligence² today. He told me that he had been worried for sometime past about the figures of migrations from and to West Bengal. The actual figures we give, especially in regard to railway passengers, are more or less accurate. You may have seen the statement I circulated to Members of Parliament here, giving these migration figures.³ But the Director told me that the information he had at the other end from our own sources did not tally with these figures.

2. Thereupon he organised, with the help of a large number of men taken from the West Bengal Government or police, to have a much more careful check. This check was not only in regard to numbers but also in regard to the type of person travelling and his purpose in doing so. Printed forms were used and thus a fairly accurate result was obtained one day. They only checked the Hindu travellers from East Bengal to West Bengal and *vice versa*. For the present they have not checked the Muslim passengers.

3. The results obtained were rather significant. We have been talking all along as if all the people travelling this way or that were refugees. We knew of course that all could not be refugees, because there is bound to be some normal traffic. I stated as much in my note to Parliament. But I had no idea of what the relative proportions of this might be.

4. This investigation⁴ brought out some striking figures. First of all, a large porportion of the traffic both ways was normal, that is to say, it had nothing to do with refugees. Secondly, quite a considerable number of people travelling to and fro were smugglers, who were carrying on a busy trade by crossing the border in both directions carrying some small quantity of goods each time. Those persons going from West Bengal to East Bengal would just cross the border with cloth, etc; persons coming from East Bengal to West would bring fish and other articles. Thirdly, there were a number of refugees, who went backwards and forwards between East and West Bengal, each time bringing some of their personal belongings to West Bengal. Some cases were spotted where the same persons had travelled nine times in this way.

1. File No. 2/22/50-Poll, M.H.A.

2. B.N. Mullick.

3. See *ante*, pp. 251-254.

4. The investigations were carried out at Banpur and Bongaon on 5 and 6 August 1950.

5. Now all this swells up numbers tremendously. When we talk rather vaguely of over twenty lakhs of persons having come from East Bengal since the Agreement, what we mean is that twenty lakhs of passengers travelled in this direction, and these passengers included normal passengers other than refugees, smugglers going backwards and forwards, and some refugees making repeated journeys. Thus the actual figure of refugees travelling in either direction is far less than the figure we have been giving. In fact, I was told by the Director that the normal and smugglers' traffic daily was about four thousand. This is a rough figure. But he felt that it was near enough. We should, therefore, reduce the daily figure of arrivals and departures by this figure of four thousand, if we are to arrive at a more or less correct estimate of refugee movement. Even so, it will have to be remembered that many of the real refugees travel repeatedly.

6. Roughly speaking, this would give us a figure of about one thousand two hundred migrants returning from West Bengal to East Bengal daily and about two thousand five hundred to three thousand coming from East Bengal to West Bengal daily.

7. If these figures are even approximately correct, they present a somewhat different picture than we have thus far had. In effect, they mean that we have to deal with an excess coming over to West Bengal of about one thousand five hundred daily. These figures are of Hindus only. Whether this figure will continue in future, I do not know. But it is reasonable to think that gradually this figure will go down. The process may be slow and will no doubt depend on circumstances. Granting that nothing big happens, we may presume that it will go down within two or three weeks to a thousand a day and perhaps a month or two later to a lesser figure.

8. If this is the problem, then it ceases to be of that almost uncontrollable nature that we had imagined. Our Director of Intelligence also gave me some figures of available houses, etc., in East Pakistan, which indicated that there should be no great difficulty in settling at least about seventy-five per cent of those who are going back. About this, I am trying to get more facts.

9. It seems to me that the first thing we should do is to get exact statistics, in so far as we can, about:

- (1) Figures of Hindu migrants coming from East Bengal to West Bengal, that is, real refugees and not others.
- (2) Figures of Hindu migrants returning from West Bengal to East Bengal.
- (3) Figures of Muslim migrants going from West Bengal to East Bengal.
- (4) Figures of Muslim migrants returning from East Bengal to West Bengal.
- (5) Figures of Hindu and Muslim migrants who, having returned to their original homes, go back again to the other place.
- (6) The exact camp population in West Bengal as well as in other provinces, where we have sent refugees. These figures should show the daily increase.

- (7) An approximate figure of migrants, who are not in camps but who spread themselves out in other places in West Bengal, etc.
- (8) We should also try to get figures about conditions in East Bengal, so far as we can, both about migrants going away or returning and people who are being rehabilitated. These figures will necessarily be vague.

10. I have asked the Director to take special steps to this end. Naturally he cannot do much without the fullest cooperation from your Government and police. I have no doubt that he will get this cooperation.

11. Once we get these statistics, we shall know the nature and extent of the problem and can then plan more easily as to how to solve it. We shall also then probably save much money, which is possibly wasted now. You will remember the case of rations being given in a camp in West Bengal for about sixty-five thousand persons, when the actual population of the camp, on checking, was about thirty-five thousand. This meant enormous waste of money and food. If our information is fairly accurate, we can save this money and otherwise plan more accurately. Any money that we may spend on getting this information will not only be well-spent but will mean a great saving.

12. In this work of getting this precise information, our statistical pandits could help us greatly. We might ask Mahalanobis for his advice and help. I believe he is in Calcutta at present.

13. Many references were made in Parliament to the ghastly condition at Sealdah station. Ajit Prasad Jain tells me that there has been some improvement there, at least so far as numbers are concerned. At first there were about fourteen thousand persons lying on the station platforms. I can well imagine the terrible condition those poor people must have been in. Now I am told the number has been halved and is about seven thousand. It is being progressively reduced and possibly within a few days it will go down to some hundreds only. I think we should clear up Sealdah station⁵ as rapidly as possible.

14. I attach so much importance to this business of getting information about migrants that I have suggested to Ajit Prasad Jain that he might go over to Calcutta fairly soon and consult you as to what steps should be taken in this matter.

Yours,
Jawahar

5. Refugees at the Sealdah railway station were shifted to camps in Cossipore on 28 August 1950.

8. To Liaquat Ali Khan¹

New Delhi
August 20, 1950

My dear Nawabzada,

Thank you for your letter of the 18th August.

I entirely agree with you that as far as possible our two Central Ministers should decide for themselves on the spot and should deal with the provincial Governments directly. Of course they will refer important matters to headquarters.

One rather interesting and important aspect of the continuing exodus from East Bengal and West Bengal, and probably this applies to Assam to some extent also, is that we have been confusing passengers and travellers with migrants and refugees. We have calculated fairly accurate figures of passengers by train, steamer and aircraft, going to East Bengal and coming from there. Obviously all passengers are not refugees or migrants. In a check-up recently we discovered that a considerable number going in both directions were normal passengers and an equal number in both directions were just smugglers, who went to and fro. We are carrying on a more detailed enquiry into this matter. When we get the new figures, we shall be in a better position to judge of the situation. In any event this aspect is important.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. Sita Ram Papers, National Archives of India.

9. To Ajit Prasad Jain¹

New Delhi
August 20, 1950

My dear Ajit,

Thank you for sending me a copy of your note regarding the permit system. I am sorry for the delay in dealing with this note, which you sent me first some weeks ago.

2. I have read through this note fairly carefully. I confess I do not quite follow the argument or the approach to this question.

3. For instance, take paragraph (1) about persons who left India for Pakistan before 19th July 1948 and returned to India before that date. According to your

1. J.N. Collection.

note, the Law Ministry is of opinion that they cannot become Indian citizens anyhow. My little knowledge of the law does not help me to understand this opinion. The mere act of going away does not make one lose a citizenship. First of all, a person may go for a number of reasons. He may have gone on business for a short time, he may have gone to visit a relative or as a tourist with absolutely no intention of migrating. How can we presume migration by the mere fact of travel? You will remember my pointing out to you that the figures of so-called migrations between East and West Bengal were vitiated by the fact that we took all travellers to be migrants. We now find after enquiry that more than half of them are not migrants at all. They are only travellers or smugglers who cross again and again. Therefore we cannot treat a traveller to Pakistan necessarily as a migrant. Some other proof is necessary to show that he intended to migrate.

4. Even if a person went away because of disturbances, he may have just gone for a short time intending to return as soon as all was quiet. We appear to have got all our legal notions rather twisted by the abnormal conditions that have prevailed between India and Pakistan. Anyway, since these persons have returned to India before the question of a permit arose, they do not concern you at all.

5. This argument applies to your clause (2), that is, persons who went to Pakistan before or after 19th July 1948 but returned after that date but before January 26, 1950. I do not see how citizenship disappears. So also in clause (3). Of course a person may be unable to register himself for the voters' roll because he is too late to do so. But a person does not lose his nationality because he has not registered himself. A man may forget to do so or may not have cared to do so.

6. Clause (4) applies to East Bengal. The permit system does not apply. Citizenship will depend upon the facts. Mere travelling to East Bengal will not be enough.

7. Clause (5). I do not see why we should have to legislate specially for Muslims who migrated from U.P. between February 1, 1950, and May 31, 1950. The mere fact that we have agreed to take them back indicates that we do not consider their going away as a regular migration but rather as a temporary journey due to fear.

8. We must remember that we are dealing with a very peculiar situation, where forces beyond the control of Government or individuals were functioning, when to some extent Government failed to give the necessary protection to its citizens, and when fear and terror drove people away from Pakistan to India and India to Pakistan. We must remember also that many of these people are simple folk ignorant of law or of the consequences of their action. The law we framed and Pakistan framed was also a very unusual law, which is probably unique in history. We have to follow that law of course and we cannot, so long as that law remains, bypass it. But we have to follow it reasonably and with common sense, always remembering that the human factor is involved. Therefore where there are hard cases and more especially where families are broken up, the interpretation of the law should be stretched. You refer to minor children and the wife. Even for them you want very

special reasons. The normal reasons are fear and difficulty of coming back after the permit system was introduced. Numerous cases came to my notice when permanent permits were not issued and so people took a temporary permit in the hope of its extension.

9. While it is true that the granting of permits may have some effect on the evacuee property pool, it seems to me that it would be unfair not to grant a permit for some separate reason. Cases involving any considerable property should of course be judged carefully. But petty cases involving very little property would stand on a somewhat separate basis. We might be hard on the rich, but we should be a little more lenient to the poor who, sometimes without any wish of their own, have been swept by powerful currents, which neither they nor Governments can control.

10. I am writing this note without any special reference to the law as it is, but more from my general conception of law.

11. I should like to know how many old cases you have still to deal with. Do they run into hundreds or thousands?

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

10. To Nellie Sen Gupta¹

New Delhi
August 28, 1950

My dear Nellie,

I have just received your letter of the 17th August.² I am always glad to hear from you. Please therefore do not hesitate to write to me and do not worry about my getting too many other letters. I am intensely concerned with the situation in Bengal and your letters help me to understand it.

I think that we understand the position in East Bengal fairly well, though we may not have all the detailed information that people there might possess. But we have many sources of information and they give us a fairly complete picture. What you write in your letter fits in with that picture. It is clear that conditions in East

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Nellie Sen Gupta wrote that subordinate officials in Chittagong still acted arbitrarily. Cases of serious crimes were increasing and hardly any one had returned there.

Bengal are very far from satisfactory. There is lack of security, thefts and dacoities and crimes against women. Apparently adequate steps are seldom taken by the authorities against the malefactors.

We also realise that the education policy³ of the East Bengal Government is very unfair to the minorities. No one here is under any illusion about the actual facts, though the precise nature of each fact may not be known. I might tell you that you have been unfair to Shankerrao Deo. Some of the reports of his speech probably led you to judge him as you have done. These reports evidently misunderstood him. He used the word *kahani* not in the sense of a fable, but in the sense of the story of an incident.⁴ What he said was that we must not be swept away in judging of our general policy by some deplorable stories which we hear and which undoubtedly are true.

The question before us in the debate here was chiefly Dr Mookerjee's proposals.⁵ Those proposals were transfer of territory from East Bengal to West, or to create a separate bloc in East Bengal for the minorities, or to have a compulsory exchange of populations. Now, any transfer of territory means war and war not only in Bengal, but all over. Apart from the horrors of war and the ruin caused by it to all concerned, this certainly could not bring any relief to the minorities. It might bring punishment to some people. That would be poor consolation for the minorities who would suffer even more on both sides.

There was also a proposal for the annulment of the Partition. That too meant war, and even war could not solve the question. The third proposal of a compulsory exchange of populations has always seemed to me completely unrealistic and involving enormous misery to millions of people, more especially the minorities on each side. As a matter of fact, the moment such a proposal was agreed to, it would mean that the minorities on each side were aliens and not to be looked after and to be pushed out. Having regard to the numbers involved, this would take a considerable period. Rehabilitation, of course, would take a far longer period still of many, many years. Meanwhile, both the countries would sink into a morass of economic misery, and we would not have the resources even to help the people transferred. Apart from this, the whole conception of a compulsory exchange of populations was opposed to every principle we have stood for in the past, as well as our Constitution and present policy.

3. Mrs Sen Gupta stated that the education policy of the East Bengal Government deliberately attempted "to stultify Hindu culture and religion" and this compelled the Hindus to leave East Bengal.
4. She expressed her disgust with Shankerrao's speech in Parliament on 8 August. See *ante*, pp. 274-275.
5. Describing Mookerjee's speech as "an election stunt", she wrote that "his remedies are not possible but the report he gives is a true one and not exaggerated."

Therefore, we could not possibly accept Dr Mookerjee's proposals. Dr Mookerjee's and the Hindu Mahasabha attitude in regard to the minority problem is based on emotion and anger. One can understand the emotion, because we all feel it. But if in our anger we do something which, apart from being wrong in itself, also brings disastrous results to our country and to the minorities, this would be the sheerest folly. Unfortunately, as you say, Dr Mookerjee is thinking more of the next elections than of a practical course of action.

We have to understand the situation fully, to be realistic and to adopt measures which will help the minorities in each country. As I have said above, there is little difference of opinion about the state of affairs. The emphasis may vary, or there might be some exaggeration here and there. The question, therefore, is what to do about it which brings relief and helps us towards a solution. In the nature of things this problem is mixed up with many others and cannot easily be separated. We cannot easily overcome all the evil effects of the past three years. It seems to me that the course adopted by the Agreement of April, 1950 was a realistic one. No one expected magical results to flow from it. In some respects we have been disappointed in the progress made. But we must persevere with it and vary that course somewhat as experience teaches us. You will have noticed that early this month, some further agreements were arrived at between India and Pakistan. No doubt, everything depends upon their implementation. Still, I feel that the right way is to proceed on these lines and do our best to implement them.

Above everything, the minorities must regain their morale, because nobody can protect the person who has lost his morale. The unfortunate part of Dr Mookerjee's agitation is that it weakens the morale of the minorities.

I want to assure you that we are completely alive to the situation and I am sure our Minister, Mr Biswas, is also alive to it and doing his best.

Padmaja was here for the meeting of Parliament. She is now a Member from Hyderabad. She has returned to Hyderabad now. I do not know if she got your letter.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal

11. Displaced Persons from East Bengal¹

The note of the Rehabilitation Ministry, prepared for the Cabinet Committee, deals

1. Note, 30 August 1950. File No. 243/CF/48, Cabinet Secretariat Papers.

with the problem of the displaced persons from East Bengal. The rehabilitation of the displaced persons from Western Pakistan is itself a very big problem. But it is static in the sense that the numbers are not growing. In regard to the D.Ps from East Bengal, however, the situation is fluid and more people are coming through. It is difficult, therefore, to have a precise picture of the future. The future will depend on many factors, some of which are uncertain.

2. Nevertheless, in spite of the influx from East Bengal continuing, there is a certain measure of uniformity about it and we can form some picture, provided nothing unforeseen happens.

3. The first thing to be clear about is the position now, that is, the number of people who have come over from East Bengal and who require looking after. In the first paragraph of the Rehabilitation Ministry's note, it is stated that fifteen lakhs of D.Ps came over from East Bengal to India up to the end of December 1949. From the 1st January, 1950, it is stated that another 26.5 lakh D.Ps came to India from East Bengal. Separate figures are given of arrivals in West Bengal, Assam, Tripura and Bihar and Orissa. It seems to me that these figures are not correct and certain facts have not been taken into consideration. The figures are more or less correct in so far as they give the number of people who have come over. But, as is stated later in the note, there has been also a considerable movement in the reverse direction. In order, therefore, to get a correct picture of the total number of D.Ps from East Bengal, one has to deduct those of them who have gone back, and that makes a considerable difference. I have had a careful check up made in the External Affairs Ministry of all the figures of migrations at our disposal. I am giving these figures separately.

4. From this it would appear that the total influx of non-Muslims from East Bengal from 1947 onwards to the 6th February, 1950, is estimated to be a little over thirteen lakhs. (The census was taken in December, 1949, and this figure is based on that census. The census included D.Ps in West Bengal, Assam, Bihar, Manipur and Tripura).

5. From 7th February, 1950, upto the date of the Agreement of April 8th, 1950, the net influx was 7,90,365. After the Agreement the net influx has been 8, 36,967.

6. This totals upto 29,34,065. This does not include those who came on foot across the land frontier. Only an approximate estimate of these can be made. The figure given for this is three lakhs. The total thus becomes 32,34,065. (This total has been arrived at after deducting the number of non-Muslims who have returned to East Bengal in 1950, chiefly after the Agreement. The figure is 7,61,603).

7. The figure for the total influx given in the Rehabilitation Committee's note is 41½ lakhs. This should be corrected therefore, the actual figure being 32,34,000 or so.

8. The total net Muslim exodus from India to East Bengal has been calculated as about 5½ lakhs. Again, this figure is arrived at after deducting the number of Muslims who have come back to India from East Bengal.

9. Balancing the influx in and exodus from India in so far as East Pakistan is concerned, the net influx into India since the Partition (both Hindus and Muslims included) is thus about 26,84,000.

10. In understanding the present position, we see that since the Agreement the net influx into India from East Bengal of non-Muslims has been 8,36,967. The net exodus of Muslims from India to East Bengal after the Agreement has been 4,21,908. This means that taking Hindus and Muslims together, the net influx into India from East Pakistan has been 3,81,092.

11. Again, examining recent figures of migrations for the last thirteen days, from the 14th August to 26th August, we get the following figures:

Hindu exodus from East to West Bengal	... 82,102
Hindus returning from West to East Bengal	... 73,842

There was thus an excess, during these thirteen days, of 8,260 Hindus coming to West Bengal. This means roughly an excess of 650 a day.

12. During the same period of thirteen days, Muslims coming from East Bengal to West Bengal number 35,184, and Muslims going in the reverse direction number 27,798. This gives an excess of 7,386 Muslims coming to India. This works out at the rate of about 560 a day.

13. Looking at the figures of migrations of the Hindus, it appears that this excess of those coming to India from East Bengal is greatly lessening. The figures on both sides, that is, those coming and those going, are still large. A check up was recently made of these people and it was found that a considerable number of them were not migrants in the real sense of the word, but were ordinary passengers or smugglers. This, no doubt, applies to the Muslim figures also. We are trying to get more exact figures and have made arrangements of proper statistics to be obtained. But the fact has to be borne in mind that the figures we give are of total passengers and not of displaced persons only.

14. When, however, we deduct the number of those going back to East Bengal from the number of those coming from East Bengal, this normal factor of non-migrant passengers does not make much difference as it is common to both sides.

15. As a result of the examination of these figures, more especially of the Hindu exodus from East Bengal to West Bengal, etc., it appears that the problem of future migration is not quite so big as we had feared. Even if the present rate continues, it means about 650 a day net excess, that is, about 20,000 a month. It is legitimate to assume that this figure will gradually go down. Therefore, the forecast made in paragraph 2 of the Rehabilitation Committee's note about the future exodus is exaggerated.

16. All this means that we should have careful statistics and only then can we have a true picture of the state of affairs in regard to these migrations, and can plan accordingly.

12. To Liaquat Ali Khan¹

New Delhi
September 12, 1950

My dear Nawabzada,

I am writing to you about the situation in the two Bengals. I have had a number of reports² from the Central Minister, Shri C.C. Biswas, as well as from our Chief Minister in West Bengal. They have pointed out a number of difficulties which are coming in their way and more particularly in the way of the Central Ministers.

As you know, the two Central Ministers have been undertaking joint tours in the affected areas of East Bengal, West Bengal and Assam, and I believe that these tours have done some good. The real difficulty that arises is in regard to the implementation of the India-Pakistan Agreement and in giving relief in individual cases which come within the scope of that Agreement. Our Central Minister tells me that he has drawn attention to many such cases where relief is, according to him, necessary, but no result follows. Normally he sends these cases to Dr Malik who, no doubt, forwards them to his provincial Government.

Unfortunately, Dr Malik is not always available for joint consultations which are so necessary. Apparently, he has no office at Dacca such as our Minister has at Calcutta and is frequently away at Karachi. Another major difficulty appears to be that in East Bengal the provincial minority commission and the district minority boards do not appear to be functioning satisfactorily or some time at all. It is of the essence of the machinery devised for the implementation of the Agreement that these commissions and boards should function satisfactorily. I hope you will kindly look into this matter.

In terms of the Agreement, any joint recommendation of the two Central Ministers should be normally accepted by the government concerned. I think that the two Central Ministers should make somewhat larger use of these powers and the provincial Government concerned should give effect to their recommendations. This would lead to quicker results. Of course, such recommendations will normally be in regard to important matters or cases.

Apart from this each Central Minister would communicate with his own Government, but where information is required or some enquiry suggested, a Central Minister might suggest this to the provincial Government of the other State. I make this suggestion so as to make the machinery more speedy in its work and in cases the two Central Ministers are not together at the time.

1. J.N. Collection.

2. See the next item.

I want to make it clear that I do not envisage that the two Central Ministers should lose themselves in a morass of individual cases. If they do so, they would be overwhelmed by this and might be able to give less time to certain other general and more important matters. Normally speaking, the individual cases should be dealt with by the provincial minority commissions and the district minority boards. My difficulty is that apparently such commissions and such boards are not functioning properly in East Bengal.

Our Central Minister, Shri C.C. Biswas, has sent me a copy of a letter he has addressed to Dr Malik. In this he has drawn attention to a number of steps that he considers the East Bengal Government should take. As you know, Bakarganj was the worst affected district in East Bengal. Though there is some improvement, the conditions there still appear to be bad. I must confess to you that I am distressed at receiving daily reports not only about Bakarganj³ but about other districts of East Bengal giving instances of widespread lawlessness, dacoities, molestation of women, etc. Our Central Minister suggests that the Government of East Bengal might adopt a more liberal policy for the relief of those who have suffered during the disturbances. He found, in the course of the joint tour, acute distress among the Hindus who have stayed on in the affected areas. He has suggested, therefore, that grants and loans might be given to people for rebuilding houses and godowns or for setting up work. Also some maintenance grant until the harvest and accommodation in suitable camps or homes for unattached women and children, old persons and invalids.

A relief and rehabilitation organisation is now being set up in the Bakarganj District, but according to Mr Biswas they have very little resources at their disposal and hence the relief given is totally insufficient as well as late.

An improvement of the law and order situation in Bakarganj will go a long way towards restoring confidence. If people who have taken part in any lawless activities or encouraged them are proceeded against, as envisaged in the Agreement, this would help greatly. Also a re-examination of the cases of members of the minority community who have been detained without trial or whose cases are still pending.

The disturbances in the Bakarganj District were on such a wide scale that there can be little doubt that they were well-planned and organised. If some stringent penal action is taken there against those who organised those disturbances, this will produce a feeling of confidence. Any such action taken, if given due publicity, would bring about an improvement in the situation.

3. C.C. Biswas, after a six-day tour of Bakarganj along with A.M. Malik in August 1950, said that the numerous complaints received by them showed a considerable amount of lawlessness in that area.

I have ventured to write to you at some length as I know that you are greatly interested in the successful implementation of our Agreement.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

13. To C.C. Biswas¹

New Delhi
September 12, 1950

My dear Biswas,

Thank you for your letter of the 8th² September. Also for sending me a copy of your letter addressed to Dr Malik dated 5th September. Dr B.C. Roy has also written to me on some of the matters touched upon by you in your letter.

I have an impression on reading the day-to-day and other reports that are obtained from various sources, that there is a slow and progressive improvement in the situation in East Bengal. The figures of migrants³ coming and going also confirm this impression. At the same time, this improvement is very slow and conditions are obviously very far from normal still and the general feeling of insecurity still persists. The law and order situation there continues to be bad.

The Governor⁴ of West Bengal, in his letter to the President, also expressed his opinion and stated that conditions were somewhat improving in East Bengal. He based this on the information supplied to him by a number of Hindus, merchants and others, who came from East Bengal.

I have no doubt that the joint tours that you have undertaken, together with Dr Malik, have done a lot of good. That good would have been much greater if the East Bengal Government had followed it up.

Apart from the communal situation, the general deterioration of the economic and law and order situation naturally adds to the lack of security. The unemployed must be thinking that there may be greater chances of employment on the other

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Biswas wrote about the progress made and the difficulties being experienced in the implementation of the Agreement since his appointment three and a half months ago.

3. The Government of West Bengal stated on 3 September 1950 that between 12 April and 27 August 1950, the net influx of Hindu migrants into West Bengal was 460,610 and the Muslim migration out of West Bengal was 139,990.

4. Kailas Nath Katju.

side or, at any rate, they will be looked after as refugees. Whatever the many causes may be, the fact remains that such progress as has been achieved, through your efforts and others, is not as satisfactory as we would like it to be. I agree with you and Dr Roy that the fault chiefly lies with the lack of proper machinery of the East Bengal Government, and perhaps the lack of adequate efforts on their part. The procedure that you have described⁵ also does not bring speedy relief to sufferers.

I do not myself think that it is possible to evolve a rigid procedure and to define precisely the functions and powers of the Central Ministers. We have to deal with the two Central Governments at Delhi and Karachi, the provincial Governments at Calcutta, Dacca and Shillong, and the two Central Ministers somewhere between. Then there are various provincial and district and other minority commissions and boards. This is a complicated business and yet I do not quite see how we can simplify it. We can and should give thought to it and try to find out a more effective procedure.

I do not think it will be right or advantageous for you to deal directly with the East Bengal Government or for Dr Malik to deal in this way with West Bengal and Assam. Provincial Governments are not likely to accept any directions from a Minister of the other Central Government, and the idea of the two Central Ministers functioning jointly, as far as possible, will be weakened. I can understand, however, that in special cases and where the two Central Ministers cannot meet for some time, either of them can draw attention of the other provincial Government to certain important cases, but this procedure is not to be a normal one.

My whole conception of the functions of the two Central Ministers is as far as possible a joint function and joint reports, apart from separate reports that they might send to their respective governments, Central or provincial. Such joint reports would naturally be confined to rather important cases. Otherwise the important cases will be lost in a mass of detail.

I think that the convention, that has already been established, of one provincial Government approaching the other for necessary action should be continued. I am sorry to learn that the West Bengal Government has not been following this convention lately. They should do that in any event, while at the same time keeping you in touch with what they are doing so that you can take such action as you think fit and proper. Therefore, the implementation of the Pact in individual cases should be the business of the provincial Governments, but at the same time the Central Ministers should help in every way, more specially in more important cases.

5. Biswas suggested the setting up of an effective enquiry machinery under the control of the two Central Ministers to examine individual complaints, and wanted a clear restatement of the functions and powers of the Ministers including their operational powers over the provincial or State Governments.

The minority commissions and the district minority boards can only function satisfactorily under their provincial Government. If we put them under the Central Ministers, all kinds of difficulties will arise. The Central Ministers, however, can always advise the minority commissions and where they think necessary refer matter to the provincial Government concerned.

In the nature of things, the Central Ministers cannot directly enforce implementation of the Pact in individual cases. Indeed, even the Central Governments are hardly in a position to do so unless they go out of the way completely and bring great pressure on the provincial Governments. The whole executive machinery of the province is under the provincial Government, and it will produce great confusion if the Central Ministers issue any direct orders. The only way the Central Ministers can function, apart from advice, etc., is to make their joint recommendations to the provincial Governments. If there is a joint recommendation this must be acted upon, and in the case of failure to do so, the Prime Ministers or the Central Governments should be informed. I cannot understand how a Central Minister can have any operational powers over the provincial Government of another State. Of course, in the matter of asking for information or an enquiry, this can certainly be done directly. For this purpose a direct approach can be made to the provincial Government.

I agree with you that normally each provincial Government should act according to the advice of its own Central Minister.

The Central Ministers can certainly make larger use of their powers under Section F (ix)⁶ of the Agreement to make joint recommendations with a view to action by the provincial or the State Government in specific cases. But, as I have stated above, it is better to concentrate on important cases and achieve results than to spread yourself out too much and not achieve any results. This will be a matter for your discretion.

One of the difficulties of the situation is that the East Bengal Provincial Minority Commission and District Minority Boards do not function properly. You must make every attempt to make them function, and this is a matter in which the two Central Ministers can jointly take up a strong line. The provincial minority commissions can refer any matter they wish to the Central Ministers.

6. Section F (ix) of the Agreement stated that the Central and State Governments of India and Pakistan would normally give effect to recommendations which were supported by both the Central Ministers. In the event of disagreement between the two Central Ministers the matter should be referred to the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan who should either resolve it themselves or determine the agency and procedure by which it would be resolved.

I am writing to the Prime Minister of Pakistan on some of these matters. I enclose a copy of my letter to him. I am sending a copy of this letter to Dr Roy⁷ for his information.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

7. B.C. Roy had told Biswas that the two Central Ministers should not hesitate to make larger use of powers under the Agreement and utilise services of the minority commissions for enquiry into complaints received by them.

14. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan¹

Our Deputy High Commissioner, Dacca, informs us that Dacca programme for Kashmir day, 15th September, includes meetings, processions and sword-play by people from neighbouring villages. I hope you will agree that, in present state of feeling among minorities in East Bengal, demonstrations of this kind are likely to cause apprehension which, in event of communal incidents, might result in widespread panic in East Bengal, have harmful repercussions on opinion in India and, generally, hamper progress of Delhi Agreement. I would, therefore, earnestly request you to issue immediate instructions to the Government of East Bengal to take whatever action may be necessary to prevent accentuation of alarm among minority community and revival of communal tension in province.²

1. New Delhi, 14 September 1950. J.N. Collection.
2. Liaquat Ali replied on 15 September that there would be neither any procession nor sword-play, but a meeting addressed by some responsible people might be held on the occasion. He had instructed the East Bengal Government to prevent spread of fear among the minorities.

15. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
October 1, 1950

My dear Vallabhbhai,

You wrote to me about new Muslim immigrants going to Assam from East Bengal.² I mentioned this matter in Cabinet yesterday. We have, I believe, drawn the attention of the East Bengal Government to this and we should endeavour to discourage this entry. It is not clear, however, how we can do so effectively. There is no permit system and people can travel freely either way. Of course, any such persons who come to Assam have to be considered quite separately from returning migrants. The Assam Government has no responsibility for them of any type and there are not many ways that they can adopt to discourage them. The number involved thus far does not appear to be very big, and, according to the papers you sent me, the actual figure was one hundred twenty on a certain day. Normally, there are these movements of people searching for employment.

I have been informed that on an average two hundred Muslims are going back to Western Pakistan from India daily *via* the Sind border. These people are going without permits and without any facilities being given to them.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

1. J.N. Collection.
2. On 29 September, Patel sent a report based on a sample checking undertaken at the main entry points into Assam which showed that 1,428 Muslims had entered Assam from East Bengal on 13 September. The percentage of new entrants was between fifteen and twenty, less than half of which represented permanent settlers. Patel suggested that either Pakistan be asked to stop the migration or the Assam Government be advised to send back the new immigrants.

16. To Bishnu Ram Medhi¹

New Delhi
October 22, 1950

My dear Chief Minister,

Thank you for your letter of the 14th October, which I have read with interest. I am passing on passages from it to the Ministries concerned.

1. J.N. Collection.

You inform me of your decision to appoint Deputy Ministers and that the present Parliamentary Secretaries should be so appointed. I have no objection to this. It is not clear to me what difference a change in nomenclature means. A Parliamentary Secretary is a kind of Deputy Minister. I do not know if you intend giving more powers to the Deputy Ministers or giving them higher salaries, etc. A Deputy Minister should be in a position to function for the Minister whenever need arises. A Minister may allot to him any part of his work, subject to his own supervision. In any event, I have no objection to your appointing these Deputy Ministers.

You have drawn my particular attention to the difficulties created by the entry of Muslim newcomers other than those who are entitled to restoration of land and houses, and in this connection I have read your letter to Sardar Patel also. I quite appreciate your difficulty. It is quite clear of course that these persons are not entitled to any kind of relief.

You suggest a permit system. I am inclined to think that any introduction of the permit system might ultimately injuriously affect your interests. Such a permit system cannot be confined to Assam and East Bengal. It will have to extend to the whole of Eastern Pakistan, West Bengal, Assam, etc. That would create grave difficulties. I would prefer the use of the Undesirable Immigrants' Expulsion Act² to the introduction of a permit system at this stage. I imagine that even if you introduced a permit system, it would only be partially affected. To make it really effective requires a fairly big organisation.

We have been getting accurate figures of the traffic between East Bengal and West Bengal. We have analysed these figures and it appears that several thousands of persons come and go across the border daily. These are other than migrants. Some such traffic is natural between two bordering countries. It may be that some at least of the so-called newcomers to Assam may be part of this traffic and does not concern people who intend to settle. Have you any figures of Hindus or Muslims going from Assam to East Bengal? If we have the figures on both sides, then it is possible to check up and arrive at some conclusions.

At the present moment large numbers of Hindus are returning to East Bengal from West Bengal. The numbers so doing are remarkable and sometimes the excess of those going to East Bengal amounts to between two thousand and three thousand a day. There is thus a tendency, due to various reasons, for a flow-back to East Bengal. If we take any step involving a permit system, this would have a serious effect in stopping these movements. It would also of course be said to be a violation of the Agreement of 8th April, 1950.

2. The Immigrants (Expulsion from Assam) Act, 1950, empowered Government to direct any person who was an immigrant in Assam to leave.

The matter is thus a very complicated one and we have to avoid taking a step which might react on us injuriously. We shall consider it here more fully and then I shall let you know what our advice is. Meanwhile, please send me figures of migrations on both sides, properly analysed, if possible.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

17. To Rajendra Prasad¹

New Delhi
October 23, 1950

My dear Rajendra Babu,

As you are going to Assam, I might mention one matter which might be raised there. The Chief Minister has been writing to us about Muslims, other than returning migrants, coming to Assam from East Bengal. He is greatly worried about it and wanted us to introduce the permit system. We have deliberately avoided having this system in the East, because we have all along felt that this would be harmful to our interests and to the interests of the large numbers of Hindus in East Pakistan. At the present moment more especially, the flow of returning Hindu migrants to East Pakistan is great. You might be interested in a week's figures of the movements of Hindus and Muslims between East and West Bengal. They are as follows:

Date	<i>Hindus</i>		<i>Muslims</i>	
	East to West	West to East	East to West	West to East
8 October 1950	4,768	6,078	3,231	2,480
9 October 1950	5,368	7,398	2,854	2,609
10 October 1950	7,171	6,913	2,437	2,468
11 October 1950	6,424	6,515	2,822	2,427
12 October 1950	4,820	7,665	2,711	2,646
13 October 1950	6,600	8,292	2,456	2,525
14 October 1950	6,983	9,935	2,186	2,738

1. J.N. Collection.

We cannot and should not do anything to interfere with this gradual return to normality. The West Bengal Government would be strongly opposed to it. It is clear that we cannot have a permit system just for Assam only. It will have to spread to West Bengal also. It would mean a complete upsetting of all the processes that are going on now, which are, on the whole, to our advantage. It would mean also a charge by Pakistan that we are violating our Agreement, and that there would be some justification for that charge.

A Cabinet Committee considered this matter today and was very definitely and strongly of opinion that we should not have this permit system in the East. They were further of opinion that action should not be taken under the Undesirable Immigrants Act.

As a matter of fact, the Chief Minister of Assam is somewhat needlessly alarmed. The actual figures that he himself gives, or that our Intelligence supplies, are relatively small in numbers. Some kind of movement always takes place between two countries. In any event it is better to watch developments than to do anything to impede them at present.

I am writing to you, as it is quite possible that the Chief Minister might mention this matter to you. I enclose a copy of my letter to him.²

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. See the preceding item.

RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN

II. Other Issues

1. To C.M. Trivedi¹

New Delhi
August 28, 1950

My dear Trivedi,²

I enclose a copy of a letter I have received from the Prime Minister of Pakistan.³ This relates to the canal waters dispute and you will notice that he suggests that the matter be referred to the International Court of Justice at The Hague.

This, of course, is not a new proposal and Pakistan has said so many times before. We have not liked the idea and we have been insisting on technical surveys and the like.⁴

We shall still ask for full surveys, but it is clear that if our negotiations fail then there is a deadlock. We have been at this for the last two and a half years without much success. We may say, as we do, that Pakistan did not act properly and has caused all this delay by its tactics of avoiding a proper survey. That may be perfectly correct but the fact remains that the deadlock continues. How is that deadlock to be solved? If we leave out war, we come back to some form of arbitration or a reference to a judicial tribunal. As a matter of fact, in a letter I wrote to the Prime Minister of Pakistan on January 18th, 1950, I wrote as follows:

The canal waters dispute has been the subject of correspondence between the two Governments and both are agreed that a Joint Technical Commission should be set up for making factual investigation. On the basis of the report of the Commission, the two Governments will confer with a view to arriving at a settlement. If it is not found possible to reach a settlement, we are quite

1. J.N. Collection. Extracts.

2. Governor of East Punjab.

3. Liaquat Ali wrote on 23 August 1950 that the talks in May 1950 between the irrigation engineers of India and Pakistan had disclosed disagreement less over technical questions than over the question of the fundamental rights of riparians of international rivers. Asserting that the factual data already collected had made it clear that Pakistan could not agree to diminution of its share of supplies from the Sutlej, Beas, Ravi and Chenab, he proposed that the matter might be referred to the International Court of Justice. He said that Nehru had agreed to arbitration.

4. In June 1949, Pakistan laid claim to an "equitable" share of the waters common to India and Pakistan, alleging that the existing arrangements were unfair to her. India argued that Pakistan had enough water in her rivers to fill her canals and proposed, in August 1949, the setting up of a joint technical commission to investigate and report on the availability of water in the Indus Basin. Discussions on India's proposal were held between the two countries in March and May 1950.

prepared to refer the matter to arbitration or some tribunal approved of by both Governments. You will appreciate that the manner of subsequent procedure as well as form can hardly be decided satisfactorily before we know what the results of the Technical Commission are and what the remaining points for decision are.⁵

We have thus entered into a commitment about a reference to arbitration or to some tribunal approved of by both Governments. We need not stress again on a technical or other commission to find out the facts. But, in any event, we arrive at the same conclusion.

Apart from any other reason, we are convinced that The Hague Court is not a suitable place for this matter to be referred to. That Court can do nothing at The Hague without having a commission of enquiry on the spot. So we do not propose to agree to The Hague Court. But, ultimately, we shall have to agree to some form of arbitration. This will probably consist of both Governments selecting a nominee and then jointly choosing a third person.

Before finally deciding and replying to Liaquat Ali Khan, we should like to confer with representatives of your Government. But I wanted to tell you how matters stood. Your Government as well as our W.M.P.⁶ have been reluctant to accept arbitration. I do not see how they can avoid it. Personally I think it is the proper course and we should not be afraid of it.

We should like to refer the evacuee property question also to arbitration. Gopalaswami Ayyangar is carrying on some correspondence with Pakistan on this subject, and there is a faint hope that it may lead to some satisfactory result. If this fails, then we propose to refer the matter to arbitration of the kind indicated above.

I shall let you know when we want your representatives to come here....

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. See *Selected Works* (Second Series), Vol. 14 Part I, pp. 31-34.

6. Ministry of Works, Mines and Power.

2. To N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar¹

New Delhi
August 29, 1950

My dear Gopalaswami,

The formal communication from Pakistan² about the canal waters dispute came today. A copy of it will probably reach you soon.

This is an ably written document. There can be no doubt that all this is a build up for the Security Council. As far as I can see, there is no other course left open to us than to agree to an arbitration. We should do this fairly soon. In the reply to the letter we require careful drafting, but if the main point is settled, the rest is a matter of detail.

I feel that in regard to the evacuee property question also we must move swiftly. We must either make good or ask for a reference to arbitration before the U.N. General Assembly meets, that is, by the middle of September at the latest. You have already addressed Liaquat Ali Khan and you have to wait for an answer. If, which is unlikely, your proposal is more or less agreed to, then we have to proceed on those lines. But if, and this is much more likely, there is either a rejection or a hesitation in considering that proposal, then we should immediately suggest arbitration.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Under the Agreement of 4 May 1948, Pakistan recognised the East Punjab Government's obligation to develop areas where water was scarce and which were underdeveloped in relation to parts of West Punjab, and agreed to the East Punjab Government progressively reducing supply of water to the Central Bari Doab and the Divalpur canals in Pakistan "in order to give reasonable time to enable the West Punjab Government to tap alternative sources." It also stated that the flow of water into these canals had been resumed on the condition of Pakistan paying seigniorage charges to India. Referring to this Agreement, the Government of Pakistan, in their note of 23 August 1950, stated that "with millions of people facing the loss of their herds, the ruin of their crops and eventual starvation from lack of water, Pakistan was under compulsion to accept whatever India proposed.... The so-called Delhi Agreement, if ever it was binding upon Pakistan, has since long expired." They desired the dispute to be adjudicated.

3. To Liaquat Ali Khan¹

New Delhi
August 29, 1950

My dear Nawabzada,

I must apologise for the delay in answering your letter of the 14th July regarding the issue of a joint declaration by the Governments of India and Pakistan that they will settle all outstanding disputes between the two countries by peaceful methods.² After our talks on Kashmir last month, I had to cope with an important session of Parliament and, since the session concluded, I have had a number of most pressing matters to attend to.

I have, in consultation with my colleagues, given the most careful consideration to our correspondence on the subject, in particular to the views expressed in your letter of the 14th February. We are glad to note that Pakistan desires most sincerely to remove all causes of friction with her neighbour, India, and to promote friendly relations, without which it is impossible for either country to achieve the full measure of its potential development. May I say that we fully reciprocate these sentiments. I am also happy to note that Pakistan welcomes the proposal to issue a joint declaration, the primary object of which must be to carry conviction to the peoples of India and Pakistan and of the whole world, as to the sincerity of both Governments in renouncing war as a method of settling their disputes. "To attain this object", you say, "it is essential that there should be tangible action to match the spirit of the declaration, since peoples and Governments are judged by their actions rather than by their words." I may assure you that, in suggesting that we should make the declaration first, and immediately afterwards, consider ways and means of settling outstanding disputes between our two countries, it was not my intention that action should not be prompt and in conformity with the spirit of the declaration. To mention the three more important disputes:

- (i) we have had personal discussions about Jammu and Kashmir and the matter should soon come up before the Security Council;

1. J.N. Collection.

2. On 22 December 1949, the Government of India suggested a joint declaration by the two countries excluding war as a means of settlement of disputes between them and recourse to negotiations, mediation or arbitration as alternative methods. Liaquat Ali welcomed India's proposal on 14 February 1950 but wanted a definite procedure for settlement of all outstanding disputes to be laid down. He also sent a draft declaration to solve disputes by negotiation, failing which by mediation and arbitration, allowing two months' time to each method. He reminded Nehru on 14 July to give his views in the matter.

- (ii) As regards evacuee property also, there have been discussions, since the conclusion of the Delhi Pact, between our two Governments, and my colleague, Shri Gopalaswami Ayyangar, hopes to renew these in Karachi in the near future with a view to an early settlement;
- (iii) The letter that you have sent me recently regarding the dispute over canal waters is receiving attention now and I hope to be able to address you shortly on the subject.³

These instances support my contention that individual disputes have to be and can be dealt with most satisfactorily by separate consideration. What is, in our view, psychologically important is that this separate consideration of individual disputes should take place in an atmosphere of friendly understanding. For this purpose, a short but comprehensive declaration to the effect that, whatever the differences between our two Governments, they will be settled peacefully and that both countries would be spared the horrors of a fratricidal war is desirable and should be adequate. I would, therefore, in all earnestness, again commend to you, for favourable consideration, the draft declaration that we sent you through our High Commissioner last December.

For convenient reference, I am enclosing a copy of the draft declaration proposed by us.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. See *post*, items 4 and 6.

4. To Liaquat Ali Khan¹

New Delhi
September 3, 1950

My dear Nawabzada,

I received your letter of August 23rd, dealing with the canal waters dispute, some days ago. In that letter you referred to a communication which your Government had sent to our High Commission in Pakistan on this subject. I waited to receive this communication. It took several days to reach us.²

1. J.N. Collection.

2. It was received on 29 August 1950.

I have naturally read both your letter and the communication with care. I need hardly tell you that we are very anxious to settle this canal waters dispute, as well as all other disputes between us, as soon as possible. It was with a view to a solution of the canal waters dispute that we had previously suggested that a technical examination was necessary. Whatever the method finally adopted for solving this dispute, such a technical examination seems to me essential. I regret that your Government has been unable to proceed on the lines suggested by us in this matter.

I confess that I have read the communication of your Government with some surprise. We shall naturally answer it fully. I should also like to write to you on the subject and draw your particular attention to some matters. For the present, I am rather overwhelmed with work, and early tomorrow morning I am going to Assam for a personal survey of the consequences of the great earthquake we had there. This has been a terrible affair. In addition to this we had heavy floods in three of our States.

I hope to return from Assam in about four days' time and then will send you a fuller answer to your letter.

May I thank you again for your Government's generous gift of 10,000 maunds of rice for the sufferers from the earthquake.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
September 9, 1950

My dear Vallabhbhai,

On my return from Assam,² I have had a number of letters from you, five I think. I am sorry for the slight delay in answering them, but I have been rather overwhelmed not only with work, but also with Cabinet meetings and Committee meetings.

About the canal waters dispute,³ we have had several meetings in Committee and discussed it at length. Setalvad came back this morning and we had another

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Nehru visited Assam from 4 to 7 September.

3. Patel, in his letter to Nehru on 7 September 1950, wished to see the draft reply to the Pakistan Government's note of 23 August.

conference with him. Trivedi comes tomorrow and there will be a full conference on the 11th morning, when we hope to finalise the draft. I cannot send you the draft yet, because it is not ready. What has been prepared is very sketchy. Perhaps by tomorrow evening we might have the draft ready. I shall certainly send it to you as soon as it is ready. The delay of a day or two does not matter, but the answer has to go to Pakistan before some of us leave for the Nasik Congress.

Our present decisions are more or less as follows: We do not propose to deal argumentatively with many of the points that have been raised in the Pakistan letter. That is to say, we do not deal with the merits of the case. We shall, of course, deal with certain important aspects such as the Agreement of May 4th, 1948, and their assertion that it was under coercion. We shall also deal with our repeated attempts to have a technical survey which we consider quite essential in any event, whatever further steps might be taken.

There is not much dispute about this thus far. Of course, when the draft is prepared, it will have to be carefully considered. The argument has revolved round two points: One, whether we should in the final analysis agree to The Hague Court or arbitration tribunal, and secondly, which of these two is preferable.

You will remember my suggestion that we might adopt the U.S.A.-Canada example about a joint commission for certain border and water disputes.⁴ On further consideration, this was found not to be feasible. Of course, in any event, such a joint commission could not deal with the evacuee property dispute.

After lengthy argument, we came to the conclusion that there was no escape from our agreeing to some tribunal, either The Hague Court or arbitration. In any event, this was to be linked up with the canal waters dispute.

Regarding the second point, we finally decided to suggest a judicial commission consisting of two Indian judges and two Pakistani judges. There was to be no foreigner. Of course, it can be said that they may not agree and what then? We say nothing about it at this stage. If Pakistan raises the point, we propose to say that we can consider the matter then and refer such points as are still in dispute to some other tribunal whatever that might be. This Indo-Pakistan arbitration commission would have full powers and, in any event, can clear the ground very much. If anything has to be referred after that, they will be limited issues. But this can be considered later. Even this commission would inevitably have to appoint a fact-finding commission of experts.

This very arbitration tribunal can take up the evacuee property problem to which we shall attach great importance. We shall lay stress on the urgency of that matter and the importance of that being taken up immediately.

4. An international joint commission to supervise the boundary waters between the U.S.A. and Canada had been set up in 1909.

Gopaldaswami has received a reply from Liaquat Ali Khan about evacuee property. This reply is a brief one saying that his Finance Minister⁵ is not here and he must await his return. Gopaldaswami has now written to Liaquat Ali Khan formally suggesting arbitration about evacuee property.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

5. Ghulam Mohammed.

6. To Liaquat Ali Khan¹

New Delhi
September 12, 1950

My dear Nawabzada,

I have already sent you a brief reply² to your letter of August 23rd which dealt with the canal waters dispute. After my return from Assam, I have given a good deal of time and attention to this matter. Indeed, right from the beginning, I have been personally interested in it. You may remember that I was present at the meeting of representatives of India and Pakistan who met to consider this matter in May 1948. It was at that meeting, on the 4th May 1948, that an agreement was arrived at between the two countries on this subject.

An official reply³ is being sent to your Government through our High Commissioner in Pakistan. I need not, therefore, reply to you at any length. I wish to assure you, however, that I attach great importance to a satisfactory settlement of this dispute, as of other disputes between our two Governments. It was because of this that I associated myself with these negotiations at an early stage. It seemed to me then that, whatever the legal and other aspects might be, and they were important, it was not possible to arrive at any correct decision without a full factual survey by experts representing the two Governments. Even if the matter is referred to any tribunal, the first step will have to be to find out the facts through such a survey. Because of this, we put forward the proposal long ago that a joint survey should be made. This was agreed to by Pakistan, but later your Government felt

1. J.N. Collection.

2. See *ante*, pp. 317-318.

3. The Government of India, in their note of 15 September 1950, stated that Pakistan had never earlier claimed to have signed the Agreement of May 1948 under duress, and proposed the constitution of an *ad hoc* tribunal consisting of two judges of the highest judicial standing from each country to resolve the canal waters and the evacuee property disputes.

that they could not pursue the matter. I confess I was unable to understand this because whatever approach we make, such a survey seems a necessary preliminary.

There has been, I agree, unnecessary delay in dealing with this matter, though the consequences have not been and are not likely to be serious, as the normal flow of water has continued.

We have at no time been opposed to reference to a proper tribunal. We have felt, however, that a certain preliminary should be attended to before such a reference could be made. If, however, it is felt that a reference should be made now, we would agree to it. We have suggested in our official letter to your Government the procedure we think the most appropriate for this purpose. That procedure has many advantages. It is the best suited for this particular canal waters dispute. It is also eminently suited to another dispute of old standing between India and Pakistan which appears to us to be even more important and urgent than the canal waters dispute. This relates to the evacuee property problem which, as you know, affects large numbers of persons and is a continuous source of trouble for them and for their respective Governments. Both from the point of view of alleviating the distress of these large numbers of persons and in order to remove a serious cause of friction between our two Governments, it is of the utmost importance that we should deal with this matter immediately in the way we have suggested.

The proposal we have made for the settlement of both the canal waters dispute as well as the evacuee property problem has even larger implications. This proposal may be adapted subsequently to the settlement of other disputes between the two Governments of a nature which can be dealt with in this way. Thus, this procedure would fit in with the proposal we have been considering for the adjustment of present and future disputes between the two Governments in connection with a no-war declaration.

I do not wish to deal here with other aspects of the canal waters dispute to which reference has been made in your Government's official communication to us. But there is one matter which I cannot pass over without comment. It has been stated in your Government's communication that the Agreement of 4th May, 1948, was accepted by Pakistan under "compulsion." This has surprised and distressed me greatly. As I have mentioned above, I was myself personally associated with this Agreement. I participated in the discussions and helped in drafting that Agreement in cooperation with the representatives of Pakistan present at the Conference. Among these representatives were Ghulam Mohammed and your High Commissioner in India. There were also present two Ministers of the West Punjab Government. The whole discussion was of a friendly character and both parties approached the question with a desire to find a mutually satisfactory way out. We reached this agreement unanimously and it was signed by all those present there. I cannot imagine how any question of compulsion could possibly have arisen in these circumstances. There was then no kind of threat or even suggestion about stopping the flow of water. Ever since then, on numerous occasions, this Agreement

has been referred to by both parties and acted upon. I am sure that if you go into all the facts, you will agree with me that the allegation of compulsion is totally without foundation. You can ask Ghulam Mohammed or your High Commissioner in India or anyone else present about it.

I earnestly trust that your Government will accept the proposal we have made for the settlement of both the canal waters and the evacuee property disputes and thus not only help in solving these difficult and troublesome problems, but also lay the basis for a machinery for settlement of future disputes. That will go a long way towards improving relations between India and Pakistan.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

7. To Liaquat Ali Khan¹

New Delhi
October 8, 1950

My dear Nawabzada,

I thank you for your letter of the 27th September 1950.² I received it only on the 4th October; this was due to a mistake in our High Commissioner's office in Karachi and explains the delay in my answering it.

I have read the letter with care, and I am as disappointed as you are that what appeared a simple proposition should lead to so much argument and difference in approach.

It is obvious that the difficulty arises not so much in the proposition itself, but rather in the complicated background of Indo-Pakistan relations. Only two or three days ago I read the speech on the Kashmir issue that you delivered before your Parliament.³ If you believe that our actions are based on fraud or an attempt to

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Liaquat Ali wrote that the proposed joint declaration would have no significance if it did not say that India and Pakistan would resort to arbitration to settle disputes if these were not resolved through negotiations and mediation within a prescribed period.

3. On 5 October, Liaquat Ali alleged that India had evaded her commitments on Kashmir by "quibbling, evasion and obstruction under the smoke-screen of moral platitudes." He urged the Security Council either to compel India to honour the agreement on a plebiscite, or to give its own decision, or to provide for arbitration.

deceive, then anything that I may write, or any declaration that we might make, cannot have much value for you.

How then are we to proceed? We cannot get rid of this evil background suddenly or by a wave of some magical wand. Nor can we devise any procedure which will remove all difficulties which are inherent in the situation. Yet, we can act sometimes during a crisis in a way to break the vicious circle.

We live in changing and dynamic times. The world hangs on the edge of a precipice. Our own peoples look with suspicion at each other. There are many problems which come in the way of good relations. I should like to find some panacea for all the problems and diseases from which we suffer, but life is not made that way. Even so I do not despair of finding a solution because, in the nature of things, India and Pakistan will have to find one for their problems. But it would be vain to imagine that we can solve these problems by mere formulae or some form of words. A solution will come, sooner or later, but it will have to spring from other sources.

What was the proposal I put to you last year regarding a no-war declaration?⁴ It was a simple declaration to be made by the Governments of India and Pakistan to the effect that they will not resort to war for settlement of any existing or future disputes between them. Further, that a settlement of such disputes shall always be sought through peaceful methods of negotiation and mediation and, if these should fail to bring a settlement, by resort to arbitration or reference to a tribunal. You say this was too simple because it did not lay down a strict time-table and the exact procedure to be followed in each case. I confess I do not see how, in the complicated world that we live in, we can lay down a rigid time-table or lay down an identical procedure for all manner of disputes that may arise. These disputes may be political, economic or financial; they may be justiciable or not. The difference of opinion between us has been as to whether a uniform procedure, including a time-table, should be set out in the proposed declaration as being applicable to all disputes, present or future, or the declaration should be in general terms as proposed by us and the procedure for each dispute should be agreed upon with specific regard to its nature and relevant circumstances.

I am sorry that you should think that the declaration will lose in value and significance unless it describes the procedure by which disputes will in actual fact be resolved peacefully. I still fail to see how one uniform procedure could be assumed to or would in fact cover all disputes, be they existing or future ones. What may be called justiciable disputes, for example, those relating to canal waters and evacuee property, could and should be referred to arbitration, if other methods of settlement, namely, negotiation and mediation, fail. Disputes that are predominantly political, for example, the one relating to Kashmir, can, in our view,

4. See *Selected Works* (Second Series), Vol. 14 Part I, p. 4.

be settled in the last resort only by agreement between Governments. We also feel that a uniform time-limit of two months for negotiation and two months for mediation is likely to break down in practice in many cases. The issues involved may be so complex that, with the best will in the world, negotiators and mediators may be unable to finish their work within two months. It would hardly be fair to suggest that, even when negotiation or mediation holds out reasonable hope of success, the process should automatically be abandoned in favour of arbitration at the end of two months.⁵

I am not aware of any instance where two independent nations have bound themselves down to refer every dispute, whatever its nature, to a particular authority, much less to an external authority. There is the well-known case of Canada and the United States of America. They created an International Commission, consisting of representatives of the two countries, for settlement of certain disputes. But that Commission had no outside member in it, and it dealt only with certain specified types of disputes between the two countries. I would gladly agree to any similar procedure for India and Pakistan. But, inevitably, it will have to deal with certain specified types of disputes and a commission appointed for the purpose will consist only of an equal number of judges chosen by India and Pakistan respectively. It is true that there is always a possibility of a lack of agreement between the members of the commission, but if they are judges of the highest standing, they will consider the issues before them in a judicial spirit and are highly likely to come to a unanimous or majority decision. Even if they fail to agree, the area of difference will have been narrowed down by the measure of agreement reached and only the outstanding point or points of difference will remain to be dealt with. The two Governments could then consider the matter afresh, including the question of reference to a third party. To think *ab initio* of a third party will lessen the sense of responsibility of the judges and will also be a confession of our continued dependence on others. That would hardly be becoming for proud and self-respecting independent nations.

Coming to specific disputes, I think that it will serve little purpose for me, at this stage and in this letter, to discuss the Kashmir issue. It is a non-justiciable and political issue and cannot be disposed of by reference to a judicial tribunal.

Then there is the question of the exchange ratio.⁶ This is in the hands of one of the specialised agencies of the United Nations, namely, the International Monetary

5. On 21 October 1950, Liaquat Ali replied, "If you think this is too rigid, we need not lay down a time-table, but provide that if either party comes to the conclusion that no further progress can be made by negotiation or mediation, it may refer the matter to arbitration."
6. Pakistan had decided, in June 1948, to treat the Pakistan rupee at par with the Indian rupee until 30 September 1949, but it declined to devalue her currency when India devalued the rupee on 18 September 1949, consequent upon devaluation of the pound sterling the same day. On 22 September 1949, Pakistan decided not to transact any business in Indian currency pending new arrangements.

Fund. We had hoped that the Fund would make recommendations on the subject in the course of its last meeting at Paris. Unfortunately this subject was postponed and we have to wait for their decision.

This leaves us with the questions of evacuee property and canal waters. We wrote to you about both of these sometime ago⁷ and suggested a precise method for their final settlement. We have had no answer from you to that proposal; but you have referred to it in the course of your speech on Kashmir before the Pakistan Parliament, and I regret to find from that brief reference that you do not view our proposal with favour. Your main objection appears to be that the judges from India and Pakistan may not agree with each other and there is no provision for meeting that contingency. You seem to think that such disagreement is almost certain to occur and that only outsiders can decide for us. I confess that I am unable to appreciate the force of this argument, which, as I have indicated above, reduces us to a dependent status relying upon the pleasure of others; this is something wholly repugnant to me and, in my view, incompatible with the dignity of both India and Pakistan.

If you read the two last letters that I have written to you, namely, the one dealing with the no-war declaration⁸ and the other with canal waters and evacuee property, you will find that, in effect, we have suggested not only a general and rather vague declaration, but also a precise method of dealing with what might be called justiciable issues. I have suggested a judicial tribunal of high standing to consider and decide the questions of canal waters and evacuee property. I am perfectly prepared to extend this principle to any other justiciable issue. Thus we provide not only for present disputes but for future disputes except those which cannot be considered by a judicial tribunal. I think we have gone farther in making this proposal than any two nations have ever gone. If we agree on this basis, it will not only be a great thing for India and Pakistan but also something that will powerfully impress the world at a time when despair is seizing it.

I cannot myself see how we can go into greater detail either in regard to timing or procedure. I regret, therefore, that I am unable to accept the draft declaration proposed by you. I would beg of you to give thought to the considerations I have urged in this letter. I would gladly add to my draft a reference to our constituting a joint tribunal, as I have suggested, for the final decision of the evacuee property and canal waters problems, and to say that the decision of the majority shall be binding. Further I shall be willing to say that this tribunal may also consider any other matters in dispute which are justiciable.

A joint declaration of this kind will be complete in itself. I have not the least doubt that it would go a very long way in removing the tensions that unfortunately

7. See *ante*, pp. 320-322.

8. See *ante*, pp. 316-317.

exist between India and Pakistan, and would produce an atmosphere of friendliness which would help us to solve every problem or dispute, present or future, which might arise between India and Pakistan. It would affect, of course, our two countries but it would also affect Asia and the world. For the scope of the proposal could, in time, be extended to other neighbouring countries. This would create a wide area where there would be some assurance of peace, even though the rest of this world were foolish enough to jump into the abyss of war. Last year, when I made my proposal, the world situation was none too good but there was no immediate danger of a world war. As I write this letter, that danger is far greater; so is the necessity for dispassionate judgment and for a refusal to be swept by others into a bottomless gulf.

I am as anxious as you are that a decision in this matter, which has long been the subject of correspondence between us, should be reached without further delay, and shall be grateful for an early answer.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

8. To Liaquat Ali Khan¹

New Delhi
October 19, 1950

My dear Nawabzada,

I have received your acknowledgement² to my last letter to you³ about the proposed no-war declaration between India and Pakistan. I well realise how fully occupied you must be and yet I venture to suggest that it is in the highest interest of both our countries to expedite a decision. Apart from the joint declaration which we have suggested, we have also suggested a judicial tribunal of the highest standing to decide two of our major issues, namely, evacuee property and canal waters. I would be grateful if some steps could be taken in this direction as soon as possible.

2. I am constrained to write to you, more specially, because of the continuous propaganda in the Pakistan press in regard to Kashmir. Interviews and statements

1. J.N. Collection.

2. In a letter dated 11 October 1950.

3. See the preceding item.

are published⁴ frequently demanding war with India over this issue and "a resort to the sword." Whether these statements are irresponsible or not, I cannot say, but I have seen no authoritative contradiction of them, and they are bound to affect public opinion greatly in Pakistan.

3. I have stated on several occasions, and I repeated this at my press conference a few days ago,⁵ that so far as India is concerned, we would not resort to war in Kashmir unless we were attacked afresh. That is an unequivocal statement by which we stand. If you could also make a similar statement on behalf of Pakistan this would go far to remove the fears and tension that our countries suffer from at present.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. On 7 October 1950, *The Pakistan Times*, quoting the A.P.P. correspondent in Cairo, reported the Muslim Brotherhood leader Saleh Ashmawi as saying that the only way to liberate Kashmir was to "strengthen the hands of Mujahideen of Kashmir." It also reported the same day that the Ahrar Conference held in Rawalpindi on 2 and 3 October 1950 had urged the Pakistan Government to take immediate steps to liberate the "India held territory of Kashmir."
5. See *post*, pp. 415-424.

9. To N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar¹

New Delhi
October 19, 1950

My dear Gopalaswami,

I am sending a letter to Liaquat Ali Khan today, a copy of which I enclose.²

I suppose you have no further reply from Pakistan about your proposal to settle the evacuee property problem. Perhaps, your proposal has been pushed aside by the new suggestion we have made about a tribunal. Nevertheless, I think that we should pursue your proposal independently and get a final answer from Pakistan. It might be desirable, therefore, for you to write again on that subject to Shahabuddin³ or whoever to whom you wrote first.

There is a great deal of wild talk about the value of evacuee property left in Pakistan: 3,500 and 4,000 crores are mentioned. Ajit Prasad Jain tells me that after

1. J.N. Collection.
2. See the preceding item.
3. Minister of the Interior, Government of Pakistan.

the most careful computations it is found that on no account can this figure exceed 800 crores and perhaps it is much less. I have also heard from some Hindu refugees that the value of evacuee property in Kathiawar, etc., left by the Muslims who have gone, is very great. In fact, they said that it might well be greater than that of the properties left by Hindus in Pakistan. Whether this is true or not I do not know, but all this does indicate that we have been talking rather wildly on this subject.

A deputation of Hindu refugees from West Pakistan saw Dr Syed Mahmud⁴ the other day and said that if exchange of properties was allowed, it would go a long way towards settling this question. In fact, such private arrangements have been made between many persons. I suppose we cannot permit this at this stage because that would affect the share of the poorer people.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. Minister for Development and Transport, Bihar, at this time.

9

KOREA

1. Message to Thakin Nu¹

You will have seen correspondence between me and Premier Stalin and Mr Dean Acheson which was recently released.² Pivot of my proposal to both Moscow and Washington was the admission of representative of the People's Government of China to the Security Council and other agencies of the United Nations. Not only is this necessary in our view to provide within the Security Council for representative discussion of ways and means to solve Korean problem peacefully but in perspective of future it is essential to the very existence of the U.N. as a true world organisation. Seating of the new China in the U.N. will not constitute either approval of Commission³ or of policies of the Peking Government; it will be realistic and wise recognition of established and indisputable fact as to who effectively controls China.

Strictly for these reasons we have been, since Korean conflict began, persistently urging the U.K. and the U.S.A. through normal diplomatic channels, the former to assist and the latter not to stand in the way of the entry of the new China into the U.N. Unfortunately we have had no favourable response. Indeed in vote yesterday on ruling of Soviet President of the Security Council⁴ that Dr Tsiang did not represent China, representatives of both the U.K. and Norway⁵ whose Governments have recognised the Peking Government, joined the U.S.A. in voting against Malik's ruling. This persistence in opposition to new China's admission to the U.N. is bound not only to widen gulf between Western Powers on the one

1. New Delhi, 2 August 1950. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, N.M.M.L. A similar message was sent to A. Soekarno. India's general attitude towards the Korean question was also communicated to Pakistan. "We do not," noted Nehru on 3 August, "expect much from Pakistan. But our keeping in touch with them is at least putting ourselves in the right and might exercise some slight influence on their action."
2. See *Selected Works* (Second Series), Vol 14 Part II, pp. 347-348 and 352-353.
3. The U.N. Commission on Korea (UNCOK), set up in December 1948 to help bring about unification of Korea and development of representative government, and comprising Australia, China, El Salvador, France, India, the Philippines and Syria, was not recognised by the U.S.S.R. The latter wanted a settlement in terms of the Moscow agreement of December 1945 between the foreign ministers of the U.K., the U.S.A., and the U.S.S.R. which provided for the establishment of a temporary four-power trusteeship over Korea prior to its achievement of independence.
4. Jacob Malik, the Soviet representative, who had boycotted the Security Council since January 1950 as a protest against its refusal to seat People's China in place of Nationalist China, returned on 1 August when the presidency of the Council devolved upon him according to the rule of monthly rotation, and ruled that the representative of Nationalist China could not participate in the meetings as he did not represent China. The ruling, challenged by the U.S.A. and the U.K., was overruled by 8 votes to 3; India supported the ruling.
5. Gladwyn Jebb and Arne Sunde respectively.

hand and the U.S.S.R. and China on the other, it is likely to result in the U.N. agency under U.S./U.K. leadership being utilised more and more to support policies of these Governments and thus lead to disruption of the U.N. That will mean disintegration of agency specially created for peaceful settlement of disputes amongst Powers, and a permanent division of the greater part of the world into two rival power blocs and an inevitable drift to war. The issue thus becomes one of the very survival of the United Nations as an effective instrument of peace.

As you are aware we supported the first two resolutions of the Security Council on Korea.⁶ Recently, as a token of determination to help in resisting aggression, we have offered the United Nations a field ambulance unit from our regular forces for service in Korea. We cannot however, with due regard to survival of the United Nations, limit ourselves to resistance of aggression; simultaneously we must continue working for preservation through the United Nations of peace of the world. For reasons already given entry of the new China into the United Nations, therefore, remains one of our primary objectives. As a country determined not to align itself with either bloc, we shall continue working for attainment of this objective on merit.

I have thought it desirable to signal at some length in order to explain the position. Our outlook on world affairs is so similar and our objectives so akin to one another that I hope it will be possible for you, if you agree, to urge the U.S.A. and the U.K. through diplomatic channels to recognise the dangers of prolonged exclusion of China from the United Nations and to assist in bringing about its entry. The U.S.A. and its allies do not yet seem to have realised that the peoples of Asia in general, and of South East Asia in particular, are more interested in their political freedom and economic uplift than in a war against communism inspired by clash between capitalist and communist ideologies. Support of reactionary regimes such as those of Chiang Kai-shek in Formosa and Bao Dai in Indo-China does great harm to Western Powers because it is looked upon as colonialism which Asia has come to abhor. The keeping out of the new China from the United Nations is bound to create the impression in many circles in Asia that Chinese effort at complete independence of foreign exploitation is being attacked in the guise of a crusade against communism. It should be our endeavour to make the U.S.A. and the U.K. realise that this can only result in the complete alienation of the sympathies of the Chinese people and in driving the Peking Government deeper into the arms of the Soviet.

6. See *Selected Works* (Second Series), Vol. 14 Part II, p. 307.

2. India's Korean Policy¹

Jawaharlal Nehru: I beg to move:

That this House approves the policy of the Government of India in regard to the Korean situation as stated in the announcement, dated the 29th June, 1950,² and the action taken thereafter.

During the last two days we have been discussing very important problems affecting our country, domestic problems of the utmost importance, problems concerning our economic situation, the food problem, etc. Obviously, they are of primary importance to us and we stand or fall in the measure that we solve them. Nevertheless, problems external to India are not only of great importance and concern, but of additional importance, for what happens elsewhere might have a powerful effect on the internal problems that we have to face. If there is a war in the world our economy will be affected tremendously. Our food problem will assume a new shape. So that these external problems have assumed a very special importance for us from every point of view.

We talk of the Korean situation. We know that some kind of a war on a relatively small scale is being carried on in that Far Eastern country. Most of us sympathise with the people who are suffering there. Perhaps many of us do not know very much about Korea. When we think of this struggle, we do not think of Korea so much as of the giant shadows that fall over that unfortunate land. We think of the possibilities of a world conflict and of the consequences that may ensue from it. As we face the world situation today, it looks as though the fate of the world seems to hang in regard to war and peace by a thin thread which might be cut down by a sword or blown off by a gun. We do not know what will happen in the future. Most of us do not want the war in Korea to extend. Few, perhaps, have a full realisation of the possible consequences of such a world conflict. I think it may well be said that whatever might be the other consequences, it is certain that after a world conflict of this kind, the world as we know it today will cease to be. Something else will emerge out of it, something different, and those who survive that conflict, therefore, will live in a world probably the same but essentially different in very important matters, not only because of the destruction involved

1. Statement in Parliament, 3 August 1950. *Parliamentary Debates, Official Report*, 1950, Vol. V, Part II, cols. 217-236. Parliament met from 31 July 1950, ahead of schedule, especially to consider the international situation arising out of the Korean war.
2. See *Selected Works* (Second Series), Vol. 14 Part II, p. 309.

in such a war on a vast scale, but rather on account of the bitterness and extreme violence and hatred which such a war will generate. Whatever progeny there may be of the hatred, bitterness and violence of this type, that progeny can never be good.

So the fate of our generation hangs by this little thread. Therefore, some of us feel that every conceivable and possible effort should be made to prevent that. I do submit that there is nothing wrong in that feeling. At a moment of this kind it is very dangerous for any person in a responsible position in any country to allow himself to be carried away by passion and to judge things merely in anger and hatred. Thus he will not serve his country or the world. I say so with all humility because I am myself often carried away by anger and passion, although I try to restrain myself. But I do feel at the present moment that I would be completely unworthy of my position, if I allowed myself in this context of world events to suffer my judgment to be perverted by passion or by anger and, therefore, become unbalanced. Whether I succeed or not—I do not know—I will at least make every effort to that end.

We have a tremendous responsibility. Not that India, as she is constituted today, can play or does play a very important part in world affairs. Those countries which have big battalions or economic and money power play a big part. We have neither big battalions nor money power. So we do not play any big part and we do not claim to play any big part. But whether we play a big part or a small part, inevitably we have to play a part and in that totality of circumstances that arise even that little part may count, and I believe it does count. Therefore, it becomes important for us what we do in these circumstances. To some extent our relations with some of our neighbouring countries of Asia are close. They are situated as we are, and we take counsel together and, therefore, the part taken by us and the action we indulge in has a certain wider significance also.

Before I deal with this more fully I should like to give the House a few facts about Korea. Here is a country which through over two thousand years of recorded history built up a homogeneous nation with a common national character, cultural heritage, language and way of life. Korea stands between Japan and China; yet it is completely distinct. It is influenced by both or it has influence on the other countries too, but it is completely distinct from the two and has had a strong national feeling all the time. After the Russo-Japanese War, which ended with the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905, Korea became a Protectorate of Japan.³ Five years later, in 1910, Japan annexed Korea. It put an end to the Protectorate and annexed it,

3. Korea maintained a long spell of self-imposed isolation until 1876, when Japan forced a trade treaty on her. After a war with China in 1894-95, Japan established her hegemony over Korea and occupied it during the war with Russia in 1905. The treaty of Portsmouth in September 1905 recognised Japan's paramount political, military and economic interests in Korea and in December 1905 Japan assumed full authority over Korea's foreign relations.

and Korea became a full part of the Japanese Empire. Therefore, from 1905 onwards till 1945, that is, till the end of the last World War, Korea was under Japanese administration. During this entire period there was a movement for independence in Korea—a strong movement. There were violent insurrections in Korea, on a big scale occasionally. It was more especially round about that year when we in this country started under Mahatma Gandhi's leadership a peaceful movement of revolt, about that time in Korea also something in the nature of a peaceful non-cooperation movement started and functioned against Japanese occupation.⁴ It failed. It was different in a sense, of course. And the Koreans suffered greatly. So, during all these forty years the people of Korea, or many of them, have endeavoured and tried to free themselves. Many of them became exiles. Many of them, during the last World War, fought against Japan, in Chinese armies and so on and so forth. So round about 1945—I think it was in August and September—when the armies of the Allies, the United States and the Russian armies, entered Korea at different ends,⁵ both of those armies were greeted with great joy by the Koreans as armies of liberation. The Koreans came up with their flags—in the case of the United States armies the United States flag and in the case of the Soviet armies the Soviet flag—because they regarded them as liberators and hoped that their dream of freedom would be realized soon. Very soon the enthusiasm of the Koreans waned because they saw that the type of liberation that they had expected did not come.⁶

I might go back and say something that had happened in war time. In December 1943, a conference was held at Cairo where the leaders of the United States, the United Kingdom and China declared that in due course Korea was to become free and independent.⁷ On July 26, 1945, this decision was confirmed at the Potsdam

4. A peaceful movement against Japanese rule began on 1 March 1919 with the promulgation of a Declaration of Independence by the leaders of the various religious organizations in Korea. Carried forward by students after the leaders had courted arrest, it soon developed into a mass movement but was eventually crushed by military force.
5. The Soviet forces, having entered Korea on 12 August 1945, had already reached the 38th parallel, when the Allied directive of 2 September 1945 stipulated the surrender of Japanese forces north of that line to the Soviet commander; the Japanese forces south of the 38th parallel surrendered, as per the directive, to U.S. troops on their arrival in South Korea on 8 September 1945.
6. The Korean people tended to associate the trusteeship provisions in the Moscow agreement of December 1945 with the Japanese protectorate which had preceded the annexation of Korea in 1910, and launched a violent anti-trusteeship movement.
7. It was announced on 1 December 1943 that at a conference in November 1943 between Roosevelt, Churchill and Chiang Kai-shek, it had been decided that Japan would be stripped of all the territories that she had taken "by violence and greed", and that Korea would "in due course... become free and independent."

Conference and subscribed to by the Soviet Union.⁸ Later, after the American and the Soviet armies entered Korea, some kind of an arrangement had to be made to prevent them from overlapping, and thus Korea was divided artificially by the 38th parallel for entirely military purposes.

In 1946, a Joint Commission was put up—the United States-Soviet Union Commission—to form a provisional government for the whole of Korea.⁹ This Commission broke down. It made various attempts to solve the problem jointly, but it did not succeed and it broke down.¹⁰ Then, in 1947, the General Assembly of the United Nations established a U.N. Commission on Korea to assist in the establishment of a unified independent government of Korea.¹¹ The Soviet Union voted against this Resolution and subsequently did not cooperate with that Commission, because, in fact, I remember, one of the members chosen on that Commission was from the Ukraine and he did not agree to join it, and never actually joined.¹²

I might mention that one of the sponsors of this Resolution on Korea in the United Nations at that time in 1947 was India.¹³ Later, when the Commission was being set up there, I might inform the House, we were not anxious to serve on it, simply because of our desire not to interfere too much in other countries' affairs.

8. The Potsdam Declaration, signed by Truman, Churchill and Attlee, and subsequently approved by Chiang Kai-shek, proclaimed that "the terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out." The Soviet Union, in its declaration of war against Japan on 8 August 1945, indicated its adherence to the Potsdam Declaration.
9. The Moscow conference of foreign ministers, in December 1945, created a Joint Commission representing the two occupying powers for the purpose of setting up a provisional Korean government which should negotiate a trusteeship, not to exceed five years, with the U.S., the U.K., the Soviet Union and China.
10. The Joint Commission met at Seoul in March 1946, but soon there was a deadlock on the Soviet demand that those Korean groups opposing trusteeship be excluded from consultation on the formation of a provisional government. The Commission met again from May to August 1947, but without success.
11. On 14 November 1947, the General Assembly adopted a U.S. resolution for setting up a Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) comprising Australia, Canada, China, El Salvador, France, India, the Philippines, Syria and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic to facilitate, by means of nation-wide elections to be held not later than 31 March 1948, the establishment of a national government in that country which should arrange with the occupying powers for the complete withdrawal of their armed forces.
12. The Eastern Bloc countries abstained from voting on the U.S. resolution because they considered that the absence of elected representatives of the Korean people during debates affecting the independence of their country contravened the provisions of the U.N. Charter and the right of self-determination of peoples. Ukraine did not join the Commission on the same grounds.
13. Several suggestions made by B.R. Sen, India's representative in the First Committee, for removing mutual suspicions of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. and ensuring that the division of Korea was not perpetuated were incorporated in the draft resolution.

We are interested, we cannot help it; but we do not wish to interfere too much. We have got enough on our own hands. But when we said that at Lake Success, we were told, "Your representative was one of the sponsors of this Resolution, so you must undertake this responsibility." So one of our representatives was put on the Korean Commission, and a little later that Commission chose him as its Chairman, so that for many months the Korean Commission had an Indian for its Chairman. Perhaps honourable Members know that he is at the present moment our Foreign Secretary¹⁴ here. We have had the advantage during all these days of his intimate personal knowledge of the Korean situation which he acquired in Korea as Chairman of this Commission.

So, this Commission assembled in January 1948, under India's chairmanship at Seoul. They tried to get in touch with North Korea, that is, on the other side of the 38th parallel. But the North Korean Government did not encourage them, in fact it did not allow them. Meanwhile, the two Governments on either side of the 38th parallel had, if I may say so, solidified, and both were more or less military governments. In May 1948, elections were held in South Korea under the auspices of this U.N. Commission. As a result of these elections the Republic of Korea was proclaimed. The Republic of Korea was proclaimed in South Korea because the North did not join.

Of course the electors voted in South Korea and that Government represented South Korea only.¹⁵ As a matter of fact the Northern Government too claimed to represent the whole of Korea and so there were two Governments of South Korea and North Korea, each claiming some kind of mystical domain over the other.

Mahavir Tyagi asked whether the North Korean Government was duly elected as the South Korean Government was.

JN: I cannot say what process of election took place there, because we have not got enough facts about it; some kind of choice was exercised and I really cannot say how it took place but it came into existence as it is called the People's Republic of North Korea.¹⁶ The United Nations General Assembly recognised the

14. K.P.S. Menon served as Chairman of UNTCOK from January to March 1948, when he was appointed as Foreign Secretary of India.

15. The Government of the Democratic Republic of Korea, however, claimed to be considered as the national government of Korea as envisaged in the resolution of 14 November 1947.

16. On 25 August 1948, elections for the Supreme People's Assembly were held with a single list of candidates. It was claimed that elections were also held in South Korea and that the South Koreans occupied 360 of the 572 seats. On 9 September 1948, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was proclaimed, claiming jurisdiction over the entire country.

Government in South Korea as the only lawful Government of Korea.¹⁷ India declined to recognize either Government officially. I might say that we felt that this division between North and South Korea could not last. It was artificial and the less we confirmed the division the better, although, as a matter of fact, our representative¹⁸ was still functioning in the United Nations Commission on Korea...

N.G. Ranga asked whether India abstained from voting in the United Nations when the South Korean Government was recognised.

JN: I am sorry I do not remember exactly what we did, but I imagine we must have done so.¹⁹

In April 1950, this year, elections were held in South Korea again.²⁰ President Syngman Rhee²¹ was defeated in these elections. In May the North Korean Government attempted to send a party to South Korea to explore possibilities of unification, but that did not lead to anything. In fact, these men were arrested by the South Korean Government at the border. On June 25, North Korean troops marched into South Korea.

Now, so far as we know, conditions in neither North nor South Korea during this period had been very praiseworthy or admirable. From North Korea about two million refugees gradually came to South Korea during the past year or two. That shows that conditions in North Korea, at any rate, were not such as those people liked; they had to come away under pressure of circumstances. In South Korea also—about which we have far greater knowledge, thanks to newspaper correspondents and others who, having been permitted to come and go there, reported fully—the conditions were very far from good. But it is not my purpose, nor do I think it is the business of the House, to sit down in judgment with the information that we have on the position in North or South Korea and the internal

17. The General Assembly resolution of 12 December 1948 declared, *inter alia*, the Government of the Democratic Republic of Korea as lawful having effective control and jurisdiction over that part of Korea where UNTCOK was able to observe, consult and supervise elections. John Foster Dulles, the U.S. representative had, revising his earlier stand, explained during the discussion that the resolution neither asserted that this Government was the Government of all Korea nor denied that another regime existed in certain parts of Korea.

18. Anup Singh.

19. In fact, India voted in favour of the resolution of 12 December 1948.

20. In the elections to the 219 seats of the National Assembly on 30 May 1950, the pro-Government parties as well as the principal opposition groups managed to win 83 seats only; independents won 130 seats and six candidates were returned by minor parties.

21. After elections in May 1948, Syngman Rhee became President of South Korea.

conditions. The main fact that emerges is that here this division took place; it was an artificial division and an unnatural one and there was a constant attempt on either side to get rid of it by some kind of compulsion if that was possible. North Korea talked of it and then South Korea talked of it. Ultimately North Korea, on the 25th of June, invaded South Korea. It is stated on behalf of North Korea that before they invaded, South Korea had apparently gone across the border with some troops, but whether that is true or not I do not know. Obviously that is a very feeble plea. There have been border incidents all the time and possibly there might have been border incidents, but to make that an excuse for the very well-planned, big-scale invasion patently does not carry much force.

So, whatever the past history might have been, it is perfectly clear that North Korea indulged in a full-scale and well laid-out invasion, and this can only be described as aggression in any sense of the term. So, when this matter came up before the Security Council of the United Nations,²² it seemed to us quite inevitable that we should describe it as aggression because it was aggression. Irrespective of other factors, or our sympathies which might influence any future decision, it did not get away from the fact that it was an aggression of one country, functioning as a State, over another country. It may be described, if you like, as civil conflict; it may be described as an attempted unification and all that; but I rather doubt if any of these excuses can be taken to be a sufficient justification for this kind of thing. It was aggression. Of course all the time we considered this question of the two States relatively small in area, not of too great importance in the world but important because they were client States of very great Powers in the world. So, in essence any conflict between these two small States was a reflection of the larger conflict in the world and, therefore, one had to be very careful because it might lead to that larger conflict taking shape. Anyhow, it seems to me that there can be no doubt at all in describing what North Korea did as aggression and I submit to the House that we are completely justified in accepting and approving the Resolutions of the Security Council because from the first Resolution the second Resolution also followed. That was the attitude that India took up and that is the attitude that is described in that Statement of June 29th. In that Statement the House will also see that we laid stress on the fact that we intend to continue to maintain our independent policy in this and other matters, that is to say, our future policy is not going to be governed automatically by other decisions by other countries

22. When the Security Council met on 25 June 1950 under the presidency of B.N. Rau, it had before it two communications addressed to the U.N. Secretary-General: a cablegram from UNCOK, then in Seoul, informing him about attacks by North Korean forces on South Korea, and a letter from Warren Austin, the U.S. representative at the U.N., on the same subject.

whoever they might be. It is difficult in such a state of affairs to maintain a completely independent policy; we are affected by events; of course, we are swept by the course of events. Nevertheless, we feel, not only in consonance with our oft-declared policy but even more so because it is important that we should not allow ourselves merely to be swept away and made to follow unthinkingly any particular line of action. So that is the proposition that I place before you for your approval in this motion.

Since then other things have happened. Here I may say that we were rather concerned when we saw that this Korean situation was likely to be enlarged, or the consideration of it is likely to be extended to include other situations such as Formosa or Indo-China.²³ I am not going into the question of Formosa or Indo-China. They are separate. But the fact of this enlargement seemed to us to be not only not right, but to have dangerous consequences from the point of view of world peace. Therefore, right from the beginning we made it clear that we supported the United Nations Security Council Resolutions and we did not extend our support to anything else beyond that.

Since then the House knows that there was some correspondence between our Government and Marshal Stalin and Mr Dean Acheson of the United States State Department. The correspondence has been published and has attracted a good deal of attention. As a matter of fact that personal appeal which I addressed to these leaders was only in continuation of the policy that we have pursued for months past diplomatically and it was nothing new except that a personal appeal was made at that stage. Ever since we recognised the new People's Government of China,²⁴ it naturally followed that the consequences of such recognition should come. We recognised them for a variety of reasons into which I need not go, the main reason being the fact that a strong, stable and durable Government existed over the whole continent of China. It is none of our business to like or dislike governments, though we can do so of course. But in recognising one normally does not go by likes and dislikes, but by the fact that they represent stable governments. Otherwise, if we went by our likes and dislikes, then it may be that we may not recognise quite a good number of countries in the world. Each country would have a list of countries that they did not like. So, one has to take facts and the fact that the People's

23. President Truman stated on 27 June 1950 that the attack upon Korea showed "communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations" and, fearing that if Formosa were taken over by the communists the security of the Pacific area and U.S. forces there would be directly threatened, announced that he had ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa, strengthening of U.S. forces in the Philippines, and accelerated "military assistance to the forces of France and the associated States in Indo-China." See also *Selected Works* (Second Series), Vol.14 Part II, pp. 308 and 312-313.

24. On 30 December 1949.

Government of China was firmly established in that great country, and there is not the least chance of its being pushed out of that country, compelled us, apart from other reasons, to recognise that Government as it led many other countries to do so, including the United Kingdom. Having recognised it, it seemed to us not only illogical but exceedingly unreasonable not to accept the consequences of that recognition which was that this China should function in the United Nations.

Having recognised the People's Government, it followed obviously that we should not recognise its predecessor Government in China which had ceased to exist on the Asiatic mainland.²⁵ So, ever since we recognised China, in fact, if I may say so, a little before we recognised China, we have tried, in our dealings with the nations friendly to us, to impress upon them this view of the case and to point out that any other course would be harmful in the future. We have discussed it with countries in Asia, with countries in Europe and America, with all countries, in fact, with whom we are fortunate enough to have friendly relations. With some we discussed more intimately and with some a little less intimately, but we put our viewpoint before them all the time, because we were convinced that by not recognising a patent fact, the fact did not cease to exist. It was there. Ignoring it did not make it vanish. It merely created difficulties and difficulties came. I do not know what might have happened if China had entered the United Nations at an earlier stage this year. But I am inclined to think that many of the subsequent dangerous developments, including this Korean development, might well not have taken place. As a result of China not being admitted into the United Nations and the representative of the old Kuomintang regime being there, the House knows that the U.S.S.R. and some countries friendly to them, more or less walked out of the various organs of the United Nations, more especially from the Security Council.²⁶

Now, that created a peculiar situation. It is not for me to criticise other countries. But, if I may say so, it was an unfortunate decision of the U.S.S.R. to walk out of the Security Council and remain out for all this time. However, that created a new situation, because, immediately, the very purpose of the United Nations was somehow affected by this change. The United Nations was established to bring in all the nations, or, at any rate, all the more and less important nations in the

25. As communists gained control of the mainland in 1949, the Kuomintang Government moved to Formosa under U.S. military protection.

26. Chou En-lai had, on 8 January 1950, asked for the expulsion of the delegation of Nationalist China from the Security Council and on 13 January 1950 the U.S.S.R. withdrew from the Council after its resolution urging derecognition of the representative of Nationalist China was defeated. Jacob Malik stated that the U.S.S.R. would not deem itself bound by any decisions adopted with the participation of the representative of Nationalist China. After the Soviet withdrawal from the Council, various organs of the United Nations were boycotted by the Eastern Bloc countries.

world together. The U.N.O. was never intended to be a group of nations thinking one way and excluding other nations which did not fit in with that way of thinking. If that was the idea behind the United Nations, it would not have been called that; it would have been called something else. Therefore, deliberately countries with different ideologies, different approaches to life, with even a certain hostility to each other, were included in the United Nations, in the hope that by doing so gradually they might tone down, gradually, they might, instead of going towards conflict outside, indulge in verbal conflict and not in more dangerous methods. At any rate, taking the world as it was, it was an attempt to solve the problems by peaceful means; not a very successful attempt.

It is very easy to criticise the rules and regulations of the United Nations, the power of veto and so many other things. It is easy to criticise what the United Nations has done since then. We ourselves have often felt a mood to criticise the United Nations in regard to some of its decisions relating to India. But the fact remains that the United Nations reflected the difficulties that existed in life itself, in public affairs of the world today. You cannot create some organ which is superior to the state of the world, which becomes an idealist thing and which does not function at all. So, the United Nations consisted of these various nations thinking differently, sometimes looking at each other with suspicion and unfriendliness.

Now, with new China and the U.S.S.R. and some other countries going out of the United Nations, it has assumed a new shape. It has ceased to be what it was meant to be, for the time being at least. Inevitably if this state of affairs persisted, there can be no other outcome than a world war. There is no forum left for any attempt at peaceful settlement. Therefore, those people who were greatly interested in the future of the United Nations, more especially the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr Trygve Lie, communicated repeatedly with the various member nations including us, earlier this year, pointing out these great developments and saying that if something was not done soon the United Nations would simply disintegrate.

Ultimately Mr Trygve Lie went for talks to important capitals of Europe and America. I do not know, of course, all his proposals, but essentially the thing that he was aiming at was to put an end to the deadlock in the United Nations, especially that those great countries which for the moment were not represented there properly should be represented; because otherwise the result would be that the United Nations could not possibly achieve any results. Otherwise the United Nations, instead of being an organ for peace, would inevitably drift towards being an organ for war or preparation for war. That was what Mr Trygve Lie felt, and that is how we felt. And we continued in our own way pressing with various governments to solve this problem by agreeing to the inclusion of the People's Government of China in the United Nations and in the Security Council.

Therefore, when this Korean invasion took place and we tried to think what we could do in the matter, there was a great deal of talk about mediation and

India being a mediator,²⁷ and I am afraid some of our own representatives abroad talked rather loosely and used such words,²⁸ meaning well, of course, and with all goodwill. But we had no intention of jumping into this in any such capacity as mediator or anything. We know our own limitations, our own weaknesses, and we have no desire to play an important part in this or any other affair. It is, therefore, with no desire to play any part, but rather with a keen realisation of this great responsibility that rests not on us only but on every country in this crisis, that we thought about it. And we felt again, as we had felt previously, that whatever the approach directly to the Korean question might be, our initial approach would surely help in creating an atmosphere which would facilitate the solution of that question, and we went back again to what we had previously said, that is, the inclusion of the People's Government of China in the United Nations. We pressed for that diplomatically and later through those personal appeals which I made to Marshal Stalin and Mr Dean Acheson. Those appeals failed to achieve the result we had hoped for and matters remained where they were. Not quite, because the situation had worsened; and we had to face from day to day fresh positions, fresh developments in the United Nations and the Security Council, and the House must know in the course of the last two days what has happened at Lake Success at the meetings of the Security Council.²⁹ I should like to pay a tribute here to our representative, Shri B.N. Rau, who is carrying a heavy burden, a very difficult burden, and is doing so not only with ability, not only with integrity, but is succeeding—and that is a remarkable thing—in convincing everybody of his integrity and impartiality in this difficult state of affairs.

So that is the position. Now, to some extent, these highly important decisions, of course, should be our decisions and have to be the decisions of the full Government of India and of the Cabinet. If this House was sitting I should like to come to this House for every major decision so that it may confirm it; and I am glad that even now, nearly a month after this decision, the House is enabled to consider this matter. But decisions have to be taken from day to day. We meet

27. On 2 July 1950, *Reynold News* (London) stated, "What is needed in Korea is a new mediator of world stature and repute. The one who measures up to that standard is Pandit Nehru..." The same day *Daily Compass* (New York) argued that Nehru was suited for the task of a global mediator.

28. B.N. Rau told the U.N. Correspondents Association on 4 July 1950 that the Indian delegation was taking steps to bring about a high level meeting of two of the leading Powers as a first step towards international mediation.

29. A procedural wrangle over the question whether priority be given to the issue of Chinese representation raised by the U.S.S.R. or to the U.S. draft resolution condemning North Korea for defying U.N. resolutions was marked by unprecedented heated exchanges between the Soviet and the American representatives. Jacob Malik labelled Nationalist China an "usurper" and "a group that represents no one but itself"; Warren Austin said that so long as U.N. men were dying on the battlefield, the Council could not "cheapen their suffering or sully their heroism" by seeming to engage in the consideration of "deals, bribery or blackmail".

in Cabinet frequently, and in order to have the advice of some of my colleagues at any moment, it has been necessary to form a small Foreign Affairs Committee³⁰ of some of our senior colleagues. Nevertheless, this great responsibility inevitably rests upon me, as the House will realise, and I feel the burden of this responsibility and I try to the best of my ability to follow the policy which I believe has been the policy which this House has repeatedly approved, a policy which I think is good for India and good for Asia and for the world, realising all the time that we cannot make too much difference in this conflict. I wish to make this clear because some of our friends, some newspapers, write, if I may say so, rather pompously of India's position in the world. It does not do any good to be pompous or vainglorious about it. We have a certain position and, no doubt, if we function rightly, that position will grow and become more important. But our opportunities and our power to influence events are very strictly limited. People talk about what they call a "third force", "third parties" and "third grouping" without really analysing what all this means, because it means next to nothing in actual fact.

We are friendly and on most intimate terms with some countries of Asia. We tell them what we intend doing, and they tell us their reactions. But they can do what they like and we can do what we like; there is no compulsion about it. We are friendly with the countries of the Commonwealth. We inform them of what we intend doing, they inform us, and there is a constant stream of information going from one to the other. We agree on many matters, and we disagree on some matters, and we can disagree without doubting the other's *bona fides* in the matter. With countries which are not in the Commonwealth, we are also friendly and in constant touch, and in the course of the last month or two, since our Ambassador reached Peking,³¹ we have been in fairly regular touch with the Peking Government. From all the evidence that we have had from our Ambassador about the Peking Government, we feel that they have the most friendly sentiments towards us, which they have repeatedly expressed, and we have the most friendly sentiments towards the great country of China. It is not for us to criticise what they do internally in their country, as it is not for them to criticise internal happenings in our country. That is for them and for us to decide. But I do not see why we should not take advantage, full advantage, of these friendly sentiments, which we are fortunate enough to have in regard to these countries and from these countries, and why we should lose our balance of mind and rush into the fray and talk in terms of more and more conflict. As I said, and I want to repeat it, I do not think that any action that we may take will, for the present, make any radical difference in the world situation. Nevertheless, I think that in the long run it will make a very big difference, not because we take that action, not because we are a strong nation,

30. It consisted of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vallabhbhai Patel, C. Rajagopalachari and N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar.

31. K.M. Panikkar took charge as Ambassador to the People's Republic of China on 20 May 1950.

but because, I am convinced, that the line we are adopting is the right line, and I have not the shadow of a doubt that ultimately, if we have to solve these problems, it will be by coming back to that right line of action.

Now I do not wish to criticise any country, because I know very well that my country and my Government are very much open to criticism. We all are and it is a foolish pastime to indulge in criticising each other; it does not help, it only creates ill feeling.

But one thing I should like to say and I have said it in public on many occasions in various countries. I have drawn attention repeatedly to the importance of Asia in the new context of things. People may have thought that I am just trying to boost up Asia. It is not that at all, because I felt, for war or peace, events were happening in Asia which would affect the world as you see it today. I laid stress on that. I laid stress on it because through sheer old habit the great countries of Europe, America, etc., have been functioning in the old ways of the League of Nations and now in the United Nations. Naturally, and I quite understand it, through sheer habit they have placed much more emphasis on the problems of Europe than on the problems of Asia. They are nearer to them, they feel them, they understand them. Asia is a more distant continent, it is a troublesome place, it is a mysterious place, it is an unknown place. So their outlook becomes governed much more by Europe's problems than by Asia's problems. Now European problems are important for the world and for India, and I am prepared to say that it is very important for the world that this great continent of Europe with all its cultural traditions should survive. It would be a terrible disaster if the culture of Europe goes under, and whatever our respective cultures may be in India, China or anywhere else, we also are today, partly at least, children of the culture of Europe. So it is with no feeling of disrespect that I speak of Europe and its problems. Nevertheless, as I pointed out, to judge the world today in terms of European problems is wrong: you get a wrong emphasis. Of course, they talk of Asia right enough; they talk of Asia, Indonesia, Japan and all these Asian countries. Nonetheless the whole perspective, I have felt, has been wrong and I have laid stress on this.

Another thing and perhaps an even more important thing is this that there is little awareness, if I may say so with all humility, in the mind of the Western world of how the mind of the Eastern world functions—their mind and heart. They are cultured people in the West, very able people, and they draw up statistics and write books and magazines and newspapers full of articles about India, Pakistan, China, Japan and Korea. The amount of material that comes out from capable hands is tremendous. And yet sometimes I feel that they have concentrated on the externals and not fully looked into what lay inside the mind and heart of Asia.

Asia is a very big continent and there is a world of difference between the various countries of Asia, between the Middle East countries of the Arab world, of the Far East and South East Asia, India or Pakistan; between China and us there is a great deal of difference. Nevertheless, for a variety of reasons, especially the

history of the past one hundred or two hundred years, when European colonialism flourished in Asia, certain common bonds have sprung up, certain common reactions have taken place and those common reactions still take place. One of the basic reactions in Asia is against colonialism. I know and have stated frequently that the old-style colonialism is dead; I have no doubt about it. The old-style empires are dead but it does not mean that they have completely ceased to exist or that they do not function in Asia or Africa; they do function. They may carry on for a number of years but I know that they lost their basic strength and cannot revive. Whether some new type of colonial control—which does not call itself colonial control but which nevertheless is control—would arise in the future, I do not know. But the point is this that the strongest urge in Asia, in every country of Asia without exception, is this anti-colonial urge and the positive side of it is nationalism. The strongest urge in large parts of Asia still is the nationalist urge.

Another powerful urge in Asia is the social urge, because Asia has been very poor and backward in many ways. It has not profited by the great wealth that has poured into the world since the Industrial Revolution came. In fact, the whole of Asia has been exploited and it has been a passive witness of that Revolution.

And now Asia is wide awake to these differences and feels her poverty and distress and wants to remedy it and it does not want to wait too long in the process. There is this sense of social inequality, not only as between Asia and Europe or America, but social inequality in our own countries as between different classes, etc., which we have to face all the time and unless we solve them to some extent we shall go towards disaster, internal as well as external.

So there is this strong feeling, and any approach to an understanding of the Asian problems must take into consideration these three major factors. The kind of approach that is sometimes made by the Western European nations or the U.S.A. has something in it, no doubt, and some intellectuals here may understand it, and maybe some may agree with it and some may not. But it is quite impossible for the average Asian to appreciate it fully in that way, because the sort of danger that they fear does not appear to him as a primary danger; at any rate, it is a lesser danger than some other and greater danger. I mention this because it is a subject worth study for all of us. I mention this in this connection, for however different we may be from the Chinese, the Japanese, the Arabs or Indonesians, we have a greater understanding of each other than, I imagine, Europeans or Americans have of us in Asia. In spite of this fact the old methods continue, old habits die hard, and the fate of Asia or of countries of Asia or of policies in Asia is determined by the leading statesmen of the Western world without much reference to the countries of Asia which are most concerned. That is an old habit that endures still. I do not mind it; I have no reason to object to it, because it is not right for any of us to object. Nobody can prevent me from conferring with other countries; they cannot force me not to confer with anybody. So I do not complain but I wish to point out that the danger of this is that that kind of trying to solve the problem

without taking Asia into consideration is not the way to solve any problem. You simply come up against a blank wall and then you are surprised that this or that has happened and that country does not function in a particular way. That is simply because you do not try to understand what that country wants or what it was aiming at.

So, all these factors have to be considered. If we are in a position, apart from our general policy, etc., perhaps to understand better what, if I may say so, the people of Korea might want or might not want, or the people of China or the people of Indo-China or of Indonesia, whatever that is, should we put away our special knowledge, our special position, the special opportunities that we have for understanding all this, and without utilising them should we just push them away and function as a nation saying ditto to others who decide without that special knowledge? In any event, speaking for India, whatever happens I am not prepared merely to say ditto to any country in the wide world. I think it is degrading for a country, as it is for an individual, just to be an automaton, just to be a puppet and to repeat what others say. But it is not from the point of view of national prestige, although national prestige has some meaning, it is not from the point of view of national pride or prestige that I am speaking, but in an earnest effort to help in some way in preventing a world catastrophe. And we are in a position to help so far as Asian questions are concerned; we are in a better position to throw light on them sometimes, to understand others or to convince them than some of the countries of the Western world whose methods, if I may say so with all humility, lack all subtlety. They are extraordinarily lacking in any approach to the mind or to the heart and, therefore, they fail. If we can serve a cause, if we are in a position to serve that cause of peace now or even later at any time—or even if conflict spreads later we might be able to serve that cause—then are we to give up that position simply because other people have lost their heads and function in an unbalanced way? I submit that we would not thereby be doing any service either to our country or to any other country or to the cause of that peace.

Therefore, we have tried to function in this way. It is a cautious way, it is a restrained way. We don't shout because there is nothing to shout about. We want to go by reason. I know reason does not go far when the battle-drums are sounded, but, nevertheless, a time comes when if there is right on the side of that small voice that has to be heard. As I said, I am convinced that at some time or other that voice will have to be heard if these problems are to be solved. Meanwhile, our policy is, first, of course, that aggression has taken place by North Korea over South Korea. That is a wrong act; that has to be condemned; that has to be resisted. Secondly, that in so far as possible the war should not be spread beyond Korea, that no other questions should be tied up with this Korean struggle. And, thirdly, of course, that we should explore means of ending this war. The future of Korea must be decided entirely by the Koreans themselves, in what form or shape, I cannot just now say.

And here may I say that people talk about war. Of course, everybody knows how terrible a world war today is likely to be, but one might even pay a terrible price if one is sure of a more or less reasonable solution at the end of the war of the problem you have. But curiously enough, most people and even eminent statesmen get mixed up in solving the problem between realising the objective they are aiming at and the victory in war. The two are not necessarily synonymous and past history shows us that they are not. The war is won, won completely, overwhelmingly, and immediately the victorious powers find, as they found at the end of the last war, as they found at the end of the 1914-18 war, that somehow the objective they aimed at was not there. They had not realised it; in fact, fresh and greater problems had arisen. So, it is not good enough. We have to be clear as to what our objective is and we have not to get misled into thinking that mere victory in war necessarily means getting that objective.

So, I beg to place this Resolution before you. It is a simple Resolution, it does not say much. I have tried to place before this House the background of my thought on this problem and all I can do is to assure the House that to the best of our ability the Government will try to give effect to our policy in the way that I have stated.

3. An Independent Policy¹

I may perhaps deal with my honourable friend's query² first of all. What we have been stating has been that our whole defence organization has been built up and is looked upon as a defence organization and not from the point of view of service in distant theatres of war. Therefore, if any considerable use is made of it, it would completely upset that organization and it would not be of any particular use distantly. But obviously that does not prevent us if we so chose to send token forces³ if that

1. Reply to the debate in Parliament on the Korean situation, 4 August 1950. *Parliamentary Debates, Official Report*, 1950, Vol. V, Part II, cols. 371-387.
2. Ramnath Goenka said that C. Rajagopalachari had said in the House on 4 August 1950 that India had not contributed troops to the U.N. Command in Korea in pursuance of her policy to prevent conflagration, whereas B.N. Rau had stated in the Security Council that India was not in a position to do so.
3. The Security Council resolution of 7 July 1950 recommended that members of the United Nations providing military forces and other assistance pursuant to the resolutions of 25 and 27 June 1950 make such contributions available to "a unified command under the United States." India had abstained from voting on this resolution.

will not come in the way of any particular organization; we can always send token forces, without making any military differences. We did not, however, send any token forces on this occasion because of a variety of reasons, because we are not quite sure how this war may develop and because of other matters of war connected with Korea and all these things. As I said, it made no difference actually. It was only a gesture and it would have been a gesture which might have embarrassed us and other parties in case of other developments in particular directions.

A great deal has been said in the course of the last few days on this subject. With your permission, I shall only refer to two or three points, taking them by themselves. First of all there has been a great deal of insistence laid on this partition of Korea. My honourable friend Dr Mookerjee spoke eloquently about it a great deal and said that we must insist on the union of Korea and, I believe, he finally said that our policy should be: We have got to tell these Powers this and that and our slogan should be a 'United Korea'.⁴

To begin with nobody that I am aware of has ever proposed anything but a united Korea. In fact if I may read out to you how this so-called partition was looked upon in the beginning, it was completely artificial. So artificial, indeed, you will be surprised to know that this 38th parallel not only cuts across provinces, districts, but even cuts across towns in the middle of it.⁵ It is just an imaginary, theoretical line; this is a line between two armies. It was ultimately so that even towns and villages were cut into two bits. It was not a reality except the reality of military necessity: the two armies were marching and they wanted some line which would indicate where to stop so that there should be no conflict. Here is what in March 1947 the Assistant Secretary of the United States said:

The line of demarcation was intended to be temporary and only to fix responsibility between the United States and the U.S.S.R. for carrying out the Japanese surrender. Nevertheless now nearly eighteen months later this artificial and temporary line still stands like a stone wall against the unification of Korea.⁶

4. Wishing that Nehru had not been "so diffident or apologetic", Syama Prasad Mookerjee claimed on 4 August that "there is something in the strength and the moral stamina of India.... I would have stood up and said: We stand for the rights and liberties of the oppressed people and our slogan is 'United Korea'. Let all come and support us in carrying this forward peacefully, if possible, otherwise by force, if necessary."
5. The 38th parallel cuts across Korea where the country approaches its greatest breadth and at one point on the west coast it intersects and isolates from the rest of South Korea an important peninsular area which extends southward.
6. John H. Hilldring, Assistant Secretary of State, said this in a speech on 10 March 1947 before the Economic Club of Detroit.

That is to say, nobody has tried to partition Korea. It has been nobody's policy to do it, certainly not the Korean, not the United States' policy and presumably not the U.S.S.R.'s policy, but owing to various sets of circumstances, which really have little to do with Korea, but which have to do with the wider interests and conflicts of Great Powers, they came into touch at a certain point, for spheres of influence, etc., and that line became a dividing line for the time being. It has nothing to do with dividing Korea as such. It was an unhappy and, as was thought, a temporary consequence. Even now it is nobody's policy that Korea should be divided. But, then, it is Korea's misfortune that it has come in the way of other interests and other Powers and therefore Korea's interests suffer because of that. Not that anybody wants that Korea's interests should suffer; but it is only unfortunate.

Dr Mookerjee advised us to have a straight policy and to tell these big Powers to get out and to have a united Korea.⁷ That sounds very fine and very brave like many other things that are said in this country often repeatedly, whether in regard to Bengal or other parts of India. But, fine and brave as it sounds, it is mostly sound with little reality in it. What is the point, I ask this honourable House, in India going about telling other Great Powers of the world to do this and do that, as if we are in command, and as if we can control the destinies of the world and destinies of other people. It is, if I may say so, not a strong man's attitude, but a weak man's attitude, who can do nothing at all but talk. We are a responsible Government. What we say, I imagine, we intend to work up to. Therefore we do not say much. Therefore, yesterday, in this House, I said as little as I possibly could. I do not wish to advise these people, much less to issue directions to these Great Powers. I am not strong enough in any sense. I am not for the moment even talking about material strength. It is desirable if I had it. That would add weight to my advice. But I am sorry to say that I am not strong enough even morally to put forward that claim and advise the world. We have in India advised others sufficiently; but we forget that we have to advise ourselves also occasionally and act up to that advice. I have not the moral stature yet to do that. If I have any moral stature, it is not due to me or, with all respect, to this honourable House; but it is due to those who have departed, who have left their moral stature for us. So, what is the good of our talking in this way, advising the world and issuing directions, just as sometimes I find my enthusiastic friends, some students congress or youth league and others passing resolutions advising the world what it should be like, advising this country to do something or that country to do something else. That kind of

7. Mookerjee said that India should have asked other nations to keep their "hands off Korea"; "Let us ask representatives of both South Korea and of North Korea, let us get the representatives of Soviet Russia, and sit round the table and discuss on what basis Korea can be reunited."

thing is good enough for a students debating society. It is not good enough for a responsible Chamber dealing with realities at a very dangerous moment in the world's history. This kind of ordering about has no reality about it. We have to advance warily, step by step, and avoiding, if I may say so, casting blame on other countries. I ventured to point out that it is easy to make a list of the errors and omissions and commissions of other countries just as it is easy or easier to make a longer list of the errors and sins of our country or Government. But, even though it might be easy to make that list, it does not help to point out the errors of other nations. It may produce some self-complacency in us, some sense of self-righteousness, which is not justified. It is a dangerous thing. It leads us to think not of what we have to do; but we begin to think of what others should do all the time. That, if I may say so with all humility, is one of the great weaknesses of our people, that we are always advising our neighbour what he should do, not doing our duty ourselves. Each person advises his neighbour; the neighbour advises his neighbour; we as a country advise other countries. What we are to do in our country, whether it is the food situation or any other situation, we advise each other as to what should be done. It does not matter much if we do it in regard to the domestic problems. But, it matters still more if in this international context we set about advising other countries what they should do and telling them that they have sinned here and sinned there. No doubt they have sinned. But, still, how does it help, except to create ill will and irritation at a moment of excitement and passion, to close their minds to what we say and to close our minds as to what they say?

There has been some talk about dollar imperialism⁸ and the like. Again, I felt that it is easy to talk about these matters at length here. But it would be easier and perhaps more profitable to talk of the great services, of the great achievements of the other nations and to learn something from them so that we might make ourselves great, rather than point out something else which we consider bad or not so good. Take the United States of America. Of course, the dollar is a great force there. It is the Almighty Dollar as it is called. Of course, they have tremendous financial and economic resources. They have an expanding economy; they are bursting out like youthful people, exercising their power in right ways and wrong ways, anyhow, youthful ways. It is easy to find fault with them. Look at the other picture of a nation which has tremendous achievements to its credit. It has built itself up; we did not help them to build themselves up. Nor can you say that any wide exploitation has helped the United States of America to grow up. You might say that of the colonial countries of Europe. The Industrial Revolution in England was helped tremendously by the original, if I may say so, loot from India. True. Nevertheless if the British people went ahead, it was due to their great genius,

8. K.T. Shah said on 3 August that "the modern dollar imperialism" was more deadly than the imperialisms of earlier times.

hard work, organisation and discipline and a hundred fine qualities. We do not talk about those qualities; but we talk of the fact that because of our weaknesses, they came and conquered India, controlled India and profited by their stay in India. Then, we blame them for it while the blame is ours for our failures, stupidity, factions and disruptions in our country.

I was talking about America. Look at their tremendous achievements. Their achievement is amazing. It is a great country. It is very easy for you to find constructive peace forces at play in that country. It is also easy to find other forces. It is a mighty country with all kinds of living currents, currents for war, currents for peace. You can pick and choose what you like. You remember that a certain lady came to India many years ago and wrote a book,⁹ largely true, largely untrue, which Mahatma Gandhi described as a drain inspector's report. It is not so much a question of truth of that particular report. I think it was largely untrue. Certainly it gave a wrong picture. But this business of our trying to find fault with other countries and thereby justifying ourselves, as if we are more virtuous than others, seems to me not only bad, but dangerous: dangerous because it prevents us from looking at our faults. I have not the least fear of any dollar imperialism of the United States of America. I say, there are in that country all kinds of forces including forces of dollar imperialism. I do not deny that. There are also other forces, constructive forces, forces beneficent to the world. I am not afraid of dollar imperialism; certainly not of the United States or any other country. What I am afraid of is our sitting complacently in our house, doing nothing and expecting things to happen for us. I think it is, if I may say so, in bad form, apart from lacking in truth, because if you lay too much stress on one particular aspect of something and not on the rest of the picture, you produce a distorted picture. It is lacking in clarity.

Here, we talk about the Korean affair and the decisions of the United Nations in regard to Korea, and North Korean aggression. The Americans have sent their young men to fight and die there.¹⁰ These young men are not a party to the dollar diplomacy or any other intrigue of high policy. They are fighting, I have no doubt, for what they imagine to be in furtherance of the United Nations or their own country's efforts in the right direction. Whether it is right or wrong, you may argue. But just for us sitting comfortably at home, either to criticise them or their country, or for the matter of that, the opposite party, I say, it is not just good enough. It does not become a responsible assembly to do that. It is a very important and a difficult problem. I make bold to say that there are very few people anywhere in the world, in the United States or in the U.S.S.R., very few people who want

9. *Mother India* (London, 1927) by Katherine Mayo.

10. Starting with the two American companies which landed in Korea on 1 July 1950 the number of U.S. armed personnel had grown to 350,000 men, including about 100,000 air force and service personnel, when the war drew to its close in January 1953.

war. I am quite certain that there is hardly a soul in Western Europe who thinks of war except with extreme horror because the results in Western Europe of a world war would be too terrible to contemplate. It is not a matter for speechifying. It affects each individual home there—whether that home will survive or not. And we talk lightly of war because as a matter of fact we have had no experience of it, except reading in newspapers mostly. In the United States or anywhere else, I have no doubt that there is hardly a handful of people who might like war for war's sake. But the vast majority of the people want peace. They hate the idea of war, because war means ultimately their sons or husbands or brothers going to war and possibly being killed in war. So also in the U.S.S.R. But owing to certain facts, certain developments, maybe the follies of statesmen or, if you like, the follies of those who control these financial imperialisms, call them what you like, we get into a more and more panicky state; we get into a tangle and become helpless to get out of it. Here we are in this tangle. The future historian can sit down over this matter and say this leads to this and that leads to the other. But for the moment it is not of much use. Though everyone wants peace, men get frightened, they come into conflict, they kill each other and destroy the world. It is an extraordinary state and presents a tremendous problem. On the one side there is the passionate desire for peace and there is no doubt about that. But there are people who have the belief that something might happen to destroy what they stand for and so they are full of fear and say, let us arm ourselves, let us prepare ourselves, and let us fight to prevent that very thing from happening. And so, in spite of the passionate desire for peace, we function for war, go to war and destroy peace.

Now, that is an extraordinary contradiction, and I do not know how it is possible to get out of that vicious circle. And India cannot by herself do much, no country can do much, except possibly, if she is fortunate enough, to just touch some kind of live wire, if you like, which sets various currents in men's minds and thus divert people's attention; their minds are ready to receive it, because they want peace. They may look in a slightly different direction and themselves move in that direction. We cannot push them in any direction. We can only perhaps do something which makes them think occasionally. That is all we can do. And, I do submit, that was the purpose of the recent action of our Government in making a personal appeal to Marshal Stalin and Mr Dean Acheson; that was the whole purpose of it. If it had succeeded in inducing those Governments to take some action that would have been a wonderful thing, not wonderful for us, but rather wonderful for the world. But even if it did not succeed in doing that, I do submit that it was a good thing to do and the result is good, not bad. It is good because in a mounting war fever, when people's minds were becoming embittered all over the world, suddenly they were made to think, they were made to stop for a moment and think of something else. It is possible that some of them became rather angry at India. But I do not mind that anger. I can understand it and I do not mind it in the least. But we wanted them to think. That takes time; and when they think there is the slight possibility

of the minds of people turning in a particular direction that might influence State policies. It may not be a big chance, but we cannot wait for big chances. We have to take every little chance that comes our way.

One thing more I may say in this connection. The word 'appeasement' has been bandied about a great deal with regard to this question, that we were out to appease the Soviet, or China or somebody else and therefore we had taken this step.¹¹ In a foreign newspaper I read that some kind of a secret deal had been arrived at between us and the U.S.S.R. to the effect that the U.S.S.R. had promised its support to our claim for a permanent seat in the Security Council and therefore we had done this.¹² Well, the bait was not very big, but anyhow, there is nothing in it. So far as we are concerned, we are not very anxious to have a permanent seat or any seat in the Security Council. It is a troublesome business. It gives us no joy to sit in the Security Council. It brings only responsibility, and grave responsibility. But talking about appeasement, we may be right or we may be wrong in regard to a particular policy. Obviously that is a matter of judgment. But for any person to think that we have the frame of mind that is usually associated with appeasement shows a strange lack of knowledge of our past background. I say this because for the last over thirty years we have been functioning in a peculiar set up in India. It was a set up where we were continuously in conflict with a great imperial power, and we developed or tried to develop, under our great leader, a mixture of two rather contradictory qualities he had. They were not contradictory in him; to us they appeared to be so. One was always to be willing to compromise with the enemy, always to have your hand outstretched, but at the same time always to stand firm for what we stood for, never to move from the basic principle. Do not haggle about small matters, find out what your basic thing is and stand for it to the bitter end; but stand for it smilingly and with hand outstretched. If year after year we stood by that decision, then it is hardly likely that in the afternoon of our lives we are likely to change now, and more especially in matters which are of enormous importance to the world.

This talk of appeasement does not show a very clear understanding of how our minds work. When we take up a certain policy, it may be right or wrong, other people should try at least to understand the motives that lie behind that policy. Try to convince us that it is wrong, but to tell us that we are appeasers makes not the slightest difference to anybody.

11. Syama Prasad Mookerjee said that India had tried to please both sides by supporting the Security Council resolutions and by linking the issue of admission of China into the United Nations with Korea. Nazimuddin Ahmad said that the policy of appeasement had emboldened Germany before 1939 and suggested that India should send a token army to oppose the aggression in Korea.
12. *Newsweek* of 19 July 1950 thought that in a bid to secure India's favour in the Korean affair, the U.S.S.R. would be recommending permanent membership for India in the Security Council.

May I also mention another thing. I saw in a newspaper today—I think it was a message of a news agency from the U.S.A.—something to the effect that I was making another effort at mediation.¹³ May I deny that completely. There has been no such question. As I said, at no time did I consider this matter of mediation as such, or this business of being a mediator or offering mediation. What we have suggested, at first diplomatically and later in the personal appeal, was not mediation. We have suggested a step for which we had been asking for months and months. We have suggested that because we thought that it would ease the situation.

There is a certain confusion in people's minds. Our proposal that the People's Government of China should be accepted and taken into the United Nations was something which is entirely apart from the Korean question. We have been trying for that for the last eight months.¹⁴ So it stood by itself and if we propose it, we propose it on its own merits. Certainly and in that sense it is unconnected with the Korean situation.

In another sense it is connected as everything else is connected which is happening contemporaneously. Whatever step one takes has a reaction on something else. Undoubtedly we thought that if China goes there a new atmosphere will be created in the Security Council and the United Nations Organisation for the discussion of all outstanding problems and for the consideration of the Korean problem.

So far as the Korean problem is concerned our views have been stated in our acceptance of the United Nations Resolution that there has been aggression and it should be met and resisted. Obviously if our proposal in regard to China had been accepted by other Powers the next step for us, in so far as it lay in us, was to see that the United Nations Resolution is given effect to still further and in a better way. So that, while those matters were apart, that is, the recognition of China and the Korean question, yet one affects the other and naturally they had to be seen in the context of each other. It was not that the question of China was raised by us as a set off against anything or in a spirit of bargaining. It was an independent proposition to create a better atmosphere to deal with these questions.

There is a great deal of talk about neutrality.¹⁵ Now I do submit that the way this word is used is completely beside the point. We are accused of having left

13. A U.P.A. message from London, published in *The Hindustan Times* of 4 August, said that India would, with Soviet Union's blessings, propose in the United Nations a mediation commission to effect a settlement in Korea.

14. India supported the Soviet Union in the Security Council on 13 January 1950 to unseat Nationalist China.

15. Hukam Singh said that by participating in the voting on the U.N. resolution, India had shown that "it was a partisan and not a neutral power."

the path we have followed thus far, because we have ceased to be neutral. I want to make it perfectly clear that at no time have we been neutral and at no time do we propose to be neutral. What does this business of neutrality mean? As I said, normally speaking, neutrality is a word that has been used in war time. Those countries that are not belligerents are neutral. The word is not used in peace time except when in people's minds peace and war become one and they become so confused that they talk in military terms even in peace time. Perhaps it has happened now for sometime past because military terms are used as if there was a war going on.

Therefore, normally the question of neutrality would arise only when there is a conflict between two parties. It may be said, of course, that there has been what is called a 'cold war', a conflict of ideologies or power blocs, whatever you like to call it. True, and it is said: You did not take sides in that and therefore you were neutral. You may say that. But even in regard to that when you say you are neutral that is a policy of not doing anything. Our policy was, as I stated, not committing ourselves to follow a certain line beforehand. Suppose there are two power blocs. If I am neutral that itself is a commitment that I will not do this or that; I refuse to bind myself. The whole essence of our policy is independence of action, that is to say, any moment we decide for ourselves what is best in our interests and in the interests of world peace, whatever our ideals or objectives may be. We do not say from now that in the future we will not do this or that and make a long list of 'nots', as might be the case if we said that we are permanently neutral. It has no meaning except a permanent retirement from public affairs, a kind of national *sanyas*. No country can do that and certainly we have no desire to retire from the world or public affairs. To some extent we have tried to the best of our ability to keep ourselves out of entanglements, because our capacity is limited, because of our own problems. In spite of that we get more and more entangled, because, as Shri Rajagopalachari said, we cannot get rid of the fact of the inherent position of India. Inherently, historically, geographically and in the political context of the world today, in Asia and elsewhere we have to shoulder that burden in foreign affairs and international matters. So that neutrality, so far as we are concerned, means an independent policy without alignment with any particular line adopted by other powers, which means ultimately your carrying out what others say to you in future. That we do not propose to do. But in future, if circumstances do warrant, we shall support this policy or that as the country may choose. So I should like to make this point clear to this House and the country about our neutrality, because there is so much confusion and vagueness about it and it surprises me when I am told that you have left your policy of neutrality. I have never had it, much less have I left it.

There is one rather curious argument raised. Someone said that because we have not recognised either North or South Korea, therefore apparently the consequence followed that they do not exist for us. Hence no aggression has taken

place and nothing is happening there.¹⁶ If so, why this debate and why have honourable Members spoken? We are reaching into the upper regions of metaphysics. But the fact that one does not recognise a country in the political sense does not mean that the country does not exist. It is there, very much so, and it does not mean that aggression cannot take place, if we do not recognise North and South Korea. The question of recognising either North or South Korea does not arise.

Normally, we ought to have recognised South Korea in the sense that it was a kind of a child of the United Nations. We did not recognise it because we felt that all this business was petrifying the division of Korea. And the more recognition was given to it the more South Korea became petrified and North Korea became petrified and we felt this arrangement cannot and should not endure. Therefore we did not recognise it. Again, our not recognising it probably did not make any basic difference to the situation. It was a gesture that we were looking forward to the unification of Korea. As a matter of fact, the United Nations Commission on Korea was sitting at Seoul and one of our men was a member of it.

So the fact is undoubted that aggression took place and once we admit aggression, whatever the justification—and I may say there might be justification—but once you admit aggression, immediately you get out of that body of law called international law, which is so fragile that it breaks up, it tumbles over at a step almost. We have to deal with what are called sovereign nations, recognising no law but their own goodwill. Gradually, some body of international law, international convention grows up. The United Nations grows up, and we criticise it because it is not strong enough. Mr Shiva Rao compared it to the leaky huts of the refugees here somewhere in Delhi.¹⁷ It is all very well to say so, but we are trying to build that up gradually. Every strain breaks up that fragile structure of international law. And if aggression takes place and we permit it and we talk in big terms either about its initial justification or about dollar imperialism and red imperialism and all that, trying to cover up a simple fact of aggression of one State over another—or call it anything you like, civil war if you like—the simple fact is that one present, existing, if you like, temporary, State committed aggression over another State. You can look up in the dictionary and see whether that is the correct definition or not. If you try to cover it up it is a dangerous thing because then that evil leads to another evil. Today it may be a small State, tomorrow it may be a big State

16. K.T. Shah said that since India had recognised neither North nor South Korea, neither of them could be called an aggressor. "Aggression... must mean an invasion by force of a recognised, constituted government by another, and not by an unrecognised horde of people."
17. Comparing the United Nations with the pre-fabricated stalls on Janpath, a shopping centre in New Delhi, which would crack "under the touch of adverse realism", Shiva Rao underlined the need for a radical revision of the Charter to strengthen the U.N. to deal with any crisis and thought that Nehru was the fittest person to undertake the task.

and then it is much more difficult, of course, to deal with big States. Therefore, you must recognise aggression, therefore we must give our vote against it, therefore we must resist it. Resist it, yes. In resisting it there is always this difficulty of over-resisting it or resisting it in the wrong way, thereby producing a complication, the simple issue being complicated. And what I am troubled about is this, that instead of the United Nations and the great countries of the world talking about this Korean matter in its Korean context, they are always talking in a much wider context, firstly, taking a rather fatalistic view of a world war which I think is not justified, and secondly, always thinking of it in terms of world conflict. I myself mentioned yesterday that when we think of this Korean war we forget Korea entirely and we rather see the shadows lying upon it of other giants. That is perfectly true, but if we emphasise those shadows all the time, if we talk about them, we create that very atmosphere which brings about that world war. We may be very logical, we may be very intelligent and intellectual and analytical and all that, but that does not help. If you are run over by a car while you are walking, all the logic in the world showing that you were on the right side of the road would not be of help. And we want to prevent the world being run over at the present moment by, if I may say so with extreme respect, a large number of people, well, whose sanity is not what it should be and who are behaving not as sane human beings; vast numbers of people, because of this passion that moves them, lose all sense of perspective and therefore tend to act wrongly—all this will not help and it is no good being logical and analytical. You have to be clear as to what your objective is and then you have to think what are the best means of achieving that objective or, at any rate, in helping others to achieve that objective because we cannot achieve it ourselves. If our objective is avoidance of a world war, then let us remember that, let us for the moment forget all the other talk that we have been indulging in.

At the present moment the basic urge for war is, I suppose, fear. It is an extraordinary thing how fear has gripped people of great nations. And the bigger the nation the more afraid it is and the more it thinks in terms of somehow being encircled by some other nations, till we come to this that no nation can live safely in the world unless that nation includes the world because otherwise it might be encircled by some other nation. That is, ultimately you must have a world State, whatever the internal character of that State, because otherwise there is always fear of encirclement. An extraordinary situation!

This House certainly knows what our general attitude is towards these prevailing ideologies. We call ourselves a democratic country, having a democratic Parliament, and a democratic Constitution. We have expressed ourselves against non-democratic methods, against authoritarian methods of Government, against what I would call the monolithic State, and so on and so forth. I don't like to go about criticising other countries, and I don't wish to say anything about them, but it is clear that so far as we are concerned we don't approve of these tendencies which lead to complete imperialism and a form of government which is certainly not political

democracy, whatever else it might be. We don't want it, we don't like it. Oddly enough, many people who talk in terms of civil liberty and demand it from us in this country, often admire conditions existing in other countries which have no relation to civil liberty at all. It is those people who clamour most for civil liberty. I don't mind their asking for civil liberty, and I am all in favour of it, and it pains me excessively that civil liberty should be limited in this country. What I was pointing out was that we are not admirers of certain systems of government in other countries and we made that perfectly clear. But that does not mean that we should go about criticising other countries even though, if I may say so, they criticise us. An honourable Member read out some press extracts to that effect.¹⁸ I know that. Nevertheless, we have refrained from replying in kind, because it does no good. Similarly, take the United States of America. I referred to their very great achievements, and I think we can learn a very great deal from them. It was a great adventure for me to go there last year¹⁹ and to find the hospitality and warm regard and the generous nature of the people there. I found also things, to be quite frank with you, which I did not like: tendencies, things. But surely you do not expect a great country like that to be fashioned according to your wishes or my wishes. It is a vital country, growing in many directions. I did not like very many things in America, but there it is. I liked many things—very many things—there and I should like our contacts to grow. I am just putting it to you that we try not to approach these problems in the spirit of white and black—I am not talking about the colour of people's skins. There is a feeling that there is something white and therefore that thing is absolutely right and there is something that is black and therefore that thing is absolutely wrong. The world is neither black nor white. Neither are we. We are all rather grey, with various shades, and this simple reduction to black and white does not help in understanding a problem or in solving it. It may be that it takes away from the firm conviction which grows from faith in blackness and whiteness. Possibly it does.

Anyhow, in our political policy and in political affairs, we try to frame our policy, in so far as we understand things, judging each event and considering it from the point of view of general peace and prosperity of mankind. We completely realise that there are grave dangers in Asia and elsewhere of countries losing their liberty in many ways—whether it is the economic liberty or whether it is the political liberty—under the guise of freedom. We realise that. We are not blind to this fact.

18. M.R. Masani had said that besides the Western Powers, whom Nehru had criticised on 3 August, some other countries had also shown a lack of understanding of Asia, and quoted from some articles in the *Pravda*, *New Times*, and *Cominform Journal* which described India as a colony of Britain "to be liberated" and the Indian Government as fascist, reactionary and imperialist.
19. Nehru visited the U.S.A. and Canada between 11 October and 7 November 1949. For seven days in between, he visited Canada. See *Selected Works* (Second Series), Vol. 13, pp. 295-468.

But what we do submit is that the way often adopted by some countries to meet those dangers is a way which ultimately encourages those very dangers. So we differ in the method of approach. It is, I think, our great poet Rabindranath Tagore who once said that you do not open a lock with a hammer; you open it with a key devised for the lock, and certainly you do not open the locks of men's hearts with hammers. There is an idea abroad that you can solve problems with hammers, bayonets and bombs and all that. I am more convinced of this than anything else that in the ultimate analysis no problem is solved by the bomb and the bayonet and tanks.

4. To B.N. Rau¹

New Delhi

August 10, 1950

My dear B.N.,

I am writing to you briefly, although I have much to say. You are carrying a heavy burden and having to face difficult situations from day to day in the Security Council. We try to send you some kind of instructions, but it is not easy to keep pace with events and naturally you have to be guided by your own judgement. We have formed a Foreign Affairs Committee here, consisting of myself, Sardar Patel, Rajaji and Gopalaswami Ayyangar. We meet almost daily for consultation.

I do not at all like the way things are shaping. It seems to me that the greatest danger that we have to face today is probably the hysterical state of mind of the Americans. This is difficult to deal with and is very likely to lead to catastrophe. Today's papers contain news of American efforts to push out Malik from the Chair, or, at any rate, to neutralise him.² Anything more foolish, I cannot imagine. As it is, large numbers of people think of the U.N. as just a forum for the U.S. to function regardless of others. Almost every action that the U.S. Government takes

1. B.N. Rau Papers, N.M.M.L.
2. Jacob Malik's insistence on 8 August that both North and South Korea be invited to take part in the discussion produced a stalemate; while Malik demanded that a new Soviet resolution condemning U.S. bombing of North Korea be discussed first, the U.S. representative claimed priority for his resolution which condemned North Korea for defying the U.N. and invited a South Korean representative. He also warned that if the U.S.S.R. did not change its tactics of "obstruction" within two days, the other members of the Council would decide upon steps to assert the Council's authority. A U.S. resolution postponing the meeting till 10 August to give the U.S.S.R. time to revise its stand was carried.

encourages this view. MacArthur's recent visit to Formosa was extraordinarily foolish.³

Apart from the major fault of invasion and aggression by North Korea, it seems to me that most of the other mistakes have been committed by the Americans, both before and after the invasion. Widespread bombing of North Korea is leaving a bad taste.⁴ What passes my comprehension is how Americans view the future. They may win a war. But how can they possibly deal with any part of Asia afterwards? They will have fewer and fewer friends here, if they behave as they have been doing.

We have to follow procedure of course and rules and regulations, but you were perfectly right in saying in the Security Council that peace and right policy are more important than some rule or procedure.⁵ We have to try to achieve results and not merely to be slaves of routine. We have accepted the legality of the Security Council's decisions in the absence of the U.S.S.R., etc.⁶ But the fact remains that the worth of those decisions is considerably lessened by this absence, and if any attempt is made to push out the Soviet representative, it will make matters worse.

At one time I thought vaguely that I might go with our delegation this year to the U.N. General Assembly. But I have given up that idea. I cannot leave India and I am not sure that my going to Lake Success would be worthwhile.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. Following the visit to Taipeh on 31 July of Douglas MacArthur, Commander-in-Chief of U.N. Command, for discussions with Chiang Kai-shek, it was announced on 1 August that the U.S.A. and Nationalist China would coordinate their efforts to defend Formosa, but Chiang's offer of troops to fight in Korea would be held in abeyance.
4. On 7 August, U.S. bombers made their heaviest raids since the operations began, dropping more than 540 tons of bombs on two major North Korean targets.
5. On 1 August, Gladwyn Jebb, challenging Jacob Malik's ruling to unseat Nationalist China, said that Article 17 of Security Council's rules permitted a member whose credentials were questioned to sit in the Council until the question was decided. B.N. Rau, reminding the Council of the grave issues involved, said, "If observing the rules of procedure might cause the disruption of the U.N., that ...would be a compelling reason for dispensing with the rules."
6. The U.S.S.R., People's China and North Korea disputed the legality of the resolutions of 25 and 27 June and 7 July passed without the concurring votes of all the five permanent members. They did not recognise Nationalist China as a member of the Security Council, while the U.S.S.R. had boycotted the Council when these resolutions were passed.

5. To Vijayalakshmi Pandit¹

New Delhi
August 10, 1950

Nan dear,

A few days ago I wrote² to you that there was a faint possibility of my going to Lake Success this year for the U.N. General Assembly. I have now come to the conclusion that I should not go. I just cannot leave India at this stage. Apart from this, I rather doubt if I can be of much use at Lake Success. I would rather keep out of that set there.

I have just received your letter of the 31st July. I am greatly distressed at the way American opinion and the American Government are shaping. Will they never try to understand others? They are losing such friends as they possessed. The latest moves in the Security Council do not redound to their credit, nor does the indiscriminate bombing of North Korea.

It is difficult enough for us to follow a logical policy between two extremes. Apart from the inherent difficulty of it, few people here, including of course our M.Ps, have any real understanding.

During the last week or so, I have delivered four major speeches in Parliament—two on the international situation³ and two on Bengal.⁴ This has done little good to my cold. But the speeches have produced some effect for the moment at least.

Shaikh Abdullah has come round a little and is in a more amenable frame of mind. I wonder how long this will last, because there are too many forces at play in Kashmir which pull him in different directions. He distrusts almost everybody here except me and to some extent Gopalaswami Ayyangar. Meanwhile, Dixon has been to Karachi and is back empty-handed.⁵ He is making one last effort. I doubt if he will succeed. If not, he will return to Lake Success soon and report his failure.

Thank you for Owen Lattimore's⁶ book, which has reached me.

As I think I wrote to you, the election of the Congress President is causing a great deal of excitement and some bitterness. I am of course withdrawing from it.

With love from
Jawahar

1. J.N. Collection.

2. See *ante*, pp. 89-90.

3. See *ante*, pp. 333-360.

4. See *ante*, pp. 259-288.

5. Owen Dixon, after holding talks with Nehru and his colleagues in New Delhi, went to Karachi on 2 August and held talks with Liaquat Ali Khan and others till 8 August. He returned to New Delhi on 9 August.

6. (1900-1989); taught history, John Hopkins University, U.S.A.; Political Adviser to Chiang Kai-shek, 1941-42; Professor of Chinese Studies, Leeds University, 1963-70; wrote, among others, *Sinkiang, Pivot of Asia*, and *Studies in Asian Frontier History*.

6. The Importance of Nationalism in Asia¹

Robert Trumbull: What do you think should be done about the fighting in Korea?

Jawaharlal Nehru: We should be clear about the political objective in Korea. What is that political objective? In olden days one might think of conquering a country and holding on to it. This isn't normally thought of nowadays. We can't think of Korea as a colony of the future. The future of the Koreans depends a great deal upon what the people of Korea want to be. Therefore the political objective should be to win the people of Korea as a whole or, to put it negatively, not to incur their ill will. Nothing must be done that might upset that political objective.

RT: In Korea a military problem has arisen that has to be met immediately on the military plane, leaving other factors as secondary considerations for the moment.

JN: When a military problem arises there has been a failure. When war comes a second danger appears. The soldier or the man directing him does not know when to halt. He goes on to the bitter end and upsets all political aims.

The question in Korea is: what's the next step after the fighting ends and will the intermediate moves help in the next step? To leave Korea under a large army of occupation or to leave the Koreans to their own resources will only bring us back to where we started from after all the trouble we have taken.

RT: What is your opinion of the attitude of the West towards communist aggression?

JN: In the West there is a lot of talk of communism and communist danger and there is a great deal in it. Nevertheless, the way the average person in Asia would look upon it is rather different. To begin with, he won't be swept away by that cry of communist danger because he has not so much to lose.

The objection to communism is based on these beliefs: First, it's more than communism; it's expansionism. Second, communism tends to be opposed to nationalism, that is, communist policy in a country is based on outside factors and not so much on the good of that country, and so is against nationalism. Third, the technique of the communist parties in various countries has been extraordinarily

1. Interview with Robert Trumbull, correspondent of *The New York Times* in Delhi, 11 August 1950. From *The New York Times Magazine*, 20 August 1950.

violent and immoral. That technique, if successful, leads eventually to chaotic conditions and deterioration and disintegration of the country concerned.

The intellectual reaction is not opposed to the socialistic doctrine of communism. There is an idealistic appeal in the fact that it stands for the underdog. So when a cry is raised against communism as such it hasn't much effect except with certain individuals. The communist party creates a powerful reaction. Therefore it seems to us that this business of a kind of crusade against communism is wrong and not even practical politics as far as Asia is concerned.

The West should abandon the condemnation of communism as such and take up political and economic freedom as a more effective rallying cry. We come to a compromise with opposing ideologies rather than try to exterminate them which I think is impossible to do and unwise to try.

RT: What do you think should be the policy of the Western Powers towards Asia?

JN: As for the policy of the Western Powers towards Asia in general, due importance must be given to the spirit of nationalism which is the strongest influence in Asian affairs at present. The policy of the West towards Asiatic nations must be based on the fact that Asia is passing through a revolutionary period. This is natural since Asia has been tied to various countries, mostly European, in the past. So there is a tendency to break loose in many ways, in many directions. Breaking away in the political field leaves many economic problems piled up. There has been no time for economic development step by step. These economic problems must either be solved peacefully in time or other forces will come in and try to solve them in a violent manner.

Asia's major problem is agrarian. With that is tied up industrial development. But industrial development alone is not enough from the point of view of producing wealth and absorbing people. The basic agrarian problem remains. Most problems of Asia should be viewed against the background of attempts towards agrarian reform.

I feel that Western leaders should try to understand the two-sided picture of Asia in revolution. One side is release from colonialism, and the other concerns a number of problems, more especially the bitterness over land ownership. These problems link up with new ideas of social justice. Our ideas outrun our resources. People now expect a lot, first, because they are free, secondly, because there has been so much talk of social justice all over the world, more particularly from Russia. So Asians want things done quickly, but sometimes they cannot be done quickly.

In an ultimate analysis of the economic problem it does not matter much what ideology or argument one advances. The policy or programme that ultimately delivers the goods will prevail. This may be different in different countries in different circumstances.

RT: How do you view the question of the admittance of China to the U.N.?

JN: Any organization ignoring the big fact of China is likely to come to erroneous conclusions. The United Nations wasn't formed on the basis of accepting some governments and not others.

Events in China have had considerable effect in various parts of Asia. There has not been in India any direct fear of China as a country or of China's communism directly affecting India. There are practical difficulties, and, besides, we don't see any reason for it.

China in the best of circumstances will take a generation to recover. I don't believe China has designs on any country, leaving apart Formosa² and Tibet.³ All information we have is that they are too engrossed in their own problems.

There is no feeling by the people or the Government of China of any kind of subjection to the Soviet. They won their revolution with no help from the Soviet. They are big and individual enough to stand on their own feet. The underlying Chinese characteristics persist under communist rule, as they have under all other kinds of governments. They won't play second fiddle to anybody. Naturally, they now look to the Soviet because a large part of the world is unfriendly to China and they have to look that way.

Now there is a huge mass with enough strength in itself. No opposition is strong enough to upset it. It is a stable regime, struggling hard with economic difficulties. And by sheer weight of numbers China is making a difference to Asia.

This fact, whether we like it or not, is there, and we should acknowledge it in a friendly way. Any other course leads to creating difficulties.

While it is undoubtedly true that China contains communist leadership, the whole course of their direction in the last year shows they are realists. They are seeking the cooperation of non-communist elements of the country and are largely getting it because of their more or less moderate policy.

The success they have achieved in some ways, like putting down graft and corruption, lowering prices to some extent, and starting public works like the Yangtze dam to prevent floods, has been rather remarkable. This shows the constructive side of their revolution, and the fact that China has able, realistic leaders who are undoubtedly of great influence there. I don't see how you can ignore these facts of a huge country like China functioning this way.

2. Chinese territory under Japanese control from 1895 till 1945, when Japanese forces there surrendered to the Nationalist Chinese authorities. People's China claimed for herself all rights possessed by Nationalist China over Formosa since then.
3. Tibet had for long been viewed by the authorities in China as Chinese territory. On 1 January 1950, the Government of People's China announced the liberation of Tibet as one of the main tasks of the People's Liberation Army. On 5 August 1950, Liu Po-chen, chairman of the South-West China military affairs commission, said that "the People's Army would soon enter Tibet with the object of wiping out British and American influence there."

RT: The feeling in Western countries is that communism is always accompanied by the abolition of civil liberties. You yourself stated in July that economic gains in communist countries, if any, have come at too high a price to the individual.⁴

JN: I agree but, on the other hand, socially reactionary regimes also cause a great deal of widespread human suffering. The problem, therefore, is how to combine a fairly rapid economic advance with democratic ideals. In each country this depends on circumstances. Giving up either means no solution of the problem.

If we support a patently reactionary system or regime we support what in the present context of the world is a dying thing. It is a thing that can't stand on its feet. The moment the prop goes it collapses. Take the Indian Princes. Their rule had long been supported by British power and it simply vanished as soon as Britain left India.

My July talk is a more extensive statement of my views on civil liberties. Today we see the development of huge monolithic States under communist guidance. Possibly they do answer a certain question, the economic question, in certain countries. But they answer that question at a tremendous cost. I do not like monolithic States. I think that while economic freedom is essential, or we have to aim at it, the price of giving up all political and individual liberty is great.

If any country can find a solution for this problem, that is, by maintaining individual and democratic liberty and at the same time satisfying the economic needs of the people fully, then that country has solved the problem.

I do think that individual liberty—what is normally considered political liberty—does not exist in monolithic authoritarian countries. They may get something that is very valuable to them, that is, economic betterment, because their standards are low, and they may consider that even more important than individual liberty for aught I know. But the point is that neither by itself is enough. You must have both.

I recently said that I am friendly to communism. But that statement has been hurled back at me. I used that phrase purposely to show that while I am sympathetic to certain elements in it, I found the communist parties of certain countries acting very badly. I want to appeal to man's mind. It is no good just to tell him that communism is bad. Mere denial does not make him think at all.

4. See *Selected Works* (Second Series), Vol. 14 Part II, p. 335.

7. Understanding the Issues¹

In dealing with the U.K. Government's note handed to you by the Deputy High Commissioner for the U.K.,² I think we might proceed on some general lines. We agree that any action taken to push out Malik from the Security Council or to disable him from functioning properly would be harmful.³ As it is, an impression is gaining ground that the U.N. is being utilized, not so much in settling disputes or for ensuring peace, but to accentuate differences and conflicts. These differences and conflicts are of course obviously there and the world knows it. It is also equally clear that Malik's tactics are to prevent the Security Council from functioning against his wishes, just as the tactics of the others are to prevent Malik from coming in the way. It should obviously be the object of the majority in the Security Council not to suppress the minority point of view or to give the impression that they do not allow the minority viewpoint full expression. Already there is good deal of criticism of the way the U.N. has been made to function in a rather one-sided manner. This should be avoided as far as possible.

2. The basic difficulty has been that the U.N., which, by its Charter and organisation, consists of all kinds of member nations, even opposed to each other, has been functioning for sometime past without some of its important members, namely, the U.S.S.R. and China. This may be convenient, for the time being, for the majority. But it does strike at the roots of the difficulty, and till this is righted, these complications will continue. It is true that if China came in, another opponent appears in the Security Council. This is the natural consequence of wrong policy in the past which is being persisted in at present. There can be no doubt that China will sometime or other come in, if the U.N. endures. The longer this takes, the more hostile China becomes. The basic fact is that the U.N. cannot function fully in this partial way, recognising the Kuomintang Government and not the real Government of China.

3. We entirely agree that we should put forward a constructive suggestion. This constructive suggestion should be, as you have suggested, an unequivocal announcement that the purpose of the United Nations is the creation of a united Korea, through the deliberations of a constituent assembly, freely elected by the Korean people. When this will be possible, it is difficult to say. But the longer

1. Note to the Secretary-General, M.E.A., 12 August 1950. J.N. Collection.

2. Frank Roberts.

3. The British Government thought it expedient "to talk out time" during Jacob Malik's presidency "rather than resort to shock tactics such as allowing the South Korean representative to take his seat uninvited or summoning a special session of the Assembly."

this war lasts, the more distant and difficult the prospect of such a constituent assembly becomes. Also, in the nature of things, the more the Korean people are antagonised. From this point of view, apart from the human approach, continuous and widespread bombing in areas outside the precise field of conflict⁴ is to be deprecated, as it will have harmful results.

4. Obviously, there cannot be any constituent assembly till there is peace. Therefore, there must be a ceasefire. The U.N. is committed to a withdrawal of the North Koreans to the 38th parallel. But as matters are developing, we do not quite know what will happen. The military situation is entirely in favour of the North Koreans⁵ and it is almost admitted that no major change can take place for the next eight months or so. This means that no forward step in favour of a ceasefire and withdrawal can take place for eight months or possibly a year. That is too long a time to wait for a constructive approach.⁶ We should seize any opportunity for such an approach and follow it up, without giving up our basic claim. A situation may arise when it may be desirable for the North Koreans to be dealt with directly, in some form or other, even before what might be considered their final defeat. This business of unconditional surrender and carrying on war to the utmost limit has not proved profitable in the past. It merely makes the enemy fight on to the last, because there is no hope in giving up the fighting. Therefore, there should always be an opening, or rather nothing should be done which prevents us from taking advantage of a suitable opening, which may be consistent with our general position. Talking in extreme terms is to shut every door to a settlement. All this, of course, need not be officially or publicly said anywhere. Nevertheless, these are matters which are to be borne in mind by statesmen, just as every patent fact has to be taken into consideration. We may not invite representatives of the People's Government of China or of the North Koreans at the present stage. But to say that we will never deal with them, unless they purge themselves completely and confess

4. On 11 August, the press reported heavy casualties among civilians, including children, in North Korea due to air attacks. Earlier, the North Korean Government had complained to the Security Council about U.S. aerial attacks on the residential areas in Pyongyang causing the deaths of about seven hundred people.
5. The North Koreans had, by the end of July, overrun about two-thirds of South Korea and, by 12 August, crossing the Naktong river defence line, captured Pohang, one of the main supply ports of U.S. troops. Taegu, the provisional capital of South Korea, was threatened by five North Korean divisions.
6. Britain thought that UNCOK might visit North Korea provided North Korean forces withdrew to the 38th parallel and a ceasefire was accepted on that line. If UNCOK, after its visit, recommended inviting North Koreans for discussions, steps could be taken towards that end.

their error and do all manner of other things,⁷ is to take up an attitude which is unrealistic, which will add to our burdens and difficulties and delay any possible settlement.

5. Any position that we may choose to take up in the future will depend not only on our objectives as proclaimed by the Security Council but also on all manner of other considerations, such as the military situation, the trend of opinion in the Security Council at the time, and the paramount necessity of putting an end to this conflict in the larger interests of world peace as well as the authority of the United Nations. No kind of appeasement is suggested. But all these facts have to be borne in mind.

6. The U.K. proposal for representatives of the U.N. Commission to go to North Korea, as stated, has all the difficulties you have pointed out.⁸ The point is that sometime or other the North Koreans will have to be dealt with, unless the U.N. wants a war of extermination, which hardly any sensible person should aim at. How they can be contacted and at what stage, will depend on many circumstances.

7. It is patent that the North Koreans are not only fighting with ability and courage but also with a faith in their cause which gives them tremendous strength and driving power. John Gunther, whom I saw last night and who is coming from Japan, said that the most amazing thing was this faith of the North Koreans in their cause. You cannot deal with such people in a casual way or even in the purely military way. If the North Koreans feel that way, probably many people in China will also feel that way. The South Koreans, on the other hand, have shown an equally amazing capacity for not fighting and for running away. There is no cause to support. From all accounts, all even in South Korea can hardly be said to be in favour of the U.S.A., or even of the U.N. It is this overriding factor which is important and it cannot be dealt with merely by bombing or other military methods. The basic fact of the situation is, here as elsewhere also, that we support reactionary regimes, which have little popular backing and no idealism or faith in an objective to fight for and die for. We ignore this and go on supporting reaction in the name of democracy and get more and more involved in difficulties. A majority vote in the

7. Britain suggested that the Soviet contention that the Korean conflict being a civil war, North Korea should be heard, ought to be countered by the argument that the North Koreans having flouted the U.N. and attacked U.N. forces could not "expect to be heard until they have purged their contempt of the U.N." by complying with the Security Council resolution urging withdrawal to the 38th parallel.

8. Bajpai doubted the calibre of the members of the Commission and suggested the inclusion of China and the U.S.S.R. in it. "In any scheme that concerns the settlement of major political problems in the Far East, it would be not only unrealistic but even dangerous to ignore China persistently." He added that the requirement of North Korean withdrawal having been met, a report of UNCOK was not necessary.

Security Council, as constituted today,⁹ does not solve the difficulty. There should be no appeasement, but at the same time, there should be no support of obvious reaction.

8. Every attempt to support Chiang Kai-shek, instead of strengthening the U.N., goes to weaken and discredit it.

9. All these matters are tied up together and if we really want a constructive policy, we must be brave enough to face these problems.

10. All that I have written above is of course just a background only towards the understanding of the many issues that have arisen. It is not a precise policy, except perhaps in regard to some points.

9. Of the six non-permanent members, Cuba, Egypt and Norway were elected to serve until December 1950, while Ecuador, India and Yugoslavia were elected to serve until December 1951.

8. Prospects for Korea¹

This interval,² if and when it occurred, should be used for an intensification of constructive efforts for peace, otherwise the situation would be both hopeless and fantastic. The reinvasion of Korea will presumably be preceded by heavy and widespread bombing which would hardly endear their liberators to the Koreans. Even if it is successful, it is only the first step. And what then? You drive the North Koreans back, you defeat them and then what do you do? Some day you have to leave. You cannot stay there for ever. Then the Koreans take over. It is a ludicrous prospect.

The French member³ of the U.N. Commission on Korea recently passed through Delhi on his way to America. His testimony is that the North Korean forces

1. Report of a talk with Tom Driberg, New Delhi, 19 August 1950. Driberg, a British Member of Parliament and correspondent for *Reynolds News* (London), passed through India on his way to Korea to cover the war. From *The Hindustan Times*, 21 August 1950. See also *post*, pp. 433-434 and 496.
2. Driberg said that if the Americans were obliged to withdraw from Korea it would take them, as per their own estimate, at least six months to prepare a successful reinvasion. He asked for Nehru's views on Korea's prospects during this interval.
3. Henri Brionval.

are being well received everywhere by the population. To some extent this welcome may be based on fear; nonetheless it is a fact that these forces need take no security precautions against civilian or guerilla attack. The Commissioner also confirms that a substantial proportion of the opposition members of the South Korean Parliament—who were after all in the majority anyway since President Syngman Rhee was defeated at the last election though he omitted to resign—have joined the North Koreans.

The proposal for a committee of “little six” was Shri B.N. Rau’s own idea.⁴ But we told him to go ahead with it informally rather than formally so long as it did not arouse the antagonism of the Great Powers. Even if they would not support it actively it would be alright if they were not hostile.

The great initial mistake was not to admit China to the Security Council at an earlier stage. If this had been done there would, of course, have been a great deal of trouble in the Council but all this worse trouble would not have happened. The Chinese people and their new Government are honest, able and self-reliant. They have won their own victory without outside help. They feel they can take on anybody.

I recently spoke about the Western Powers’ ignorance of the mind and heart of Asia. Let me give the example of China. Communist China differs from the Eastern European countries in various ways. The Eastern European countries are small; they are near Russia; they are mostly Slav; they have no sense of unity with Western Europe. By contrast China is large. It is far from Moscow. The Chinese are not Slavonic but very Chinese. Moreover, there are certain common reactions among the people of Asia, the strongest of which is their reaction against colonialism.

It is commendable the way the Chinese Communists prevented famine when they took Shanghai and there was only ten days’ stock of rice. They commandeered rice in the districts and brought it to the city so efficiently that the price of rice soon fell. Throughout history every Chinese Government has been judged by one simple test—the price of rice.

Madame Sun Yat-sen, widow of the founder of the Chinese Republic, is in charge of relief work in Shanghai. She has suggested that I should visit China. It is unlikely that I shall go to China yet but I cannot completely rule out a visit to Peking or even to Lake Success if it could contribute to peace. I do not want to go and sit around Lake Success for months if such a visit is unlikely to be useful.

I was taken aback by recent suggestions that I should mediate. My personal appeal to the Great Powers was not mediation but the suggestion of a step for which we had been asking for months because we thought that it would ease the situation.

4. To break the deadlock in the Security Council, Rau suggested on 14 August that a committee of non-permanent members of the Council should study all proposals to find a solution of the Korean problem.

There has been much misunderstanding also of India's supposed "neutrality", which, in fact, is not neutrality but independence of the Great Power blocs.

9. Cable to B.N. Rau¹

Your telegram No. 236 of August 19th.² I have given the draft resolution prepared by you the most careful consideration in consultation with some of my colleagues. We all feel that unless this or any other proposal has the support of the U.S.A. and the U.K., no practical benefit will accrue from adopting it. For the reasons stated in para 1 of Bajpai's telegram No. 24239 of 18th August,³ which I had seen and approved, we do not wish to get involved in efforts which do not advance the solution of the Korean problem but merely expose us to the risk of misunderstanding and criticism.

As regards the alternative suggestion made in Bajpai's telegram dated 18th August,⁴ the first thing is to discover by informal consultation with the major Powers whether they are agreeable to the creation by the Security Council of a study group, not limited to members of the Council but including one or more member nations of the U.N. not on the Council, which will make proposals for the earliest possible determination by the Korean people of the future of Korea, according to their wishes through an elected constituent assembly, and for the creation of conditions in which elections can be freely held. If agreement on this main proposition is forthcoming, we can consider the formulation of terms of reference in some detail.

1. New Delhi, 21 August 1950. J.N. Collection.
2. Rau, while forwarding a draft resolution on his proposal for formation of a committee of non-permanent members of the Security Council, speculated that if the U.S.A. supported it, the U.S.S.R. would probably vote against it and *vice versa*.
3. Bajpai stated that the proposed committee would not have the confidence of the U.S.S.R. and at best the attitude of the U.K. and the U.S.A. would be neutral. Moreover, its proposals would be regarded as Indian in inspiration and praise or blame for them assigned to India. "We are, after experience of Prime Minister's approach to Stalin and Acheson, reluctant to be put in this position again."
4. Bajpai had suggested the formation of an advisory group for the purpose of informal consultation by the Security Council. Rau wanted to know about the status and precise terms of reference of the proposed group to facilitate discussion on it with the other members of the Council.

10. Ideas for Peace¹

Question: Mr Prime Minister, why do you believe mediation of the Korean dispute should be considered at this time?

Jawaharlal Nehru: Your question presumably refers to my approach to Marshal Stalin and Secretary of State Acheson. This was not an attempt at mediation, but an effort to bring the new China and the U.S.S.R. into the United Nations Security Council so that the Korean problem could be considered in association with these major Powers.

Even though my personal appeal did not succeed, I do not regret having made it. At any rate, it has made people think that something possibly can be done to stop the onward rush toward catastrophe.

Q: Many people in the United States feel military victory over North Korea should come first. What is your view, and why?

JN: Military victory need not necessarily precede efforts for peace. Since prolongation of warfare will increase the threat to world peace through an extension of the area of conflict, efforts at a peaceful solution would be preferable before a greater feeling of bitterness and hatred has taken hold of the minds of people everywhere.

Q: Do you believe a formula for settlement of the dispute can be made without first determining responsibility for the underlying causes of the Korean war?

JN: The underlying causes are well known and no practical purpose will be served by trying to determine responsibility at this stage. Whatever the past history, it is perfectly clear that North Korea launched a full-scale and well-planned invasion and this, in the context of the United Nations Charter, has already been described as an aggression by the Security Council.

A search for a formula of peace is, however, always desirable and although none has yet been devised, attempts to explore all avenues for a peaceful settlement should not be given up.

1. Replies to questions addressed to Nehru by David Lawrence, editor, *U.S. News and World Report*, on 23 August 1950 and published in that journal, 15 September 1950.

Q: Do you think that the United Nations report² on the origin of the Korean war was adequate, or should it be supplemented by further investigation?

JN: It would not be fruitful at this stage to consider the adequacy or otherwise of the report of the U.N. Commission on Korea. It is impossible at this stage to supplement the report by any further investigations owing to the existence of a state of war in Korea. Peace must first be established before any fruitful investigations can even be considered.

Q: Do you think mediation should be undertaken by governments as a separate effort, or should it be done directly by the United Nations machinery?

JN: Any method for a peaceful settlement of the dispute should be considered acceptable. If mediation appears hopeful it does not matter whether it is done within or without the Security Council, so long as it is done with the consent and cooperation of the United Nations and in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter.

Q: If mediation fails, do you think the Korean dispute will lead to a third world war?

JN: There is no doubt that if all efforts at a peaceful settlement end in failure, then the chances of an extension of the conflict with all its dangerous consequences will be greatly enhanced.

Q: What is the viewpoint in Asia towards communism? Is it regarded as wholly controlled by Moscow or are the national movements independent of control of Moscow?

JN: The birth of communism in Asia is largely due to its alliance with nationalist movements fighting for independence from foreign domination.

The widespread hunger and poverty of the peoples of Asia to which centuries of colonial exploitation have contributed also makes communism look attractive by contrast.

Thus, communism is strong in places like Indo-China, where foreign domination still exists, and weak in countries like India, which have already attained their independence and are now actively engaged in bettering the living conditions of their people.

2. The report of UNCOK of 26 June 1950 stated that the attack by North Korea was "a calculated, coordinated attack prepared and launched with secrecy."

The tendency of Asian nationalist movements to follow the leadership of the Communist Party is dependent on the degree to which their deep-rooted anti-colonial impulse is ignored by the Western Powers. Communism throughout the world no doubt draws ideological inspiration from Marx and Engels, Lenin and Stalin; there is no evidence of direct control of the communist movement in India from Moscow. So far as the nationalist movements in Asia are concerned, they are genuine and indigenous.

Q: Would you say that communism in China is a national movement and that the Government of China is independent of Moscow's control?

JN: The Government of China is a national coalition with the Communist Party as a dominant partner. The coalition is composed of all sections of the nation, including some members of the Kuomintang, pledged to work a common programme of democratic advance.

Mao Tse-tung has openly declared that China at this stage is a new democratic State preparing itself for socialism. It has a mixed economy as its immediate objective and a coalition Government as its present machinery.

The Chinese Revolution appears to be following the law of its own development—influenced by others, but chiefly influenced by the conditions prevailing in China. In our view, the Government of China is entirely independent.

Q: How long ago did you take the position that Communist China should be admitted to the United Nations and what were your reasons for doing so?

JN: Ever since we recognised the new People's Government of China, it was natural that the consequences of such recognition would follow. We recognised it for a variety of reasons, the main reason being the fact that a sound and stable government existed over the whole continent of China.

It was none of our business to like or dislike it. In recognising countries, normally one does not go by likes or dislikes, but by the fact that they do represent stable governments. It, therefore, seemed to us not only illogical but exceedingly unreasonable not to accept the consequences of that recognition, which were that the new China should function in the United Nations.

The United Nations was never intended to be a group of nations thinking one way and excluding other nations. With new China and the U.S.S.R. and some other nations out, the United Nations would assume a new shape. It will cease to be what it was meant to be, and if this state of affairs were allowed to persist the outcome would probably be a world war.

Q: Why does India regard the settlement of the Korean dispute or the solution of the Communist China problem as vital to her interests?

JN: We have historical and almost immemorial ties of culture and friendship with China. For us, situated as we are and where we are, the friendship of China is desirable and natural.

A free and independent China is a most effective assurance of stability in Asia.

So long as a nation of 450 million people remains outside a world organization, that organization cannot be regarded as fully representative.

As for Korea, India is vitally interested because the peace of Asia is involved.

Q: Does India view with alarm the communist efforts to control Tibet? If so, why?

JN: India has no political or territorial designs in Tibet but is interested in that country because of cultural and other associations that have grown up through geography and the intercourse natural between neighbours. The Indian Government has suggested to the Chinese Government the desirability of settling the Tibetan question peacefully through negotiations.³

Q: What should be done by the Western Powers to assist non-communist countries in Asia to combat communism?

JN: The habit of thinking only in terms of military and economic power unfortunately persists in the West, and while it is not possible to ignore the force of arms or of money, there are strict limitations to what arms and money can do if they go against the prevailing mood of millions of people. There has been ample evidence of this in Asia.

The first thing, therefore, should be an attempt by the Western Powers towards a better understanding through the mind and heart of Asia. The strongest urge in every country in Asia today is the anti-colonial urge of which the positive side is nationalism. Remnants of colonialism must, therefore, be completely ended and the national movements receive support.

The other powerful urge in Asia is the social urge. Asia is poor and backward in many ways. It has not profited by the great wealth poured into the world since the Industrial Revolution. In fact, Asia has been exploited and has been a passive witness of that Revolution. But now Asia is wide awake to these differences and feels her poverty and distress, and wants to remedy it and does not want to wait too long in the process.

Q: What is your attitude towards communism in India?

3. See *post*, pp. 430-431.

JN: Theoretically, communism in India, as elsewhere, offers to solve the problems of poverty, inequality and low living standards which cause discontent among the masses everywhere. The Communist Party in India is banned in two States,⁴ but in other parts of the country it is permitted freedom of expression so long as it adheres to peaceful methods. Like the United States, India has a democratic Constitution which guarantees fundamental liberties to the citizens.

In practice, however, the Indian Communist Party has indulged in the technique of fraud and violence to disrupt established institutions. It has functioned as a terrorist group, and to that extent has been dealt with according to law.

In India, since 1947, communism has come into conflict with nationalism and progressively isolated itself from the masses it sought to convert.

Q: Do you agree with the view that the future status of Formosa should be settled by the United Nations?

JN: In order that the United Nations may arrive at a decision which is acceptable to the parties concerned it is necessary that the People's Republic of China should occupy its rightful place in the Security Council and other organs of the United Nations. No decision relating to Formosa should be taken by the United Nations in the absence of new China.

Q: What are the essentials to a settlement of the dispute in Indo-China?

JN: The desire of the people of Indo-China for their independence is legitimate and should be respected. It is not a military problem to be solved in terms of strategy, but a human one. No outside help should be given to bolster up the colonial regime in Indo-China. The nationalist movement, on the contrary, should be encouraged.

Q: What are the principal factors required for a better understanding between Asian peoples and the people of the United States?

JN: To come closer to each other there must first be trust of each other's motives. The United States has the opportunity to assist the nations of Asia to develop their resources and raise their living standards. Such assistance would be welcomed if made in the right spirit. It is also important that in all matters concerning Asia, decisions should be taken only after close consultation with the free countries of Asia.

Q: Is India in a position to send ground forces to assist United Nations forces in Korea?

4. In West Bengal and Madras from 25 March 1948 and 26 September 1949 respectively.

JN: Any military assistance is beyond India's capacity and would make little difference. India's defence forces have been organized essentially for home defence and not for service in distant theatres of war. The best assistance India can render in this grave crisis is to help to limit and in ending the area of conflict.

Q: Can you give us your reasons as to why it was not desirable to go to Peking at this time?

JN: This question does not arise because no formal invitation has been received from the Peking Government.

11. To B.N. Rau¹

New Delhi
August 27, 1950

My dear B.N.,

It is exceedingly difficult to send you instructions from day to day about the various developments that take place in the Security Council. I suppose, after another three or four days when Malik's presidency ends, things will take a different turn. Whether Malik attends the Security Council then or not is still doubtful.² Anyhow the Korea question will figure largely in your agenda in some form or other.

While we agree that aggression has to be met, it must always be remembered that the United Nations are not just out for vengeance or for punishment, but for peace and to secure justice and freedom to the people. If in meeting aggression and pushing it back we destroy the country and its people, then surely the U.N. has failed completely. Therefore, the main objective of bringing peace and security to the Korean people should always be remembered. This is obvious enough and rather trite. But the obvious needs emphasis and I fear when people get war-minded too much, we forget all the obvious things in life. Some of the speeches that have been delivered in the Security Council by Austin³ or Jebb⁴ seem from here to be just pompous and silly nonsense.

1. B.N. Rau Papers, N.M.M.L. Extracts.
2. Jacob Malik attended the Security Council on 1 September when it met under the presidency of Gladwyn Jebb.
3. Warren R. Austin (1877-1962); lawyer; U.S. Senator, 1931-46; Representative of the United States to the United Nations, 1947-53.
4. Gladwyn Jebb (b. 1900); British diplomat; Representative of the U.K. to the United Nations, 1950-54; Ambassador to France, 1954-60.

I wonder if you have seen an article in *The New Statesman* of London of August 12th. It is called the "Menace of General MacArthur".⁵ There is a great deal of truth in this article. Anything more foolish than MacArthur's visit to Formosa and his hobnobbing with Chiang Kai-shek, I cannot imagine. Apart from the main Korean issue, there are two matters which require attention. The most important of these is Formosa. Formosa must obviously be deemed China's territory. There may be some argument as to how and when it should return to China. Those countries which have recognized the People's Government of China must naturally support the return of Formosa to that Government, though they might have some suggestions about the manner and time of doing so.

At the present moment there can be no doubt that the People's Government of China looks upon Formosa as an American base for the invasion of the Chinese mainland. To some extent they are justified in doing so. Some American newspapers and periodicals openly proclaimed this fact. Is it surprising, therefore, that the Chinese Government suspects and accuses the U.S.A. of this policy? I do not think this is the U.S.A.'s official policy though some militarists might want it to be so.⁶ In any event, our policy in regard to this matter is perfectly clear and should be stated in appropriate language whenever an opportunity comes.

Another matter which has greatly disturbed Indian public opinion is the large-scale bombing of North Korea. At my last press conference many questions were put to me on this subject. I confess that I am distressed at this bombing not only because of the inhumanity, but also because of the future consequences which can only be the spread of bitterness and hatred among the Koreans against the U.S.A. and the U.N. This kind of thing serves no direct military purpose unless sheer terror and destruction is the military purpose. In this matter too, it would be desirable for you to make references whenever this can be done with propriety and without raising too much ill will or argument.

Whether it is Formosa or some other related question, it seems to me clear that the recognition by the U.N. of the People's Government of China is essential.

5. *The New Statesman and Nation* wrote that a war between China and the U.S.A. on the issue of Formosa "would be the doing of General MacArthur, who is apparently making something like a private alliance with Chiang Kai-shek and the group of racketeers who surround him." In discussing military plans with Chiang, he was not acting for the U.N., and in countenancing Chiang's "naval and air blockade of China, in flat defiance of Truman's instructions, General MacArthur confirms the view that he is not a fit and proper person to be in charge of responsible military operations."
6. On 25 August, Francis Matthews, the U.S. Naval Secretary, had called for a preventive war against China "to compel cooperation for peace." The State Department disavowed his statement the next day. Louis Johnson, Defence Secretary, who also advocated preventive war, was obliged to resign on 12 September.

So, whenever opportunity offers, this matter has to be kept in the forefront. Probably at the meeting of the General Assembly this will come up in some form or other. It should, of course, be fully supported. If there is a great deal of support the U.S.A. might gracefully accept a decision. I doubt if they will veto it in those circumstances...

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

12. To Vijayalakshmi Pandit¹

New Delhi
August 30, 1950

Nan dear,

... As far as I can see at present I shall not be going to Lake Success. But of course there is always a possibility of some new development which might induce me to go there. I am quite sure that my going there casually will do no good to any one. Einstein and people like him, with their simplicity and good-heartedness, think that some magic might result by a personal intervention. We can hardly plan for magic. Frankly, I do not want to make myself cheap and to get entangled in the internal controversies and debates of Lake Success.

Living in the United States, you are naturally oppressed by the atmosphere there at the present moment. You dislike it and you criticise it. Nevertheless, your view of the world situation is necessarily influenced by your environment. That environment and what happens there is of very great importance because, as you put it, the issue of war and peace may depend upon it.

It is clear that the world outlook today of the British people is markedly different from that of America, even though they might be functioning more or less as allies. Western Europe again is also different in its own way. If you travel further to Russia, you are of course in a new world entirely, with new fears, new apprehensions, new ambitions. Here in India, though there may not be much intelligent thinking on international affairs, there is nevertheless an instinctive reaction to them which is not at all favourable to the U.S.

It is no easy matter to deal with this complicated situation where each group thinks differently and where perhaps the only common feature is some kind of

1. Copy in B.N. Rau Papers, N.M.M.L. Extracts.

fear. Only today I received a letter² from Panikkar from Peking together with a report³ on present-day China. Both the letter and the report are very interesting and I am therefore enclosing a copy of them for you. Here also you will see an entirely different world with its own way of thinking on problems. What a vast difference there is between this and the U.S. view of China as a stooge of Moscow!

Panikkar is a man of extraordinarily acute intelligence and powers of observation. In fact, his mind is so keen that it overshoots the mark and goes much further ahead than facts warrant. But his analysis of a situation, apart from the time factor, is usually good. What will happen to China during the next few years is anybody's guess. But it is a complete misunderstanding of the China situation to imagine that they function like a satellite State of Russia. Only one thing will push them in that direction to some extent. And even then this cannot go far. That one thing is isolation from the rest of the world. The U.S. policy is the one policy which will make China do what the U.S. least want. That is the tragedy or comedy of the situation. We grope blindly to achieve something and get something entirely different.

There can be little doubt that the Chinese Government is trying its best to be friendly to us. Apart from present-day conflicts, and in the long run, I am sure that it is of great importance to Asia and to the world that India and China should be friendly. How far we shall succeed in this endeavour, I cannot say.

In your letter you mention that the State Department is trying to unseat China as a Permanent Member of the Security Council and to put India in her place. So far as we are concerned, we are not going to countenance it. That would be bad from every point of view. It would be a clear affront to China and it would mean some kind of a break between us and China. I suppose the State Department would like that, but we have no intention of following that course. We shall go on pressing for China's admission in the U.N. and the Security Council. I suppose that a crisis will come during the next session of the General Assembly of the U.N. on this issue. The People's Government of China is sending a full delegation

2. Panikkar wrote on 2 August that "China is desirous of maintaining the friendliest relations with India and also of maintaining her Asian character." The Chinese view, totally different from that of the other communist countries, was that at present the Western Powers were attempting to recover their lost political authority in Asia, and that while Korea provided the cover, the action of the Americans extended from Thailand to Korea and Japan and China was the primary enemy.
3. Panikkar observed that the revolution in China was "following the laws of its own development", the Chinese leaders' approach being contradictory to Bolshevik and Stalinist doctrines and practices. A programme of "gradualism" was being pursued with peasant proprietorship as its main feature and permitting capitalism and small business within limited spheres. He doubted if China was moving towards an industrialised socialist economy and thought that "if the socialist revolution comes, it will only be after at least another major civil war."

there.⁴ If they fail to get in there will be trouble which might even result in the U.S.S.R. and some other countries finally quitting the U.N. That may please the State Department, but it would mean the end of the U.N. as we have known it. That would also mean a further drift towards war.

India, because of many factors, is certainly entitled to a permanent seat in the Security Council. But we are not going in at the cost of China.

Meanwhile, the continuance of the Kuomintang representative in the Security Council becomes more and more Gilbertian. Here is a Permanent Member of the Security Council with power of veto, supposed to be a Great Power. In fact what we have is a representative of the Government of Formosa having this authority and power at Lake Success. That Government of Formosa too is practically protected by a foreign power, the U.S.

Pakistan is busy building up a big case against us. There is of course Kashmir. They are now demanding from us a reference to the International Court at The Hague of the canal waters dispute. Obviously they are going to raise this matter in the U.N. and are likely to do so directly on the ground that this might involve a breach of peace between the two countries. They have also written to me after many months about my proposal for a no-war declaration between India and Pakistan. I have replied⁵ to them that we are perfectly willing to have that no-war declaration in the simple and general form which I have originally proposed and which Pakistan had not accepted then.

As regards canal waters, I have not answered them yet, but I shall do so in the course of the next week.⁶ I do not propose to agree to The Hague tribunal. But we are prepared for arbitration, that is, each party to nominate an arbitrator and a third to be chosen by them.

I am thinking of going to Assam for two or three days soon to confer with people there and to fly over the earthquake areas. We do not yet know the full extent of the earthquake and the damage it has caused. Many areas are completely isolated and people are marooned. It is exceedingly difficult to get food to them, and food is scarce enough in this country at present. It is said that the landscape of upper Assam has changed considerably. Some hills have disappeared and rivers

4. In a cable to Trygve Lie on 26 August, Chou En-lai claimed that the People's Government was "the sole legal Government representing the Chinese people", demanded the expulsion of the representatives of Nationalist China from all U.N. organs, and said that Chang Wen-tien, heading a delegation of five members, would be attending the fifth session of the General Assembly on behalf of People's China.

5. See *ante*, pp. 316-317.

6. See *ante*, pp. 317-318 and 320-322.

are following new courses. Fortunately that area is not a heavily populated one, or else the damage would have been colossal.

With love from
Jawahar

13. To B.N. Rau¹

New Delhi
August 30, 1950

My dear B.N.,

I wanted to write to you at some length today, but I have now decided to send you a copy of a letter² I am writing to Vijayalakshmi. Many of the points I wished to write to you about have been touched in this letter and I do not wish to repeat them separately. I am also enclosing Panikkar's letter and report from Peking. I should like you to keep these secret. But of course you can use the information there as you like. Panikkar, as you know, is apt to run away sometimes with his ideas. Nevertheless, I think that his analysis has a good deal of truth in it. Even if it was only twenty-five per cent true, it would make a difference to our judgment of the present situation in the Far East. That analysis is completely different from the U.S. official way of looking at things.

Vijayalakshmi in her letter to me mentioned that the State Department was thinking in terms of making India a Permanent Member of the Security Council in place of China. How this can be done is not clear to me unless the whole Constitution of the U.N. is changed for the purpose. But, in any event, we shall not encourage any such move. It would do us little good and it would bring a great deal of trouble in its train. We must stand by the People's Government of China coming into the Security Council and the U.N. in the same way as the previous China's Government. Of course, I do not know what developments might take place and I am for the present giving you my general approach to the question. Apart from the attitude we have taken about China till now, it seems to me of the highest importance that we should keep on friendly terms with the new Government there. That does not mean that we agree with them or that we support them in everything. But we must not line up against them in any way.

1. B.N. Rau Papers, N.M.M.L.

2. See the preceding item.

I have mentioned in my letter to Vijayalakshmi some of Pakistan's new moves in regard to the no-war declaration and canal waters. I have no doubt that Zafrullah is trying to build up a strong case against us. I shall keep you informed of what we do.

We have been keeping in touch here with the American and British Ambassadors³ and telling them quite clearly that the U.S. should clearly define their policy in regard to Formosa. If MacArthur has his way, world war is a certainty. I was glad to see Truman pulling him up.⁴

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. Loy W. Henderson and Archibald Nye respectively.

4. In a message to be released on 28 August 1950, MacArthur argued that the defence of Formosa was vital for U.S. strategic interests in the Pacific, and criticised the policy of avoiding action to defend the island as being based on misconceived fear of antagonising anti-colonialist sentiment in Asia. The message came to Truman's notice on 26 August and he directed MacArthur to withdraw it as it was in conflict with U.S. policy. MacArthur complied with the directive but the message had been published by then.

14. Cable to K.M. Panikkar¹

Your telegrams 213 and 214 both of 30th August.

Regarding reported bombing of Chinese towns in Manchuria,² Peking can ask for enquiry and compensation and assurances that such bombing will not be repeated. We propose to suggest this, both informally and through diplomatic channels, but chances of success in such efforts will be greatly lessened if simultaneously Peking unleashes violent propaganda against U.S.A. There are plenty

1. New Delhi, 31 August 1950. J.N. Collection.

2. Panikkar reported that the bombing of Manchurian towns by U.S. aircraft was regarded in China as a provocative action and said that China was unlikely to accept U.S. suggestion for an enquiry into the charge by the U.N. Chou En-lai had, in fact, demanded on 28 August that the Security Council condemn the U.S.A. for the incident, and sought prompt withdrawal of "the American aggressive forces" from Korea.

of people in Western world, including U.S.A., who are sympathetic to Chinese Government and would like to help, but violence or propaganda on either side prevents such people influencing policy. It is evidently desire of some countries and groups to bring about conflict between U.S. and China. It is not in interest of either China or rest of the world to play into their hands.

2. Regarding Formosa,³ we are continuing to impress both upon U.K. and U.S.A. need for suitable declaration that America has no intention of attacking Chinese mainland. Acting U.K. High Commissioner here assures us that his Government are considering matter at Cabinet level. It is true that Chiang derives support from American declaration to neutralise Formosa during Korean campaign,⁴ but this appears incidental and not designed. There are obviously differing trends in America.⁵ Approaching American elections no doubt have effect on declarations of policy. In spite of this Truman's pulling up MacArthur has significance. It is desirable, therefore, to avoid any action which might help militarist group in America by extending area of hostilities and thus imperilling peace of world.

3. We recognise danger to future of U.N. and world peace if next session of the Assembly fails to secure admission of China to U.N. and are working hard for such admission. More and more countries like Canada are beginning to recognise importance of entry of China into U.N. Their only fear is that Peking might be exploited as instrument of Soviet expansionism in the Far East. According to you this is not so, but we have to deal with a delicate situation full of fears and apprehensions. Hence threats of military action by Peking against Formosa and Tibet do not make our task easier.⁶

3. Panikkar stated that American clarifications about Formosa, including Truman's disclaimer of MacArthur's statement, had passed over the Chinese complaint that support to the Nationalists amounted to intervention in China's internal affairs. The Security Council's refusal to hear China on the issue was viewed in Peking as "*mala fides* of Council majority and U.S. determination to get the Security Council's *imprimatur* to its irregular action."
4. On 26 June, Truman ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa and consequent enlargement of the area of conflict, followed by a call to Nationalist China to cease all operations against the mainland.
5. Before its neutralization, Formosa's occupation by People's China was considered by the Truman administration as inevitable, a position strongly criticised by the Republicans as appeasement of communism. They wanted application of the containment policy in East Asia and support to Chiang. A section of public opinion advocated war against People's China to help Nationalist China regain control of the mainland.
6. Panikkar reported that Chou En-lai, when told on 2 September that in view of misapprehensions about Chinese intentions it would be unwise to alienate world sympathy China had gained on the Formosa question and the Manchurian bombing incident, "agreed that their propaganda had not been effective" and said that steps would be taken "to explain Chinese position to friendly countries."

4. Security Council has decided to list Chinese complaint of warlike invasion of Formosa on its agenda. Norway was among four who voted for hearing Chinese when issue is debated⁷ and U.K. has practically promised to do likewise. To prejudice verdict of Council on hearing China when complaint about Formosa is discussed would be premature.⁸

7. The Soviet proposal to invite a Chinese representative was rejected on 29 August with only India, Norway, U.S.S.R. and Yugoslavia voting in favour, Egypt, France and the U.K. having abstained.
8. On 29 September, the Security Council eventually voted, by seven votes to four (Nationalist China, Cuba, Ecuador and U.S.A.), in favour of inviting a Chinese representative during discussion of the Formosan problem. It simultaneously adopted a proposal by Ecuador to defer consideration of the problem until 15 November.

15. To A. Soekarno¹

New Delhi
August 31, 1950

My dear Soekarno,

We have been following with great interest the developments in Indonesia since the formation of your unitary Government.² It is not always easy to understand everything that happens, but our Ambassador³ has on the whole kept us fully informed.

We have had the misfortune in India to have a succession of calamities. Nature has been very unkind to us. In some parts of the country the failure of the monsoon. resulted in great damage to the crops. In many other parts of the country there have been enormous floods, not only destroying crops but also inflicting tremendous damage on human beings and property. Thousands of villages have been washed away. To add to all this came an earthquake in the north-east corner of India. This earthquake was one of the severest that India has ever had. This area, almost on the borders of Burma and Tibet, is sparsely populated and because of that the actual damage has not been so great as it might have been in a more populated area.

1. J.N. Collection.
2. On 15 August 1950, Indonesia proclaimed herself a unitary State, replacing the sixteen-unit federation in existence since the Dutch transferred power on 27 December 1949. A nine-point programme announced by the new Cabinet envisaged general elections within the shortest possible time and maintenance of an independent foreign policy as important aims of the Republic. Soekarno, as President under the new Constitution, asked Mohammed Natsir on 22 August to form a new government while the outgoing Prime Minister, M. Hatta, became Vice-President.
3. P. Subbarayan.

Nevertheless, the damage and loss is tremendous and we do not even yet know the full extent of it. The whole landscape in some areas has changed. Some hills have disappeared and rivers have taken to new courses.

You can well imagine what our burdens are with all these disasters and calamities. I am going to Assam myself in two or three days' time to see the terrible effects of this earthquake. Indeed, the earthquake is not fully over yet and occasionally there are still some tremors.

While we are rather overwhelmed with these problems, the world sits precariously on the edge of a precipice. Ever since the Korean war started, events have taken a more and more dangerous turn. Probably there is no immediate danger of world war, but that does not mean that the situation is any better. We have felt all along that it is essential for the new Government in China to be admitted to the United Nations. That will bring some normality. Not to recognise it is to shut our eyes to a patent fact and thus to invite trouble. Unfortunately we have not been able to convince some of the major Powers. We intend, however, to press for this recognition of the People's Government of China at the meeting of the United Nations General Assembly. This meeting is a vital one and there is danger of its being almost the last meeting of the U.N. as we have known it. I hope, however, that some wisdom will come to the people there.

As I have said, I do not expect a world war in the near future. And yet we seem to be heading for it. What are we to do if this catastrophe descends upon us, it is difficult to say now because events have a way of forcing our hands. Nevertheless, I feel that we should try to keep out of such a war as far as and as long as possible. If some of the countries of Asia decided to do so, it would have some effect at least on the others. It might even prove a slight brake to war and if war ultimately came, there would at least be one large area which was outside the range of war and which could exercise some influence in favour of conciliation. It is true that people's passions have been roused in many countries and when war breaks out, the situation will be worse still. If the world has to face this terrible disaster, then there is no help for it. That is no reason why we should not try our utmost to prevent this disaster from occurring.

The U.S.A. and the U.K. on the one hand and the U.S.S.R. and China on the other, are the major countries whose opinion counts. We have been in communication with all these countries and trying to impress upon them the necessity of preventing this drift to war. I hope that your Government will also exercise its influence in this direction.⁴ Indeed I am sure you will. What I am

4. The Government of Indonesia, in a statement on 27 June 1950, said, "It would be premature and useless... to give an opinion on the Korean question and take up a position. It may be stated, however, that another issue has been added to the 'cold war'." It said that though the Indonesian Government was watching developments very closely, "its most urgent task is to reconstruct and build up the country" as a strong bulwark against every exigency.

anxious about is that in this great crisis in world history, we should as far as possible act together and pull together. The Government of Burma is very friendly to us also and is generally of the opinion I have expressed above.⁵ All our three Governments could cooperate in this wider policy and perhaps other countries might join it also.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. M.A. Rauf, Indian Ambassador in Burma, reported on 8 August that Thakin Nu was in agreement with India's U.N. policy and had written to Attlee and spoken to the American Ambassador pressing the admission of China into the United Nations.

16. Cable to Vijayalakshmi Pandit¹

Your telegram 461 of September 2. I appreciate greatly Walter Reuther's² message and entirely agree with the aim he has in view.³ We must have positive ends and human values and should not allow ourselves to be swept away or stampeded by momentary passion. One of the greatest dangers today is for U.S. to antagonise Asia. General MacArthur's recent statement which President Truman disapproved is just the kind of thing which creates very bad impression here, more specially his reference to oriental psychology.⁴ I am convinced that military measures,

1. New Delhi, 4 September 1950. J.N. Collection.
2. Walter P. Reuther (1907-1970); American labour leader.
3. Reuther wrote that human values and replacement of negative and war purposes with positive and peaceful ends were needed to strengthen democracy, and considered Nehru's personal participation in the forthcoming session of the General Assembly as of "utmost importance to cause of world peace."
4. In his message to the Veterans of Foreign Wars on 28 August 1950, MacArthur had said that "those who advocate appeasement and defeatism in the Pacific that if we defend Formosa we alienate continental Asia... do not grasp that it is in the pattern of Oriental psychology to respect and to follow aggressive, resolute and dynamic leadership—to quickly turn from a leadership characterised by timidity or vacillation—and they underestimate the Oriental mentality."

however strong, will not solve the problem of Korea or Asia or the world, and moral purpose and clear-eyed consideration of problems are essential. I am deeply distressed by war hysteria in some American papers and by terrible bombing going on in North Korea. Attitude towards new China is also exceedingly unwise and harmful.

I feel that even from the point of view which Reuther has mentioned my presence in India is desirable for some time at least. I would certainly go to Lake Success if I am convinced that thereby I can further cause which we have at heart, but I do not have that conviction at present and am feeling that my visit to Lake Success will not bear any fruit. I shall merely get entangled in interminable arguments. I can hardly function in the United States in any other capacity.

Please convey above message to Walter Reuther.

17. The Future of Formosa¹

... The U.N. should state clearly that they stand by the previous declarations made regarding Formosa, that is to say that Formosa reverts to China.²

The only difficulty that arises is how to do this, more specially because of the Korean war. While this war lasts, it is hardly possible to do anything which results in a peaceful transfer of Formosa to the People's Government of China. Any attempt made to take possession forcibly during this period would lead to an enlargement of the area of war and possibly even to world war. Therefore we have to accept the fact that no change-over can take place in present circumstances and any aggressive action to this end should be avoided. To say that the change-over should await the pacification of the Pacific area³ is to leave this question completely vague and indeterminate. It would be better to say that during the continuance of military operations in Korea any change-over in Formosa is not feasible.

1. Note to the Secretary-General, M.E.A., 7 September 1950. J.N. Collection. Extracts.
2. The Cairo Declaration, reaffirmed at Potsdam, said that "all the territories that Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China."
3. One course of action suggested by the British Government was reversion of Formosa to China after "the pacification of the Pacific area" and establishment of a commission to determine the timing and other conditions for the hand-over.

Could we not leave it at that, without mentioning a commission which would lay down the time and the conditions of handing over? The appointment of such a commission is bound to be opposed by Russia and China as they will feel that, in any event, they will be in a minority in that commission. At a later stage it might be more practicable to have some commission. At present it cannot do much or anything at all.

18. Cable to S. Radhakrishnan¹

Your telegram No. 82 dated 9th September only confirms what we have been anticipating, namely, that while military situation in Korea remains what it is, neither Koreans nor Americans would be in a mood to go into such details as form and functions of agency required to prepare Korea for elections and other steps needed to establish a united, independent and democratic Korea.² We are, therefore, limiting our effort, at this stage, to securing earliest possible adoption by General Assembly of United Nations at forthcoming session of resolution to the effect that, as soon as the military situation permits, all possible steps should be taken to secure the holding, under United Nations auspices, of elections in Korea on a national basis with a view to the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Korean Government. Your suggestion to Vyshinsky regarding creation of a commission³ should not be repeated to Gromyko.⁴ Apart from your impression that Vyshinsky seems against any interference by way of commission or otherwise, we think that, when time comes for setting up a commission, its membership, apart

1. New Delhi, 11 September 1950. J.N. Collection.
2. Vyshinsky, the Soviet Foreign Minister, told Radhakrishnan on 9 September that withdrawal of foreign troops and establishment by the Koreans of their own Government must precede any settlement. The Koreans had "demonstrated not only their political sense but their military prowess.... What right have others to interfere with their internal affairs."
3. Radhakrishnan had suggested the setting up of a commission consisting of China, India, Indonesia, U.K., U.S.S.R. and U.S.A. "which will administer and police for a period of, say, three to six months during which period elections will be held and Government for the whole of Korea established." Vyshinsky commented, "America will never accept a commission on which they will not be in a majority."
4. Andrei A. Gromyko, Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs.

from being predominantly Asian, should not include representatives of U.S.S.R., U.S.A. or U.K. A commission which includes members of these Powers will immediately get bogged down over procedural and other differences that reflect wide and deeper political antagonisms. Commission must be composed of neutrals, although its membership should, so far as possible, have the approval, even if it cannot enjoy the confidence, of the rival Power groups.

This is for your own information at this stage.

19. Attitude of the United States to China¹

The voting in the U.N. Security Council on the resolution inviting the Chinese Government representative to attend when the Council is considering bombing in Manchuria has rather distressed me.² I cannot understand how any person can reasonably argue that the Chinese Government should not have been invited for this particular purpose when that Government was one of the concerned parties. For the U.S.A. to take this line means that they are bent and determined to oppose China's inclusion in the U.N. at all costs.³ That means that they are determined, if necessary, almost to break up the U.N. on this issue. That is a serious matter and I think they should be made to appreciate fully our feelings and our own analysis of the situation.

It is a normal rule of law that any party concerned should be invited to state its case. Not to do so is to decide a matter *ex parte*. To adopt this procedure on a vital matter of this kind appears to be not only very unfair but very foolish.

I think that to mobilise opinion is much more difficult now in favour of China's inclusion in the U.N. This means that we should address as many friendly countries as possible asking them to support this and pointing out the grave consequences

1. Note to the Secretary-General, M.E.A., 12 September 1950. J.N. Collection.

2. On 11 September, the Soviet proposal to invite a representative of People's China received six votes but could not be adopted, having failed to secure seven affirmative votes. Nationalist China, Cuba and U.S.A. voted against, while Ecuador and Egypt abstained.

3. The Soviet Union claimed that Article 32 of the U.N. Charter implied that both parties to a dispute must be heard, whether either of them was a member of the U.N. or not. The U.S. opposed this argument stating that Article 32 was inapplicable since China was already represented in the U.N.

of rejection of our appeal. We should further tell B.N. Rau that we wish him to tackle this matter in all seriousness and to make it clear to every one concerned that we attach the greatest importance to it. We might, at our end, also do so.

20. To B.N. Rau¹

New Delhi
September 12, 1950

My dear B.N.,

The vote in the Security Council on the Soviet resolution inviting the Chinese Government to send a representative to attend when the allegation of the U.S. bombing of Manchuria was considered has distressed me. It is true, as you say, that the resolution was lost by the narrowest majority. It is a healthy sign that the U.K., France and Norway supported it. Nevertheless, it amazes me how the U.S.A. or any other country could oppose it. The matter concerns China most. It is being brought at the instance of China. How then can it be considered in the absence of her representative? This upsets all my ideas of justice and fairplay or law. If the U.S.A. adopts this attitude in this obvious matter, then they will oppose everything connected with China with vehemence.

That way lies trouble and I am surprised that they do not draw the obvious conclusions. They will lose any bit of goodwill that might still remain for them in a great part of Asia. No one in India or in any other part of Asia will understand their attitude and there would be great resentment.

I think this should be made clear to all concerned. We must take an active and positive role in this matter. That is to say, we must approach the representatives of other countries and tell them not only that we feel strongly about it, but also that if the U.N. General Assembly fails to admit China, it will be a major disaster for the U.N. I am distressed about this matter and at the childish folly of the U.S.A. in regard to it.

We shall of course at our end inform governments about our strongly felt opinion in this matter.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. B.N. Rau Papers, N.M.M.L.

21. To B.N. Rau¹

New Delhi
September 23, 1950

My dear B.N.,
I have just returned from Nasik.

I am glad India took the lead in proposing China's admission to the U.N.² This has become an acid test for the U.N. and for its Member States. So far as we are concerned, we are not only committed to it, but something more. We attach the greatest importance to it and we should try our utmost to get it through.

At the Nasik Congress the Resolution on Foreign Policy³ made specific mention about China's entry into the U.N. I spoke⁴ strongly in the open session on this subject. Later, when news came of the defeat of your resolution in the Assembly, I spoke again⁵ in open session and expressed my great surprise at such a wrong and unreal decision of the U.N. Assembly.

This decision of the U.N. has undoubtedly made the position in China worse and there is naturally very great resentment.⁶ The whole thing is so fantastic. Whatever the demands of American local politics and elections⁷ might be, surely there is some limit to taking up an attitude which is so obviously wrong and unreal. I am quite sure that very grave results will follow if this attitude is persisted in by the U.N. We are not going to weaken on this issue at all. We have made this clear to various Ambassadors here and I want you to make it perfectly clear to people on the other side.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. B.N. Rau Papers, N.M.M.L.
2. As soon as the fifth session of the General Assembly opened on 19 September, B.N. Rau introduced a resolution to this effect, calling for quick disposal of the question "when the atmosphere surrounding this issue remains calm." The resolution was, however, defeated by 33 votes to 16, with 10 abstentions.
3. See *ante*, pp. 119-120.
4. See *ante*, pp. 120-126.
5. See *ante*, pp. 137-141.
6. Panikkar reported on 22 September that Chou En-lai, whom he met on 21 September, considered U.N.'s refusal to admit China as a far more serious matter than the "present American aggression in Korea." Chou said that America was determined to keep China out of all her rights and added, "China has now waited for over a year but her patience is getting exhausted."
7. The Republican Party drew up on 29 August 1950 the party campaign line for the November Congressional elections, blaming the Democratic administration for events leading to the Korean war. Truman's Far Eastern policy was criticised for having "consistently temporised with and capitulated to the ruthless demands of the communists."

22. Cable to K.M. Panikkar¹

On my return from Nasik I have seen your telegram² and Bajpai's reply³ with which I entirely agree. I should like you, on suitable occasion, to convey my own judgment of situation to Chou En-lai. I can well understand his resentment and bitterness at recent decision of U.N. Assembly. We have ourselves been greatly distressed by it. Nevertheless, I am sure that American opposition is being undermined and cannot last long unless something untoward happens. India's firm attitude and the fact that in this matter other countries of Asia⁴ wholly agree with India, has had powerful effect on United Kingdom and U.S.A. Former has definitely come round in spite of American pressure. The United States are still tied up with their elections, but it is generally understood that their opposition cannot last long. In any event, China's case for admission to United Nations is so strong that I cannot imagine any long resistance to it. While fully appreciating dangers of delay, to which we have ourselves drawn repeated attention, I feel that we should avoid any step which might give excuse to United States for further obstructive tactics.

So far as India is concerned, we have taken up very strong attitude. At Nasik Congress, foreign policy resolution made special reference to China's admission to U.N. I spoke about it in open session. Later when news of U.N. decision reached us, I criticised it in open session.

In this matter U.S. are obviously in the wrong and they cannot persist for long in this policy when world opinion is progressively realising that it is not only wrong, but dangerous and likely to affect whole future of United Nations.

1. New Delhi, 24 September 1950. J.N. Collection.
2. After meeting Chou En-lai on 21 September, Panikkar reported that Chou, seeing little hope of settling the Formosa issue through the Security Council, thought China would have to resist if U.N. forces crossed the 38th parallel. Chou accused Britain of duplicity, alluding to her refusal to vote for unseating Nationalist China, and doubted if China's position would receive a fair understanding by European Governments due to their dependence on America. Chou felt peace could be assured if Asian countries took a resolute stand against extension of war and on the Formosa issue.
3. Bajpai stated that in view of Britain's support to the Indian resolution proposing China's admission and on the question of hearing China on the Manchurian bombing incident, the charge of duplicity against her seemed unfair, and asked Panikkar to bring to Chou's notice the recent decision of the Foreign Ministers of France, the U.K. and the U.S.A. that U.N. forces should not proceed beyond the 38th parallel without prior U.N. direction. As for Formosa, India would support in the General Assembly a move for its reversion to China as soon as the war in Korea ended.
4. Afghanistan, Burma and Pakistan voted for the Indian resolution proposing China's admission to the United Nations, while Thailand voted against it. Indonesia was not yet a member of the United Nations.

23. On the 'Uniting for Peace' Resolution¹

It seems to me that the U.S. resolution,² as a whole, is entirely misconceived and instead of reducing risks of conflict, adds to it. Some parts of it, taken by themselves, may not be particularly objectionable, but in the present context and in view of what has recently happened and is happening, they will be naturally viewed with great suspicion and will add greatly to the tension that exists today.

The object of the resolution presumably is to reduce risk of Soviet or Chinese aggression, and to be ready to meet it in case it occurs. This aggression can be on a relatively minor scale or indirectly, or it may be the immediate prelude to general war. If it is the beginning of world war, then these measures will mean little; other factors will come into play and they will be far more important.

I do not think there is any reasonable chance at present of minor or indirect attempts at aggression. We have arrived at a stage when a fresh challenge of this kind will almost inevitably lead to war on a big scale. There is the danger in Korea. If the U.N. forces do not go beyond the 38th parallel, it is unlikely that there will be any general conflict. The U.N. has made the declaration, and President Truman has accepted it,³ and therefore we may presume that the Korean conflict will not spread.

There might be danger in Germany.⁴ But if any marked aggression takes place, then this will lead to a major war. The point to be considered by us, therefore, is whether any steps that the U.N. takes tend to prevent this drift to war or encourage it.

It is clear that the U.S. proposals will not make much difference to a general war, if other factors bring it about. There will be no investigations, etc., there. Even the preparations for it will not make much difference. Every country is alive to

1. Note to the Secretary-General, M.E.A., 24 September 1950. J.N. Collection.
2. On 20 September 1950, Dean Acheson presented before the General Assembly a plan for prevention of war. It provided for (1) an emergency session of the Assembly on twenty-four hours' notice if the Security Council should be prevented from acting; (2) the setting up of a Peace Observation Commission for immediate and independent observation in any area where international tension might exist threatening peace and security; (3) designation by each member of units of its armed forces for U.N. service; and (4) the establishment of a special committee to develop further means of collective action.
3. Truman stated on 21 September that it was for the U.N. to decide whether its forces would advance beyond the 38th parallel and that the U.S. would abide by that decision.
4. Chancellor Adenauer of West Germany said in August 1950 that the setting up of quasi-military formations within the East German police force and the increasing East German propaganda and infiltrations had aroused fears of aggression by East Germany with Soviet support similar to the North Korean aggression.

the dangers of the present situation and is taking such steps as it can. The Atlantic Powers are acting in concert and putting their war machine into gear.⁵ It is only some countries in Asia that might be affected by a fresh U.N. mandate or recommendation. From a military point of view this matters little, and I do not see which of the Asian countries is going to act up to the proposed U.N. resolution. Instead some or many of them will ostentatiously keep aloof and this will create an unfavourable reaction to the whole scheme of the resolution.

The practical effects of the U.S. resolution therefore appear to me to be negligible. Presumably it is meant to create a psychological atmosphere. This it will undoubtedly do, but it seems to me that this psychological reaction will be of a wrong kind. It will increase tension, conflict, fear of war, and hysteria all round.

The entire U.S. approach in this matter appears to me to be completely wrong even from the point of view of real U.S. interests. It will create a commotion and many countries, apart from the Soviet and Co., may hold aloof. Generally it will be looked upon as a prelude to war in the near future. It is not a peace approach but something that increases very greatly the danger of war. The future of the U.N. is also obviously involved in it. Opinion may vary as to the possible reactions of the Soviets and China, but surely the risk is a grave one.

Apart from the merits of the U.S. proposal, it has to be viewed in the context of recent events, for example, U.S. persistence in opposing the new China. This is so unreasonable and illogical and unwise that grave doubts arise about the trend of U.S. policy. It is a legitimate inference that the U.S. are trying to fashion the U.N. as an instrument of carrying out any policy which they may suddenly impose upon it. This will not only weaken the U.N. but lessen its significance in people's eyes. It may put countries like India in a very false and embarrassing position.

I think that the U.S. should be made to realise that their China policy affects very considerably our considerations of any other proposals they may put forward. To us their China policy appears completely wrong and harmful. If any other policy flows from it that may well be also injurious.

The U.K.'s attitude in this and some other matters (U.S. resolution,⁶ etc.) appears to me to be an attempt to get the best of both worlds. It is not a straight and courageous policy and hence it is weak, drifting and compromising. It satisfies nobody.

5. The North Atlantic Council, at its meeting in New York on 15, 16 and 18 September 1950, discussed the creation, in the shortest possible time, of an integrated military force adequate for the defence of freedom in Europe.
6. The British Foreign Office was initially reluctant to support the U.S. resolution, but on 25 September 1950, Bevin expressed full agreement with its objective and wanted its urgent consideration by the General Assembly.

Coming to the actual U.S. proposal, I agree with S.G. that A and part of C are wholly unacceptable.⁷ I think the proposal to have a U.N. military coordinator is also objectionable from many points of view.⁸ The only part which might possibly be accepted, with variations, is B.⁹ But, as I have said above, the whole context is bad and so is the approach of the entire resolution.¹⁰

7. Part A related to the calling of an emergency session of the General Assembly. Part C related to maintenance of armed units by member States for U.N. service and establishment of a Collective Measures Committee.
8. The resolution provided for the appointment of a U.N. Military Adviser to advise member States regarding the organisation, training and equipping of armed units by them.
9. This related to the establishment of a Peace Observation Commission.
10. Sponsored by Canada, France, the Philippines, Turkey, the U.K., Uruguay and the U.S.A., the resolution was eventually adopted by the General Assembly on 3 November 1950 and came to be known as the 'Uniting for Peace' Resolution.

24. Message to Chou En-lai¹

Our Ambassador in Peking has kept us informed of developments and of your Government's views and reactions.² We are grateful to you for taking us in your confidence so that there may be the largest measure of cooperation between our respective Governments. As you know, we have attached the greatest importance to the admission of the People's Government of China into the United Nations and we have been constantly working for this both at Lake Success and in other countries through our embassies. The rejection by the U.N. General Assembly of our resolution asking for representative of your Government to U.N. Assembly

1. New Delhi, 27 September 1950. J.N. Collection.
2. Chou En-lai told Panikkar on 21 September that as "the U.N. claimed to have no obligations towards China, she also had none to the U.N." A few days later the Chinese Chief of Staff confirmed to Panikkar that China had decided on a more aggressive policy, regardless of consequences. Panikkar reported on 26 September that U.S. intransigence in the U.N. on her complaints and the large vote against her in the General Assembly had led China to reconsider her earlier position of avoiding a major conflict and added that a "very powerful army" was concentrated in Manchuria and indirect intervention by China in the Korean war could not now be excluded.

has caused us great disappointment. We feel strongly that American opposition³ has been misconceived and is wrong. Unfortunately American politics are largely governed by coming elections there. But even in America there is a strong and growing feeling against present American Government's attitude. Voting in the General Assembly is misleading. We feel that substantial progress is being made in favour of China's admission and we might well succeed on subsequent occasion. India's firm attitude and fact that in this matter other countries of Asia fully agree with India has had powerful effect on the U.S.A., the United Kingdom and other European countries. The U.K. has definitely come round in spite of American pressure. As you would know, a Committee of Seven has been appointed to examine question of new China's admission.⁴ We are trying our utmost that the Committee meet and reach decision urgently.⁵ The case for entry of your representatives into the United Nations Organisation is so strong and reasonable that I cannot imagine any long resistance to it.

2. Two other issues, in which your Government is profoundly interested, are also being dealt with urgently and in manner which I hope will lead to satisfactory results. The U.K. contemplates moving resolution on Formosa from which following are relevant extracts:

Noting that Formosa was Chinese territory for more than two centuries before being ceded to Japan in 1895 and that the signatories to the Cairo Declaration declared their intention that Formosa should be restored to the Republic of China;

Recognising that two parties at the present claim right to administer Formosa, that there have been threats of an armed attack of Formosa from the Chinese mainland and that Formosa has been used as a base for attacks on the Chinese mainland and that an attempt to settle the dispute by force or the continuance of attack on the Chinese mainland from Formosa would heighten international tension at a time when the situation in the Pacific area is already tense as a result of events in Korea;

3. Dean Acheson, opposing the Indian resolution in the General Assembly on the ground that the time was not opportune for a "proper and well-considered decision", wanted it to be voted down at once so as not to drag out the matter.
4. On 19 September, the General Assembly resolved to set up a seven-member Special Committee nominated by the President of the Assembly to consider the question of Chinese representation and report back to the session. Meantime Nationalist China would continue to sit in the Assembly.
5. The Special Committee, consisting of Canada, Ecuador, India, Iraq, Mexico, the Philippines and Poland, was established on 12 December and elected B.N. Rau as its chairman at its first meeting on 15 December 1950.



WITH THE AMBASSADOR OF CHINA, NEW DELHI, 14 SEPTEMBER 1950



WITH THE ACTING CHAIRMAN, INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, LUCKNOW, 3 OCTOBER 1950

Decides to establish a Commission which, bearing in mind China's claim as set out above, should study the problem and submit a report to Assembly containing recommendations for the future of Formosa.

Commission should consult with all interested parties, including the Central People's Government, and should take into account the interests of the people of Formosa.

We shall do our utmost, in cooperation with like-minded countries, to ensure that Commission reports as soon as possible and not later than end of present session of General Assembly.

3. As regards Korea, Security Council's resolution, which we supported, merely asked for return of North Korean forces to the 38th parallel. At recent meeting of American, British and French Foreign Ministers in New York,⁶ it was decided that U.N. forces should not be committed to proceed to north of the 38th parallel without prior U.N. direction. Every effort will be made to ensure that present hostilities in South Korea do not extend beyond this line.

4. We can well understand your Government's resentment at attitude of United Nations and of some countries in regard to admission of China into U.N. May I say that the patience and restraint which Your Excellency's Government have shown in a matter deeply affecting your country has added greatly to your Government's prestige in the world? New China is strong enough to face the future with dignity and calm. The countries of Asia more especially look to China as a friendly neighbour with respect. They know that what happens in China will affect their own future. We have felt that it is of paramount importance that world peace as well as the general peace of Asia should not be endangered as the consequences are bound to be disastrous for all concerned. We have also felt that entry of new China into United Nations and localisation of Korean conflict are essential to maintenance of world peace. We have had many disappointments and progress has been slow. But I am convinced that world opinion is rapidly realising the urgency of action that will secure both objectives. The alternative is catastrophe on a world scale. I am sure that Your Excellency is keenly desirous of preventing world conflict and at the same time maintaining the dignity and interests of China. In the interests of both I earnestly trust that Your Excellency's Government will continue to exercise patience and restraint that you have manifested so far. By waiting a little longer China will, I feel sure, achieve all that she desires, peacefully and thus earn the gratitude of mankind.

6. On 14 September 1950.

25. Message to Ernest Bevin¹

Your High Commissioner has just transmitted to me the draft resolution on Korea² proposed by the United Kingdom, and your message thereon.³ I have considered these with the greatest care. I agree with you entirely that it is imperative that our efforts should not result in an extension of the Korean conflict and it is primarily from this point of view that I have considered your proposal.

Your High Commissioner has been asked to repeat to you the text of two telegrams that came in this morning from our Ambassador in Peking. You will appreciate for yourself the gravity of the news that he has given us. I am sending a personal appeal to Chou En-lai, urging moderation and restraint.⁴ If that appeal is to have any chance of success, then we must avoid all action that might precipitate the entry of new China into the armed conflict in Korea. That any decision or even suggestion that U.N. forces will move beyond the 38th parallel is likely to precipitate what might well be world catastrophe is, I fear, more than probable. If, for reasons mentioned by our Ambassador, Peking is envisaging military action, announcement that U.N. forces are going to advance beyond the 38th parallel will add fuel to fire. The limitation of the military operations by U.N. forces north of the 38th parallel, as you suggest (your High Commissioner mentioned that it was not intended to go beyond the 40th parallel north), will, in my judgement, not prove satisfactory to Peking in present circumstances. We must appreciate that persistent opposition by some Powers, not United Kingdom, to new China's reasonable request for admission to U.N. and rejection of this by General Assembly has inflamed Chinese opinion. Manchurian border incidents and support of Chiang Kai-shek's army in

1. New Delhi, 27 September 1950. J.N. Papers, N.M.M.L. Bevin was in New York at this time.
2. The draft resolution proposed the setting up by the General Assembly of a U.N. Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) which would assume the functions of UNCOK and work for Korea's rehabilitation and recovery. It recommended "all necessary steps" to ensure conditions of "enduring peace" throughout Korea, elections under the auspices of the U.N. and establishment of a unified, free and democratic government of all Korea. It added that any U.N. forces entering North Korea to achieve these objectives should not remain there longer than necessary.
3. Bevin stated on 26 September that unification of Korea having been declared as the objective and with the military operations successfully concluding, "we cannot be content with restoring the *status quo*." Consideration by China of the crossing of the 38th parallel as a challenge to her security should not be allowed to jeopardise U.N. efforts. He sought India's support for the resolution which he said was designed to cover the immediate future as well as the long-term settlement of the Korean problem and had defined very carefully the functions of U.N. forces entering North Korea.
4. See the preceding item.

Formosa have also led many in China to believe that invasion of China is contemplated. Any attempt to cross the 38th parallel will convince them that such invasion is imminent and they will react accordingly.

I would, therefore, urge with all the emphasis at my command, that no action be taken by U.N. that would involve crossing the 38th parallel. I recognise that military developments in South Korea⁵ lend urgency to a decision as to how the future of Korea should be settled. I would suggest that, at this stage, such action be limited to announcement of objectives, namely, creation of a united, free Korea on the basis of free elections under the auspices of the United Nations, and an offer to the North Koreans to discuss with them ways and means to this end, provided that they cease hostilities immediately. Such negotiations could be entrusted to the proposed temporary commission. For the present, therefore, a decision as to whether or not U.N. forces should go beyond the 38th parallel should be deferred.

5. On 15 September, U.N. forces effected a seaborne landing on the west coast at the port of Inchon, 150 miles behind the North Korean lines and 20 miles from Seoul. On 26 September, Seoul was liberated after severing all lines of communication of the North Korean army and supply south of the 38th parallel.

26. Message to Ernest Bevin¹

I hasten to answer your message² in reply to mine of yesterday's. I have given the most earnest consideration to what you have said. Our Ambassador, as you should have realised from his messages, most of which have been shown or given to your High Commissioner, has attempted throughout these critical days to urge moderation on Chou En-lai and to present to us an objective picture of the situation in Peking. It is not to be expected that this situation should be static. The very isolation of new China from the outside world, for reasons which both you and

1. New Delhi, 28 September 1950. J.N. Collection.
2. Bevin wondered whether the Chinese really believed that the termination of hostilities in Korea would be followed by U.S. aggression against her, and doubted if China would defy the U.N. because "the future of Korea in the absence of U.N. intervention would be in the hands of Russia and not of China." He thought that the statements of the Chinese Chief of Staff to Panikkar were deliberately aimed at weakening the front against North Korean aggression, and that the Chinese, at Soviet instigation, might be trying to minimise the results of the defeat of North Korea.

I deplore, creates fears and suspicions that may turn optimism justified one day into equally justified gloom the next. It may be, as you say, that the latest turn in China's policy, reported by our Ambassador, is due to outside instigation, though I do not think that external pressure influences China's policy to any large extent. I should not, however, be prepared, for that reason, to assume that the threat of armed Chinese intervention in Korea is merely put on to deflect the U.N. from a certain course of action. Nor can we safely dismiss as unreal the Chinese Chief of Staff's remark to our Ambassador that China is prepared to face the consequences of an armed conflict with the U.N. or, in effect, the U.S.A. Governments have taken similar desperate risks in the past from what they regarded, perhaps wrongly, to be the compulsion of honour, interest or fear. In any case, I find myself unable to assume the responsibility for concurring in a particular course of action on the assumption that the Chinese are bluffing, and, while I cannot presume to dictate to others what their judgment should be, I would, in all sincerity and friendship, urge you not to treat the reported attitude of the Peking Government as an empty threat.³ Even if it were no more than a threat, I should counsel that the U.N. proceed with statesmanship and circumspection for, if we wish to live with China some day on terms of friendship, we must not delay the advent of that day by doing something that must inevitably intensify bitterness.

I agree with you that a resolution should be introduced immediately in the General Assembly, and it was not the purpose of my message of yesterday that this should not be done. All that I wanted was that the resolution should avoid any mention of the intention of U.N. forces to cross the 38th parallel,⁴ and should limit itself to a declaration of the U.N. objective, namely, the creation of an independent and united Korea by means of free elections to be conducted under the auspices of the U.N. and call upon the North Koreans to cease hostilities immediately so as to enable the U.N. to initiate forthwith steps that would lead to an early consummation of this purpose. If considered necessary, the appointment of a commission to carry out this objective of the U.N. could be included in the resolution, though the choice of members will need most careful consideration. Now that the U.N. forces are well on the road to victory, a call to the North Koreans to cease hostilities would not be unrealistic, nor could an expectation that they would cooperate in implementation of the U.N. objective be regarded as

3. Bevin replied on 29 September that the British assessment on the likelihood of Chinese intervention was not based upon the assumption that Peking was bluffing, and that Chou En-lai as a statesman would surely appreciate the consequences of an attack upon U.N. forces in Korean territory, even if he did not share Bevin's confidence that the U.S. had no aggressive intentions.
4. Bevin had stated on 27 September that the resolution, far from being provocative, defined clearly the limited objectives of the United Nations and he wanted India to be one of the sponsors.

appeasement. Should the North Koreans fail to respond, the Assembly could review the situation and rechart its future course.

I have tried to give you the best counsel of which I am capable with a full appreciation of all the relevant circumstances. If you agree to the proposed resolution being amended on the lines suggested by me, our Delegation will be happy to join you and others in sponsoring it. I have not tried to amend your draft resolution to conform to the views that I have expressed; this can best be done by you in New York in consultation with our Delegation, to whom this telegram is being repeated.

27. Cable to V.K. Krishna Menon¹

Your telegram No. 5983 dated 27th September.² No warning has been given by us to Peking Government either through our Ambassador or otherwise. On 17th September, following American landing at Inchon, American Embassy represented to Ministry that warning be conveyed to Peking not to intervene in Korean conflict. Americans were informed that we could not issue warnings but would instruct the Ambassador to advise restraint to the People's Government in Peking provided he saw no objection to this course. In view of Panikkar's reply that even such an approach might be misunderstood none were made. Panikkar in personal appreciation of situation reported on 19th September that direct participation of China in Korean fighting seems beyond range of possibility, unless a world war starts as a result of U.N. forces passing beyond 38th parallel and Soviet Union decides directly to intervene. This was communicated both to Washington and to Bevin who is in New York. Report to which you refer is presumably based on leakage from State Department. We have suppressed its publication in Indian papers and have refrained commenting ourselves on it for obvious reasons, that any suggestions that we had been advising moderation to Peking on American initiative would be misunderstood in Peking. Panikkar's latest report presented graver picture of possibility of Chinese armed intervention in Korea. I have addressed personal

1. New Delhi, 28 September 1950. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, N.M.M.L.
2. Krishna Menon stated that enquiries had been made from him about a report in the *Washington Post* of 26 September alleging that a "friendly warning" had been given by the Government of India to Peking through K.M. Panikkar, and added that the Indian Government were reported to have refused to comment on it.

appeal³ to Chou En-lai in the hope that action on part of new China that might lead to Sino-American war and indeed third world war might be averted and have assured him that we are doing everything possible to achieve satisfaction of China's wishes in respect of entry into U.N., Formosa, etc. I have also telegraphed to Bevin in New York that suggestion in proposed U.K. resolution on Korea that U.N. forces should proceed beyond 38th parallel north should be abandoned because of real danger that this would involve war with China.⁴ This is for your information only. In view of delicate and dangerous character of present situation we are anxious to avoid publicity that might do more harm than good.

3. See *ante*, pp. 397-399.

4. See the preceding item.

28. Cable to B.N. Rau¹

Continuation our telegram No. 24330 dated 29th September. Draft resolution on Korea. I have now received Bevin's reply to my message to him which was repeated to you in telegram No. 24326 dated 28th September. As we informed you yesterday, amendments made after meeting of Commonwealth countries² do not meet our point of view. North Koreans will inevitably put up even fiercer opposition to U.N. forces in their "homeland" than they did in South Korea. Conflict, which may be prolonged, can only increase danger of bringing in Peking. Moreover, by associating ourselves with proposal which definitely envisages entry of U.N. troops into North Korea, without trying exhortation to induce North Koreans to cease hostilities and cooperate with U.N. in attainment of objective of united Korea, we should be creating an unfortunate impression on Peking Government and necessarily diminishing our effectiveness with them as moderating influence. For these reasons, after full consideration, we have decided not to sponsor the resolution.

When Political Committee discusses resolution, we should like India's point of view to be fully explained. We entirely associate ourselves with declared objective of United Nations. We also support plan of economic rehabilitation that U.N.

1. New Delhi, 30 September 1950. J.N. Collection.

2. On 28 September, B.N. Rau telegraphed that a meeting of the Commonwealth countries had revised the U.K. draft resolution, replacing, *inter alia*, the term "all necessary steps" with "all appropriate steps," "enduring peace" with "stability" and the clause relating to "U.N. forces entering North Korea" with the words "U.N. forces should not remain in any part of Korea otherwise than necessary...." A new clause was also added: "that all necessary measures be taken to accomplish the economic rehabilitation of Korea."

propose adopting. Difference between us and sponsors of resolution is over priority we give to approach to North Koreans to cease hostilities and give U.N. every help in realisation of objective of united Korea. If North Koreans fail to respond, U.N. could claim to have exhausted possibility of securing their peaceful cooperation and would thus be free to take alternative action. Process of appeal and waiting for response need not be long. Every one recognizes that unification of Korea must involve effective extension of U.N. authority throughout Korea for attainment of objective. But sequence of steps taken to this end and their timing are vitally important.

We do not ourselves see why Article 12 of Charter should be regarded as preventing Assembly from making such an appeal to North Koreans; Bevin has put this forward as objection to proposal made to him in my message in this behalf.³ Even if this technical objection be valid, not only should our spokesman on resolution make such appeal but President⁴ should endorse it on behalf of Assembly. Our present view is that we should not vote for resolution in Committee but should abstain. Please keep us informed of developments.⁵

3. Bevin telegraphed to Nehru on 29 September that, as the Korean question was still before the Council, mention in the resolution about ceasing hostilities might be interpreted as usurping the functions of the Security Council. He added that it could be stated during the discussion that the North Koreans could themselves contribute to the aims of the U.N. by ceasing hostilities and cooperating in the unification of Korea.
4. Nasrollah Entezam, President of the fifth session of the General Assembly.
5. A Soviet draft resolution introduced on 2 October recommended cessation of hostilities, withdrawal of foreign troops, the setting up of a government for a unified Korea through elections held under joint auspices of representatives of both the Koreas and their bordering States and observed by a U.N. committee, and plans to be drawn up for economic aid to Korea. In view of similarities in this and the U.K. draft resolution, B.N. Rau proposed on 3 October that a sub-committee might consider the two resolutions and effect a compromise between them. His proposal was rejected on 4 October by the First Committee, while the U.K. draft resolution sponsored by eight countries was approved. The latter was eventually adopted by the General Assembly on 7 October, India having abstained.

29. Need for Peaceful Methods¹

Ever since the Korean war started, we have been in constant touch with various

1. Press conference, New Delhi, 30 September 1950. From the *National Herald* and *The Sunday Statesman*, 1 October 1950, and File No. 43(102)/50-PMS. For other parts of the press conference, see *ante*, pp. 56-58, 148-150 and 243-247.

Governments on issues arising from it. More particularly we have been in touch with the United Kingdom, the U.S.A. and China. We have endeavoured to place our viewpoint before these various Governments and have ventured to suggest to them always to keep the objective of peace before them. There has been no question of our warning any Government, nor have we received or forwarded any peace proposals to any Government.

We have felt for a long time past that it is quite essential from every point of view that the People's Government of China should be represented in the United Nations. Long before the Korean war started we urged this on other Governments. After the invasion of South Korea and the war that followed, we felt it all the more necessary that the new China should have its due place in the United Nations. It was obvious that China was at least as intimately interested in developments in the Far East as any other country could be.

We have felt that in regard to Formosa, the decisions arrived at Cairo and Potsdam, which were fully accepted and elaborated upon by President Truman and Secretary Acheson on January 5, 1950, should be the basis of discussion and future action.

We are of opinion that every effort should be made to bring the Korean war to a conclusion and that it would be wrong to carry on military operations when peaceful methods can bring the necessary results. Therefore we think that the U.N. forces should not go beyond the 38th parallel till all other means of settlement have been explored. It is clear that the objective in Korea should be a free and united Korea, whose Government is settled by the will of the people. The United Nations should see that this objective is given effect to.

Question: Do you agree with Syngman Rhee's view that the 38th parallel no longer exists?

JN: Our objective should be a unified Korea and the 38th parallel should ultimately disappear and it should not be the dividing line. If President Rhee meant that they should take all kinds of military steps in furtherance of his aims,² I differ from him. I am not a great admirer of President Rhee anyhow.

The U.N. military operations have been carried on, at first, under conditions of great difficulties and, later, with success. I think we have to seize a proper psychological moment to further the object of a united Korea. It is wrong, not now but always, to assume that we can obtain any objective by pursuing military methods to the utmost and the last. Every major war has shown this and the last war had created new problems.

2. Rhee stated on 19 September, "We will cross that artificial barrier (the 38th parallel) and go on to the natural, northern borders of our country...." The South Korean forces reached the 38th parallel on 30 September.

What we have indicated is that the time may arise soon for the settlement of the issue by peaceful means. As far as I can see, the North Korean forces have been adequately defeated and it should be easy to bring peace on the lines of the U.N. objective.

Q: Are you not very happy that the North Korean aggression has been defeated?

JN: I am very glad that the aggression has been defeated.

Q: Do you consider that the defeat of the aggressor in Korea has lessened the chances of a world war?

JN: Yes. It depends upon the future as to what action is taken. By itself, it has lessened the chances, but actions taken in future might make the chances of a world war greater.

Q: In case the U.N. forces cross the 38th parallel, will India dissociate herself from the first resolution of the U.N.?

JN: Surely this depends on various factors and circumstances.

Q: Has the voting in the U.N. Assembly not indicated that the U.N. meant the United States and Britain alone?

JN: In regard to the admission of China there were six votes in favour and three against.³ Britain voted in favour of admission. I have no doubt in my mind that so far as the admission of the People's Government of China to the U.N. is concerned opinion is becoming stronger in favour of it.

3. Probably Nehru was referring to the voting in the Security Council on 11 September. See *ante*, p. 391.

30. To B.N. Rau¹

New Delhi
October 4, 1950

My dear B.N.,

I have just come back from Lucknow where I went to inaugurate a conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations.² Meanwhile, events have marched ahead and

1. B.N. Rau Papers, N.M.M.L.

2. For Nehru's inaugural address, see *post*, pp. 499-507.

taken a very serious turn.³ Probably the next three or four days might decide whether there is going to be a world war or not, so that even before you get this letter these decisions will have been taken. We have been keeping you informed of the part we are taking in our communications to Peking and London.

Whatever fresh developments might take place, a heavy burden is going to rest upon us and it is necessary that our foreign missions abroad, especially in the chief capitals concerned, should be in constant touch with us so that there may be a unanimity in our approach on our behalf at all these places. It is equally necessary that you and our U.N. Delegation should be in full touch with us and with our Embassy in Washington. We have to deal with the U.N. people on the one hand and the State Department at Washington on the other. It is necessary that the approach in both places should be identical. We are trying to keep both you and the Embassy informed of what we do. Sometimes it may be that some particular message is only sent to you or perhaps to the Embassy because it deals with some special matter which is not of immediate concern to the other. I feel therefore that the contacts between you, your Delegation and our Washington Embassy should be fairly close during the fateful days that are coming. Our Ambassador has to be in Washington most of the time, but she ought to visit New York to confer with you and the Delegation from time to time.

I doubt if the South African Indian issue is likely to come up before the U.N. General Assembly during this session.⁴ It is low down in the list and even in the normal course might not be reached. International developments and crises make it still more unlikely for that item on the agenda to be taken up. I suppose the U.K. and U.S.A. are not keen on discussing it. Nevertheless, we cannot take any risks in the matter and we must be ready for it. As you know, we have asked Vijayalakshmi to deal with it, if and when it arises. This necessitates not only her being prepared with the papers but her consultations occasionally with you and our Delegation. It may also be necessary for her to meet representatives of some other delegations and discuss this subject with them. For this reason also she ought to visit New York and for a consultation with our Delegation there. Everything, of course, depends upon other major developments.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. In a broadcast from Tokyo on 1 October, MacArthur called upon the North Korean forces to surrender at once while the South Korean army marched into North Korea. The same day Chou En-lai warned, "Chinese people will not at all tolerate foreign aggression, nor will they supinely tolerate seeing their neighbours being savagely invaded by imperialists."
4. On 21 September, the Steering Committee of the General Assembly voted by ten votes to one to include the question of treatment of Indians in South Africa in the agenda. Britain and Venezuela abstained and Australia voted against. On 27 September, the Assembly endorsed the Steering Committee's decision and the *ad hoc* Political Committee discussed the question from 14 to 20 November 1950.

31. Cable to K.M. Panikkar¹

Please refer to your telegrams 240 and 241,² dated 3rd October, addressed to me, and your telegram No. 242³ of the same date to Bajpai.

Immediately on receipt of first two, the U.K. High Commissioner was asked to telegraph them textually to Attlee for information. At our instance, Nye has told his Prime Minister that China's intentions as disclosed to you should not be treated as empty threat, but accepted at their face value. We understand that the U.K. is in communication with the U.S. Government. Nye has also informed us today that London has asked Washington for latest information regarding (a) actual position of U.N. forces in South Korea (especially as to whether they have crossed the 38th parallel) and (b) MacArthur's intentions. We should know within next twenty-four hours the U.K. and, probably, the U.S. reaction to information that they now have regarding plans of the People's Government in Peking.⁴ It would be nothing short of tragedy if fateful and irrevocable step of China sending armies into North Korea was taken while there is prospect, however faint, of settling matter peacefully. Once Chinese and U.N. forces clash, it may become impossible to localise conflict. Consequences to world peace of new China's entry into the Korean war are so tremendous that I feel that it would be act of wisdom for Chou En-lai to hold his hand for the present and await developments. I would therefore ask you to convey this to him as an appeal in the cause of world peace which we both hold precious and which both of us must do our utmost to preserve.

1. New Delhi, 4 October 1950. J.N. Collection.
2. Panikkar stated that Chou En-lai had told him on 3 October that he was anxious for a peaceful settlement of the Korean issue, but if U.N. forces crossed the 38th parallel, it would be a hostile act against China and she would be forced to take immediate steps. Chou also warned that the U.N. might find itself faced with a *fait accompli* dictated by MacArthur.
3. Panikkar stated that China would doubtless resist movement into North Korea of forces under U.S. command, as distinct from South Korean units, as she was convinced that the U.S. was determined to bring down the People's Government. He added that the impression in Peking was that an attack on Manchuria would immediately bring the Soviet Union into the war. He reported that Chou En-lai had told him that any settlement on Korea must be with the full participation of China as the power most immediately concerned.
4. Truman, in his *Memoirs, Years of Trial and Hope: 1946-1953*, Vol. 2, (New York, 1955), wrote of Panikkar's messages as "no more than relay of communist propaganda" and Chou En-lai's "bald attempt to blackmail the U.N." On 8 October, U.N. forces crossed the 38th parallel and on the next day MacArthur was directed by Truman not to enter Chinese territory without prior approval. Meanwhile, Loy Henderson, who had sought to meet through Indian help the Chinese Ambassador in India to convey the State Department assurance of limited U.N. mission in Korea and the operations there not constituting a threat to China, was informed by Bajpai on 10 October that Yuan Chiang-hsien had refused to meet any American official in view of the reluctance of the United States to establish relations with Peking and her attitude towards Formosa and Chiang Kai-shek.

32. Cable to V.K. Krishna Menon¹

Continuation of my telegrams No. 22302 and 22303 of 3 October.² We understand that U.K. is in communication with United States Government. We should therefore know within next twenty-four hours U.K. and probably United States reaction to information that they now have regarding Chou En-lai's plans. So long as there is the slightest prospect of peaceful settlement it is worth trying to consummate such settlement. I have therefore instructed Panikkar to convey appeal from me to Chou En-lai to hold his hand for the present.

1. New Delhi, 4 October 1950. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, N.M.M.L.
2. These telegrams repeated messages received from K.M. Panikkar. See the preceding item, footnotes 2 and 3.

33. Cable to B.N. Rau¹

We have had first-hand and other reports of horrible atrocities being committed in Korea, more especially after recapture of Seoul.² Sometimes American forces have behaved badly, but usually it is South Korean troops who have indulged in these atrocities both on prisoners of war and civilians. Complaints made to United Nations Office there as well as to military authorities have produced no results.

Syngman Rhee being put in charge again³ after his very bad previous record

1. New Delhi, 5 October 1950. J.N. Collection.
2. Two representatives of *Picture Post* who were present in Korea when U.N. forces recaptured Seoul had, on 5 October, given Nehru "horrible accounts of what they saw being done by the South Korean troops and sometimes by the Americans." Several American periodicals had reported brutal treatment of North Koreans, especially by South Koreans.
3. Syngman Rhee, who, following the capture of Seoul on 28 June by the North Korean forces, had set up the headquarters of the South Korean Government at Taegu, about ninety miles south of Seoul, was once again vested by MacArthur on 29 September 1950 with civil responsibility for the Republic of Korea.

seems to me to be an affront to public opinion and to decency⁴ and it is largely as a consequence of this that these atrocities are probably taking place. We take the strongest exception to the U.N. flag being besmirched in this way and the U.N.'s reputation suffering, because ultimately the United Nations are responsible for what is being done in Korea. We should like you to explain our viewpoint to U.S.A. and U.K. representatives as well as to Secretary-General, United Nations. This may be done informally for the present. I might add that it is no excuse to say that North Koreans have also indulged in atrocities.

4. Suspected dissidents and prisoners held during the Yosu rebellion in South Korea in November 1948 were treated brutally by officials of the Rhee Government.

34. Cable to B.N. Rau¹

Your telegram No. 343 dated 6th October.² Before coming to our decision not to join the Commission, we had considered matter from every point of view and see no reason to alter our view. We are far more likely to help cause of peace and United Nations by staying out of the Commission than by joining it, especially in view of circumstances in which it has been set up, and also its composition.³ I have received no message from Bevin on the subject.

1. New Delhi, 7 October 1950. J.N. Collection.
2. Rau stated that the British and other delegations believed that India, having made her position clear, by joining UNCURK might be able to influence it from within.
3. The eight-power resolution provided for the establishment of UNCURK with Australia, Chile, the Netherlands, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand and Turkey as members.

35. To Chief Ministers¹

New Delhi
October 8, 1950

My dear Chief Minister,

In my last fortnightly letter² I pointed out to you that the international situation

1. J.N. Collection. Also printed in G. Parthasarathi (ed.), *Jawaharlal Nehru: Letters to Chief Ministers 1947-1964*, Vol.2 (New Delhi, 1986), pp. 222-223.
2. See *post*, pp. 543-551.

was grave. Subsequent developments have brought matters to a head and it is quite possible that within the next day or two other serious consequences might follow. The United Nations has clearly decided now that the United Nations forces in Korea, which are primarily U.S.A. forces, should cross the 38th parallel into North Korea. The People's Government of China has also apparently decided and have announced that in the event of American forces entering North Korea, Chinese forces will also enter Korea. These two rival forces converging on each other may well come into conflict and lead to war on a larger scale than at present. That, as you will realize, has far-reaching consequences, and might lead to world conflagration. All this need not happen immediately but it may not also be delayed.

Naturally, we cannot be certain of what will happen and it cannot be wholly ruled out that wiser and saner counsels might prevail. Nevertheless, we have to realize that we are on the verge of a crisis which the world has feared for so long. We have to be prepared for anything that might happen. So far as we are concerned, we shall try our utmost to keep out of any extension of military operations that might take place, but there are bound to be reactions in India to these serious developments elsewhere and I want you and your Government not only to keep wide awake in regard to internal developments but to plan ahead for any such conceivable development, so that you may not be taken by surprise. This applies not only to the law and order position, but even more so to economic consequences. We have to function calmly and without allowing excitement to fill people's minds.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

36. To B.V. Keskar¹

New Delhi
October 9, 1950

My dear Balakrishna,

I have today received four letters from you by the bag. They are dated September 22nd, 26th and two dated October 3rd. I do not know why they have taken such a long time in coming. I find that the ordinary air mail is very much faster.

1. J.N. Collection. Extracts.

Since you wrote your letters much has happened and, I fear, much more may happen by the time you get my reply. I am quite convinced that the policy the United States have been following, more specially in regard to China, has been very harmful. Even if we escape big-scale trouble in the near future, the hatred and ill will of a vast country like China is not a price which any country should be willing to pay. And it is not merely China. Generally speaking, other countries of South East Asia, notably Indonesia and Burma, sympathise with China. In India there is a great deal of criticism of the U.S. in the U.N. Indeed, many people criticise our policy also as inclining too much towards the U.S. policy.

You say that many delegations point out that our approach is merely a negative one. That is partly true, but only partly so. If you read some of the telegrams we have sent to Bevin, the U.K. Foreign Secretary, which were repeated to B.N. Rau, you will find that we are positive enough though we did not wish to go into details. We did not think it worthwhile to put forward a formal proposal which would not have the support of the principal Powers and a great majority of the delegations in the U.N.² Any such proposal could not merely be an expression of opinion; it would have meant the assumption of responsibility in Korea. We are obviously not in a position to assume that responsibility.

We are convinced that a great deal of subsequent trouble and confusion have resulted from the persistent refusal of the U.N. to admit China. It is no good asking us to take that as an accomplished fact and then try to do something effective. But, even apart from that, it is perfectly clear to us that the Korean problem cannot be satisfactorily solved without the active, or at least the passive, concurrence of China. Even a military victory there will not solve it otherwise. Therefore, any proposal of ours could only be based on associating China in some way or other with the future disposal of the Korean problem. In the circumstances any such proposal had little chance of success. We did not rule out military operations or the crossing of the 38th parallel, but we did say that certain other steps should be taken before the U.N. forces entered North Korea. Those steps would have involved an attempt to bring China into the picture. If that attempt failed for no fault of ours, then the U.N. would have been on stronger ground in taking further action. Anyhow, this is past history.

2. Keskar wrote from New York on 3 October that the Norwegian, some Arab and a few other delegations at the General Assembly constantly enquired whether India had any plan which would ease the tension, reassure the Chinese, and help to achieve a united Korea.

As you point out in your letter, it is becoming far too obvious that the U.N. is being used by the U.S. to give cover to their policy.³ Their South and Central American battalions line up wherever wanted. Many of the European countries are too much beholden to the U.S. to take a different line. This applies to some extent to the U.K. also. Obviously this is a very unsatisfactory state of affairs. More specially, when the U.S. is suffering from a war hysteria and its policy governed by the coming elections. Are we to be swept hither and thither because Americans are excited or are thinking about their elections?

I am afraid the U.S.A., whatever the result of the military operations in Korea, will have a rude awakening sometime or other. I cannot see any good out of their present policy. It is a policy of a destructive nation which can think only in military terms. MacArthur is a true symbol of that policy.

It is a little surprising that Palar should not mention India when he gave expression to his thanks in the U.N. on behalf of Indonesia.⁴ This may have been an oversight. Even so, it was not too good a sign. The new Government in Indonesia is rather different from the old.

It is difficult to say now whether a visit from the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister of Israel to India next year will be desirable or not.⁵ Ordinarily we would welcome such a visit, but many things are happening in the world and we cannot plan for the future too rigidly. Our recognition of Israel has naturally given a shock to the Arab countries. If eminent representatives of the Israel Government came here soon, that would mean the development of closer bonds with Israel. It is obvious that if the Prime Minister of Israel comes here, he should be treated as such. We cannot deal with such a visit in a casual manner. On the whole, I think we should wait and see before we fix up anything....

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. Keskar thought the U.S.A. had "a definite feeling" that major complications would be avoided if the 38th parallel was crossed under some disguise, and therefore the entry of only the South Korean army was highlighted. The Americans were confident that with an overwhelming majority in the U.N. they could bring the region beyond the 38th parallel under their effective control.
4. Speaking in the General Assembly on 28 September, the day Indonesia was admitted to the U.N., L.N. Palar, the representative of Indonesia, expressed his special gratitude to the Governments and peoples of India and Australia, supported by the Philippines, Pakistan and Burma, who had taken up Indonesia's case in the U.N. But Keskar wrote that most delegations wondered why Palar had not made any mention of India or Nehru.
5. M. Sharett, Foreign Minister of Israel, told Keskar that Ben-Gurion, Prime Minister of Israel, and he himself wished to visit India on a goodwill mission if it was not considered objectionable or embarrassing by Nehru.

37. The Situation in East Asia¹

Jawaharlal Nehru: As there has been some misapprehension about our policy in regard to Korea and the situation in the Far East, I should like to make this clear.

2. First of all, I would like to repeat what I have often said before, that we are not seeking or attempting to achieve the leadership of Asia or of any group of nations. Asia is a vast continent, including in its scope great countries with ancient cultures, with many dynamic movements and different problems in different areas. To talk of Asia as a political unit is misleading. It is our good fortune to be on friendly terms with the various countries of Asia, even though we differ from them in many ways and sometimes pursue different policies. We seek to understand each other and we feel that perhaps we are in a better position to have that understanding than people in other continents with entirely different backgrounds. The common features of Asia today are a reaction from the previous colonial regime, a resurgent nationalism, agrarian movements, a desire to get rid of our economic backwardness, and a passionate urge for freedom. In varying degrees these urges are found in different parts of Asia.

3. Generally speaking, the countries of Asia are developing or wish to develop democratic institutions. Most of them are opposed to totalitarianism as represented either by communism or fascism. The idea of social justice, as embodied in communism, attracts many people, but at the same time the ideology and the methods of Communist parties have been greatly disliked and have come into conflict with democratic nationalism. World communism, in its expansionist phase, just as any other expansionist movement, is considered a danger to peace and freedom. It appears, however, sometimes in the guise of a liberating movement.

4. This problem has at times its military aspects, but fundamentally we feel that it is a problem of winning the understanding and goodwill of the masses of the people. Unless the people have some hope in the future held out to them, they seek other remedies. To think of the military issue only is to misunderstand the problem.

5. We do not think that it is inevitable for world conflict to take place between the democratic world and the communist world. Every effort should be made to avoid it, because the result of such a major conflict will be disastrous for the entire world. Given a period of peace, the inner weaknesses of any system will show themselves and there will be a tendency for each country to evolve on the lines best suited to its existing conditions and genius. Therefore, it is of paramount importance to avoid world war. In avoiding it, any aggression cannot be tolerated

1. Press conference, New Delhi, 16 October 1950. File No. 43(102)/50-PMS.

because that in itself leads ultimately to the war we wish to avoid. Aggression has to be met by military or other means, but military means should only be used when other means are not available. Otherwise, a war mentality comes into play and takes command of the situation and other methods are ruled out. Our country's history during the past thirty years shows that we do not follow a policy of appeasement and that we stand up against what we consider evil, whatever the consequences. But we have always left the door open for conciliation and a peaceful approach. We try to adapt this policy in the international sphere.

6. We have attached great importance to the United Nations because it held out the hope of international cooperation. This organisation was started by President Roosevelt and others as a special forum where all nations, even those holding different and contrary views, should meet together and try to find some common way of action. Any attempt to change the basic nature of this organisation, by excluding some nations, has far-reaching results and we are opposed to it.

7. Since the beginning of this year, we have felt that it was essential from the point of view of Asia and the world for the new China to be admitted to the United Nations. This had nothing to do with our approval of any policies. It was a recognition of stark reality. To ignore it is to base one's policy on something that does not exist and the consequences, therefore, are necessarily bad. We think that if new China had been admitted into the United Nations at the proper time, the crisis in the Far East might not have arisen, and events might have taken a different turn.

8. When aggression took place in Korea, in accordance with our policy we supported the resolution of the Security Council. But when it was sought to extend the area of operations beyond Korea, we felt this was wrong and we could not associate ourselves with it. We urged even then that the new China should be admitted to the United Nations and the U.S.S.R. should return to the Security Council. This seemed to us of basic importance both in terms of reality and in order to have a peaceful solution. It was patent to us that the U.S.S.R., and even more particularly China, were deeply concerned with the future of a neighbouring territory like Korea and that no satisfactory solution in the Far East could be arrived at by ignoring these two Powers. At no time has India suggested that she would resile from her support of the U.N. resolution about North Korea's aggression. Had the new China been admitted to the United Nations, India would have urged both China and the Soviet to cooperate within that Council in finding a peaceful and just solution of the Korean problem.

9. After the collapse of the North Korean armies in South Korea, we felt that the time had come for an effort to be made for a peaceful solution which could only be based on a unified independent Korea and a fresh election under the auspices of the United Nations. To cross the 38th parallel without making such an effort at a peaceful solution appeared to us to be wrong and to involve grave risks of conflict on a much wider scale.

10. It is with this background that we viewed the two resolutions² which were recently placed before the United Nations Assembly. There were parts of those resolutions with which we were in agreement. There were other parts with which we did not agree. We did not agree with the immediate crossing of the 38th parallel by the armed forces of the U.N. We also did not agree with proposals to create separate armed forces on behalf of the U.N. in each country. This seemed to us a wrong and dangerous approach. It was converting the United Nations into a large edition of the Atlantic Pact and making it a war organisation more than one devoted to international peace. Because of our disagreement with major parts of these resolutions, we could not join the Korean Commission.

11. India has tried to follow in all modesty and humility what she considers the right path and has tried to understand others' viewpoints. She does not claim infallibility of judgment, nor does she recognise such infallibility of judgment and monopoly of rectitude in any other country. It is unreasonable to expect unanimity of opinion on momentous international issues. It is equally unreasonable to seek peace by taking steps which make its realisation more difficult. Disagreement is often softened by a sincere effort at mutual understanding; recrimination only leads to a hardening of differences. The crisis of the world requires every country to search its conscience and to seek ways of action which lead to the peace which we all desire. We cannot sacrifice tomorrow because of the passion of today.

The whole idea behind the U.N. Charter is that you can have police action or military action on a small scale and the United Nations should be prepared for it but that you cannot really take sanctions against very powerful nations without having a world war. The United Nations, by its Charter, tries to avoid a world war in the hope that when people meet and discuss things, they may quarrel but they will not go to war and some way out will be found. If we set aside that approach, then we will find ourselves functioning in a completely different way.

Question: Will India be prepared to help the United Nations resist aggression by force?

JN: Absolutely, to the best of its ability and capacity, but according to its own thought and according to its own views on the subject.

Q: Is there any possibility of India's withdrawal from the United Nations?

JN: In spite of its weaknesses and failings, the United Nations is a powerful force for holding together the world and even though India might disagree with some of its resolutions, we shall try in our own way to press our viewpoint there and

2. The eight-power resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 7 October and the 'Uniting for Peace' resolution introduced in the First Committee on 10 October.

try to influence others. There is, therefore, no question of India's withdrawal from the United Nations.

Q: Is India opposed to the Atlantic and Pacific Pacts?

JN: There is no question of India being opposed to or being in favour of the Atlantic Pact which does not affect her directly but she has not encouraged a Pacific Pact³ and thought that a move in that direction was not a right one.

Q: What are your reactions to the proposal that each member State should keep separate armies reserved for U.N. work?

JN: That will not really make any great difference because every country has an army and almost at a moment's notice a bit of it can be sent. At the moment, obviously the Indian Army is built for defensive purposes and its use outside will be rather a token use. Of course, her infantry can go anywhere and fight well but normally India will be averse to sending the Indian Army outside because it will interfere with her outlook. Much as we dislike a great deal that is happening in the world, we are certainly not in a position, and we have no desire, to function as the policeman of the world.

If India had the capacity and the will to take any action, a bit of her army will be there. But we will object to any bit of our army being under the control of an outside body.

Q: You have stated that crossing the 38th parallel without making an effort for a peaceful solution was wrong and involved grave risks of conflict on a much wider scale. Do you consider that that grave risk has passed?

JN: I should say that those grave risks are somewhat less than they were. I would not say they have passed, but certainly I should say they are less than they appeared to be about, let us say, two weeks ago.

Q: A statement has appeared in a foreign journal that in appealing to the United Nations not to cross the 38th parallel, you acted merely as the mouthpiece of Peking and fell into the trap laid by Peking in your path. Have you anything to say on that?

3. On 11 May 1949 Nationalist China's Ambassador in Washington suggested to Dean Acheson conclusion of a Pacific Pact similar to the Atlantic Pact. Similar suggestions followed soon from Australia and South Korea and the Pacific Defence Pact was eventually signed in San Francisco on 1 September 1951 by Australia, New Zealand and the U.S.A. to meet common danger in case of attack in the Pacific area against any member.

JN: A great deal of the trouble at the present moment in the Far East is due to the obstruction put in the way of China entering the United Nations. It is about time everybody realised it. To me it is as clear as daylight that, whatever the reasons, the refusal to recognise this patent fact of a great Asian country, more solid, more unified and more centralized than at any time in its previous history, is an astounding and amazing phenomenon.

If the foreign policy of any country is based on unreality like that, that foreign policy is wrong and it will lead to unreal and imaginary results. We feel strongly about this. There is no question of likes or dislikes. It is a question of understanding of events that are there.

Having come to that conclusion, we have followed that line throughout and it was natural for us to try to avoid anything which might lead to a major conflict. Naturally, we have been in constant touch with various important governments whether it is in London or Washington or Peking. We have been served well during these difficult months by our ambassadors in these big capitals and other representatives like our Representative in the Security Council, Shri B.N. Rau.

We have conveyed frequently the opinions of one Government to another. Because we happened to be the only country which could function as a kind of window between China and the Western world, a peculiar responsibility came to us and we conveyed what the opinion of that Government was to the others and *vice versa*. But our policy has flown, naturally, from our conviction about China becoming part of the United Nations.

Q: Was it on an apprehension or advice from Peking that China would enter the North Korean fray that India opposed the crossing of the 38th parallel?

JN: You will have seen the statements made by the Chinese Government in public about that.⁴ They have said nothing to us more than that. They conveyed that to us maybe two days before that appeared in public. They still take up that line.

Q: If you are opposed to the crossing of the 38th parallel, what is India's attitude now that it has been crossed?

JN: We did not rule out the crossing of the 38th parallel. We said that the time has come, as a time would come in any war, when the enemy's morale is broken, that we should seize hold of the psychological moment and get peace on satisfactory

4. A spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Ministry denounced on 10 October as "illegal" and "sanguinary" the U.N. resolution of 7 October empowering the U.N. Command to enter North Korea and declared that "the Chinese people cannot stand idly by with regard to such a serious situation as that created by the invasion of Korea by the U.S. and its accomplice countries."

terms. The terms we and they agree to are: a united, independent Korea and free elections under the auspices of the United Nations. It means that the United Nations authority extends for the purpose of free elections to North Korea. We feel that if the psychological moment was seized for peace, it might yield substantial results and the United Nations might have achieved their objective. It is worth while trying it.

Q: A foreign journal has alleged that your attitude towards Korea has been largely governed by exigencies of domestic politics and the loosening grip of your political party on the country. Is there any truth in that?

JN: One of the difficulties of the situation is that it is quite natural for people to think of the domestic politics of another country in terms of their own. Now, we have plenty of difficulties in India, but I can say with complete confidence that no internal question or difficulty or suggestion or hint has come in the way of our fashioning our foreign policy. I do believe that it has the support of, call it what you like, 99 per cent of the population or 99 per cent of the people who think about it in the country. I have no doubt that suggestion (in the journal) is a complete misinterpretation.

Q: What do you think of the Sino-Tibetan negotiations?

JN: I believe that the Chinese Ambassador has advised the Tibetan delegation to carry on further negotiations in Peking⁵ and the Tibetan delegation thereupon has referred the matter to the Government at Lhasa. They are awaiting their reply.

A press report has mentioned the invasion of Tibet by the Chinese forces.⁶ I confess we were rather worried about it. We inquired from both the Chinese and Tibetan sides. Both replied that nothing had happened. In fact, there was some very minor border incident some months ago which has now apparently been told to a newspaperman who has reported it as if a big thing has happened recently.

Q: What are your comments on the present Chinese leadership?

JN: There is no doubt that the Chinese Communist Party are the leaders in the revolution in China and in the Government of China. At the same time, it is stated that the Government is a coalition Government, embodying, so far as numbers are concerned, a majority of non-communist elements. Their policy is devoted entirely to internal politics, especially their economic situation. It has been universally recognized that they are far removed from what might be called the communist policy, although the leaders undoubtedly are communists.

5. See *post*, p. 436.

6. See *post*, p. 431.

Q: Do you not think that the attitude of America towards that country and Asian countries generally is becoming more and more bumptious, arrogant and insolent?

JN: I should imagine, if I may say so, that some of you gentlemen are not lacking in those qualities.

We do not wish to displease the United States or, for the matter of that, any other country, even though we may tell them our differences. Surely, we cannot expect unanimity in regard to important matters of policy, because that will mean regimentation. Now we talk about non-regimentation and the democratic way. Surely, we are not going to bring in the authoritarian way in international relations.

Q: What are the future prospects for the United Nations?

JN: Once the United Nations functions with more or less unanimity, there is no doubt that its will must prevail, backed by military forces. Once it splits up into two huge warring groups, the question of sanctions as such has no meaning and only the question of a world war arises. I can understand the use of military forces by the United Nations in Korea or any other place where aggression takes place. But when it comes to the possibility of a world war, if it comes in spite of us, it has to be faced. But the whole question is whether we try to avoid its coming as far as possible or create conditions where it is more likely to come.

What is happening today is, I believe, an attempt to change the basic character of the U.N. Charter. That is a serious affair because we are going beyond what it was meant to be. I do not say that no change should ever be made—circumstances may compel change sometimes—but it is a very serious thing and not a sort of thing which should be done in a hurry without thinking of all the consequences.

Q: What are your views on capitalism?

JN: The tendency to talk in terms of 'isms' is not good. Capitalism today is very different from what it was two or three generations ago. It is certainly much better, but whether it answers the questions of the day is another matter. Why not think of problems without attaching labels? Ultimately it is the human factor that counts, not the 'isms'. Whether socialism or communism plays a good role or not will also depend a great deal on the mentality of the people running it.

Q: Will the Kashmir issue be settled by war?

JN: I am prepared to declare on behalf of India that in regard to Kashmir we will not take any war-like action unless we are attacked or further aggression takes place. I have had a correspondence with Mr Liaquat Ali Khan on the question of a no-war declaration.

In my correspondence with Mr Liaquat Ali Khan, an offer has been made for a no-war declaration between the two countries, condemning resort to war for the settlement of any existing or future disputes between them. It has been suggested that the settlement of such disputes should always be sought through recognised peaceful methods, such as negotiation or by resort to mediation or arbitration by special agency set up by mutual agreement for the purpose or by agreed reference to some appropriate international body recognised by both of them.

Pakistan's viewpoint has been that such a declaration is too vague and that they should lay down a specific procedure with a time-table for the settlement of each existing or future dispute.

We have pointed out that it is difficult to have the same procedure for disputes of entirely different kinds, some of which may be justiciable and some not. Also that a rigid time-table would defeat its own purpose.

Apart from the general declaration that Pakistan has suggested, the Government of India have made a particular proposal for the settlement of two of our major disputes, those relating to evacuee property and canal waters. A tribunal, consisting of two judges from India and two judges from Pakistan, both of the highest standing, should decide these two disputes and India will abide by any decision they may arrive at. High judicial officers would normally consider any matter placed before them dispassionately and would usually agree. In the event, however, of their not agreeing, it would be for the Governments either to come to a settlement directly or suggest some other ways.

I do not know of any instance where two independent nations have gone further in devising some method for settling their disputes. Our proposal is an eminently practical and reasonable one. If accepted, it would immediately relieve the tensions that now exist between India and Pakistan. I am awaiting a reply from the Prime Minister of Pakistan.

Normally, we do not like any reference of a dispute to a third party and we particularly object to any proposal which brings in the third party at any stage. If special occasion demands we can have a tribunal with outsiders associated with it but to have such permanent arrangement is really derogatory as it makes both India and Pakistan dependent countries. I am not aware of any two independent nations doing that.

I would like to know of any instance in the relationship between two countries where such a far-reaching offer has been made as we have made to Pakistan.

There is an international commission between Canada and the United States dealing with water disputes. We are perfectly prepared to have such a commission. They appoint their own judges and do not import any one from other countries. Let us have an international commission like the one which Canada and the United States have.

Q: What are your comments on Mr Mandal's statement?

JN: Mr Mandal's statement⁷ deals with certain facts and events that have happened between him and the Pakistan Government and deals also with certain inferences. I have naturally nothing to say about his dealings with the Pakistan Government. Nothing in Mr Mandal's statement, so far as I am concerned, throws any real light on the situation, or gives facts which I did not possess previously.

I do not understand what exactly the people want to be done in connection with Mr Mandal's statement, apart from criticising and complaining. Mr Mandal has talked vaguely about two points, namely, that Bengal should become one and alternatively non-Muslims should come away from East Bengal. I do not think either means is the only alternative feasible or desirable. We, therefore, pursue the policy which we have followed, varying it and making adjustments from time to time. The basic fact is not East Bengal or West Bengal. Apart from certain economic factors, it is the relationship between India and Pakistan resulting from Partition and all that has followed. That is the upsetting factor leading to all kinds of changes, political, economic and psychological. That is the continuous irritant to normality coming back.

The conditions in East Bengal and West Bengal on the whole are improving. I regret that some time ago the Kashmir agitation, especially in East Bengal, was entirely so misconceived that we feared that it might upset the movement towards normality. We have, however, overcome it and progress is being made. A very marked change has come over the Bengal situation in the last month. People are returning to their own homes in a much larger number than before—both Hindus and Muslims. On the whole, on an average over 1,000 to 1,500 more Hindus are going back to East Bengal than those who are coming to West Bengal. I should imagine that 20,000 to 30,000 more Hindus have gone back during the last month.

There are many reasons why they go. One of the reasons may be that we have not been able to rehabilitate them here and that they have not got the facilities they hoped for. The fact is that there is not only in East Bengal but in West Bengal and other provinces plenty of unemployment. A large number of Muslims are returning to West Bengal because the economic situation there is bad. One of the main tests that we have applied in regard to migration is taking effect now. The Hindus are going back to East Bengal in a larger number. That does not mean that conditions in East Bengal are very satisfactory and need no improvement.

7. Jogendra Nath Mandal, the only Hindu Minister in the Pakistan Cabinet who resigned on 8 October 1950 on the issue of the treatment of Hindus especially in East Bengal, had stated in his letter of resignation that he had drawn Liaquat Ali's attention to the "barbarous atrocities perpetrated by police on frivolous grounds" and the anti-Hindu policy of the provincial Government, but no action had been taken.

Q: Why is the trade between India and Pakistan not resuming?

JN: There is no question of not resuming the trade.⁸ Continually some kinds of attempts are being made but finally the resumption depends upon the exchange question. It may be decided in the course of a month. If that is decided trade will flow immediately. Even then there is no reason why some efforts should not be made to relieve tension somehow in regard to trade.

Q: What were the reasons that induced you to change your mind not to join the Congress Working Committee?

JN: Whether I join the Working Committee or not is not important. What is important to my mind is that a certain policy is to be pursued in the country by the Congress and by the Government.

The Nasik Congress has laid down or confirmed certain policies which obviously applied to the Congress and which also applied to the Government in so far as they concerned the Government. The test for any action that I may take is how best to pursue those policies not only in the Government but in the country through the Congress or otherwise. I have to judge it from that point of view. If I feel that those policies will be helped by my being in the Working Committee, I am there. If I feel that I will help them by not being in the Working Committee, but cooperating with the Working Committee, I go outside. If I am in the Working Committee and if I find at any time that I will help those policies by remaining outside, I will go outside.

It is a question of balancing and seeing how best to achieve certain results in the country. It is not an easy thing to do and I have to take into consideration numerous factors.

Q: Do you have any assurance from the Congress President that the Working Committee will pursue the policy laid down at Nasik?

JN: I do not require the Congress President to tell me that he will follow the Nasik Congress decisions. If he does not, he goes against the mandate of the Congress and he gets into trouble.

8. Trade between India and Pakistan was deadlocked as a result of Pakistan Government's refusal to follow India's decision to devalue Indian rupee *vis-a-vis* U.S. dollar in line with the Sterling on 18 September 1949 and also because of her decision of 22 September not to transact any business in Indian currency pending completion of new arrangements with the Reserve Bank of India. A short-term barter agreement concluded in Karachi in April 1950 expired on 30 September 1950.

38. Message to C.R. Attlee¹

I thank you for the personal message² which you have sent me through your High Commissioner in New Delhi. I would welcome an opportunity of meeting you and the other Prime Ministers of Commonwealth countries to discuss the present international situation. The preservation of peace, in the distracted world of today, is of vital importance. While each country can help to the extent of its ability in this task, there can be little doubt that the Commonwealth as a whole can help greatly in this work.

My only difficulty is the time suggested for the Conference. During the first half of December, our Parliament will be meeting here and will be considering important matters. Normally I should be present here during that period. But in view of the importance of a Commonwealth meeting of Prime Ministers, I shall make every effort to attend it.

I agree with you that there should be no publicity about this proposed meeting until some decision has been taken.

The agenda that is suggested³ is fairly comprehensive. I would personally suggest that it would be better, in accordance with the previous practice, not to have a formal agenda. All that is necessary is to say that the Conference will discuss the international situation in all its aspects.

1. New Delhi, 25 October 1950. J.N. Collection.
2. Attlee suggested on 24 October a meeting of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers in the first half of December to discuss the international situation. He stated, "At such a time as the present it seems prudent that we should take counsel together," and hoped that the meeting "would exert a steadying influence on the distracted world."
3. Archibald Nye was asked to communicate to Nehru a tentative agenda for the meeting.

1. To V.K. Krishna Menon¹

New Delhi
August 18, 1950

My dear Krishna,

A minor sensation has been caused here by Reuter's report of what you are supposed to have said at a press conference in regard to Tibet.² From your telegram it appears that there was no press conference but an informal talk after lunch which was off the record. Also that the text as sent to us by Reuter's is not a correct version of the answers given. I hope you will send us a correct report.

Tibet is a very ticklish issue. We have to proceed rather cautiously in regard to it and we did not want it stated in public that we have been addressing the Chinese Government on this subject. They are sensitive and this itself might create an undesirable reaction in them.

On the other hand, our own position in Tibet can hardly be described in the terms that the press report stated.³ It is true that we recognise Chinese suzerainty but at the same time we recognise Tibetan autonomy and the two went together so far as we were concerned. What happens in the future, I do not know; but we do wish Tibetan autonomy to continue under some kind of Chinese suzerainty. Tibet is very different from China proper and there is some dislike between the two. The right solution appears, therefore, to be Tibetan autonomy. What happens in Tibet immediately affects some of our border States, like Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim. As it is, there is tension in these States.

For some time past, I have been asked questions about Tibet at press conferences. I have answered them rather vaguely and tried to avoid any direct commitment. Now, since the publication of the Reuter's message from London, press correspondents are pestering us or rather embarrassing us for a clear declaration of our policy in regard to Tibet. We do not intend any such clear declaration because whatever we may say may be embarrassing either from a Chinese or a Tibetan point of view. Anything that we might say to the Chinese loses its effect to some extent if any public reference is made to it.

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Krishna Menon was quoted as saying that "our views have been made known to the Chinese Government but it would not be correct to say that there have been *demarches* from the Indian side. Whatever advice we give to China on the Tibetan question would be in the direction of moderation irrespective of legal rights."

3. The report stated that "India's position in Tibet was rather peculiar. She was the only country represented at the Tibetan capital. But the Indian representative was there in an 'undefined capacity' and was more or less the successor of the original British representative." It added that India, like Britain, recognised Chinese suzerainty.

In any event, please send us a correct report of what you said so that we may deal with this matter when it arises.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

2. Cable to K.M. Panikkar¹

As you know, it has been our earnest desire to prevent any spread of hostilities beyond Korea and, if possible, to help in ending Korean war. How this can be done and whether anything effective can be done at present moment is another matter. But we are continually exploring situation and trying to do our best. Because we have taken up a somewhat independent attitude large numbers of people all over the world look up to India to save them from the horrors of world war.

2. We have based our policy on the full recognition of the People's Government of China and her admission in the United Nations. We have disapproved of the American declaration in regard to Formosa and, to some extent because of our efforts, the American State Department has moderated its position regarding Formosa.² We recognise China's claim to Formosa and the strong desire of the Chinese Government and people to take some steps in regard to Formosa.

3. Apart from the merits, however, it is clear that any attempt on the part of China to invade Formosa in near future is likely to lead to a major war and possibly even world war. That would be a very serious development, which will ultimately do no good to any party concerned, including China. Out of world war, no good is going to emerge. Therefore, with all our friendly sentiments for China, we feel that any development leading to war on a big scale would be exceedingly unwise. For the present, fear of world war has receded, except for the Formosa question. It would be a tragedy if the Chinese Government, in an attempt even to advance what it considers its just claims, should precipitate this catastrophe. We earnestly trust therefore that People's Government of China will show its strength and wisdom in restraining itself at present. World opinion is now considering this matter more objectively and will undoubtedly appreciate any restraint on the part of China.

1. New Delhi, 19 August 1950. J.N. Collection.

2. Truman stated on 19 July that the U.S.A. had "no territorial ambition whatsoever" concerning Formosa and its military neutralization during the Korean war was without prejudice to political questions affecting it which should be settled by peaceful means as envisaged in the U.N. Charter.

4. In regard to Tibet, you know that we want to help in a friendly settlement, which should aim at the autonomy of Tibet being recognised together with Chinese suzerainty. But apart from this, this invasion of Tibet³ might well upset the present unstable equilibrium and let loose dangerous forces. Some of our border States will be affected. But I am more concerned with the larger issues which this involves. Again, for the sake of preserving peace generally, it seems to me path of wisdom for Chinese Government not to precipitate conflict when especially the Tibetan Government is eager to discuss matters with China with view to settlement.⁴ It is perfectly clear that no external power, and certainly not the U.S. or the U.K., is interfering or can interfere in Tibet. They have not even a representative there and no means of direct contact. The position therefore is quite safe from this point of view and nothing harmful can possibly occur. Delay in any positive action may lead to a much more enduring settlement with goodwill and will redound to China's credit.

5. I have fully appreciated what you have said about the situation in China. But I feel that I should let you know how we view this matter. We are anxious to proceed in a manner friendly to China and to cooperate with her as far as possible. You have informed us that President Mao has strong feeling for Asia. It is from this point of view especially that I have tried to consider this question. We should like a number of Asian countries to cooperate with us in our attempts to maintain peace and to prevent the conflicts of the major Powers from pushing the world towards destruction. China can play a vital role in this.

It is for you to decide in what manner you can best put forward these viewpoints to the Chinese Government.⁵ In view of urgency and possibility of events overtaking us delay is undesirable.

3. According to unconfirmed reports reaching Hong Kong on 8 August, Chinese forces had begun advancing towards the borders of Tibet.
4. The Tibetan Government proposed to send a delegation for talks with the Chinese authorities on the future political status of Tibet.
5. After his meeting with Chou En-lai on 22 August 1950, Panikkar telegraphed that Chou appreciated Nehru's efforts but thought that the United States was determined to enlarge the field of conflict. Panikkar felt that China would not take extreme action on Formosa unless she was directly threatened. Chou seemed greatly concerned about reports that Nepalese military units had gone to the assistance of Tibet, and expected India to prevent them "from entering on such an adventure." While China would welcome a Tibetan delegation to Peking, she would not agree to any solution limiting Chinese sovereignty. Panikkar was convinced that China would not take military action unless the Tibetans proved too obdurate.

3. To K.M. Panikkar¹

New Delhi
September 2, 1950

My dear Panikkar,

We have received several very interesting reports from you. The last of these came with your letter of the 2nd August. I have not written to you myself because I did not know that courier service had been established. So I contented myself with sending you telegrams.

Your letters as well as your reports have been extraordinarily interesting and instructive. It is obvious that what is happening in China, whether we like it or not, is of the highest significance. I have been sending some of your reports to all the members of the Cabinet and sometimes to our Chief Ministers of States.

The situation changes so rapidly that one can only deal with it by telegram, and anything one may write might well be out of date. You must have received copies of the speeches I delivered in Parliament² here during the foreign affairs debate last month. I tried to explain and clarify what our foreign policy has been and is. On the whole, I created an impression on most people. There are, of course, some who just cannot understand anything but a crude lining up with this or that Power.

It is obviously a difficult situation for all of us. I think, on the whole, that India's prestige has gone up during the last two months. That does not mean that we are liked greatly, but, at any rate, we are respected and our integrity is to some extent recognised. This casts a special burden upon us.

I have been repeatedly suggesting to you to point out to the Chinese Government that it would be most unfortunate if they indulged in any warlike operation either against Formosa or Tibet. I can well understand their feelings in these matters, but I am convinced that it is to their advantage as well as to the advantage of the world that they should bide their time a little and not give cause to their enemies to say that China has aggressive and expansionist ideas. It is immaterial whether that charge is true or not and there can be no doubt that China has particular rights in Formosa and Tibet. But it is clear to me that in the delicate world situation today it would be disadvantageous to China to take any such step. On the whole opinion is veering round all over the world in favour of China, and more especially in favour of China's entry into the U.N. Whether this can take place or not soon depends upon many factors and notably the attitude of the U.S.A. I believe that even in the U.S.A. there is a growing feeling that it might be harmful to their own interests to prevent China from coming into the U.N. But if China takes any aggressive action, however justified, there is no doubt that the question of entry

1. J.N. Collection.

2. See *ante*, pp. 333-360.

into the U.N. will for the moment be decided against her and other far-reaching consequences will follow. The militarist element in the U.S. will play this up for all it is worth and seek to make it a further pretext for any action that they may wish to take. Future historians will decide as to who is the guilty party and who is the aggressor. But, for the moment, this question will have little value for, if world war comes, these minor pre-war episodes will sink into insignificance. Therefore it is not much good to have legal and constitutional arguments to justify a particular course of action which, in effect, leads to a worsening of the international situation and probably to war. The ultimate test should be the preservation of peace in the world as a whole. That of course does not mean that we should surrender any legitimate claim. Time is very much in favour of China and I do not see why they should not take advantage of this fact. The Chinese are a wise and far-seeing race and not liable to hysteria. Therefore we feel that this approach should be clearly placed before them.

So far as Tibet is concerned, we know our position. We claim no special political or other rights. We recognise the suzerainty of China. But we certainly feel that for the good of all concerned Tibet should retain autonomy. Also, naturally, that our interests there, which are in no way adverse to China, should continue.

I attach great importance to India and China being friends. I think the future of Asia and to some extent of the world depends upon this. I am looking forward to meeting the Chinese Ambassador who will be here within a week or so.

India has had a succession of very grave calamities during the last few months. There have been many serious floods. But the biggest disaster of all has been the Assam earthquake. I imagine that this earthquake must have shaken up a bit of Tibet also. I am going to Assam day after tomorrow for a few days for an aerial survey of the affected area.

You will remember writing to me about your visit to Madame Sun Yat-sen. You mentioned that she had suggested my going to China.³ You also said that you had thrown out a hint that she might come to India. In my reply to you I said that perhaps the present moment might not be a suitable one for her to come. But if she really wants to come here, we would welcome her. The best time would be the next winter.

A British M.P. was here the other day and in the course of my talk with him I mentioned this fact of Madame Sun having suggested my visit to China. I forgot at the time that he was a newspaper correspondent also representing Reynolds. To my surprise and embarrassment, two days later, I found our talk reproduced in the form of an interview,⁴ and this led to all kinds of speculations about my going to China almost immediately. We had to announce that I have no such present

3. Madame Sun Yat-sen had suggested this when Panikkar met her in Shanghai on 8 August 1950.

4. For Nehru's interview with Tom Driberg, see *ante*, pp. 370-372.

intention. Of course, I would like to go to China, but I do not see when that can come about. There was some talk of my going to Lake Success, but I discouraged the idea. It may be that if some special crisis arises there and I feel that my presence might be helpful, then I might think of going. But it is difficult to leave India when we have a large number of serious political and economic problems facing us.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. Conversation with the Tibetan Delegation¹

Mr Shakabpa, the leader of the Tibetan delegation, referred to the importance of Tibet to both India and China and said that his Government wished to maintain their friendship with both these countries. Tibetans wish to continue their present religious way of life. Like every race, they had a right to their independence and they looked to the Prime Minister for help. The Prime Minister said that India could only give friendly advice to China. She had already done so by asking China that the problem of Tibet should be settled in a peaceful manner. India has also advised China of her interest in the autonomy of Tibet and of her desire that her interests in Tibet, which are cultural and commercial but not political domination, should be maintained. The Chinese have expressed their willingness for a peaceful solution and to that end have invited Tibetans to send a delegation to Peking.

On the question of the venue of the talks, there was a long discussion. Mr Shakabpa said that they were afraid that, if they went to Peking, they would not have much freedom to negotiate and that the talks would be a one-sided affair. They had, therefore, no desire to go to Peking. They had said so to the Chinese Charge d'Affaires² and they proposed saying it to the Chinese Ambassador too when they meet him. Mr Shakabpa asked for India's help in this direction. The Prime Minister enquired why they should be reluctant to go to Peking now when they were willing to go there three or four months ago. Mr Shakabpa explained

1. Record of conversation with the Tibetan delegation, New Delhi, 8 September 1950. J.N. Collection.
2. The Tibetan delegation met Shen Chi-en, the Chinese Charge d'Affaires in New Delhi, on 6 September.

that they had instructions then to go to Hong Kong only and not to Peking. The Chinese had agreed to send a representative to Hong Kong to talk to them, with the understanding that all important questions would be referred by him to Peking. The Prime Minister told them that although India was perfectly agreeable to Delhi being the venue, it was not for him to suggest this to the Chinese. As the parties to the proposed talks, it was for China and Tibet to settle where the talks should be held. In this connection the Prime Minister referred to the refusal of the British to give visas for talks in Hong Kong. This was because they did not like to give the impression that they were taking part in the talks.

Mr Shakabpa stated that his Government had written to the Chinese Government suggesting Delhi as the venue. This letter had been returned from Hong Kong, probably by the post office. Similarly, a telegram containing the same suggestion had failed to reach Peking. The message had, however, been given to the 'guide' who had been sent by the Chinese Government to Hong Kong to meet them.

Mr Shakabpa pointed out that on a previous occasion talks on Tibet were held on Indian territory—the reference was clearly to the Simla Convention—and wondered why this could not be arranged now. The Prime Minister repeated that it was not possible for India to urge Peking to hold the talks in Delhi. This would mean that India had a dominant position over China and Tibet. It was different thirty or forty years ago when China was weak. The Prime Minister explained that the Tibetans were perfectly free to insist on talks being held in Delhi but if, as was likely, the Chinese did not agree, there would be no talks and the chance of a peaceful settlement of the Tibetan problem would disappear. The possible alternative would be an armed invasion of Tibet by China. In a peaceful settlement we can give Tibet diplomatic support but we cannot give any help in the event of an invasion. Nor can any other country. It is for the Tibetans to make their choice between war and a peaceful settlement but in doing so they should clearly understand the consequences of their choice.

The Prime Minister told the delegation that his own advice would be that when they meet the Ambassador they should not refuse his invitation to go to Peking but should ask for some preliminary talks in Delhi as a prelude to their visit to Peking. If the preliminary talks are not agreed to, the Prime Minister advised, the delegation should go to Peking making it clear that they will have to refer to their Government for instructions from time to time and asking for assurance from the Chinese Government of personal safety and facilities to return to Tibet.

The Prime Minister also advised the delegation that, wherever the talks might be held, it would not be much use talking to the Chinese in terms of complete independence; talks could proceed only on the basis of Tibetan autonomy under the suzerainty of China. The leader of the delegation replied that they had no authority from their Government even to accept Chinese suzerainty. He said that the Chinese Charge d'Affaires had told them that Tibet is under China and that China intended stationing troops in Tibet and taking over her foreign relations.

This disclosed that the Chinese views are diametrically opposed to the views of the Tibetans. Only if the differences could be narrowed down in Delhi, Mr Shakabpa said, he would not mind going to Peking. The Prime Minister repeated his advice that they should not be afraid to go to Peking and with this the interview ended.³

3. The Tibetan delegation, when it called on the Chinese Ambassador in Delhi on 30 September 1950, was advised to proceed to Peking for further negotiations. The Chinese Ambassador declined to discuss with it the question of future relations between Tibet and China as he was not empowered to conclude any agreement.

5. Cable to K.M. Panikkar¹

Your telegram 260 dated 18th October.² While we appreciate the reasons that you have given, we still feel that our position should be clarified before the Chinese Government. Foreign Secretary has spoken to Chinese Ambassador here on lines we suggested to you. We know very well what China's claims have been in Tibet in the past. We are not entering into their merits. It is quite clear to us that any invasion of Tibet by Chinese troops will have serious consequences in regard to their position in the United Nations. It will strengthen the hands of the enemies of China and weaken those who are supporting China's cause there. Easy success in Tibet, which can be had at any time later, will not counterbalance loss in international sphere. We have no ulterior considerations in this matter as we have pointed out. Our primary consideration is maintenance of world peace and reducing tensions so that all questions can be considered in a more normal atmosphere. Recent developments in Korea have not strengthened China's position which will be further weakened by any aggressive action in Tibet.

We might remind you of our position in regard to French and Portuguese possessions in India. Their legal position is, we know, different from that of Tibet,

1. New Delhi, 19 October 1950. J.N. Collection.
2. Panikkar thought that a fresh representation to China was not called for in view of lack of confirmation of presence of Chinese troops in Tibet. Reference to India's efforts on behalf of China in the U.N. during discussion on the Tibetan matter would suggest "ulterior considerations" as he had so far supported China's case on merits. China would be prepared for negotiations in deference to India's wishes to settle the question peacefully and the Tibetan delegation should be asked to proceed to Peking forthwith.

but, to the world at large, Tibetan autonomy is a reality not to be swept aside by force of arms. We are convinced that Goa and Pondicherry must come to us and it is easy for us to seize them by military means. But we have deliberately refrained from doing so because of larger considerations. We do not understand the occasion for urgency and immediate military action in Tibet, when international situation is so delicate and no harm can result by delay in an attempt to seek settlement by negotiation.

What the actual position on the borders is appears doubtful and you can find out. According to Lhasa report, Chamdo is not yet in Chinese hands, but threatened, though Chinese troops are reported to have entered what, according to our maps, is Tibetan territory. But, in any event, it seems necessary that our position should be clarified to the Chinese Government. We cannot afford to have our world policy injuriously affected without at least trying our best to inform the Chinese Government in a friendly way of what we think is right and what is wrong. That world policy is based, apart from preservation of peace, on friendly relations between China and India as well as between China and other countries and United Nations.

We feel therefore that you should draw attention of Chinese Government in a suitable manner to the various considerations we have mentioned here and in previous telegram on the lines that we have indicated.

6. Cable to K.M. Panikkar¹

Your telegram 263 dated 21st October.² Our information from Lhasa is that Chinese forces are still advancing and Riwoche, Dzokangdzong, Markhan and Chamdo have fallen. Also that Lhodzong is expected to fall soon. Unless it is clear that these forces are halted and there is no imminent danger of invasion of Tibet, there is little chance of Tibetan delegation proceeding to Peking. We have been

1. New Delhi, 22 October 1950. J.N. Collection.
2. Panikkar reported that he had conveyed to Chang Han-fu, the Chinese Vice Foreign Minister, the views of the Indian Government. Chang reiterated his Government's resolve to "liberate" Tibet and said that they were still waiting for the Tibetan delegation to arrive, though some interested party was "opposing and obstructing" a negotiated settlement. Panikkar felt that if the Chinese suspicions regarding American or British influence on the delegation were confirmed, they would act with "lightning rapidity." He also said that the point about China losing international goodwill was not well taken.

pressing them to go but cannot continue doing so in view of military movements threatening invasion.

I confess I am completely unable to understand urgency behind Chinese desire to "liberate" when delay cannot possibly change situation to her disadvantage. Anglo-Americans, no doubt, dislike idea of China spreading out right up to Indian frontier but they are not in a position to do anything about it. Everyone including Tibetan delegation knows that. It seems to me that aggressive elements in United States would welcome Chinese military action against Tibet, as this would enable them to justify their policy regarding China in the U.N. and elsewhere. Such a development would undoubtedly play into the hands of war-mongers in every country.

It is quite easy to understand Tibetan hesitation and delay because they are afraid of China, and latter dictating terms which will amount to complete surrender of autonomy which Tibet has enjoyed during last four decades. They have no knowledge how to deal with other countries. Nevertheless, they were prepared to go to China when fresh news of invasion frightened them. Tibetan National Assembly, which is summoned on occasions of national emergency, has been in session in Lhasa since 19th October.

Chinese Ambassador here has fully appreciated our viewpoint. I can only express my regret that Chinese Government has not done so and attaches more importance to solutions by force and lightning strokes than to slower but more enduring methods of peaceful approach. More particularly, in present context of world events, Chinese invasion of Tibet would be deplorable and, we are convinced, not in the interest of China or of peace. Unless Chinese Government halt progress of their forces and give assurance for peaceful negotiations we cannot help in this matter any further.

7. To K.M. Panikkar¹

New Delhi
October 25, 1950

My dear Panikkar,

I have received your letter of the 27th September together with your note on Soviet influence in China. I have read this note, as I have read your other notes, with great interest. We are anxious to make a correct appraisal of the developing situation in China, not only from the point of view of the present crisis, but also from a long-term point of view. Your notes have helped us greatly in doing this.

1. J.N. Collection.

We are wrapped up at present in day to day developments. Nevertheless, the major fact in my mind is the future relationship of India and China, even apart from the present crisis. There can be no doubt that the future of Asia and to some extent of other parts of the world also depends upon this relationship. In the distant past India and China spread out in various cultural activities in South East Asia. Each exercised a powerful influence and had left its influence on the countries of South East Asia. They did not come into conflict with each other but there was, I suppose, some kind of rivalry, even though unconsciously, between the two over this wide area.

Then came the period of colonialism and both, India and China, in their different ways, shrunk into their respective shells in self-protection. Now that that colonial era has passed, the old tendencies assert themselves and the vital energies and populations of these two countries tend to spread out. Whether this can be done in a peaceful and cooperative way or whether it will lead to some kind of conflict, the future alone can show.

It becomes important thus for us to keep this perspective in view in shaping our policies. China is undoubtedly going to count in this future. So, I think, is India. How do we look at each other? Most people seem to think in terms of the present crisis only. That is important but, I think, that even to understand the present crisis one must look at the past and the future. It is our desire to develop as friendly and cooperative relations with China as is possible in the circumstances. These are necessary from the point of view of the present crisis, and even more so from the point of view of the future. We have shaped our policies accordingly and thereby often offended the Western Powers. Your reports and communications have helped us greatly and I think it may well be said that what we have done has, to some extent, even affected world policy. It is conceivable that but for India world war would have been much nearer.

I have tried to understand Chinese policy with every sympathy and with the background that you have provided us. It was intelligible to me but I must confess that latterly I have been unable to appreciate it fully.

Your urgent and important messages, conveying the views of the Chinese Government sent after the collapse of the North Korean armies, were communicated by us in a somewhat altered form to the U.K. and the U.S.A. These messages said clearly and categorically that any crossing of the 38th parallel by the U.S.A. troops would inevitably bring about a conflict with China. The U.K. and the U.S.A. said that China was bluffing. We said that to us China appears to be deadly serious and in any event the risk should not be taken. Finally, China did not act up to its threat, and the U.K. and the U.S.A. took pleasure in informing us that they had been right when they considered China's warning as mere bluff. I am glad that China did not intervene at that stage and thus prevented the Korean war from assuming huge dimensions. Still, I must confess that this episode has weakened China's prestige to some extent and made people think that she indulges in empty

threats. That is not a good thing; when a like crisis arises again, her warning might not be seriously taken.

China's attitude to Tibet again becomes more and more incomprehensible to me. I know Chinese feelings in the matter of Tibet. This has been continuous for the last thirty or forty years and one can very well understand the new China, full of vitality and vigour, not desiring to wait before giving effect to her wishes in regard to Tibet. Nevertheless, if military operations are started in the near future, it is quite clear to me that they will injure China's interests considerably. It is easy enough for China to overrun Tibet. Indeed, Tibet is hers for the asking at any time almost. When she is in such a favourable position, the need for military action seems to be very remote. In the context of the world today any such action is bound to create a great deal of prejudice against China. It will put an end to our efforts to bring her into the United Nations. It will give a tremendous handle to her enemies, and Korea and Formosa will be affected. If China is aiming at a big conflict, then of course it does not matter much, but if she aims at the preservation of peace with honour, then this does matter. It is no good saying that China does not attach much importance to international opinion. No country, however great or big it might be, can afford to think so.

To repeat that Anglo-American intrigues are taking place in Tibet is to say something which has no foundation in fact. I have no doubt that both, U.K. and the U.S.A., would like Tibet to keep outside the Chinese orbit, but liking is one thing and the capacity to do something about it is another. It is clear that neither the U.K. nor the U.S.A. can influence Tibet policy to any extent.

The mention in your last telegram about Nepal possibly taking action in Tibet is still more fantastic. At no time could Nepal have done so effectively. At the present moment, the Nepalese Government is in grave trouble internally and they could not possibly, even if they wished, embark upon an adventure abroad.

If the Chinese Government distrust India and think that we are intriguing against it with Western Powers, then all I can say is that they are less intelligent than I thought them to be. The whole corner-stone of our policy during the past few months has been friendly relations with China and we have almost fallen out with other countries because of this policy that we have pursued.

You tell us that the foreign policy of China is independent and is not influenced by the U.S.S.R.² That may be so, but whether it is independent or not, there is an identity in foreign policy between China and the U.S.S.R. This is not surprising. Your own note shows that the Chinese Government have adopted the techniques

2. Panikkar had noted that while China had the assurance of firm Soviet support, there was no evidence that the Soviet Union was encouraging her to adopt a more hostile attitude towards the United States. According to Panikkar, China's foreign policy might approximate to what the U.S.S.R. desired to see pursued in Asia, but it was based on an appreciation of her own national interests.

and methods of the Soviets.³ Their sources of information must largely be the Soviet sources.⁴ They are cut off from the rest of the world; so it is not surprising that unconsciously at least they are influenced greatly by the Soviet policy. The prospect of war throws China still more into the lap of the U.S.S.R. If war came then this association will become complete.

If China has taken the decision not to make any further attempt to reach an agreement with the Western Powers, this is unfortunate and in our opinion wrong. No one asks China to barter away any of her rights or her self-respect, but at any moment to say that we do not wish to make any further attempts at an agreement cannot be right. This simply means that China has given up the idea of a peaceful solution of any major problems.

There is a great deal in the U.S.A. policy which I think is wrong. There is much wild talk there and at present there is a full-blooded preparation for war. Nevertheless, I do not think that China is justified in thinking that the U.S. aim at some kind of military campaign against China. There are some elements in the U.S.A. who would like this, but a great majority are opposed to it, or rather it would be truer to say that the great majority can be influenced in either direction. Much would depend on what China herself does. If she has made up her mind for war and if she invades Tibet or takes any other action which is in the nature of an aggression, then that great majority of people will themselves think that China is in the wrong and there is no way out except war. On the other hand, if China acts reasonably, without sacrificing her interests, then vast numbers of peoples in the world, including the U.S.A. and the U.K., will sympathise with her.

I have no doubt in my mind that in the long run China is going to be completely independent and not receptive to Soviet pressure. China cannot become just a satellite country to the Soviet. But for the present what is important is the immediate future. There is the danger of China feeling isolated and convinced of war and, therefore, plunging into all kinds of warlike adventures. That is too grave a risk for any great nation to take.

You have yourself come to the conclusion that a conflict between China and America cannot long be avoided.⁵ I do not think that is inevitable and it would be wrong to consider it inevitable till the last step has been taken.

3. Panikkar wrote that China had adopted most of the Soviet political methods, especially those relating to control of the press and radio, propaganda, extreme secrecy in regard to all activities, treatment of foreigners and diplomatic missions, labour and education.
4. Panikkar wrote that all newspapers in China were strictly controlled. Such external news as was published would be from the New China News Agency, which took its foreign news from Tass.
5. In his letter of 27 September 1950, Panikkar was inclined to think that before the U.S. forces reached the 38th parallel, the Chinese army would probably have moved into North Korea. He did not think that there was anything much that India could do to avert the impending crisis.

North Korea has been smashed and at this stage for China to help her directly, or to start an invasion of Formosa, would be foolish in the extreme from a military or a political point of view. So far as we are concerned, we have laid stress repeatedly on the fact that there can be no proper solution of the Korean problem or of any other in the Far East without China's concurrence.

I have been disappointed to read in your report about the introduction of Soviet pattern in many things in China. This may give some immediate strength, but ultimately it will go a long way towards weakening the country.

You ask in your letter about having a direct wireless service between your Embassy and the Government here.⁶ We are examining this point, but such a service will probably cease automatically if war comes.

I do not expect war in the near future, though there will be plenty of cold war. We must not let our imaginations run away with us. The Chinese especially are not swept off their feet easily.

About Tibet, our position is first of all that our frontiers with Tibet, that is, the McMahon Line, must stand as they are. There is no room for controversy over that issue. Internally in Tibet we earnestly hope that Tibetan autonomy will be recognised under Chinese suzerainty and that we will be allowed to keep our representatives for trade and other purposes in Tibet. Our own advice would be that Tibetan autonomy should not be interfered with. In course of time, Tibet will certainly come nearer to China. A military invasion would not result in such a process of integration and foreign reactions will certainly be most unfavourable.

If unfortunately there is war on a large scale, it will be our earnest endeavour to keep out of it. I cannot guarantee what will happen in the distant future, but our whole policy is to keep out of such a war. I think Burma and Indonesia are likely to do the same. It will be something to have a 'no-war' area in South and South-East Asia.

I believe the Sino-Burmese border in some places has not been clearly defined. This might give rise to trouble between Burma and China. We would strongly urge that this matter may not be taken up now. It can be considered later when dangers of war have passed away. The Burmese Foreign Minister⁷ is here now and I have been discussing these various matters with him. We largely agree. Any attempt to create trouble on the Burmese border would make Thakin Nu's Government completely hostile to China.

6. Panikkar suggested the establishment of direct wireless links between the Embassy and New Delhi on a reciprocal basis with China, as a flare up in the Pacific might cut off communications with India which were then routed *via* Hong Kong.
7. U Sao Hkun Hkio.

Thus whether it is Tibet or any other place our activities can only be diplomatic. There is no reason why we should be apologetic about our policy. By what we have done for China, we have earned the right to be frank. Our viewpoint should, therefore, be put before the Chinese Government fully whenever an occasion arises. If they disagree, we cannot help it, but it should not be said that we did not make our position clear.

I am not writing to you about our internal troubles, which are many. I want to tell you that you have done a fine job in Peking and I want you to continue in the difficult and responsible position which you occupy.

I do not know how far you get information in Peking about the rest of the world. I suppose you have a good deal of information about the Soviets. Possibly, some information may trickle in from the United Kingdom. This is unfortunate, because it prevents you from knowing all the facts and all the currents of opinion that are passing through the world.

It may interest you to know that after a period of an attempt at courting me as "the great leader of Asia", those in authority in the United States, and this includes the State Department and the press, and the radio, have decided to "debunk" me. Word has gone out to do so and, in the course of the last two or three weeks, there has been a succession of virulent attacks on me all over the States. Some of these attacks are quite hysterical. It appears to be a well-organised campaign. Primarily, these attacks are due to our China and Korea policy. With American thoroughness, it is sought to be made out that I have no real influence in India and that in fact I stand rather alone in this policy, most of my colleagues being against it, that I am a kind of Hamlet in Indian politics, that I am an ambitious politician and not a statesman, and so on and so forth. A week or two before this, I was supposed to be one of the topmost men of the age, a man whose goodwill was more important than any number of armies, whose influence was predominant in Asia, and so on and so forth. It is interesting, from the psychological point of view, to study this phenomenon in America.

All this, of course, does not affect our policy in the slightest. It only confirms it, and shows the immaturity of American judgment and also the lack of stability in it. I am informing you of this as it will help you to realise what the reactions of our policy are in the rest of the world. I am supposed to have 'sold out' to Mao through your bad influence. Panikkar is referred to as "Panicky". It really is amazing how great nations are governed by very small people.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

8. Cable to K.M. Panikkar¹

Your telegram 264 dated October 23rd.² It is difficult for us to understand, how any intelligent person can consider Chinese security to be threatened along Tibetan frontier, whatever might happen, including world conflict. Reference to Nepal intervention appears to us to be equally absurd. Nepal has troubles of its own and it is inconceivable to us that it could intervene in Tibet, whatever her sympathies or fears might be. Chinese policy might be independent of Soviet, but is clearly influenced by one-sided and distorted news coming from Moscow. If Chinese Government distrust and disbelieve us,³ in spite of all that we have said and done, then there is nothing further that we can say. To us, any apprehensions of danger to Chinese security from side of Tibet which adjoins our frontiers are utterly devoid of foundation and cannot, in our view, be a justification for military action; nor do we appreciate how, even in event of world war, such military action against Tibet can be of help to China.

Tibetan delegation is leaving Delhi today on way to China.

1. New Delhi, 25 October 1950. J.N. Collection.
2. Panikkar stated that there were indications that the Chinese Government foresaw possibility of large-scale warfare and were gearing themselves up for it. The Chinese effort to extend their authority in Tibet seemed to be actuated by their concern to make their rear secure against Anglo-American influence in case of war. "Recent attack by Moscow Radio on Nepal as an Anglo-American satellite and fear that Chou expressed of Nepal intervention add weight to these considerations."
3. Panikkar stated, "Chinese have been talking of security of their Tibetan frontier and whenever I have pointed out that we are the only State on that boundary, they have remained silent."

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

I. Bilateral Relations

(i) United States of America

1. Message to the American People¹

Isidor Feinstein Stone²: Is a new world war inescapable?

Jawaharlal Nehru: If one thought it inescapable, there would be no point in making an effort to avoid it; therefore, it would be wrong to consider another war inescapable. There is always a chance and one should try one's best.

IFS: Would a new world war solve any of our problems?

JN: No. Even the last two wars did not succeed in doing so, or, rather, if they did solve a problem it was at the expense of creating a new one. War always creates a multitude of new problems.

IFS: Can any one nation or system dominate the world?

JN: It is almost impossible for any one nation or system to succeed in dominating the world. The world is too various and not very submissive. Any attempt to dominate it will provoke opposition and initiate new instability.

IFS: Do you believe in the possibility of the peaceful co-existence of the capitalist and communist systems?

JN: This is a question of time. If you ask me whether they can co-exist peacefully for a hundred years or more, I don't think that they can. There is a kind of conflict between them. On the other hand, it should be quite possible for them to co-exist peacefully for a shorter range of time, and to influence each other. Out of this something new might emerge, which could lay the basis for a certain stability in the world.

In answering the question, one must keep in mind that any system of society depends a great deal on the state of social advance a country has achieved, and on its historical and cultural background. It is obvious that in this respect the world is not uniform and it is therefore wrong to try to proceed as if it were. One has to allow for diversity.

1. Interview to I.F. Stone, 27 August 1950. J.N. Collection.

2. (1907-1989); well-known journalist; author of *Underground to Palestine* (1946), *The Hidden History of the Korean War* (1952), and *In a Time of Torment* (1967).

IFS: Do you believe tension between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. is due to differences in their social systems? If Russia were a democratic capitalism like the United States would cooperation be possible or would strategic fears and economic competition create similar tension?

JN: Basically the tension is due to fear of each other. That fear is certainly conditioned by strong differences in ideological approach and the belief that each is trying to suppress the other approach. If there was no fear of expansionism, then probably tension would be much less and neither would care about the internal regime of the other. This mutual fear of expansionism derives not so much from ideological as from political factors. Each tries to check the other.

IFS: Do you think the American or Russian systems are applicable to India?

JN: India has been trained up to a certain democratic concept of society. Our Constitution lays stress on individual freedom and therefore any kind of authoritarianism goes against that basic approach. At the same time the economic problems of India require urgent steps to remedy them. They cannot wait for slow processes. There is a strong feeling in favour of social justice and progressive economic equality. How all these things can be reconciled, it is difficult to say.

There is a great deal in the U.S.A. which appeals to India: America's technological advance and success in producing wealth. We should like to learn all we can from the United States but we will have to apply the lessons of its experience to the entirely different conditions which prevail in India.

IFS: What can be done to prevent the polarization of mankind between Washington and Moscow?

JN: As a matter of fact, there are many countries which, though they have their sympathy towards one side or the other, are still trying to follow an independent policy. This in itself helps to prevent the division of the world into two major camps and thereby to some extent helps to prevent another world war. If there were a number of such countries which tried deliberately in this way to prevent war that would surely have some effect on the international situation.

IFS: Is a neutrality bloc between the two Great Powers, a new kind of *cordon sanitaire*, possible?

JN: I hardly think a new kind of *cordon sanitaire* is possible. A *cordon sanitaire* tends to become an iron curtain. It does not really bring greater stability but greater fear of what is happening behind the curtain. Apart from this, when tension is worldwide, we can hardly have such a cordon all the way round the world.

IFS: Could India remain neutral in a war between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., or between the U.S.A. and China?

JN: This is difficult to answer because so much depends upon the circumstances. Our first attempt would be, if possible, to prevent such a war from breaking out and, secondly, if it did break out, to limit it as much as possible, so that at least some large areas might not be directly affected and might help to some extent in bringing about peace. But all this depends so much on circumstances; it is difficult to say what might happen.

IFS: Can the United States stop communism in Asia by war?

JN: Not, surely, by war alone. In fact war by itself seldom solves any problem, especially not a problem based on economic backwardness. War worsens economic conditions and therefore tends to make solution more difficult.

IFS: Does India hope for large-scale development aid from America?

JN: Naturally she would welcome such aid. It is urgently required.

IFS: What is your estimate of the Point Four³ programme?

JN: Point Four is a good programme but appears to be now on a relatively small scale. The idea is good but it doesn't go far.

IFS: Is India satisfied with the way the World Bank⁴ has operated?

JN: The World Bank serves a useful purpose, but it functions naturally too much as a bank and too little as a development agency.

IFS: Are any conditions being suggested in return for American financial aid?

3. The U.S. aid project aimed at helping in the economic, health and educational development of the underdeveloped countries by providing them with technical know-how and equipment and encouraging private investment there. It was the fourth point of President Truman's programme spelt out in his inaugural address in January 1949. India signed the Point Four agreement with the U.S.A. on 28 December 1950.
4. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, also known as the World Bank and affiliated to the U.N., was founded in 1945 to provide guaranteed loans, technical advice, and training facilities to the developing countries.

JN: No special conditions, so far as I know. There have been discussions about the security of American capital here.⁵ We promise no discrimination against American capital and are prepared to give all normal assurances of security within the terms of our national policy. Within those terms there is a large field for investment with security.

IFS: Without American aid, would the Indian Government become more "socialistic" or less?

JN: A relatively underdeveloped country must necessarily depend on large-scale public development because private capital is not advanced enough to handle the big things which need to be done. Even during the British period most of our large-scale enterprises were public enterprises. The railways, the telegraph, telephones, the postal service, defence factories, large-scale river valley schemes—all were governmental enterprises, as they are in most States.

Our general policy is to develop key industries as State enterprises, leaving a large sector for private industry. Key enterprises would include any which are more or less fundamental to our development programme. The question of how broad a field this category might cover would depend on our resources, which include, of course, the amount of private capital available.

IFS: Is Indian capital ready for long-range, moderate profit, industrial expansion or is it still under the influence of the money-lender and speculator psychology?

JN: There is a good deal still of the speculative psychology about Indian capital, desiring fairly quick returns. But there is a tendency, growing slowly, to think in different terms. Of course, the resources of Indian capital are very limited compared to American capital, and that makes a difference.

Originally Indian capital was interested in the quick profits to be made in jute and textiles.⁶ Then it began to invest in more basic things, as the Tata concern did with much success in iron and steel.⁷ There has also been some private capital in hydro-electric schemes.⁸ Now private capital is going into the manufacture of

5. The Industrial Policy Statement of 6 April 1948 made the American investors apprehensive about the security of their investments in India.
6. Fifty-seven per cent of the world's jute looms in 1947 were located in India, while cotton textiles formed the biggest industry in India in 1948 with an investment of Rs 100 crores.
7. The Tata Iron & Steel Company started its steel plants at Sakchi (Jamshedpur) in Bihar in 1908. The total investment in 1950-51 was Rs 41 crores.
8. The Tata hydro-electric system comprising three power supply companies in Bombay was the largest power system in the country in 1950 with a capital expenditure of more than Rs 16 crores.

automobiles⁹ and machinery. The Government's Planning Board is finding a spirit of cooperation in its dealings with private capital.

IFS: In your *Autobiography*, you said you would not be content with the mere Indianization of the existing social order in the struggle for political freedom.¹⁰ To what degree do current conditions differ from mere Indianization? What difference has national independence made for the peasant and for the worker?

JN: So far as the peasant is concerned, there have been during the last fifteen years or so many measures for bettering his lot, giving him security, dealing with his debts, and finally for putting an end to the big landlord system, with which we are proceeding now. The old tenant class is being converted into small proprietors and is undoubtedly much better off than it has been for many generations.

This process has been helped greatly by high prices for agricultural products during the last War and after. The farmer was able to pay off his debts. But the conditions of the landless labourer is bad and the only thing to do with him is to provide him with other occupations away from the land. There are too many people on the land. This means that we need to develop industry, big and small industry, and cottage industries.

As for the worker, his wages have gone up considerably but have not done him as much good as they might have because of high prices. Our problem today is to bring down prices and at the same time to increase productivity, both of industry and land. Productivity at present is low.¹¹

We have succeeded in going beyond 'Indianization' of the social order as it existed when independence was won but what we have done has not helped much because of high prices.

IFS: Why is the Indian Government utilizing the same kind of repressive emergency regulations against workers and radicals which were used against you and your colleagues in your fight for freedom?

JN: We have had to contend in several parts of the country with what you might call a declaration of war by the Communist Party of India. The communists have

9. Hindustan Motors, Calcutta, and Premier Automobiles, Bombay, established in 1944 with authorised capital of Rs 20 crores and Rs 10 crores respectively, had started their operations by 1948.

10. In his *Autobiography* Nehru had criticised the attitude of the Indian Liberals who never thought of independence of India in terms of a new State but wanted mere Indianization of the administration by replacement of Englishmen by Indians.

11. The interim index of industrial production which stood at 108 in 1948 receded to 105 in 1950. The average per capita income from agriculture was Rs 500 in 1948-49.

indulged in extreme forms of violence, killing and sabotage. We have had to regard this in the light of a war situation, with the enemy functioning inside. I doubt if any country would have dealt with the situation more leniently than we have done.¹²

There is complete freedom here of expression of opinion but where actual violence takes place, the State must act. You can see from the Indian newspapers and the frequent bitterness of their comments that they enjoy freedom. They are not stopped. They are allowed to function even though some indulge in all kinds of licence.

We have also had to deal with extremists on the right, including some members of the Hindu Mahasabha.¹³ You must remember that conditions here and in Pakistan since Partition have been far from normal and that all kinds of reactionary and subversive elements as well as what we call in India communal forces have planned mischief and created trouble. The murder of Mahatma Gandhi was an instance of this lawlessness.

IFS: Do you think the rise of religious or non-secular States would help or hurt social stability and peace in Asia?

JN: I am entirely opposed to religious States, though not of course to religion itself. The mixture of religion and the State is dangerous. It produces narrowness and excites bigotry.

IFS: What effect does the Kashmir dispute have on the fight to maintain a secular State in India?

JN: The Kashmir dispute is itself a conflict between the ideals of the secular and of the religious State. Essentially it is a dispute not between Hindus and Muslims but between Muslims in Kashmir who prefer a secular State and those who prefer a religious State. Pakistan stands for the latter and therefore claims that Kashmir should automatically go to it.

12. Violence and insurrectionary activities in various States in the wake of a call by the C.P.I. in February 1948 for a final struggle to win freedom and bring about democracy in the country and its condemnation of the draft Constitution led to the detention, by August 1949, of about 2,500 persons under the Public Safety Act. The Preventive Detention Act passed in February 1950 enabled Government to arrest and detain for one year people suspected of anti-national activities.
13. The annual session of the All India Hindu Mahasabha in Calcutta in December 1949 reasserted its concept of *Akhand Bharat*. The Mahasabha demanded armed intervention in East Bengal to protect the life and property of the Hindus when communal troubles erupted there. A number of its leaders were taken into custody as a precautionary measure during the Nehru-Liaquat talks in April 1950.

As a matter of fact the whole national movement in Kashmir was built up on the idea of the secular State under Muslim leadership of an area which is about seventy-five per cent Muslim — in Kashmir itself the proportion is even higher.

IFS: Do you think that the Anglo-Saxon Powers, themselves based on secularism, favour secular States in the East?

JN: There has been a tendency in the past to rely on what might be called a religious State in the East. This policy has not succeeded and yet to some extent it is still followed, although it seems to be clear that religious States as such are out of place today.

IFS: In this connection how do you account for the fact that the Security Council, though it acted in twenty-four hours on Korea, has yet to determine the aggressor in Kashmir?

JN: The answer to that should come from the Security Council.

IFS: Granted that the Korean war was precipitated by aggression from North Korea, have the United Nations forces the right to restore the *status quo ante* at the expense of widespread destruction and death in Korea? Or is there a duty to find a peaceful way out?

JN: The answer is obvious—not only to avoid unnecessary destruction but to avert the bitterness which becomes an obstacle to peace after the fighting is over.

IFS: Do you think the admission of the new Chinese regime to the Security Council necessary to a solution of the Korean problem?

JN: It is necessary quite independently of the Korean problem because the Government of China is a matter of fact to be recognized. But this would, incidentally, make it easier to solve the Korean problem.

IFS: Have you any word for the American people, who have always cherished a deep regard for Mahatma Gandhi, for India, and for yourself?

JN: I would only say that we are grateful for that friendship and hope it will play its part in achieving the peace we all desire.

IFS: Lastly, all my friends in Israel want to know why India has not yet recognized the new State. Would you care to comment?

JN: It is not a question of non-recognition, but of certain formal steps to be taken. It is possible that these will be taken.¹⁴ That is all I can say now.

14. India recognized Israel on 17 September 1950.

2. To Freda Kirchwey¹

New Delhi
September 24, 1950

Dear Freda Kirchwey,²

Thank you for your letter of September 13th. I am afraid it is not possible for me to participate in the *Nation* Forum which you mention. I welcome the idea of your having such a Forum and I hope that it will influence public opinion. But a Foreign Minister can hardly function in this way.

If I am convinced that my going to the United States is likely to produce some definite result, I shall certainly go there even at the cost of leaving important work here. But I have no such conviction at present and I have no desire to go as a propagandist. My work here is heavy enough and important and probably I can serve the cause of peace better from here than from elsewhere.

With all good wishes to you,

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

2. (1893-1976); editor and publisher of the U.S. liberal journal, the *Nation*, 1933-1955.

3. Cable to C.D. Deshmukh¹

Your telegram 5949 dated 25th September.² We have to keep in mind attitude of

1. New Delhi, 26 September 1950. J.N. Collection. Deshmukh was at the time in London to attend the meeting held there from 25 September to 4 October 1950 of the Commonwealth Consultative Committee on Economic Development of South and South-East Asia.
2. Deshmukh stated that a draft report by officials had posed the problem of external finance facing countries in the region, without explicitly suggesting U.S. or other assistance for the purpose. In view of the anticipated U.S. assistance, adoption by prospective recipients of a uniform attitude to the offer was considered advisable. He added that the need to have a consultative body to liaise between these countries and the U.S. and for an organisation for administering assistance would be discussed at the ministerial meeting.

countries in South and South-East Asia towards plan of economic development.³ In South-East Asia, countries standing in greatest need of assistance are Burma and Indonesia. Approach of both to London Conference has been lukewarm, Indonesia not participating and Burma only sending an observer.⁴ This is no doubt due to fear of political complications. Siam and Ceylon are comparatively prosperous. French Indo-China is already on American pay roll, and in any event we are not interested in help being given to it, which must necessarily aim at increase of military strength. Thus, *prima facie*, at present principal recipients of aid are likely to be Pakistan and India. Aid is seldom given without some strings being attached to it, as in case of Marshall Aid in Europe.⁵ We have to be very careful about this for political and other reasons. Present attitude of United States Government in regard to Far East conflict and China is very unreasonable and almost hysterical.

On this analysis, it is doubtful if an elaborate and imposing organisation for either of two purposes mentioned by you is really necessary. However, we have no objection to continuance of Standing Committee of officials set up in Sydney for purpose mentioned in paragraph 3 of your telegram.⁶ I agree that no explicit suggestion for American or other assistance should be made in draft report.

I have no objection to adoption of third plan suggested in your paragraph 6 for division of assistance and reviewing progress, namely, creation of combined organisation of givers and recipients for general purposes, assistance being determined and managed bilaterally with general cooperation, if majority of countries participating in London talks favour this.⁷ But difficulties may arise if strings are attached in any such arrangement or help given indirectly for military purposes.

Any developments in the critical international situation today would naturally affect any plan that you might draw up.

3. The Commonwealth Consultative Committee, at its meeting at Sydney in May 1950, had recommended development of the countries of the region under a six-year plan.
4. Burma and Indonesia attended the meeting of the Commonwealth Consultative Committee as observers.
5. Sixteen West European countries joined the European recovery programme proposed by George C. Marshall, the U.S. Secretary of State, in June 1947 to help restore their economies impoverished by the War.
6. Deshmukh suggested that the Standing Committee of officials might coordinate consultation between the Commonwealth countries, while the U.K. Government would continue to liaise with the U.S.
7. Deshmukh thought it was unlikely that the U.S. would channel grants or non-commercial loans through the U.N. and bilateral agreements would therefore have to be entered into.

4. Cable to Vijayalakshmi Pandit¹

Your telegram 548 dated 12th October to Bajpai.² Tone of *New York Times* has been for months highly critical of Indian foreign policy in general and policy towards new China in particular. Latest outburst of petulance and vexation has doubtless been provoked by our refusal to join eight-power Commission in Korea as also by our criticism of American policy in Pacific Relations Conference in Lucknow. I propose to hold press conference³ on Monday to explain India's recent decisions. I shall not refer particularly to *New York Times*. I feel, however, that criticism in U.S., whether by press or prominent individuals, should be effectively met by prompt rejoinder in country where criticism appears. We have nothing to be apologetic about. Our general policy should be explained forcibly and at the same time inoffensively. We suggest, therefore, press statement or conference by you. Similar suggestion is being made to B.N. Rau. If you have any other specific suggestions to counter hostile manifestations, we shall gladly consider them.

Following points are for your guidance:

(1) We have no responsibility for criticisms of American policy made in Lucknow Conference⁴ which is unofficial. There is no question of our Government not permitting our intellectuals and journalists to express their opinions freely whether we like them or not. That, we thought, was American policy also.⁵

1. New Delhi, 14 October 1950. J.N. Collection. A similar telegram was sent to B.N. Rau.
2. Vijayalakshmi stated that *The New York Times* of 12 October had strongly criticised India's Korea policy. "It was illogical", it wrote, "to condemn North Korean aggression and not to support the only possible measures to right the wrong....Nehru purports to speak for Asia, but it is the voice of abnegation; his criticism is obstructive and his policy one of appeasement." The paper hoped that, while the U.S.S.R. was harming the cause of freedom and Asian nationalism, Nehru would not be afraid to give second thoughts to his policies. "The U.S. is not seeking sympathy, appreciation or gratitude but it does ask at least a modicum of understanding."
3. See *ante*, pp. 415-424.
4. Some Indian and Pakistani delegates criticised the U.S. for exaggerating the threat of communism and offering aid with strings. A Pakistani delegate expressed fears about the expanding U.S. outposts in the Pacific, while an Indian delegate complained that the U.N. was controlled by the U.S. and Britain.
5. *The New York Times* also wrote that attacks on the U.S. at the Pacific Relations Conference were surprising at a time when the U.S. was, with her blood and money, helping Asia preserve its independence and raise its standards of living. It said that charges that U.S. economic aid was imperialistic were due to misconceptions for which the Governments and press in India and Pakistan were responsible and wished "friendly newspapers" in these countries to explain U.S. disappointment with Nehru's policies on Korea.

Sometimes American newspapers criticise India in terms which are resented here. But we know that this represents individual opinion and not official policy. It is extraordinary to suggest that we should not permit free expression of opinion in India. So far as we are concerned, we do not consider that American policy has imperialistic ends. We have expressed our desire repeatedly for economic cooperation with America not only in India but in South East Asia.

(2) We agree that both United States and India are entitled at least to a modicum of understanding of each other's position. It is unfortunate that when we express our views in a frank and friendly way, instead of an attempt at understanding them, they are resented. No one here purports to speak for Asia which is too big and various. But we do think that we are, perhaps, in a better position to understand Asia's mind than most people in America. We are always prepared to change our policy on second thoughts if we are convinced of error. We hope that the United States are also always ready to do this. To talk of our policy being one of appeasement is to lack understanding of what we have been and what we are. Whether our voice is full of abnegation or our criticism obstructive, can be judged by a comparison with the tone and manner of voices and criticism in other countries of the East and West. We feel strongly about subjects which affect us and the world, but we have tried to put our viewpoint forward as moderately and in as friendly a way as possible without condemning others. That is the lesson which Gandhiji taught us.

(3) The United Nations Organisation was started by President Roosevelt and others as a special forum where all nations, even those holding different and contrary views, should meet together and try to find some common way of action. Because of this, we worked for the entry of new China into the United Nations and the return of the U.S.S.R. to the Security Council. It seemed to us of basic importance that reality should be recognised and new China was reality from every point of view. To ignore it is to base one's policy on unreality and something that does not exist. Inevitably the consequences of such an unreal policy must also be largely unreal, and create complications. These matters have been fully discussed in Parliament⁶ here, in my press conference of 7th July,⁷ and at the Nasik Session of Congress.⁸

(4) We have not attempted any mediation at any stage nor do we believe in appeasement of wrong at any time. But wrong cannot be met by wrong and friendly approach in the interests of peace is not appeasement. It is patent that the U.S.S.R. and, more particularly, China are deeply concerned with the future of a neighbouring territory like Korea. We do not think any satisfactory solution in the Far East can be arrived at by ignoring these two Powers and hence we have always been in

6. See *ante*, pp. 333-360.

7. See *Selected Works* (Second Series), Vol. 14 Part II, pp. 320-341.

8. See *ante*, Section 2, subsection II.

favour of consultation with them. At no time has India suggested to any Power that she would resile from her support of U.N. Resolution about North Korea's aggression. Had the U.S. given indication of readiness to view favourably effort at new China's entry into Security Council, for which India had worked steadily since beginning of January, India would have urged both China and Soviet to cooperate within Council in finding peaceful and just solution of Korean problem.

(5) Any long-term view of Korean or other problem tells us that no final solution is likely by military means alone, though military means may also be essential. Hence the peaceful approach must always be made and the door to it always kept open. Also no step should be taken which might worsen the situation and enlarge the area of conflict. India, therefore, urged that before suddenly crossing the 38th parallel, attempt should be made to cease hostilities and seek fulfilment of U.N. objective to establish united and independent Korea which India has fully supported. This is not appeasement, but justifiable and necessary attempt to serve cause of world peace and realise U.N. objective by peaceful and cooperative methods.

(6) It is unreasonable to expect unanimity of opinion on momentous international issues. It is equally unreasonable to seek peace by taking steps which make its realisation more difficult. Disagreement is softened by sincere effort at mutual understanding; if either party claims for itself infallibility of judgment and monopoly of rectitude, this leads to recriminations and hardening of differences. India certainly does not claim infallibility of judgment and may often err. We seek in all modesty and humility the right path and try to understand others' viewpoints. We do not change our path unless we are satisfied that it is wrong and then we shall certainly do so. The crisis of the world requires every country to search its conscience and to seek ways of action which lead to the peace which we all desire.

5. Only Untied Aid Welcome¹

... In dealing with the economic development of South East Asia, it should be said that India would welcome foreign capital to come in and would give fair and just

1. Note for the Indian Parliamentary delegation to the Inter-Parliamentary Conference in New Zealand, 23 October 1950. J.N. Collection. Extracts. The delegation led by Seth Govind Das attended the Conference in Wellington from 24 November to 1 December 1950 where, among other things, questions affecting the economic development and defence of the Commonwealth countries were discussed.

terms for it. But economic help should not be tied up to political strings. There has been much talk of American imperialism. While there is little doubt that the United States are spreading out their economic influence and trying to utilise it for political ends, there is no particular profit in condemning the U.S. or criticising it. We must state our case positively and not rely on criticism of others. We are prepared to accept foreign capital, but we do not wish it to interfere in any way with our political policy.

The Japanese peace treaty² might come up for discussion. We are in favour of an early peace and here also we think that the U.S.S.R. and China should join. If they refuse, nevertheless we should go ahead with the peace treaty. That peace must be based on an independent Japan. Its constitution lays down that it will keep no armies or other defence forces. The question then arises as to how it can be defended against an attack. In spite of this risk, we would say that Japan should not have an army and should be treated as a neutral country. We would disapprove of American bases in Japan. But inevitably some country will have to be responsible for the safety of Japan from aggression. If we make any country so responsible, that country becomes a dominant power in Japan. If it is necessary to have some such guarantee, this might be given by the United Nations and not by one country.

2. A treaty to end the state of war with Japan was drafted by Britain and the United States and signed by several countries at San Francisco in September 1951. India did not sign as the treaty had failed to give Japan a position of honour and equality among nations and concluded a separate treaty with her on 9 June 1952.

6. Cable to Vijayalakshmi Pandit¹

Have seen your letter to Secretary-General dated October 16th. Have also read many comments in American press.² All this does not worry me in the least and

1. New Delhi, 25 October 1950. J.N. Collection. Extracts.
2. The *New York Herald Tribune* of 5 October commented that India's title to leadership of Asia was unquestioned but "mere wringing of hands over all obvious difficulties and perils of the situation is not leadership." Commenting on India's refusal to support the crossing of the 38th parallel and the raising of U.N. special armed forces, the *Washington Post* stated on 18 October that faith in the world statesmanship of Nehru was fast crumbling. "His mind is difficult for others and perhaps himself to fathom." The *New York Times*, commenting on 21 October on India's abstention from voting on the 'Uniting for Peace' plan sponsored by the U.S.A., described India as "the Hamlet of Asia which wishes to do right but shrinks from backing up the right with action."

only convinces me of lack of poise and intelligence of commentators and other higher ups in America. We are convinced about our own policy and are not going to be moved by other people's anger or hysteria. There is absolutely no reason for our representatives to be apologetic about our policy. They should repeat it politely but forcibly....

7. Cable to B.N. Rau¹

In view of spate of hysterical and ill-informed attacks in American press and radio on me and India's policy generally, I want to make it clear that we must not be affected in the slightest by this exhibition of immature mentality. We are convinced that policy we have pursued is the right one and we intend continuing to follow it subject to changing circumstances. Therefore, every subject should be judged from the point of view of that basic policy, and every opportunity taken in debate in press or elsewhere to give expression to this policy forcibly. We must not be apologetic about it but speak with conviction and assurance. Please show this telegram to members of your delegation with whom, I hope, you are sharing my other policy messages. It is also important, as I informed you before, that you must keep in constant touch in consultations and otherwise with our Ambassador in Washington. There should be coordinated and well thought out joint approach to our problems in U.N., State Department and public.

1. New Delhi, 25 October 1950. J.N. Collection.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

I. Bilateral Relations

(ii) Soviet Union

1. To S. Radhakrishnan¹

New Delhi
August 6, 1950

My dear Radhakrishnan,

I have received your letters, more particularly the one of the 4th August.² I have not answered it. But of course we have exchanged many telegrams and the situation has changed and developed greatly in recent weeks. For the present, we are in the good books of the Russians, because of the attitude we have taken up in the Security Council.³ I do not know how long this will last. The situation is a complicated one and it is no easy matter to tread the straight and narrow path.

I can well understand your distress at the turn events have taken. We are all distressed about them and grope about rather in the dark. It is no good your thinking in terms of being ineffective in Russia and just marking time. You have done a very good job there and you must continue. So far as our position in the world is concerned, it is pretty high at the present moment, though the big Powers are irritated with us. But we have made everybody sit up a little and think, and that is some small achievement, when passion and prejudice govern people's minds.

The next meeting of the U.N. General Assembly is going to be of vital importance. It may mean the end of the U.N. or something constructive may perhaps emerge from it. Because of this, I am pressed to attend it. I have not made up my mind, as it is extraordinarily difficult to leave India at this stage. We are having the annual session of the Congress about the middle of September and I must attend that. Our domestic problems get more and more confused and distressing. Whether we look at India (and this might apply to many countries) or at the world at large, there appears to be some inner process of disintegration going on. Can we overcome it, the future will show. Anyhow we have to fight that process.

In any event you must carry on at Moscow. Panikkar is doing well in Peking and, again for the present, our relations with the Peking Government are definitely

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Radhakrishnan wrote, "Soviet Russia is anxious to break down her isolation and get on with other progressive countries; at any rate for the present they would like to adopt constitutional methods. What is happening in Greece, Britain and India is evidence of it. The unconditional return to the Security Council of the Soviet delegate is another indication."

3. On 1 August, B.N. Rau supported Malik's move to unseat Nationalist China from the Security Council. The same day, describing Nehru's personal appeals to Stalin and Acheson as "a noble initiative", Malik said that Stalin shared Nehru's view that Chinese representation in the Council was essential for a peaceful settlement of the Korean question.

good. But if they indulge in a military invasion of Tibet just at this stage, this will create grave difficulties and embarrassment for us.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. To K.M. Munshi¹

New Delhi
August 6, 1950

My dear Munshi,

I am told that an offer was recently made to us by the U.S.S.R. to sell sugar. The rate quoted was much less than we are paying elsewhere. I shall be glad if you will kindly find out about this matter. Obviously, if we get sugar cheaper in Russia, we should take it. The Russian Embassy have complained on several occasions that we do not accept their offers even though they are cheaper than others and we discriminate against them for political reasons. Certainly that is not our policy.²

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 31(77)/49-PMS.
2. Munshi replied on 8 September that enquiries made with the Soviet Embassy had revealed that the U.S.S.R. had no sugar to sell. Enquiries were also made about wheat, but the talks with the Soviet officials "resulted in no deal, as the prices asked for were prohibitive and they did not appear to be in earnest."

3. To S. Radhakrishnan¹

New Delhi
August 10, 1950

My dear Radhakrishnan,

Your letter of the 25th July with its enclosures. I received your telegram the other day about the U.S. Ambassador² telling you something. I was surprised to read

1. J.N. Collection.
2. Alan G. Kirk.

this. First, because it was completely untrue and secondly, it is obvious that we are not likely to tell the U.S. Ambassador anything about you. No mention has been made to him about this. As I have repeatedly written to you, we want you to continue in Moscow and there is no question of your coming back at this critical moment.

I wish you would not think that there is lack of confidence in your work, because that would not be true. There may be a difference of opinion about some approach or other. We have to judge of events from a variety of points of view and from information we receive from many capitals from our ambassadors and others. Apart from that, final decisions do not depend upon me entirely or on my Ministry. In vital matters we have continually to consult the Cabinet. We have now formed a Foreign Affairs Committee consisting of myself, Sardar Patel, Rajaji and Gopalaswami Ayyangar.

The situation in Korea, and arising from it, is extraordinarily difficult. While on the one hand, there can be no doubt whatever that North Korea carried out an invasion in force, it is equally true that the behaviour of the U.S.A. before and after has been very questionable. The U.S. is full of hysteria at present and it is a little difficult to be logical and reasonable with them. It is a frightening thought that world peace should depend upon people who are so excited and angry.

At one time I thought of going to the United Nations General Assembly this year. But I have now come to the conclusion that I should stay on here.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

11

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

I. Bilateral Relations

(iii) Nepal

1. To B.C. Roy¹

New Delhi
September 30, 1950

My dear Bidhan,

As you perhaps know, the situation in Nepal is dynamic.² We are not at all satisfied with the state of affairs there. During the last three years we have been pressing on the Government there to introduce substantial reforms. As long ago as 1947, even before the Partition, I sent Sri Prakasa there to advise the Government about constitutional reforms. He presented a scheme after long argument.³ This was whittled down and then kept in cold storage.

Meanwhile, all kinds of odd movements were taking place there and these were suppressed ruthlessly. The conditions in the prisons of politicals were very bad. Sometimes, with a great deal of pressure from our side, some little steps were taken in the right direction but did not go far. Recently some so-called reforms have been introduced, but they are very, very feeble.⁴

Things have come to a crisis there. There is a kind of peaceful movement for reform, a semi-violent movement and a small but growing communist movement.⁵ Of course, the communist movement has very little to do with communism. It is only communist in the sense that the organisers are communists. Its main argument is that the old methods have failed and the Government of India, from which so much was hoped, has done nothing at all and therefore other methods should be employed. This incursion of the communists in Nepal has galvanised the other movements into some kind of activity.

1. J.N. Collection.
2. The Nepali Congress, formed in April 1950 with the merger of the Nepali National Congress and the Nepal Democratic Congress, resolved on 26 September 1950, after the arrest of some of their members, to start a movement under the leadership of M.P. Koirala against the Rana regime.
3. The reforms suggested by Sri Prakasa provided for a legislature consisting of an Upper House composed of elected members of the Rana family and a Lower House elected indirectly through a system of electoral colleges. They also provided for the division of Nepal into several administrative units enjoying local autonomy.
4. On 22 September 1950, Mohan Shamsher, Prime Minister of Nepal, formally convened the legislature provided for in the constitutional reforms introduced by him in 1948. The Nepali Congress rejected this, considering the partially elected legislature consisting of a Council of Elders and a Lower House as inadequate since both Houses consisted largely of officials and exercised limited powers.
5. The Communist Party of Nepal was formally established in September 1949, but the communists had been working among the Nepalese peasants and landless labourers since 1930.

Our position is a peculiar one. We naturally sympathise with progressive movements in Nepal. We think that the present regime is very backward and harmful both to Nepal and to our interests. In view of the new situation that has arisen on the Tibet side, it is all the more necessary for substantial reforms to be introduced there, or else there will be trouble on a big scale. On the other hand, we have naturally to conform to international conventions in behaviour. Our general policy therefore has been, and we have made this clear to the Nepal Government, that we will not interfere with normal and constitutional movements in India concerning Nepal provided they keep within the limits of our law. If they infringe our law, then of course we take such action as we consider necessary. Perhaps you know that the King of Nepal⁶ is a figurehead. His general sympathies appear to be with the reformers.

This is in brief the background in Nepal. We do not know what developments may take place in future, but there is no doubt that things are astir and much may happen. We have, therefore, to be very careful about our policy and the steps we take. The general policy will, of course, be laid down in Delhi. But some of our provinces, notably those bordering Nepal, may have to deal with new situations. The two chief provinces are Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. For some reasons Calcutta is also a centre.

State Governments have also to be careful. Any matter of policy should always be referred to us and no action should be taken without this reference. We do not wish to come in the way of normal constitutional activity. Naturally, we cannot countenance terrorism and the like.

In order to discuss the present situation in Nepal, we summoned our Ambassador there, Shri Chandreshwar Prasad Narayan Singh, and we have had talks with him. I feel it will be desirable for him to meet you and discuss the situation with you also. I have, therefore, asked him to go to Calcutta. He will reach there on Tuesday, 3rd October, in the forenoon by air. I shall be grateful if you could give him some of your time that day as he has to return soon.

Yours,
Jawahar

6. King Tribhuvan.

2. To Sri Krishna Sinha¹

New Delhi
October 2, 1950

My dear Sri Babu,

I have already written to you about our Ambassador in Nepal, Shri Chandreshwar Prasad Singh, visiting you for a talk about Nepal. It is important that you and your Government should know what is happening there and what our general attitude towards it is. Your Government has more to do with it perhaps than any other State in India. We have to proceed very carefully in this matter as it involves not only policy but, what is more difficult, the application of that policy at each step. I suggest to you that whenever any difficulty arises you should refer to us immediately for advice. We cannot support reaction in Nepal, nor can we become policemen acting on behalf of the Nepalese Government in India. On the other hand, we cannot permit terroristic activities or violence in our territories.

I would particularly like you to keep all conversations about Nepal as secret. We do not want any leakage.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

3. Nepalese Agitators in India¹

In view of the long message received from the Nepal Government,² I suppose we shall have to send some answer. I do not see what other answer we can send except to tell them what we have said already. That is to say, that we are prepared to

1. Note to the Foreign Secretary, 5 October 1950. J.N. Collection.

2. Bijaya Shamsher, Foreign Minister of Nepal, stated that recent interrogation of suspects in a conspiracy case had indicated that some terrorist groups might penetrate into Nepal. He requested the Government of India to put immediately under detention certain "ring leaders" of the conspiracy and others whose names would be supplied in due course.

do everything, but whatever we do must be in conformity with our own laws. It is perfectly true that we have put people in detention in the past because of violent activities. All these persons have been released by the High Courts or the Supreme Court unless we could immediately produce adequate evidence. We have, indeed, been much embarrassed by the release of persons whom we considered dangerous and who were working from behind the scenes, but we have to obey our law and our courts. The only course open to us is to change the law and that is not an easy matter. Our superior courts had warned Government repeatedly. For us to arrest people and detain them on the basis of a telegram received from the Nepal Government which refers to some statement made by a person in their custody, will be challenged immediately in the law courts and will be criticised severely in the press. We must, therefore, have some adequate evidence which we can produce before the courts, if necessary.

You might also mention the allegation that people have been tortured to give their statements. Any such suggestion would prejudice the courts even more. We have, therefore, no other course open except to wait for some definite and positive evidence.

You might add that our Ambassador in Nepal will be returning there very soon (I do not know exactly when he is likely to be there) and we have discussed this matter fully with him. He will be able to explain our viewpoint and our difficulties to the Nepal Government.

11

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

I. Bilateral Relations

(iv) East Africa

1. To Fenner Brockway¹

New Delhi
October 5, 1950

My dear Fenner,

Thank you for your letter of the 29th September.

I am glad that you appreciated the work of our High Commissioner in East Africa and found that there was a great deal of cooperation between the Indian and African communities in Kenya. I am sorry this was not so in Uganda.² Apa Pant,³ our High Commissioner, is a first rate man who has devoted himself to bringing the Indian and the African together. I am sure he will succeed in Uganda also. He has to deal with a vast territory.

I have repeatedly made clear not only to our High Commissioner but to others and to the public generally that it is of the utmost importance that Indians and Africans should cooperate together. Indeed, I have stated often enough that I do not wish any Indians to stay there if they come in the way of African progress. The first consideration must be the interests of the Africans themselves. I have referred to this in our Parliament here also. Our High Commissioner has full authority to make such a statement on my behalf whenever an opportunity for it occurs. I am quite convinced that it is of primary importance for friendly relations to exist between Indians and Africans. We have given a number of scholarships to East African young men for study in India and we have welcomed them at our universities.

You can, if you like, inform your friends of the African community in Uganda of my views on this subject. But I should not like any publicity to be given to them except through our High Commissioner.

With all good wishes,

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Brockway wrote that the Indian monopoly of trade and transport in Uganda had strained relations between Indians and Africans in Uganda and said that he wished to bring about cooperation between the two communities on behalf of Nehru.

3. He was Indian Commissioner to British East Africa, 1948-54.

2. To M.C. Setalvad¹

New Delhi
October 12, 1950

My dear Setalvad,

I am giving you some more trouble. I want your opinion about the interpretation of the Deed of Trust of the Gandhi National Memorial Fund.

This question has arisen because of a request made on behalf of the Gandhi Memorial Committee of East Africa for a grant from the Fund for a college to be started in East Africa to be called the Gandhi Memorial College. The question is whether such a grant can be made for this purpose in terms of the Trust Deed. I am sending you a copy of the Trust Deed for reference....

An important feature of the proposed college is that it will be equally open to Indians, Africans, Arabs and Europeans, that is, to all the communities in East Africa. This will be a novel experiment of this kind, meant to remove racial barriers and to bring about knowledge and understanding of each other between these various communities. It is meant to break down certain barriers that have existed for so long there....

East Africa has, I believe, no institute of higher education and no college. All students who want to pursue their studies further have usually to go to England. Rarely they come to India also. Probably more would have come to India, but for the fact that the Government there discouraged this in the past. Obviously very few can travel long distances for study. It is therefore of considerable importance to provide East Africa with a college which can develop into a university. Among the Africans themselves there is at present a passion for education and they have started recently numbers of schools out of petty collections made amongst themselves. Latterly they have looked greatly towards India to help them in various ways. The fact that our Government gave some scholarships to African students to be held in India has been welcomed with enthusiasm by the Africans.

Mahatma Gandhi's name and story is increasingly known there and exercises a vague but powerful appeal.

...As a Government, we sympathise with this proposal very greatly. But we feel it will be impolitic for us to contribute any money for it from Government funds, apart from our other financial difficulties. There is a suspicion among English people and other foreigners there that India has political ambitions in East Africa. If, as a Government, we did something there of this kind, we might be still more suspect.

1. File No. 2(548)/50-PMS. Extracts.

Africa today is in a state of great ferment of mind. It is breaking away from the old ties and looking forward to the end of colonial rule. At the same time it feels weak. There are various pulls, such as that of communism. There is also a new pull towards India, with which is associated Mahatma Gandhi's name and ideals. All this is of course rather vague. In a sense, however, Africa is virgin soil for ideas and Gandhiji's ideals find receptive minds.

Taking a long distance view, say twenty or twenty-five years, there is little doubt that Africa will undergo big changes. There may be conflicts, racial or other. It is the continent of the future. It is important, therefore, from India's point of view to have the best of relations with the people of Africa.

For these and other reasons, some of us feel that it will be very desirable to help in this venture of a Gandhi Memorial College in East Africa. It would be a dramatic gesture, which would create a powerful effect on people's minds in Africa. Practically it will do good to Africa's relations with India; and it may turn minds there more towards Gandhiji's ideals. If even a part of this is achieved, it will be a big thing. Hence our desire to help.

There is a certain element of speed about this. If we come to fairly quick decisions, the British Exchequer might also make a big grant.² Otherwise this moment may slip by. We can of course try to collect money privately for this proposal. But that takes time. Apart from this question of time, there is also the feeling that a grant from the Gandhi Memorial Fund would be particularly appropriate and would create good reactions in Africa....³

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. The British Governor of Kenya was willing to recommend to the Colonial Office the grant of a sum equal to collections from other sources.
3. Setalvad replied on 25 October that "the grant would fall within the objects of the Trust." The Gandhi Memorial Academy Committee of East Africa eventually decided to merge its plans with those for a Royal Technical College, which started functioning in Nairobi from 1956.

11

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

I. Bilateral Relations

(v) Other Countries

1. To A. Soekarno¹

New Delhi
August 6, 1950

My dear Soekarno,

I received your letter of June 27th some little time ago. As you mentioned sending a set of Wayang figures,² I was waiting for this set to arrive before answering your letter. It has not come yet, though undoubtedly it will reach me in good time.

I must confess that this magnificent gift is rather overwhelming. You and Padma³ have been so good and generous to us already and you go on adding to that generosity. Need I say that I am exceedingly grateful. Your gift of this set of Wayang figures is hardly a personal one to me. I am therefore going to treat it as a gift to India and have it placed in a museum, where others can see it and profit by it.⁴

We have been having heavy days here, because of the rapid development of the international situation. In spite of us, we have got more and more entangled in it. You will no doubt have followed what we have done. We have tried to keep you in touch through our Ambassador.

The situation is an extraordinarily complicated one. But then our world becomes more and more complex. One might almost think that some unseen forces are driving us, whether we will it or not, in particular directions. I fear that none of us will have a quiet time in our lives....

I hope Padma is well. We often think of you and her, and in this difficult and tiring world, the thought of our visit to Indonesia brings relief.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection. Extracts.

2. These figures are used in the classical Javanese shadow puppet drama.

3. Wife of Soekarno.

4. Soekarno, replying on 28 August, agreed with Nehru that the Wayang figures be kept in a museum for public display as a symbol of the strong cultural ties between the two countries.

2. Trial of Emperor Hirohito¹

I am clearly of opinion that a proposal to try Emperor Hirohito² should not be supported and in fact should be opposed. Whether it is silently opposed by a vote or spoken to also might be left to the discretion of our Representative. There can be no doubt that a trial of this kind will be bitterly resented by the Japanese people and will cause ill-feeling. There is no point in carrying on this witch hunt.

1. Note to Foreign Secretary, 27 August 1950, J.N. Collection.
2. On 1 February 1950, the U.S.S.R. had proposed the trial of Hirohito, Emperor of Japan (1901-1989), by an international military court as a war criminal.

3. To D.S. Senanayake¹

New Delhi
August 29, 1950

My dear Prime Minister,

Our High Commissioner² in Ceylon has forwarded to me the correspondence which has passed between you and him ending with your letter of the 16th August, 1950. This relates to a suggestion he made for his office to give assistance to persons who claim registration as citizens of Ceylon under the Indian and Pakistani Residents (Citizenship) Act, No. 3 of 1949.

I must say that I was surprised to read your letter and, more specially, to learn that you think that our High Commissioner's proposal did not accord with the high

1. J.N. Collection.
2. V.V. Giri.

traditions of diplomatic practice. If I may say so, we have some acquaintance with diplomatic practice and are anxious that its traditions should be maintained. I am quite unable to see any impropriety from any point of view in the proposal our High Commissioner made. The suggestion made by him was intended to help in the attainment of a common objective. This objective, you will agree, is that those who are qualified for the citizenship of Ceylon under the Indian and Pakistani Residents (Citizenship) Act, should be enabled to acquire such citizenship. Many of the potential Ceylon citizens of Indian origin are illiterate and might find it difficult to fill in their application forms without some assistance. It should be our common purpose to give that assistance in any convenient form. I would have suggested that the Government of Ceylon itself might give this assistance in the initial stage in addition to such other assistance as might also be arranged.

For a long time past our two Governments have been corresponding or conferring on this subject of Ceylon citizenship of people of Indian origin in Ceylon. Originally the question of citizenship or nationality did not arise because both the people in Ceylon and in India were, in law, British subjects. It is only recently that each country has begun to define its separate nationality. It was because of this that it became necessary for people of Indian origin in Ceylon to be considered either Ceylon nationals or Indian or Pakistani nationals. Their position, till a final decision is made, is not a clear one. Till such persons are formally admitted to Ceylon citizenship, they are in an indeterminate position. They cannot be stateless. As a matter of fact, most of these persons have severed their connections with India and have made Ceylon their home; they are, therefore, entitled to Ceylon citizenship and must be helped to claim it. Either the Ceylon Government or the Government of India and its Representative or both should give them the necessary help in regard to registration, etc. If neither Government helps, the great majority of these will, in effect, be treated as stateless for whom no Government is responsible. That, surely, is not your objective, as it is not ours. In any event, I do not see what is wrong in our High Commissioner's office assisting them, on request, in filling in certain forms. Legal proceedings do not commence until an application reaches the Commissioner. I do not, therefore, see how by giving assistance in filling forms we could be said to be intervening in legal proceedings. It would be extraordinary and unwarranted if, because of such assistance given by us, registering officers were to draw any adverse inference against the application.

I trust that on reconsidering this matter you will appreciate that there is nothing wrong or even unusual in our High Commissioner affording this elementary assistance to simple folk who seek it. Indeed, it is to the interest of your Government, as well as ours, that this matter should be dealt with as rapidly and as efficiently as possible.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. To Thakin Nu¹

New Delhi
October 13, 1950

My dear Thakin Nu,

Our Ambassador² has informed us that you wish to send your Foreign Minister here for consultation. We shall welcome his visit here. I have suggested that he might come on any day from the 20th October onwards. He could even come a little earlier, but I am much more occupied during these days.

I think it is very necessary that India and Burma should keep in close touch on foreign affairs. Foreign affairs today largely deal with Asian problems. The war in Korea has brought about a very great shift in the centre of gravity of world problems. Because of this, countries like India and Burma are more intimately concerned and have necessarily to play a bigger part.

We in India have always tried to avoid being entangled too much in foreign affairs. But, almost against our will, we have been entangled in them. You will have noticed that during the present session of the General Assembly of the U.N. India has played rather an important part. It has been an independent part and we have tried, where possible, to bridge the gulf between the two big contending blocs. This is no easy matter. Nevertheless, I think we have done some service to the world. It may even be said that because of our earnest efforts the extension of the Korean conflict has thus far been avoided. The position there at present is very delicate.

I am sorry to find that your representative at the U.N. took a different line from India's recently.³

So, I welcome your idea of your Foreign Minister coming here to discuss various matters of common concern.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

2. M.A. Rauf.

3. Burma supported the eight-power resolution on Korea in the General Assembly on 7 October.

11

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

II. Foreign Possessions in India

1. Resolution on Foreign Possessions in India¹

This Congress, while affirming the Jaipur Congress resolution on foreign possessions in India,² declares afresh that it is essential that these territories should be politically incorporated in the Republic of India. The Congress regrets that all efforts to bring about a peaceful change have thus far been opposed or obstructed by the colonial Powers holding such possessions. Opposed as she is to colonialism in any form and in any part of the world, India cannot tolerate its continuance in her own territories.³

1. Drafted by Nehru for the consideration of the Congress Working Committee, Nasik, 16 September 1950. J.N. Collection.
2. See *Selected Works* (Second Series), Vol. 8, pp. 426-427.
3. The resolution passed by the Working Committee on 17 September 1950 and adopted at the plenary session of the Congress at Nasik on 21 September 1950 read: "The Congress is strongly opposed to any foreign colonial Powers continuing to hold any part of India. It, therefore, reaffirms the Jaipur Congress resolution on foreign possessions in India and declares that it is essential that these territories should be incorporated in the Republic of India."

2. No Tolerance of Colonial Islands in India¹

It is now about four years or so since this question of foreign possessions in India has been before the Government. In fact, even before that the Congress had been passing resolutions about them time and again. It is obvious to us right from the beginning that these possessions must necessarily pass to India. Geographically and culturally and in every other way this is so.

Even apart from all this, it is quite impossible for us to agree to any distant foreign Powers or European Powers having a foothold in India in this way. That Portugal may begin calling Goa a part of Portugal makes no difference at all. Some act or law or decree passed in Lisbon does not take away Goa from India. It is here geographically. Therefore, it is quite clear, as the Jaipur Congress had said, that in any event these possessions have to come to India.

1. Speech on the resolution on foreign possessions in India at the plenary session of the Congress, Nasik, 21 September 1950. From the *National Herald*, the *Amrita Bazar Patrika* and *The Hindustan Times*, 22 September 1950.

In spite of much provocation deliberately we have not taken any steps which might lead to trouble and we have sought a peaceful solution of the question, and I want to tell you that we shall continue to seek a peaceful solution in spite of all the provocation we have had.

India has agreed to a referendum in French India. It was partly applied to Chandernagore and Chandernagore came to India.² But in Pondicherry and other places down south there has been no referendum. It has been repeatedly postponed and from all the accounts we have had the conditions existing there are such that unless they are completely changed, there can be no fair and impartial referendum. We certainly are not going to have an unfair and partial referendum. So that is the position so far as we are concerned. But the main point, apart from cultural, geographical and other reasons, is that we cannot tolerate any colonial islands in India. For that matter I might go further and say that we are against colonialism anywhere in Asia or Africa, much more so in our own country. Can we have any colonial entities like this?

I wish to contradict the report of an interview with me published in a British newspaper. I believe it was the *Daily Express*.³ That report has quoted two or three sentences out of context and is obviously wrong and misleading.

I have been quoted as saying that the Americans are clearly prepared for a third world war against Russia and her allies in Asia. The report has also attributed to me the statement that the British must get out from Malaya, Singapore and Hong Kong as soon as possible. What I had said about the first part, speaking from memory, is that there is something to be said for the fact that while vast numbers of people all over the world desire peace and are anxious to avoid war, still many of the big countries are preparing for war. They are full of fear and because of various developments they are going on feverishly preparing for war. I had mentioned all the big countries in this connection.

I had referred to the action taken by the American President against the United States Navy Secretary⁴ and the statement of General MacArthur on Formosa and said that in America some people had openly asked for war but I was glad that President Truman had pulled them up.

2. On 19 June 1949, the French Indian settlement of Chandernagore voted in a referendum for union with India and on 2 May 1950 the Government of India assumed responsibility for the administration of the territory.
3. The *Daily Express* published a report of an interview of Nehru with its special correspondent. As the text as published is clearly unreliable, it has not been reprinted here.
4. Francis P. Matthews, the Secretary of the Navy, when asked by Truman why he had stated that the U.S. ought to fight a 'preventive war', regretted that he had made the statement without realizing that it differed from the official policy of the U.S. Government.

As regards the second part, what I had said was that colonialism must vanish from all over Asia, certainly also from Malaya and other countries.⁵ I had added it was true that in Malaya there were considerable difficulties at present because there were several nationalities there—Malay, Chinese, Indian and others. That made it very difficult for any action to be taken there and, therefore, the first thing to be done was for them to fuse together more or less, politically at least, so that Malaya might become a free country.

So what the gentleman⁶ who reported me had said was partly correct in that sense but, taken out of context, it appears as if I was throwing all the blame on America for what is happening in the world. That is totally incorrect. We would not have supported the Security Council resolution about Korea if we had not thought that North Korea had committed aggression. We did believe that but that did not mean that we should unthinkingly agree to everything said in America, England or Russia or anywhere else. We judge for ourselves.

5. Asked if British withdrawal from Malaya, Singapore and Hong Kong would not leave the door open to communism, Nehru was reported to have replied, "You must take the risk. The longer you put it off the greater it will become." Asian nationalism was so strong that it would impose its own stamp on any new regime.
6. Sefton Delmer.

3. To Purushottamdas Tandon¹

New Delhi
September 25, 1950

My dear President,

I should like your help and cooperation in the matter of the French settlements in South India. The French Government of these settlements has been encouraging all kinds of gangster elements there, specially in Pondicherry, who are trying to crush pro-merger people.² We have generally remained quiet except for protests occasionally made. I think it would be desirable for Congress Committees in the surrounding districts of South Arcot and Tanjore to take some interest in this matter. They should not of course bring the Government into the picture at all, and they

1. A.I.C.C. Papers, N.M.M.L.

2. The office of the Communist Party of Pondicherry and houses of 125 pro-merger supporters were burnt in Pondicherry during 1950.

should not do anything improper. They can, however, in many ways help the pro-merger movement from their side and thus encourage these pro-merger sentiments of the people on the other side. They should not cross the border or do anything in the territory of the French possessions. They might to some extent coordinate their activities with the pro-merger groups on the other side.

I shall be grateful if you could issue instructions to the Tamilnad Provincial Congress Committee in this behalf. I think Government should not be mentioned.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. To P.S. Kumaraswami Raja¹

New Delhi
September 25, 1950

My dear Chief Minister,

I am writing to you about Pondicherry and the French settlements in South India. We have been rather quiet about these matters in spite of very objectionable behaviour in Pondicherry where, as you know, gangster tactics have long been employed to crush pro-merger sentiments. I think we should wake up to this fact and do something on our part. We can adopt two lines of action as a Government.

One approach would be for the Government of Madras quietly to help pro-merger groups and Congress workers when they come within their jurisdiction. Of course, this should be done without fuss.

The second line of action would be in relation to many merchants and others who are at present engaged in extensive smuggling.² I understand that a number of these have their offices in Madras City and carry on business there and often get contracts or licences from Government. I understand further that they are fairly well-known to your Government. In the case of such known individuals your Government might warn them and strike their names off from the list of persons to whom contracts or licences are given. You may also send us a list of these names so that we might take similar action here whenever an opportunity occurs.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection. Kumaraswami Raja was the Chief Minister of Madras.
2. Unrestricted flow of foreign goods into Pondicherry, following the termination of the Customs Union Agreement with India in March 1949, in due course had given rise to smuggling of diamonds, gold and several consumer products to India.

11

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

III. General

1. To Homi J. Bhabha¹

New Delhi
August 8, 1950

My dear Homi,²

Your letter of the 4th August. I am afraid my vision at the present moment is very limited in regard to time. I can hardly think of what will happen in December next. I should like to come to Bombay round about that time and if I can I shall certainly attend any function that you may arrange.

I do not think there is much chance of my going to Bombay next month.

I have received Niels Bohr's³ open letter.⁴ I have not read the whole of it. I have just glanced through it. I shall read it later. I have read your notes on it. With Niels Bohr's general approach, I agree largely. The difficulty is how to take any effective steps. What might have been possible in 1944 or even 1945 is extraordinarily difficult today. War passions have been roused and fear and anger everywhere. I agree with you that there is not the least chance in the world of either the U.S. or the U.S.S.R. agreeing to disarm in any way or to dismantle atomic weapons. The U.S.A. is terribly frightened and dare not, in its opinion, weaken its military apparatus. Certainly, if they could make a declaration about the hydrogen bomb, as you suggest, it would be a good thing—one step in the right direction.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.
2. Director, Tata Institute of Fundamental Research, Bombay.
3. Niels Henrik Bohr (1885-1962); Danish physicist; awarded Nobel prize for physics, 1922.
4. Niels Bohr appealed to the United Nations in June 1950 for unrestricted dissemination of information about atomic energy as a means of relaxing international tension.

2. To the Aga Khan¹

New Delhi
August 25, 1950

My dear Aga Khan,

Thank you for your letter of the 10th August 1950.² I am sorry for the slight delay

1. Copy in V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, N.M.M.L.
2. The Aga Khan suggested the formation of a neutrality union between India, China, Pakistan, Indonesia, Burma and Thailand to help limit the area of conflict and thought that if Nehru won "China over, then the others can easily be brought in."

in answering it. The matter you raised was important and I wished to give thought to it and to consult some of my colleagues.

Your suggestion is of course not entirely a novel one and others have from time to time put forward some similar proposals, though what you have said is much more concrete. I confess I feel attracted towards your proposal but, at the same time, I foresee all manner of difficulties. Any formal approach of this kind is likely to lead immediately to certain complications. Many of the countries that you have mentioned are not in a position to adopt an independent policy. They are beholden in some way or other to some Great Power and are a little afraid of displeasing it. I remember that when we had a Conference on Indonesia in January 1949, two countries of Asia told us frankly and privately that they were in entire sympathy with us, but they did not dare join us openly in that Conference.

Then, again, there is China, which is on the one hand closely allied to the U.S.S.R. and on the other hand certainly has a strong Asian feeling and looks towards other countries of Asia. The future of Asia depends to a large extent on what happens in China, which way it goes. In the long run, I am sure that the powerful national characteristics of the Chinese people will prove dominant. All history supports this view. What will happen in the short run, however, is a little more difficult to say. It will depend on many factors. If all other doors are closed to China except the Soviet door, then, inevitably, China will look more and more that way. That is why we have been firmly of opinion, ever since the beginning of this year, that the People's Government of China should be admitted to the United Nations. We have not succeeded and I think the policy of some of the Western Powers in this matter has been very short-sighted indeed. Fortunately, we are on the whole on friendly terms with the new China or, at any rate, there is no unfriendliness. There is certainly a desire in China to be friendly with India and we have naturally tried to encourage this, in spite of certain points of possible conflict.

Any action that you suggest would largely turn round China. You have yourself given China first place in your list. I am afraid, at the present moment, we can hardly suggest to China to refrain from all military action, unless directly attacked. There is the difficult problem of Formosa which excites the people of China greatly. We have brought some friendly pressure to bear upon China and suggested that they should endeavour to have a peaceful settlement of the Formosa question.

Then, again, there is the question of the United Nations. If we try to form a league of Pacific States in Asia, this obviously shakes up and breaks up the United Nations.³ Whether the United Nations will survive the present crisis for long, I do not know. But it seems to me that for us to take any step, at this stage, to break

3. The Aga Khan wrote that even if Asia left the United Nations, the proposed league would limit the area of warfare to "those who still have... imperialism as a motive."

up the United Nations would be harmful for all concerned. Indeed that step would not succeed because, as I have said above, several countries in Asia would not be prepared for it.

Nevertheless, I think there is a great deal in what you have said and we should keep it in view. Possibly we might even slowly try to advance in that direction without any commitments to begin with. The U.N. General Assembly is meeting next month and much will depend upon how it functions and what emerges out of it.

With all good wishes,

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. To V.K. Krishna Menon¹

New Delhi
August 25, 1950

My dear Krishna,

...Things are in a curious way here and it is not particularly easy to explain them.

It is definitely decided that I am not going to Lake Success.² As for China, there is also little chance of my going there in the foreseeable future....

I would very much like you to come here. I think that would be good for you and good for me. But owing to various possible developments, I think you should wait for some time. In any event you should be in London, when Deshmukh is there. I want you to cultivate him. He is far the best I.C.S. man that I have come across. He is cautious, and perhaps rightly so, a little unsure, but at the same time definitely with progressive ideas, and he wants to do something. Unfortunately we are in such desperate financial straits that there is not much room for movement, unless that movement is a jump somewhere. We are not fashioned that way at present at least and the idea of jumps rather frightens people. Deshmukh is fundamentally decent and modest. He is good at his particular job. You should certainly let him see the working of India House. What is even more, you should

1. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, N.M.M.L. Extracts.
2. Krishna Menon had written to Nehru on 21 August that it would have been a mistake for Nehru to go to Lake Success and become embroiled there. "It is unnecessary to argue the case now."

quietly discuss other matters with him, including this Sydney Conference affair. The main purpose of Deshmukh going is to attend the International Monetary Fund meeting, of which he is Chairman, and to discuss the exchange issue....

About what you are reported to have said regarding Tibet,³ there was nothing much in it. But the report, which was obviously patchy, gave occasion to a number of newspapers here to write leading articles. Our newspapers do not improve from day to day. As for our Urdu and Hindi press and even some English papers and weeklies, it is just amazing to what depths they can descend. Since the Supreme Court let off two newspapers some months ago,⁴ there has been complete licence. I am a particular target of a number of them.

I met Tom Driberg⁵ and had a talk with him. I had not the least notion in the world that he was interviewing me on behalf of a newspaper. I talked to him frankly and was amazed to find two days later a fairly full report of our talk.⁶ I was somewhat embarrassed. I cannot blame him, because I had not warned him at all.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

3. See *ante*, pp. 429-430.

4. The Supreme Court on 26 May 1950 quashed the Madras Government order imposing a ban on the entry and circulation in the State of *Crossroads*, a Bombay weekly, and on the same day struck down an order requiring pre-censorship of *Organizer*, a Delhi weekly.

5. Thomas Driberg, Baron Bradwell (1905-1976); journalist and politician; war correspondent, World War II and the Korean war; Chairman, National Executive of the Labour Party, 1957-58; Labour Member of the House of Commons, 1942-58 and 1959-74.

6. See *ante*, pp. 370-372.

4. To Maxwell H. Paterson¹

New Delhi
August 29, 1950

Dear Mr Paterson,²

I am in receipt of your letter of the 24th August. I am interested to learn that Douglas Fairbanks³ is a candidate for the post of Lord Rector of Glasgow University.

1. J.N. Collection.

2. He was President, Glasgow University World Government Movement.

3. Douglas Elton Fairbanks, Jr (b. 1909); American film star.

As you know, I believe that sometime or the other, if the world is to survive, an effective world organisation is essential. I welcome all efforts to this end. At the present moment this appears difficult of achievement and it may be that we have to face further disasters before we achieve our goal.

With all good wishes,

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. To V.K. Krishna Menon¹

New Delhi
August 29, 1950

My dear Krishna,

...Just before Deshmukh went away, he presented a picture of our financial condition to us which was rather desperate. The result was, *inter alia*, another strong economy drive in all our offices here. Personally I am convinced that it would be a good thing for the New Delhi Secretariat if we had fewer people in it, but our old system of work is such that it is not particularly easy to make any great difference without basic changes.

So far as we are concerned in the External Affairs, we continue to shrink. We have got a number of posts in the foreign missions vacant. We are not filling them. We are calling back some people also. To our misfortune there is a general impression here that the External Affairs Ministry is extravagant and wastes money abroad. People here have absolutely no conception of a foreign office, in theory or in practice, and have an old type reluctance to see money go abroad. Our work is being affected by all this, but there is no help for it.

I suggest, therefore, that you should not only have talks with Deshmukh, but let him see something of the India House organisation.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

1. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, N.M.M.L. Extracts.

6. Relevance of the United Nations¹

The United Nations came into existence to give expression to the world-wide desire for peace and cooperation between nations. They had to meet powerful political and ideological differences but they wisely decided to bring together all nations in spite of those differences, and in the hope that the spirit of mutual understanding and cooperation will gradually grow through this association. Their Constitution was not perfect from the strictly democratic point of view, but it recognized realities in the world today and provided for them.

Today the United Nations face a severe crisis. On the fate of the United Nations depends the fate of war and peace and the future of the world. It is clear that the United Nations will cease to be what the original Charter intended them to be, if the important nations of the world cannot function through them or if there is a parting of the ways between some nations and the others. It is important, therefore, that the spirit and approach of the old Charter should continue in spite of all difficulties that we have to face.

It would be a tragedy if the United Nations ceased to be. I have no doubt that the world requires some such organisation and, if we fail this time, we shall have to start afresh. But we need not think in terms of failure. We should try our best to get over the present crisis and stop this drift to war. The importance of the United Nations was never so great as now when danger threatens them. The United Nations can only function successfully if it does represent the nations of the world. It was an organ for peace and so long as it furthers peace, it will strengthen itself and go ahead. Once it loses sight of that objective, it loses its main function and its importance.

India is devoted to peace and because of this it is supporting the United Nations and will continue to support it.

1. 31 August 1950. Message on the occasion of the United Nations Week celebrated in October 1950. J.N. Collection.

7. The Destiny of Asia¹

Mr Chairman, Your Excellencies and Delegates, The Governor² and the Premier³ of the State of Uttar Pradesh have welcomed you in the city of Lucknow. May I, on behalf of the Government of India, also offer you a cordial welcome, and tell you how privileged we feel that you have chosen this city and this country for this great gathering. For a number of years past—I think it must be about twelve or more—I have been connected, at first rather distantly, then a little more intimately, with the work of the Institute of Pacific Relations,⁴ and I have profited by reading many of the publications that you have issued and I have thought how much good you were doing by pursuing this path of trying to understand the problems of the Pacific or the Far East. For a long time past, I have thought that from many points of view the problems of the world will be more and more entangled in the Far East, and that from political and many other points of view, in a sense, the centre of gravity of trouble, if you like, will be the Far East, or, if you like, not the Far East only, but large parts of Asia.

It struck me often enough that while people talked glibly about this, they did not have a sufficient realisation of it. And so they passed by problems of Asia, and discussed far more the other great problems of the world, notably of Europe, which were of course very important, but it seems to me that in the perspective of things to come, they were not paying enough attention to these problems of a developing Asia. You all know the tremendous importance of much that is happening in Europe and other parts of the world. I do not mean for an instant to say that those changes in Europe and elsewhere are to be passed over but I have felt—and I have often said so—that in the perspective of history today, Asia demands attention, and Asia demands attention in many ways. Certainly, of course, from the point of view of, let us say, developing undeveloped areas, or providing food where food is needed, and in many other like ways but much more so in understanding. For Asia is a country not only in a process of change but in a process of ferment, if I may say so. You may see some parts of Asia quiet and relatively

1. Inaugural speech at the eleventh conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Lucknow, 3 October 1950. A.I.R. tapes, N.M.M.L. The conference was attended by over six hundred delegates from thirteen countries.
2. Homi P. Mody.
3. Govind Ballabh Pant.
4. An international non-governmental and non-partisan organisation set up in 1925 to study international affairs relating to the Pacific and East Asia.

peaceful. You may see other parts in trouble, with external trouble and disturbance. I am not referring to that so much but rather referring to minor changes that are taking place all over the world, no doubt, but perhaps more so in Asia than elsewhere, because not that there is any special virtue in Asia, but because we have been kept back and we are trying to catch up. We have been entangled in past things and time has passed by. We have not kept pace with it, and so we have suddenly arrived at the stage when we have to run—walking is not enough—and in running we stumble and fall, and we try to get up again. It is no good anybody telling us to walk slowly because we cannot do it—because we are overwhelmed, if we walk slowly, by other forces. We realise that running, especially by an aged continent like Asia, involves risks and dangers, but there is no help and no choice for it, for there is a ferment in our minds and all kinds of questions before us which we seek to answer.

In the final analysis, if you seek to understand us, you will understand us a little by discussing our economic, social and political problems and the like, but you have to look a little deeper to understand the ferment in the mind and spirit of Asia. It takes different shapes in different countries, of course, and it is a problem ultimately for us ourselves to understand and to solve—with the help of others, I hope, but the burden is ours. Nobody can solve it except us; others can help as others can hinder, but they can't solve them for us.

So, if you permit me to say so, I hope that in your conferences and in your discussion you will give thought sometimes not only to the externals of these problems but to that something inside it which moves vast masses of people, which puts questions to them to which they cannot find easy answers and they go about tormented in mind and in spirit, making mistakes, sometimes doing wrong things, sometimes right things. That is our state today in Asia.

Asia is a huge continent, and when we talk about an Asian feeling, I do not quite know what it means because we differ too much amongst ourselves. Great countries like China, Japan, India, Indonesia, Burma, or the countries of the Middle East have ancient traditions and cultures with a tremendous background of history and past experiences. It is difficult to jumble them together and just call it Asia, because geographically they happen to occupy that area. And yet I think it is true that in the present context of things there is such a thing as an Asian sentiment, although there may be large differences between these countries. Possibly, it is merely a reaction to the past two or three hundred years of Europe in Asia. That may be.

I do not set much weight on this belief of the Orient and the Occident, unless there was a basic difference between what is called the Occident and what is called the Orient. There are differences of background, history, tradition, geography and climate. There are differences which have grown up especially in the last three or four or five hundred years because of the development of some countries on industrial and other lines. All these differences, the previous differences are there,

no doubt, but probably the present differences are largely caused by the fact that certain parts of the world went ahead with the consequences of the Industrial Revolution, while others did not. Possibly, if the others also went ahead on these lines, those differences may become less, although even then the conflicts may not be less. But apart from this difference in tradition, history, background and experience, there exists a tremendous difference between any two countries—take China, take Japan, or India—yet we are all clubbed together as the Orient and Europe or parts of Europe and America as Occident.

I think that this business of thinking in terms of the Orient and Occident puts us on the wrong track, when we try to think that, normally speaking, the same type of problems produce the same results anywhere. At the same time, we have to think, of course, of certain backgrounds and national characteristics, which persist in ancient countries, because countries like India or China or the countries of the Middle East have got a very great background of history and tradition, which has seeped into our mind, which influences us no doubt and which is both good and bad. It has a great deal of good in it because if it did not have that good, we would not have survived as we have done; we would have gone under. We have survived and we propose to hold on to it. At the same time, there is no doubt at all that there is a great deal of bad in it too which ties us up and prevents us in the great things that we ought to do. And so, between the good and the bad and between the past and the present and the future, we do not quite know what we are going to do and what we should not do. Some individuals may think that way, others the other way, but I am speaking, for the moment, of national tendencies.

If you ask me about my own country—and I am not a man without experience of my country—it is very difficult for me to give an answer briefly, because I see so many forces at play—not of the normal type. What is communism doing in this country, what is this, what is that? These are trivial questions. We have to think about these; these trivial questions may be important for the moment—I do not deny that—but if you seek to understand a country by putting trivial questions, then you do not understand it. You get lost in some superficial aspect, which is moving you or troubling you for the moment. We have to deal with deeper problems, and when I say we, I am not referring to India but every country. Deeper problems, more difficult questions, more complicated questions than just this of being a communist, or an anti-communist or wanting communism, or fighting it and thinking as if these are the only questions left to be settled in this world.

So, if you ask me about India, I would take a long time telling you of some aspects of the problems that we have in India, our difficulties—and the major difficulties will be not external to us but internal, of the mind and the spirit—tendencies of going ahead and tendencies of going backward, revivalism and obscurantism on one side, and progress of the latest type on the other. But then, again, the question arises, what exactly is progress, and we stumble. Certainly, progress consists of some essential things in life which one must have. Obviously

we are going ahead with them. We are going to advance, I hope, rapidly with a scientific outlook and the development of science and the applications of science in this country in every way. That will produce good results, I hope, and yet doubts creep into one's mind because that by itself offers no real solution. It is a passing solution but something more is needed. Obviously, Government can offer a solution to a particular problem that affects one. But many of these problems may themselves be the result of those applications of science itself which we lack and which we admire. What then? Where are we going? What are we aiming at? I feel that unless we give thought to these deeper problems, we are apt to go astray and not find a real answer.

You know that many of us in this country have spent a great part of our lives in trying very, very imperfectly to follow the lead given by the great leader that we had. He taught us, he moulded us, and gave us some strength and some vision and because of that we managed to achieve somewhat. But, anyhow, for thirty years or more we lived under his shadow and under his guidance, and he spoke in terms strange to the modern world, strange even to some extent to us who followed him. We did not quite understand him. We felt the greatness of his presence and the greatness of his personality. We followed him in certain things to the best of our ability. About the rest, we hope that we will be able to follow him. He talked about non-violence and the like, and yet we saw a world full of violence and here we are today in charge of governments and the governments keep armies and navies and air forces and indulge in violence pretty often. And the problem comes to us, not that we were convinced in terms of that perfect non-violence at any time.

Nevertheless, the problem comes to us—where exactly is the world going and where we are going. What are we to do about it? On the one hand, none of us dare in the present state of the world to do away with the engines of organised violence. We cannot, either for external purposes—for defence from an external aggression of an enemy—or for internal trouble from anti-social elements. We can't do it. So we keep armies and we must as far as I can see. On the other hand, we see that that does not solve any problem. Of course, such army or navy or air force as we may have in this country is a tiny affair not worth mentioning before the vast armadas of the other nations, but the problem arises with regard to those countries, great countries, with vast armies and navies and air forces. What of them? Have they solved their problems because of them? The question is not answered in the affirmative and then one finds that somehow the method of dealing with the evils of the world itself contributes to that evil. What then are we to do? There is evil in the world, plenty of it, and that evil supports itself by armed strength. We have to meet it with armed strength, and when we meet it, we become infected by that evil, and we follow the same way, or similar way, and then more and more we get infected by other things that might be called, in brief, the military method of dealing with things or the military outlook. Well, there have been great soldiers in the world, great men, but I do not think that the military outlook or the purely

military method has yet solved any major problem in the world. And that is why a great Frenchman,⁵ I believe, once said that war is much too serious a thing to be entrusted to soldiers—which is perfectly true. But if it is too serious a thing for a soldier who may go wrong, a civilian who develops a military mentality is infinitely worse than a soldier. If a nation or a government develops that type of military mentality, then there is little hope for that nation. So, we go round and round these problems.

Here we are, in the last three months or so, facing what was a small war in Korea, but which had the seeds in it of mighty conflict the world over. And almost every country desires that that war should at least be localised and ended there and the people have all desired it, I am quite sure, and yet sometimes the military mind peeped out and wanted to go much further, thinking that by going further it would solve other basic problems also and not realising the essential lesson of history that if you go too far, you topple over and get entangled in other problems. So all these things arise, and it is my misfortune that I have to deal with these problems in a governmental capacity, have to advise my Government and sometimes venture to express an opinion to other Governments and often enough find that we are not in agreement with any Government—which is an unfortunate state of affairs. But we feel that it would do little good for us merely to make our minds blank and accept others' impressions and others' views or just to follow a particular line of action because others follow it. Anyhow, I think that would not be a good thing for my country or the world but apart from that I venture to think that perhaps those of us in India or those of us in some other parts of Asia may conceivably have a somewhat better understanding, not perhaps of the economic and political problems, but certainly of those inner problems of the mind and spirit and heart that trouble Asia and which ultimately are going to govern the actions of Asia. Economics plays an important part, a vital part, in the lives of men. It is playing a tremendous part in Asia, but ultimately there are other forces also which play an even more important part and, as I said, it may be that we in Asia, to whatever country we may belong, might be in a somewhat better position to understand our neighbouring countries in Asia, to understand their troubles, their difficulties and to have, if I may say so, an emotional understanding of them which is more important than any merely intellectual one.

I ventured in a spirit of arrogance once to say that many Western countries lack subtlety in their dealings with Asia.⁶ Of course, I can say the reverse with equal truth, that is, many Eastern and Asian countries lack subtlety in their understanding of the West or in their dealings with the West, because both are true. Now how are we to get that understanding? Because it is important to get that

5. Georges Clemenceau.

6. See *ante*, p. 347.

understanding, I feel that an institute, like your Institute of Pacific Relations, is peculiarly situated so as to help in that real and true understanding. It may be that the work you do may not carry you very far in influencing governments. It is difficult to know what influences a government and how to influence it at a critical moment, but, nevertheless, in democratic countries, obviously all this goes towards influencing governments and governmental action; to what degree one cannot say.

So you meet here in India and consider problems of Asian nationalism⁷ and other problems. I wonder what exactly you mean by Asian nationalism? Is it different from a European variety, and, if so, how is it different? What is this nationalism? I do not know; I feel it difficult to define. If you were to define it, well, in the course of a struggle with a foreign power, you know exactly what nationalism is. It is simply anti-foreign feeling, that is what nationalism means. In a free country, what is nationalism? Certainly it is something positive, though opinions may vary on this subject. But even so, a large element of it is negative or anti or something that separates it from others, and so sometimes we find that nationalism, which is a healthy force in a country, which is a cohesive force, which is a liberating force, becomes, maybe after liberation, unhealthy and looks with greedy eyes on other countries and that repeats the very error against which it fought in its upheaval. All that is nationalism. Where do you draw the line? What do you call right? Or what do you call wrong?

We have just been through our struggle for independence and freedom and, naturally, nationalism was a war cry which warmed our hearts. It still warms our hearts, it still warms the hearts of almost every Asian, wherever we may go, because the memories of past colonialism are very vivid in our minds. A few individuals may escape those memories or get over them, but the vast mass of people do not forget so easily. So nationalism is a strong force today in many parts of Asia. Any other force, any other activity that may seek to function, must define itself in terms of this nationalism. That is to say, if it is anti-nationalism, it will have to come up against a great wall. If it is going parallel to it, in line with it, then it may be helped by it. That is why I said sometime ago that when the question is put, as it is often put, by people coming to us from abroad: "What is your reaction to communism?"—well, the answer is a somewhat complicated answer. And when they get a little angry with us and ask whether we don't see the great danger which is facing the world, then, for an answer, we say we see many dangers and not one; certainly that danger is there, but there are many others too, many from outside and many inside, and we shall try to balance them in freedom. An individual may answer it differently, but I am telling you what the nation's answer would be. And then the person who asked that question gets angry and irritated. He does not realise

7. The main theme of the conference was: Nationalism in East Asia and its international consequences.

that when Indonesia was struggling for freedom, it was a monstrous thing to ask any country to support Dutch imperialism there. We just could not understand it; whatever the reason, communism or no communism, it was a monstrous thing. Fortunately, in the end, the right counsel prevailed, and Indonesian nationalism was supported and it won.

No argument in any country in Asia is going to carry weight if it goes counter to the national spirit of that country, communism or no communism. That has to be understood. I am not arguing for or against. I am trying to put to you the position as I understand it. Whatever country of Asia you may go to, you have to see what is the nationalist urge, how you can support it, and if you go against it, whatever your other arguments may be, they will not be fully appreciated or understood. Well, speaking about nationalism, I venture to hint that I do not consider nationalism as, by itself, a very admirable thing. It may be good, it may be bad, and it may be a mixture of good and bad. That depends how it functions and where it is. And so, it is not that I wish to lay stress on nationalism because I consider it a good thing, but because I feel that, at the present moment, in large parts of Asia it is a factor which must be recognized. That nationalism inevitably is based, as I said, on memories of past colonialism, and if anything occurs which reminds of that past colonialism or any future form of it, immediately the old memories revive, and there is a strong reaction.

Now, I would not venture to put anything concrete before many of you, ladies and gentlemen, who are experts in these subjects, but still I have ventured to say something because my own life has been a curious one, not that of an expert at anything but a dabbler in many things and a person who has come into contact with vast masses of human beings, and who has tried to understand them, tried to influence them, and been influenced by them. So, to some extent, I am receptive to mass influences, even in other countries. I can understand them a little more. Perhaps, if I had the great advantage of being as scholarly as many of you are, I could view this problem of Asia in some historical perspective and in the sense of masses in movement, and I think unless you do it also in that way, you will not wholly understand it or grasp it. Because you do feel this ferment in Asia of the masses involved in movements, and if they are not involved in any external movement, then, take it from me, their minds are in a state of great commotion. The people in Asia are struggling for a change and I do not know where all that effort will lead them. I have not the faintest notion—I am speaking to you as Prime Minister of India—I have not the faintest notion what India will be ten or twenty years later. I can tell you what I want it to be; I can work to that end. I have a certain measure of confidence in myself, in my strength to influence people, and to make them go in a particular direction. But having said all that, I am not going to know what is going to happen ten or twenty years hence in Asia or India and, frankly speaking, I do not very much mind. I do my job to the best of my ability, and with as much energy as I possess. If I succeed, well and good; if I do not,

I cannot help it. And because I may not succeed, I am not going to start worrying today. But I have every intention of succeeding, I might tell you. Well, I have every hope.

So you will discuss these problems, and I have no doubt that your discussions will bring understanding to others as well as to many of you, that is to say, understanding of each other's problems coming from different countries, and you will consider them, naturally, on the intellectual and economic levels. But I do sometimes feel a little, looking at the world around us, how far we are drifting from any dispassionate consideration of any problem—a kind of pervading fear, which is gradually preventing us from considering any question on the merits. Now, if any country should be or ought to be afraid, it should be India or any country in Asia—India, Pakistan, or any other country. It is because, after all, judged by any modern standard, we are weak, militarily and economically weak. We are poor. We have great resources, potential resources, but not the actual resources. We should feel scared. Well, I cannot speak for the whole of India. But I can tell you with all honesty that I have not a shadow of fear in me at the present moment, whatever happens in the world, and I think that to some extent my people or many of them share that feeling. Why is that so? Because we were trained, to a large extent, in this way of functioning by our master. We started as small groups facing a mighty empire, unarmed people with no apparent means of achieving our end, and on the other side, there was the might of an armed empire and gradually we learnt from our great leader not to be afraid. Ultimately, one has to face certain consequences. If mentally you accept these consequences, fear goes. But if you avoid facing consequences, the fear stares at you. Anyhow, I think it is true that if we or some of us are not overburdened by the fear that is consuming large parts of the world, it is not from any lack of understanding of the dangerous situation that we are in, but because we have been conditioned in this way during the last thirty years. We get afraid occasionally, of course, and I am not talking in terms of courage or lack of courage. Please do not think so. It is only being conditioned gradually by events—not to become excited, and, because of that excitement, not to indulge in any action which is not carefully thought out.

The last war, perhaps, ended long after it should have ended. It was carried on; at least some people think so. It might have ended in as good a victory and with fewer problems a year before it actually ended, provided the desire to take matters to the extreme end and limit was not there. Now, unfortunately, when we enter into the realm of warfare and the military mind, there is always that desire to go to the last limit, and in doing so, the objective for which the war is fought is itself often betrayed. If you have time or opportunity, I would advise you to read in your leisure moments an ancient Sanskrit play⁸ written in the fifth century.

8. *Mudrarakshasa*, a play written by Vishakhadatta, deals with Chanakya, the Chief Minister of Chandragupta Maurya.

It is a political play dealing with this particular problem of peace and war. The great Indian who was the hero of that play was a master not only of statecraft but of war too. He waged war and established a powerful empire. He discusses it and says: It must always be remembered that war is fought to gain a certain objective. War is not the objective. Victory is not the objective. War is fought to remove an obstruction, which comes in the way of your gaining an objective. If by victory you mean removal of your obstruction, well and good. If victory itself becomes an objective, then you have forgotten your real objective. You have gone astray and therefore it is the end of it. You have gone off, the objective has gone somewhere else and new problems face you. That is a very wise message indeed. Now if, unfortunately, in the modern world, wars have to be fought, whether small or big, we should always remember that they are bad, and they have to be stopped as soon as one can do so. Because by not doing so, they corrupt us, they create new problems and thereby make our future even more terrible. That surely is the lesson of the last two world wars, and now when people talk of the third, it is time we thought of that again, and not rush into adventures, which might lead us into a third war, which everyone agrees would be a catastrophe without limit for mankind.

Ultimately, of course, the question becomes one of whether humanity is wise enough. We have accumulated knowledge, a tremendous degree of knowledge, so much knowledge that we do not know how to use it. Learning and knowledge and universities and all kinds of institutions for imparting knowledge grow. There are specialists of high degrees and all that, but sometimes a doubt comes if wisdom grows or not, or perhaps whether this abundance of practical knowledge does not come in the way of wisdom or of any new understanding. What wisdom is, one does not know. If I may, in conclusion, repeat some words of a Greek poet, Euripides,⁹ I think, which, in translation, read as follows:

What else is wisdom? What of man's endeavour
 Or God's high grace, so lovely and so great?
 To stand from fear set free, to breathe and wait;
 To hold a hand uplifted over Hate;
 And shall not Loveliness be loved for ever?¹⁰

9. (c. 484-406 BC); Greek playwright; author of *Alcestis*, *Medea*, *Hippolytus*, *Trojan Women*, *Electra* and *The Bacchae*.

10. From *The Bacchae* (Gilbert Murray's translation).

8. Indian Ethos in Embassies Abroad¹

Some days ago a young Indian visitor to Europe and America, returning to India, complained to me about the serving of alcoholic drinks at parties and receptions given by our embassies. I was asked if this was not contrary to our instructions. This led me to enquire into this matter further and, in the course of this enquiry, I read the views of different heads of our missions and consular posts abroad on the question of prohibiting the serving of alcoholic drinks. Last year an enquiry on this subject was addressed by our Foreign Office to heads of missions, who were asked to send their comments in the light of their experience. It is these replies that I read.

2. I confess that I was a little troubled on reading these views of our heads of missions abroad. It was not merely a question of prohibition, but rather a feeling I had that some of our officers abroad live in a mental climate which is far removed from that of India. I can well understand that they have to follow, to a large extent, the customs of the countries they are in and old established diplomatic conventions; also that they are affected by their environment. Nevertheless it seems important to me that they should remember that they are representatives of India and have to function in a way which is not only agreeable to Indian opinion but is also in general conformity with our conventions and policies. It is the business of our missions abroad to cultivate friendly relations with the people of the country they serve in. We have to understand and be friendly with foreigners. We have to mix with them. But we have always to remain Indians and to remember that an Indian embassy is a bit of India. No individual and no country is respected if he or it tries to ape others.

3. I am not greatly worried about this question of prohibition except in so far as it relates to larger issues and our general attitude in foreign countries as well as in India. It is clear that we are not trying to introduce prohibition in our foreign missions. Even in India, prohibition has only been applied in certain States or other limited areas. Nevertheless it is a fact that our national policy disapproves of indulgence in alcoholic drinks.

4. I am not, what might be called, a traditionalist or a person trying to revive the ways of life of a past that is over. I look to the future and I think that we have a great deal to learn from the present-day civilisation of the West. I think I have

1. Note for heads of Indian missions abroad, 20 October 1950. J.N. Collection.

myself learnt much from it and I hope to learn more. But I see no reason to be swept away by any custom or practice of the West, simply because it is popular there, or because it might make me popular there. Ultimately, individuals and nations are judged by their intrinsic qualities and not by their superficial behaviour. It is true that in the world today superficiality is much more in evidence and we are all affected by it. We have no time for depth. That, however, is no reason for us to surrender to a wrong tendency.

5. Our foreign service is very young and, as a whole, we lack experience. A foreign policy grows gradually and a foreign service also takes time to develop. And yet, in spite of our brief existence as an independent nation, we have done rather well in international affairs. We have made our mark and our voice counts and is respected. Great countries and vast numbers of people look to India and listen to India's word. They do not like it sometimes, they criticise it. But they respect it and are anxious to know what it is. Why is this so? Not because we have tried to follow in their footsteps blindly or tried to imitate them in their ways or policies; not because we have any military or economic strength to back our thoughts and policies. We count for something today, because we function in a different medium and there is a growing realisation that we are sincere and mean what we say. We bear no malice to any country or to any people and try to be friendly in our simple way. All this has to be remembered.

6. In the answers to our question about the serving of alcoholic drinks, some of our heads of missions told us that to ban such serving would not only lower the prestige of our country but would also affect the very utility of our diplomatic social functions; that we would be considered strange and unsocial. It was suggested that we should conform to the social customs and conventions of the country concerned and should not try to enforce our mores on others in their own countries; that good relationship was helped by catering to the tastes of the guests; that we are accused of economising; and that our refusal to serve alcoholic drinks is simply not understood, even if it is not resented and despised.

7. I suppose there is something in all this, but I am unable to appreciate the basic outlook out of which these comments issue. It is a poor kind of prestige which depends upon what has been described as an "emotional stimulant" or "irritant". We have to supply more solid fare, if our prestige is to endure. We have to be more interesting in other ways, if we are to attract people. Those who come merely for drinks can well keep away without much loss to us. Even from a narrow point of view, we attract more attention and consideration, if we do not become mere replicas of others, but are somewhat different. Nobody asks foreigners in their own country to change their habits or their customs. But it is no great imposition if for an hour or two they visited a somewhat different world. An intelligent person likes this. An unintelligent person does not count.

8. Having said all this, I want to make it clear that we are not proposing any particular brand of prohibition in our foreign missions. We are not suggesting hard and fast rules and, to some extent, the head of a mission must exercise his own discretion. We have laid emphasis in the past on the serving of drinks to others; the real emphasis should be on the use of drinks, more especially by our officers. They must set a standard. Even from an old established diplomatic point of view, the man who drinks much is a bad diplomat, because he cannot hold his tongue. He has to be particularly careful, therefore, about himself. Our officers have in addition always to remember that they should do nothing which obviously goes contrary to our policy. We have not tried to come in the way of personal behaviour. But any over-indulgence in alcoholic drinks, in public or private, must necessarily be considered a serious lapse.

9. I wish to leave this matter to the discretion of the head of the mission. But for his general guidance I am making some suggestions. In large parties, whether they are held on our national days or any other day, alcoholic drinks should not be served. It is often possible to time such parties, so that they take place at an hour of the day when alcoholic drinks might not be considered so necessary by the people of that country as at other hours of the day.

10. At smaller parties some drinks might be provided. But on no occasion should there be a lavish display of alcoholic hospitality. Our officers, more especially, should restrict their own consumption of drinks to the very minimum, not only at our own parties but at other diplomatic functions.

11. The kind of drinks that might be served at the smaller functions should not follow the normal expansive and variegated pattern of diplomatic functions which indulge in great variety of wines and spirits. There might be some simple drink like sherry before dinner, one wine during dinner, and possibly, port or liqueur at the end. Strong drinks such as whisky and brandy should normally not be served. Perhaps an exception might be made in very cold climates.

12. These are some general indications. But it must always be remembered that heads of missions and their staff should set an example of sobriety. Junior officers should be told that intemperance will be regarded as a major fault which may affect their promotion and even retention in the foreign service.

13. The general attitude of all our officers and staff should be to remember that they are Indians and have to function as such. We adopt many foreign ways and customs because they are good and lead to efficiency. But basically we still remain Indians and have no desire to hide that fact. It is necessary, therefore, for our embassies and legations abroad to have as much of an Indian atmosphere as possible. The furniture and fittings and pictures should try to reproduce this atmosphere.

14. As I have said above, we have no reason to be dissatisfied with the progress we have made in our international relations. Indeed we have done fairly well and the credit for that goes, to a large extent, to our heads of missions and younger



AT THE PACIFIC RELATIONS CONFERENCE, LUCKNOW, 3 OCTOBER 1950



WITH THE DELEGATES AT THE PACIFIC RELATIONS CONFERENCE, LUCKNOW, 3 OCTOBER 1950

officers abroad. At the same time I want to tell you frankly that some incidents have occurred in our missions abroad which have distressed me. There has been sometimes a lack of cooperation and a superiority complex in some of our officers which I considered totally unbecoming. Every member of the foreign service must remember that while he has to behave with propriety and discipline at all times, including his period of service in India, he has to be particularly careful when he is serving abroad. In foreign countries he is a representative of India, a bit of India, and everything that he does or does not do attracts attention and affects India's honour and prestige. There must be complete cooperation and discipline in a foreign mission. If any friction arises, it must be dealt with properly and quietly without any fuss. The head of the mission is responsible for the efficient running of the whole mission. His decisions must be final, subject of course, where necessary, to a reference to headquarters.

15. I have referred to discipline. At the same time there must be fellow-feeling and a sense of camaraderie. The mission should function as a well-knit family from the head down to the lowest grade of employee. Discipline does not mean that some people should consider themselves superior to others or behave in that way. The old officer complex, which existed in British times in India, does not fit in today; nor is it desirable. This fact should be remembered not only in official relations but also in private relations. All over the world there is a strong tendency towards equality. In India we are backward in this, in spite of our professions. This is partly due to our old customs, partly to our social set-up, and partly to the traditions of British days which we have inherited. We have gradually to get out of this framework and manner of behaviour. Discipline can and should be maintained while preserving some sense of equality and comradeship between workers in different grades.

16. In some of our missions abroad there are foreign employees in various grades. We should treat them without any discrimination, just as we treat any other members of the staff. If we have employed them, we should make them feel that they are full members of that staff and that official family.

17. I need not refer to the necessity of our keeping far away from any communal or other separatist tendency. Every member of the staff, whether he is a Hindu, a Muslim, a Sikh, Christian, Brahmin, non-Brahmin, Harijan or any other, or whatever State he comes from, must be treated alike. Every head of a mission should pay particular attention to this and prevent the growth of any separatist tendency among the members of his staff.

18. I am conveying these ideas to you not only for yourself, but so that you might share them with all the members of your staff. I hope that a true spirit of service will grow up among all those who are in the foreign service of India in whatever capacity they might serve. It is a noble service and it should be considered a high honour and privilege to be in it. We are living in difficult times both at home and abroad and a multitude of problems oppress us. That is a destiny we

cannot escape and it is no good our complaining all the time about our own personal troubles or about other matters. We work in the present to the best of our ability and we build for the future.

9. The Importance of Human Rights¹

In a world which is full of conflict and hatred and violence, it becomes even more necessary than at any other time for us to have some anchor to our faith in human destiny. The solemn proclamation by the United Nations of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides such an anchorage, if only we hold on to it. I welcome, therefore, the celebration of the second anniversary of this Declaration and I hope that it will revive in people's minds all over the world that there are certain positive values in life which we must respect and hold on to, if life is to be made worth living. The present may be bad, but the present passes giving place to the future. If the future we work for is full of hope for humanity, then the ills of the present do not matter much and we have a justification for working for that future.

So I welcome this anniversary of an event important in man's history and I send greetings to all those who work for the realisation of those human rights which we have proclaimed.

1. Message for the *Unesco Courier*, 20 October 1950. File No. 42(2)/48-PMS.

10. Foundation of Sapru House¹

It is a privilege to be associated with anything to commemorate the memory of a great Indian like Dr Sapru. Dr Sapru was a very distinguished product of a certain

1. Speech on the occasion of the foundation-stone laying ceremony of Sapru House, the building for the Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi, 20 October 1950. From the *National Herald*, 22 October 1950. The building was named after Tej Bahadur Sapru, the Council's first president.

composite culture for many long years, which still exists and which would no doubt continue to exist in some measure.

Nevertheless a change has come over the Indian scene and there are people who do not particularly like that composite type of Indian culture which grew up in India, who want to lay stress on certain aspects of it to the exclusion of others and who want to make this rich variety of Indian culture rather narrow and limited in its outlook. So I look back to Dr Tej Bahadur Sapru with a certain wistfulness, as a symbol of something in the cultural domain, apart from other domains, which I admired greatly and which I should have liked to grow in India.

Previously people lived more or less in their mental universes apart from each other and hence did not come into conflict. Now when people have been brought nearer to each other, those who had lived in their separate mental universes all the time find that the world is not what they had thought it to be. There is, naturally, some irritation. Gradually, of course, the realisation will come that this is a world not only with a great deal of commonness, unity and uniformity but also with enormous variety and it is no good all of us trying to make others think like us or act like us.

It would be a dull world if everybody thinks in a single regimented way, but however various it might be, if there is an endeavour to understand and appreciate the other's way of thinking, it would go a long way to bring about a certain capacity to adjust oneself.

Those who have fixed ideas about the West, should try to understand the West.

There is no doubt that in the course of the next generation a very great deal is going to happen in Africa and people who think that Africa is going to remain more or less static are as mistaken as those who thought that Asia was going to remain static. But leaving that out, what is going to happen to Asia is possibly the biggest question for the next twenty or thirty years. In the ultimate analysis, what is going to happen to Asia means which way the masses of Asia are likely to go. No one can answer that question.

We may, within the limited span of years allotted to us, try to influence the current in a particular direction, but no one knows what is going to happen. Perhaps, it is as well that no one knows; it is much more exciting not to know than to know.

LETTERS TO CHIEF MINISTERS

New Delhi
August 3, 1950

My dear Chief Minister,

I am a little late in writing to you this fortnightly letter. The last few days have had a rush of activities ending up with the opening of a Parliamentary session. I have had the misfortune, just at this moment, to develop an irritating cold, which has rather come in the way of my normal work.

2. Even today I do not propose to write to you at any considerable length. In regard to some of the major questions before us, you will no doubt keep in touch with the proceedings in Parliament. This session has been convened especially because of the Korean situation. This changes from day to day and does not change for the better. You will have read of my personal appeal to Marshal Stalin and Mr Dean Acheson.² That ended in failure. But I do not regret having made that appeal. At any rate it made many people think that something possibly could be done to stop this onward rush to world catastrophe. The most terrible thing that happens during these crises is a feeling of fatality that nothing more is possible except to jump into the abyss. Every country, or its Government, is afraid of the other gaining a more advantageous position and therefore is not prepared to talk or discuss or consider the problem dispassionately. So, every such effort, as I have ventured to make, is dubbed appeasement and therefore to be rejected.

3. For many months past, our policy has aimed at getting the People's Government of China admitted into the United Nations. We felt that this was necessary to stop the progressive deterioration of the world situation and the possible disintegration of the United Nations. The new Government in China was a fact, which nobody could deny or ignore. It was a stable and strong Government likely to endure, and had controlled a vast territory. China's not being admitted into the United Nations resulted in the U.S.S.R. also keeping out, as well as some of the Soviet satellite countries. This meant that a very large part of the world was outside the United Nations. Thus the U.N. ceased to represent the nations of the world. It is immaterial whose fault this was. The fact remained that the United Nations ceased to be what it was meant to be, that is, a forum where all countries could meet and discuss their problems and quarrel, if necessary. It was fatal for the U.N. to function without a large group of nations. It was for this reason that the Secretary-General of the United Nations undertook a tour, some months ago, of some important capitals.

1. These letters have also been printed in G. Parthasarathi (ed.), *Jawaharlal Nehru: Letters to Chief Ministers 1947-1964*, Vol. 2 (New Delhi, 1986), pp. 155-235.
2. See *Selected Works* (Second Series), Vol. 14 Part II, pp. 347-348.

4. It seemed to us that an essential preliminary to the solution of the problems before us was the inclusion of the People's Government of China into the United Nations. Every other approach would have been held up because of this. It was in fact the realisation of a patent fact. Unfortunately, our appeal was not heeded. The U.S.S.R., however, have returned to the Security Council and it is just possible that one of the reasons for their going back there was our appeal to them and to the U.S.A. Again, in the Security Council the question of China has been raised and has been defeated. We have followed a consistent and logical policy and I cannot see how we, or any country that has recognised the new China, could have acted otherwise. Yet the fact remains that the U.K. Government and Norway, although they have recognised the new China, had stood in the way of its admission to the U.N. All kinds of procedural difficulties have been raised, as if minor matters of procedure should be allowed to come in the way of the consideration of vital world problems. Meanwhile, the world goes forward to some inevitable climax. The odd thing is that many people take for granted that war will solve this or any other problem. They forget past experience. They do not realise that even victory in war does not yield the results aimed at.

5. In a sense the return of the U.S.S.R. to the Security Council has eased the tension. That is to say, one does not sense world war in the near future. The Korean war will, however, go on and it is estimated that it should take at least six months or possibly more, that is, provided it does not spread meanwhile. There is always a danger of that.

6. Our domestic problems are serious enough and of more intimate concern to us than what happens in Korea or elsewhere abroad. But from another point of view, Korea is more important because if this fighting spreads, it will inevitably affect all our domestic problems and put a heavy burden on our already strained economy. The food situation has suddenly grown worse. I gave you a fairly optimistic account of food production in my previous letters. That account holds good still. Nevertheless, in local areas, especially in Madras, Bihar and Bombay, there have been serious shortages due to various reasons. Lack of rain in some places and floods in Bihar and Saurashtra. But the main difficulty has been a defective administrative machinery to deal with procurement and distribution. This has become a very urgent problem for us, because it does not matter much what progress we make in production or otherwise, if the machinery in the States cannot take advantage of it. The situation in Bihar has more especially made us think hard.³ Our Food Minister, Shri K.M. Munshi, is convinced that there is plenty of food round about in Bihar itself. But anti-social elements grab it and keep it underground while people starve. How are we to meet this situation? We cannot

3. Heavy rains destroyed most of the maize crop in Bihar and floods upset the movement of foodgrains, thus causing conditions of scarcity especially in North Bihar. Deaths due to starvation were reported from Purnea, Bhagalpur and Saharsa regions.

look on supinely at the activities of relatively small groups of people holding up the whole community for ransom. If the existing law is not adequate to deal with this situation, something more has to be devised. Indeed, it may be necessary to declare a state of emergency in a particular region, where the State machinery is not functioning properly and there is great scarcity and distress.

7. The Food Minister spoke in Parliament yesterday. He is a new-comer to this business, but he has already devoted himself with great energy to this difficult task and brought a fresh mind to bear upon it.⁴ He pointed out the difficulties of the Centre in dealing with this problem.⁵ The Centre of course gets all the blame and each State demands all kinds of help from the Centre all the time. But the Centre is not an inexhaustible store-house for everything needed. It is only a coordinating factor drawing sustenance from the States. If the States fail to do their duty, the Centre cannot discharge its functions. There has been far too much slackness in some of the States, more especially those that are called surplus States. There has been hardly any real attempt in some States (not all) to profit by the increased production and to procure it. Official machinery is weak and sometimes almost absent. Apparently there is a fear that if any effective action is taken, the political consequences in the shape of votes may be undesirable. The result is that the State takes little trouble itself and throws the blame upon the Centre. This is a very unsatisfactory state of affairs.

8. It is not much good our blaming each other. The point is that we have got to grip this situation and forget elections and everything else for the time being. If we fail in doing so, then we automatically fail in everything else too later. It is a matter for very serious consideration for each State how best to put forward all its energy in creating proper machinery for procurement and distribution. All our Grow-More-Food schemes will founder, if that machinery is lacking. The Central Government is perfectly prepared to assume responsibility, wherever needed. At present it is in the unenviable position of responsibility for everything without power to do much.

9. You will forgive me for writing in this way and generalising about the States. I am trying to avoid mentioning particular States which have not come up to the mark. Others, of course, have done well. I should like to mention especially the way in which the Saurashtra Government met a serious flood situation with efficiency. I feel strongly that our governmental machinery generally is not functioning as it should and this is particularly true of some of the States. If we do not pull up now, we shall have to suffer very serious consequences.

4. Munshi described the food situation as "difficult but not desperate" and suggested adoption of an integrated programme for intensive cultivation of food crops, cotton and jute.
5. Munshi said that the Centre was merely serving as an agency for importing and subsidizing food; it could neither "pull up any State with regard to its procurement policy" nor direct movement of foodgrains from a surplus to a scarcity State.

10. While human beings suffer because of scarcity of food in some areas, it is at least as unfortunate that horses and cattle have suddenly been caused a great deal of hardship by the disappearance of gram from the market. There has obviously been a breakdown in the arrangement for the distribution of gram. There is little doubt that the gram is there; but it is not easily available. Here again is a case of utter lack of coordination in our work.

11. One of the factors which has led to the recent rise in prices and of hoarding is the talk of war. This makes it all the more necessary for us to take effective steps to prevent profiteers and the like from making hay at the expense of the people generally. I should like you to consider this aspect of the matter and take full powers to deal with the situation. I have no doubt that strong measures will yield results. Somehow, we have got so tied up with the intricacies of the law that we cannot take any step without being entangled in it for months and years.

12. As you know, we had a visit from the Prime Minister of Pakistan to discuss the Kashmir problem with the U.N. representative, Sir Owen Dixon. The discussions yielded little result, and yet there is some hope. We are exploring various avenues and Sir Owen Dixon has now gone to Pakistan.

13. The Bengal situation will be discussed soon in Parliament. I enclose a note prepared for the occasion which will give you some figures.⁶ These are interesting and give us a better idea of what is happening there in regard to migrations than all the vague statements that are made. The situation is far from satisfactory, but it is certainly not nearly as bad as is painted. Recently a refugees conference was held in Delhi and I was amazed to read the speeches of some persons,⁷ who ought to have spoken with a greater sense of responsibility. Many of the proposals made there are fantastic and have no relation to facts. Whatever else they might lead to, they would not help the unfortunate minorities who are suffering.

14. A trade delegation, headed by Shri P.A. Narielwala,⁸ will be going soon to Indonesia for the purpose of exploring the possibility of expanding trade with that country. The delegation will also visit Malaya and Burma.

15. It has been decided that with effect from the 15th August 1950, Indian coastal trade will be reserved for Indian shipping companies. The final elimination of foreign companies plying on the coast will take some months, possibly a year.

16. Most of the States have been struggling with the problem of abolition of jagirdaris and zamindaris. These are, of course, essential parts of Congress policy

6. See *ante*, pp. 251-254.

7. For instance, S.P. Mookerjee said that those who had demanded the formation of Pakistan but were still in India ought to go there. Purushottamdas Tandon suggested imposition of a capital levy on private property and compulsory acquisition by Government of a certain proportion of such property for providing compensation to refugees.

8. (1900-1990); for many years in the service of the Tatas; a friend of the Nehru family, and Secretary, Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 1980-85.

and programme and there has been already great delay in giving effect to our promises. We have been held up by the extraordinary intricacy of the problem, more especially in regard to compensation. Various States have proceeded on their own lines. Some have got completely held up. It is obvious that such a problem must be viewed as a whole and only then can effective steps be taken. What sometimes happens is that a first step is thought of and the rest is left for future consideration. High Courts sometimes intervened and declared States laws as *ultra vires*. It is clear that we have got to go through this programme of abolition of zamindaris and to avoid all delay, for delay is dangerous. Unfortunately, the law and the Constitution sometimes come in the way. I think we could devise methods which are in conformity with the Constitution. It is certain that if the law comes in the way ultimately, the law will have to be changed, because it is of the utmost importance that this agrarian reform should be put through.

17. The recent air disaster near Pathankot was a warning to us.⁹ There is going to be a full enquiry into it. We cannot afford to take the slightest risk in air travel. We have expanded our air services rapidly and with remarkable success. Indeed, we have done rather well and accidents have been few. But that does not mean that we should grow complacent. The growth of air services can only be based on a secure foundation of security.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

9. On 17 July, a Dakota aircraft crashed on its flight from Delhi to Srinagar killing all the passengers and crew. Among the dead were the Austrian Charge d'Affaires in New Delhi, Dwarkanath Kachru, private secretary to Nehru, three U.N. Observers in Kashmir and three officers of the Indian Army.

II

New Delhi
August 18, 1950

My dear Chief Minister,

Three days ago, I stood on the ramparts of the Red Fort of Old Delhi and a vast multitude was assembled in front of me. We were celebrating the third anniversary of independence. I spoke to them about various matters and, more particularly, about the food situation.¹ But even as I spoke, the picture of this world of ours, so full of conflict and trouble and contradictions, came up before me and then,

1. See *ante*, pp. 3-8.

the picture of my own country with all the multiplicity of her problems. How to deal with these problems, how to surmount our difficulties, how to attain our objectives? And what were, after all, these objectives? Were we clear about them, or were we just groping about in the dark between two worlds, one dead and the other yet to be born? Many of us worked hard enough and exhausted ourselves in this endeavour. Were we working aright, and was our work bearing fruit as it should? We put on a brave face to give confidence to ourselves and others, but sometimes doubts creep into our minds.

2. Three years is not a long time. It is a very brief period in a nation's history. And yet sometimes a nation may cover almost an age in the course of a brief period. We measure time by the clock and the sun, but the real measurement lies in our own sensations and experiences, and during these brief three years, we have had experience and sensation enough, often of a painful character. Our achievements have been many and only the perverse will deny them. And yet, the fact remains that, in spite of much in the way of achievement and work done, there is a malaise and a sense of frustration among our people. The days of flaming enthusiasm for a cause are long passed. Even a moderate faith in the present and in the future is often lacking. And so, the problem before us becomes essentially a psychological one of how to capture the minds and hearts of our people, including ourselves, and yoke them to constructive and satisfying effort at building up the nation. It is foolish to grow pessimistic and not to appreciate fully the country's achievements. It is equally foolish to be smug and complacent, when obviously things are not as they should be. The malady is not of our country only but of the world; perhaps we are a little less affected by it than some other parts of the world.

3. These thoughts came to me in the Red Fort of Old Delhi, which itself was the embodiment of a bright period of India's past. I spoke to the people and tried to convey to them the faith that was in me. But I could not get away from the other side of the picture. I spoke a little of the world situation, of the tragic happenings in Bengal and of other matters. I spoke more especially about the food situation and rising prices and the greed of people who wish to profit even at the cost of the nation. I asked for support and cooperation in fighting these anti-social elements, who do not hesitate to injure the nation, provided only they get some individual or group profit out of it.

4. We have to progress in many directions, for we are backward and have to make up rapidly for lost time and lost opportunity. We discuss agricultural improvement, industrial progress, housing, health, education and the problem of refugees. All this is necessary and has to be done. But behind it all lies the human factor, the character of the nation, and if this goes wrong, then all else is of little worth. I have sensed a process of deterioration and disintegration and faction and little-mindedness asserting itself from day to day and affecting all our national activities. The major problem for us, therefore, today is how to deal with this deadening process, how to check it and put an end to it. If we are not big enough

to do so, then others will have to make the attempt. As Prime Minister, I feel a special responsibility and the burden grows heavier from day to day.

5. Nature has been unkind to us. Just when we were expressing satisfaction at the progress made on the food front and the fine harvests, there came flood and havoc, or lack of rain or excess of it, and cyclone, and now a great earthquake in Assam. There has also been another very serious railway disaster near Banaras.² And yet, I do not mind much the vagaries of nature. We can fight them and overcome them, if we do not go contrary to the laws of nature. It is the human factor that counts most.

6. We have just had an emergency session of Parliament.³ Its main purpose was to consider the international situation and, more especially, the recent happenings in Korea, where war is being waged. There was a full debate on the Korean situation and, in spite of many criticisms from various points of view, there was a general acceptance of Government's policy. There was also a full debate on the Bengal situation and the Indo-Pakistan Agreement of April 8th. A third, and very important, matter which came up before Parliament was the necessity of emergency legislation empowering Government to take deterrent steps against hoarding foodgrains, rise in prices, etc. There was almost unanimous support of this in Parliament. When I referred to this matter in my speech from the Red Fort, there was an immediate response from the people. It is clear that the people expect Government to take strong action, and if we fail, the responsibility must be ours.

7. India has taken no special step during the last fortnight in regard to the Korean affair. We have tried to adhere to our policy of supporting the U.N. resolution on Korea and, at the same time, not committing ourselves to any extension of it in any way. There are frequent references in the press of India initiating some other step. Most of these are wrong. We are naturally anxious and eager to help in the maintenance of peace and in preventing the Korean war from developing into a world war. But we have felt that the time is not ripe for any positive step to that end. I believe that India's attitude, though it has not brought forth any obvious fruit, has undoubtedly been a great factor in preventing further deterioration of a bad situation. Almost everyone recognises our integrity of purpose and our intense desire for peace, even though many may not agree with what we do. I think it would be perfectly true to say that India's prestige stands high in the world today and vast numbers of people everywhere look to India to save the situation. Whether we can do so or not, I cannot say. But we shall endeavour to do our best.

8. The war situation in South Korea is bad at present from the point of view of the United Nations. It will, no doubt, improve but that will take time. We have

2. In a collision between a passenger train and a goods train near Mughalsarai on 13 August, 23 persons were killed and 200 injured.

3. This session of Parliament concluded on 14 August.

to consider, however, not only the war situation but possible developments in the future and what our objective should be in regard to Korea. A merely negative attitude is not good enough. It is clear that the Korean problem will not be solved just by military measures. It is clear also that finally it will be for the people of Korea to decide upon their future. We have to take care in the present to avoid doing anything which might come in the way of a future settlement. That is difficult when war breaks out, because war produces its own logic and the consequences that flow from it come in the way of the objectives we had aimed at. New problems arise and violence and hatred blind people's minds.

9. There is some hope now that the Korean war will not spread out in the near future. But the peril has not passed by any means and Formosa stands out as a danger point. The Chinese Government and people are bent on taking possession of Formosa and if they try to do so, there is bound to be conflict on a bigger scale. Tibet also is no longer secure and there are rumours of a Chinese invasion of it. Whatever the rights and wrongs may be in regard to Tibet, we are convinced that its future should be settled by peaceful means and we have impressed our viewpoint upon the Chinese Government.⁴

10. The debate on the Bengal situation led to many speeches, some of them often passionate in tone, expressing entirely varying viewpoints. Parliament did not pass any positive resolution on the subject and it may be said that they agreed generally with the Government's policy. Yet, there were many strong critics. There is no doubt that there is not only much dissatisfaction but a feeling of apprehension also in regard to Bengal. This has led some people to making proposals, which seem to me completely impractical and objectionable. I dealt with this matter in my speech in the House.⁵ These differences arise from the premises and objectives being different. It is, therefore, necessary for clarity of thought and definition of objective. We have repeatedly declared that we are opposed to communalism. And yet in our thinking and action we are often influenced by the communal outlook. That way danger lies. I have been more troubled by this than any other matter in India. We can meet and fight an external enemy. But what are we to do when the enemy is within ourselves and in our own minds and hearts? I think it has become essential for the Congress to lay down specifically and precisely what our approach is to this communal problem in all its aspects. Are we to adhere to old Congress policy or should we drift in the direction of communalism and revivalism? It is no good our trying to slur over this question or to bypass it because it is inconvenient. There must be a clear decision either way and Congress and Government must follow that decision.

4. K.M. Panikkar communicated the Indian viewpoint to the Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister on 13 August.

5. See *ante*, pp. 271-288.

11. I shall not write to you much about the Bengal situation, because you must have read a great deal of what was said in the House on this subject. The situation is undoubtedly grave. At the same time there is a tendency to exaggerate it and make it appear worse than it is. I should like to share with you some new information that we have received about the migrations. We have daily over 7,000 Hindu migrants coming from East Bengal to West Bengal and also about 5,000 Hindu migrants returning from West Bengal to East Bengal daily. These figures are rather misleading, because they apply to all kinds of travellers and not to migrants as such. On a careful check being made, we discovered that a large number of people going in either direction were not migrants at all. They were ordinary travellers between one country and the other. Then there were a considerable number of smugglers crossing the border frequently. Thirdly, many refugees themselves went backwards and forwards several times, some of them as many as eight times. All this helped to swell the number of those who are migrating. We are having a further and more detailed check made. But even so, it is clear that the number of migrants in either direction was much less than we had imagined at first. It is big enough still, but the number at any rate now appears to be more amenable to control.

12. But there is absolutely no room for complacency and the situation continues to be full of possible danger. A continuing influx for a considerable time itself creates difficult problems and explosive situations. Behind this lie passions and prejudices, fear and apprehension, and emotional reactions on both sides. We cannot directly control what happens in Pakistan. And much that happens there is not good. But we ought to be able to control what happens in India and thereby affect the situation in Pakistan. I am convinced that if we had the situation in hand completely on our side, we would develop enough strength and authority to influence powerfully what happens on the other side. It is necessary that we should not wait passively on events but try to meet their challenge constructively and with faith.

13. The two Central Ministers of India and Pakistan, appointed specially to help in the implementation of the Agreement of April 8th, 1950, Shri Biswas and Dr Malik, came to Delhi early this month. With them came the Chairman of the Minority Commissions of East Bengal and West Bengal as well as the two Chief Secretaries of the two provinces. We had full discussions in Delhi and then they all left for Karachi, where further discussions were held. As a result of all these discussions, a number of decisions were arrived at. These have just been published in the press. They deal practically with many of the problems that trouble us from day-to-day in Bengal and they suggest ways of dealing with them. They are comprehensive and detailed and approach the problem from a practical point of view. If these decisions are given effect to, as I hope they will be, they should go far towards improving the present situation. Among these, there is a suggestion that there should be continuous and sustained propaganda about the decisions arrived at in the Indo-Pakistan Agreement and subsequently. This is important so that people might know exactly what we have jointly decided. It is important also, from the

psychological point of view, to make people feel that we are tackling, not without success, this difficult problem. In this work Governments should of course take a full share, but it is not entirely governmental work. The press and other non-officials have at least an equally important part to play. There have been recently some goodwill missions going from India to Pakistan and *vice versa*. These missions have done a great deal of good. I commend to your Government that they might initiate and encourage publicity and propaganda of this type.

14. Among the recent decisions arrived at there are those relating to urban and rural property and to the requisitioning and de-requisitioning of houses. Importance has naturally been attached to the recovery and restoration of abducted women. Fortunately this problem is of relatively small dimensions in Bengal.


15. Parliament has recently passed the Displaced Persons (Claims) Act 1950.⁶ This was meant to invite and verify claims of displaced persons to urban immovable property left over in West Pakistan. It is necessary that such claims should be received and carefully checked before we can take any further steps in the matter. The evacuee property problem has been a very difficult one and has exercised the minds of large numbers of people. No solution has yet been arrived at. But there is just a glimmer of hope now that some solution may be found. It must be remembered that in law and in theory all evacuee properties, whether in Western Pakistan or in East Punjab, Delhi and elsewhere, still belong to their original owners, even though they are in the possession of a Custodian. We should like to settle them as soon as possible with refugees. Before that an agreement with Pakistan on this issue is necessary. Meanwhile it is important that we should be ready with our own data, and hence the necessity for receiving claims and verifying them, in so far as is possible.

16. Indo-Pakistan relations have got stuck up over many matters, apart from those referred to above. There is the question of canal waters and the exchange ratio, which affects all our trade. This matter of the exchange may soon come up before the International Monetary Fund. If there is a satisfactory decision there, it will go some way towards improving the trade between India and Pakistan⁷ and relieving many other tensions, such as in railway traffic.


17. Then there is the old question of Kashmir. We have had repeated talks with Sir Owen Dixon, the U.N. representative, and he has then gone to Karachi. Thus far, I regret to say, these talks have ~~not~~ yielded any substantial result. You will remember that we are all committed to the basic policy of the people of Kashmir deciding their own future. We have said that right from the beginning and we adhere to it. When the Security Council decided in favour of a plebiscite, we accepted this decision. Later conflict came in regard to certain preliminary conditions which have to be agreed to before a plebiscite could take place. We insisted that all Pakistan

6. On 18 May 1950.

7. Trade between the two countries was resumed after an agreement signed on 25 February 1951.



AT RASHTRAPATI BHAVAN, NEW DELHI, 15 AUGUST 1950



AT THE INDONESIAN EMBASSY, NEW DELHI, 17 AUGUST 1950

regular and irregular forces must be withdrawn from the whole of Jammu and Kashmir State and the so-called 'Azad Forces' should be disbanded and disarmed. We made certain other suggestions also and it was subject to all these suggestions that we accepted the Security Council's Resolution. This was made perfectly clear not only in our written communications but also in the speech which Shri B.N. Rau delivered before the Security Council.⁸ We went as far as we could, but we refused to permit Pakistan to profit by its aggression or to have anything to do with the plebiscite. That was a matter between us and the United Nations.

18. There was no agreement on this issue and the matter went back to the Security Council. Thereupon Sir Owen Dixon was sent as a kind of a mediator. He tried to bridge those differences in regard to an overall plebiscite for the whole State. He failed to do so. Then, in accordance with the Security Council resolution, he tried to explore other possibilities of solving the problem. In brief, these were a partial plebiscite and other arrangements by agreement in regard to the remaining areas. We were not enamoured of this approach; nevertheless we told Sir Owen Dixon that we were prepared to consider it, provided the other party, that is, Pakistan, was also so prepared. We now understand that Pakistan has put forward certain conditions which are quite impossible for us to accept. So the deadlock continues and there appears to be little hope of removing it in the near future.

19. All of you, or most of you, will be coming to Delhi soon to attend a conference on food and rise in prices. This is a matter of the utmost moment as our whole economy and future depend upon it. There are two major aspects of this problem. One is the policy of controls and how to give effect to it, the other is how to deal with people who flout and break our laws and rules, who indulge in blackmarketing and who deliberately raise prices whenever they have the chance to do so. As regards controls, it must be clearly understood that, in existing circumstances, the principal controls cannot possibly be removed. Some people vaguely imagine that many of our troubles are due to controls. It is true that controls bring a measure of corruption. But it is equally true that to remove controls would be to invite disaster. Therefore there must be no doubt on this point.

20. We live on the verge of a possible world war. If, to the misfortune of humanity, this comes, then it would be exceedingly difficult for us to import any foodstuffs. We shall have to make the best of what we have got or what we can grow. This is patent enough, but it requires repetition. We have got into the easy habit of getting food from abroad, even though that has cost us vast sums of money. When we cannot get it from abroad, what will we do? It is time that we considered this question from this point of view of a war emergency, and that all of us, whether we are producers or consumers, officials or non-officials, sellers or buyers, should become crisis-minded in this respect and deal with this situation in a spirit of urgency. The only possible way for us to pull through is to pool our resources

8. On 13 February 1950.

and to apportion them justly. No State can function for itself and forget its neighbour. It is natural for each State to think of itself first. But if it does so to the injury of other States, then it is serving the cause of India badly. The surplus States must also tighten their belts like the others and give generously of their abundance to the other States. Effective procurement thus becomes essential. Some States have efficient systems of procurement, others have given little thought to this or, at any rate, have not produced results. That is not good enough. Indeed even within a State we have seen scarcity while there is still food with people who hoard in the hope of profit. This kind of thing must be made impossible. You will no doubt discuss these matters at the Conference in Delhi. I hope that that Conference will not consist merely of lengthy speeches but will show an earnest approach by men determined to face and overcome this crisis at whatever cost. Many people think in terms of the general elections to come next year. Perhaps that is difficult to avoid. But failure to meet a crisis with all its dreadful consequences will affect those elections far more than any system of procurement, however hard that may be.

21. The other aspect of this problem relates not only to food but to other essential commodities and the rise in prices. Prices have recently risen chiefly because of rumours of war as also because of irresponsible statements made by some people. A Member of Parliament stated the other day that famine was coming to Bengal.⁹ That statement had no justification. But it produced its evil effect and immediately led to hoarding and thus bringing about a crisis. How are we to deal with these hoarders and anti-social dealers? Recent legislation has given authority to Parliament to deal with this matter and has laid down heavy penalties for offenders. What is more necessary, however, is some speedy method of catching and punishing those who offend. I trust that these methods will soon be evolved in consultation with you and other Chief Ministers.

22. The recent incidents in Gwalior,¹⁰ resulting in firing and the deaths of some students, naturally distressed many people. The demands of the students were trivial and there should have been no occasion for any conflict. But these demands were a mere excuse for trouble. This could be seen from the fact that a student demonstration developed later into communal attacks. We have thus to deal with situations which are apparently innocuous but which are perverted to wrong ends by mischievous people. Nevertheless, it is no credit to a Government who have to resort to firing frequently. It shows a lack of awareness and inefficiency in dealing with a growing situation. There is going to be a full enquiry in the Gwalior affair.¹¹

9. Lakshmi Kanta Maitra feared repetition of the famine conditions of 1943.

10. Firing on 9 August on a procession of students of Victoria College who were demanding certain facilities had caused two deaths.

11. The enquiry found the firing unjustified.

23. The recent railway accident near Moghalsarai has been a most painful and distressing affair. Sabotage is again feared though we do not yet know for certain. It is a terrible thing for any person to indulge in this kind of crime which means death and grievous injury to so many.

24. You will have learnt that three more Deputy Ministers have been appointed at the Centre.¹² It is possible that there might be some additions to them in the future.

25. The Election Commissioner has sent me a long note about his work. He has pointed out that some of the States are moving very slowly and have not even yet sent their tentative proposals for dividing the State into Units for constituencies. The Parliamentary Advisory Committee for each State has also been very dilatory. This is most unfortunate and I would beg of you to expedite the work of the Election Commission.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

12. On 11 August, D.P. Karmarkar, Himmatsinhji and S.N. Burogohain were appointed Deputy Ministers for Commerce, Defence, and Works, Mines and Power respectively.

III

New Delhi
September 1, 1950

My dear Chief Minister,

I imagine that India has set up some kind of a new record, not a record to be proud of. It is a record of disaster and calamity, one following another in quick succession, bringing sorrow and misery to vast numbers of human beings. Lack of rain in South India and elsewhere spoiled our crops, and then came an abundance of it, so much that heavy floods descended over vast areas. This has happened in Orissa, in Bihar and in Uttar Pradesh and thousands of villages have been almost washed away. We do not even yet know the full extent of this disaster in which millions of people are involved. Over and above all this, there was the great earthquake of Assam which, experts tell us, is an even bigger one than the Bihar earthquake of the thirties. This earthquake has not only shaken up the surface of the earth in Upper Assam, but has changed the physical features of that area. It is said that some hills have disappeared and rivers have changed their courses. People lie cut off and marooned and are difficult of access. We try to feed them by dropping food from the air.

How far we succeed in reaching all of them, it is difficult to say. I am going to Assam in three days' time to see personally this new shape of that corner of our country and to confer with our colleagues there as to what should be done in the way of relief and rehabilitation.

2. Relief and rehabilitation. These words have become our daily and hourly companions during the last three years. We started a Ministry of Relief and Rehabilitation nearly three years ago because of the vast number of refugees who came over to India. That stream of refugees has never wholly ceased and, as you know, there was another flood of them after February of this year in Bengal. That flood subsided later, but the stream continues. While we tackled that with all our might and, with only partial success, the great problem of the refugees from Western Pakistan, and thought that at last we were seeing some light, this fresh exodus has occurred in Bengal. And now, after we have battled with man's folly and fear and greed, we have to meet nature, red in tooth and claw. The prospect is overwhelming and yet it does no good to feel overwhelmed. And the only way to look upon it is to consider it a challenge to our manhood and our courage and capacity to work. Many of you, to whom I address this letter, are dealing with these problems of scarcity and flood and earthquake, and your hands are overfull. I can only assure you that the Central Government will give you every assistance that it can in meeting this difficult situation. We are forced to think, more than ever, that our only safety and security lie in pulling together and in the fullest cooperation between all the States and the Centre.

3. You came here some days ago for the Chief Ministers' Conference to consider the food situation and the rise in prices. This Conference, I felt, was different from the many conferences we have held previously. There was a sense of urgency, of crisis, of dangers ahead, which had to be met and met effectively, lest we perish. And, therefore, this Conference was a businesslike one and there was not much oratory, but quiet discussion and unanimous conclusions. We realised, what of course we ought to have realised long ago, that the fullest coordination is necessary in regard to our food policy as well as our control policy, and no State can think of itself at the cost of others. We came to certain conclusions about food and we decided to take strong measures to check hoarding and profiteering in food as well as in certain other necessities of life. It is our misfortune that the social sense is not strong among many of our people, and is specially not evident among the class that deals in these goods. This lack of social sense might be tolerated in normal times to some extent. But when crisis comes and large numbers of people suffer because of the anti-social activities of a few, then the time has come to cry a halt. That time has now come. In accordance with the decisions taken at the Chief Ministers' Conference, an ordinance is being issued soon. This ordinance is seriously meant and has to be acted upon. If even this fails to prevent hoarding and blackmarketing and consequent rise in prices, then other steps will have to be taken which may not be agreeable to many people. Laws and rules and regulations are

made for the security and advancement of the people. If that security is challenged, progress stopped and in fact people lack more and more the very basic necessities of life, then there is something wrong about the law or the rules or the people who give effect to that law or rule. Certain minimum results have to be achieved at whatever cost. If they are not achieved under the existing laws, then laws have to be changed, because the very basis and object of those laws has failed.

4. I commend to you, therefore, with all earnestness the resolutions passed by the Chief Ministers' Conference and the subsequent steps taken by the Government of India in regard to food and rise in prices and the punishment of offenders. There should be no weakness or softness in our application of these new measures, for to show slackness in this grave matter is to exhibit our incompetence and our heedlessness of the public good. Many people think of the elections to come and are afraid of taking strong measures lest they become unpopular. But elections will be won or lost not because of any measures that we may take or not take, but because of the results achieved or not achieved. Every State, therefore, must gear itself up on a war basis to meet an emergency which is certainly not less than that of a war. It is a war that we fight for the food of our people against human indolence and greed. It is also a war against the disasters that nature has thrust upon us. It is with this sense of urgency and crisis and with an outlook of war in this respect that we must face these problems. I have little doubt that we can solve them if we bring the right spirit in our tasks.

5. Unhappily even in this grave crisis, domestic and international, many of our people still think of and waste their energy over factional struggles. That is a greater weakness than any that hostile nature or a foreign enemy can bring about. I am not referring here in detail to the various steps that we have taken or that we or you have declared that we shall take. You have been informed of these separately. What I wish to lay stress on is the development of that stern and unbending spirit which is a necessary prelude to any big and effective action, and also that spirit of mutual cooperation to fight a common peril.

6. I have spoken about all our domestic perils and disasters. They are bad enough. But in addition to that we have to face grave international perils. The Korean war goes on. It is confined to a relatively small country, but already it has resulted in all the horrors of war involving the butchery of vast numbers of human beings. Doctors fight for the patient, and meanwhile the patient dies. There was aggression in Korea and if we allow aggression to take place unchallenged, then we let loose evil forces all over the world. So, aggression has to be met and we gave our support to this decision of the United Nations. But that was only part of the answer and the real question as to what should be done and how, and what we shall aim at in Korea or beyond, remains yet unanswered. Our Representative in the Security Council, Shri B.N. Rau, has tried valiantly to find some way out of this tangle with little success, except that even our critics realise that India stands for peace

and will not allow herself to be swept away by the passions that consume so many other countries today.

7. Korea is important in itself, a country of thirty million people, recently freed and now in a kind of death agony. But the importance of this war is much more because it is intimately connected with the Great Power conflicts of the world. Hence the fear that it may spread and involve the whole world in a common ruin. Probably there is not any great chance of this war spreading in the near future. But that does not in any way lessen the gravity of the situation.

8. Formosa has been very much in the picture lately. We have felt all along, ever since the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, that to associate Formosa in any way with this was wrong and dangerous. It was a challenge to the new China which, according to us and all those who have recognised this China, had a right to Formosa, if not immediately then in the near future. Recent developments, including a statement by General MacArthur and President Truman's objection to it, have indicated the two powerful tendencies in the U.S. There is the tendency of the militarists for war anyhow and anywhere. There is also the wiser tendency of the President and the State Department to check this madness. In China there is powerful reaction to all this and great popular excitement over Formosa. It is believed there that Formosa is just a base for the invasion of China, and the fact that the remnants of the Kuomintang regime are still in Formosa and challenge China and are given protection is a constant irritant to the Chinese Government and people. It is more than an irritant; it fills them with fear and when people are excited and afraid anything may happen.

9. We have endeavoured with all earnestness and with such strength as we possess to counsel moderation to all the parties concerned. We have suggested to the U.S. that a clear declaration about Formosa would ease the situation. We have suggested to the Chinese Government that any injudicious or provocative step would be dangerous and should therefore be avoided. Fortunately for us, our *bona fides* and integrity in this matter are, I believe, recognised by all parties. But our influence is limited and the part of the peacemaker is always difficult.

10. We are convinced now as we were before that it is of vital importance that the Peoples' Government of China should be admitted to the United Nations. This demand has not emerged from the Korean war nor is it in any sense a bargain for something else. Nevertheless, it has a powerful effect on the Korean situation as it has on the international situation. The Security Council has thus far refused to admit China. Within three weeks the General Assembly of the United Nations will begin its session at Lake Success. A strong delegation from China is on its way there and probably the most important question before the Assembly will be that of the admission of China. If the Assembly also refuses to admit China, then serious consequences for the United Nations are likely to follow. The United Nations may well cease to be what it has so far been. We are facing therefore a very critical session of the U.N.

11. At this session there are other very important matters also which affect us intimately. There will be the South African Indian issue and the Security Council will probably consider Kashmir again. Sir Owen Dixon's mission has failed. I explained at some length at a press conference as to what Sir Owen Dixon's proposals were and why we could not accept them.¹ In brief, Sir Owen tried his best to bring about an overall plebiscite in the whole State. We all accepted the principle, but we again got stuck on the conditions which were to govern the plebiscite. This idea of the overall plebiscite was therefore given up by Sir Owen Dixon and he proposed a partial plebiscite. This meant that certain areas of the State, where the people's opinion was perfectly clear and without doubt, might be allotted to India or Pakistan, as the case may be. In regard to other and doubtful areas, there should be a plebiscite. This meant in effect a partition of the State with a plebiscite in the Valley of Kashmir plus possibly some other minor area. It was difficult for us to swallow this bitter pill because it meant accepting and acknowledging the success of aggression in some measure. Nevertheless, for the sake of peace we said that we would be prepared to consider this proposal. Pakistan would not even commit itself to that extent. Before we could discuss this proposal in any detail, we were informed that it was an essential prerequisite of the plebiscite in the Valley that the present Government of Kashmir should be put out of commission and the Plebiscite Administrator or some other U.N. representative should have full administrative control over the Valley. This was to last about six months. This seemed to us an extraordinary condition. Not only was the aggressor given some areas of Kashmir State but in the Valley itself the existing Government was to be pushed out to please the aggressor and to give him greater chance of success in the proposed plebiscite. This was something to which we could never agree from any point of view. It would have been a gross betrayal of the Government and the people of Kashmir and a breach of the many pledges that we have given to them as well as to our people. It would have meant the final triumph of aggression. I expressed my great surprise to Sir Owen Dixon that such a proposal could possibly have been made.

12. Kashmir will now go to the Security Council² and there are indications that Pakistan is building up a big case about it as well as about other matters in dispute, such as canal waters.

13. So far as the evacuee property question is concerned, my colleague, Shri Gopalaswami Ayyangar, is making another attempt to get an early solution. There is some faint hope that we might succeed. If we do not, we have decided to ask for arbitration. This would mean that each party appoints an arbitrator and they should choose a third.

1. See *ante*, pp. 216-232.

2. The Security Council met on 26 September 1950 to consider Sir Owen Dixon's report.

14. In Bengal the situation remains much the same, though perhaps it will not be incorrect to say that there is a slight improvement. There is an improvement in the number of people coming away from East Bengal. Gradually the gap between those who come away and those who go back is lessening. The average of the last two weeks has been a net exodus from East Bengal of about 600 daily, that is, after subtracting those who are going back to East Bengal. This refers to non-Muslims only. Within East Bengal, conditions are still very far from satisfactory and we continue to receive complaints of dacoities, molestation of women, etc. The chief trouble appears to be that the lower rungs of the administration there do not function properly, either because of lack of competence or lack of will. The two Central Ministers, Shri Biswas and Dr Malik, are doing good work. You must have seen the new batch of agreements in regard to the Bengal situation which have been arrived at between India and Pakistan. This is one further step in the right direction.

15. The new Chinese Ambassador is coming to New Delhi soon. He is accompanied by a large retinue. It is evident that the new Government of China attaches considerable importance to their Embassy in New Delhi and to their relations with India. Soon after the Chinese Ambassador comes here, he will meet representatives of the Tibet Government in New Delhi. India has been greatly interested in the future of Tibet. Our position has been that we recognise the suzerainty of China over Tibet, but at the same time we believe that Tibet should retain her full autonomy. Further that the special trade and other interests that India has in Tibet should continue. We have been trying for some months past to help a peaceful settlement between China and Tibet. We may well congratulate ourselves that our efforts had met with some success at least.³ But the situation is still a difficult one and we must not imagine that the danger is over.

16. A trade delegation, headed by Shri P.A. Narielwala, is going to Indonesia to discuss trade between India and Indonesia.⁴ We are anxious to develop trade and other contacts with Indonesia and in the international situation today there is a great deal in common between our approach and theirs.

17. Our Election Commissioner, Shri Sukumar Sen, is reported to have stated recently that it might be difficult to hold elections before October 1951.⁵ I do not know if this report is correct, but I was much surprised to read it. I have often impressed upon you that it is of the highest importance that the general elections must be held in the first half of next year, at the latest by May 1951. I see no reason why we should not do so if we so will. The real difficulties have come because some State Governments have not functioned with efficiency or speed

3. On 21 August, Chou En-lai recognised China's duty to utilize peaceful methods.

4. The delegation reached Indonesia on 7 September 1950.

5. On 1 September 1950, Sen stated that if elections could not be held by March 1951, they would have to be postponed till the end of the monsoon season in October.

in this matter. We should like you to appreciate that in case elections are further postponed, we will be accused of doing so deliberately and trying to avoid elections. Our reputation and our pledge are both important and we must therefore make every conceivable effort to stick to them. I would beg of you therefore to insist upon your Government doing everything to expedite the preparations for the general elections keeping in view all the time that these elections will be held about May 1951.⁶

18. Bombay has had a strike in the textile mills for many days. Yesterday there was some kind of a general strike in sympathy with the textile workers.⁷ Workers have a right to strike and they guard that right zealously. But a weapon can be used for good purpose or bad. Any strike today which interferes with vital production and which creates conflict and ill will is a very serious matter, and should only be indulged in if no other way is open to secure justice and the issues are very serious. I confess that I am not at all satisfied that there was adequate reason for this strike from any point of view. The matter in dispute is a bonus and industrial courts and tribunals are considering it in appeal. To make the workers and the country generally suffer for something that can at best be a matter of prestige seems to me an irresponsible approach to a serious question. Probably the reason behind this is more political than any other. In any event, the result has been not only great loss to the country and the workers, but further estrangement and ill will. If the community has to surrender to every such challenge, then there can be no peace in this country. So, with all my sympathy for the cause of workers, I have greatly regretted the step that many of them took in Bombay. At the same time, it is not enough for us to criticise or condemn others. Why is it that we cannot control a situation like this and have to resort to the coercive apparatus of the State? Our word and our advice should go much further than it does today in convincing the workers or others of what they should do or should not do. This again is significant evidence of the gulf that is growing up between the Government and certain sections of the community. Normally, it would have been the function of the Congress to bridge this gulf. But the Congress is busy with its own internal troubles and elections, and so the initiative passes to others.

19. I have dealt with the food and connected situations in the early part of this letter. There is a great deal of distress in India. At the same time, I have no doubt at all that conditions in Burma or Indonesia are generally much worse than in India. Why is it that we do not hear so much shouting or complaint from those countries as we do in India? Have we become so soft that we cannot put up with hard conditions? If there is scarcity of sugar, there follows a tremendous uproar, and we are compelled to import large quantities of sugar at heavy cost from abroad.

6. The general elections were held throughout the country between 25 October 1951 and 21 February 1952.

7. The strike was organised by trade unions controlled by the socialists and communists.

Yet during war time and after, most countries of Europe had very little sugar and this was strictly rationed. There was no shouting or complaint there. People accepted the hard facts of life at that time in a disciplined way. In India the slightest mishap leads to an outcry and condemnation of Government. It is open to people to criticise or condemn Government, but they should always remember that any action of theirs should not be such as to run down the country or to make a bad situation worse. People talk of famine and starvation. There may be some slight truth here and there in these cries, but there is a great deal of exaggeration. What is worse, scare and panic are created which do great injury. Partly this is due to a desire on the part of certain groups and parties to make political capital against Government. Partly it seems to be due to some inner weakness, lack of discipline and lack of social sense. This is an important matter for us to consider because strength comes from inside us and is not external to us. If we lose that inner strength, then nobody can help us.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

IV

New Delhi
September 14, 1950

My dear Chief Minister,

I am writing this letter to you a day earlier than usual. This is so because I am going to Bombay on my way to Nasik. Probably you will be going to Nasik Congress also and we shall meet there. Nevertheless, I feel I should send you my usual fortnightly letter.

2. A few days ago I sent you a brief letter¹ again drawing your attention to the Preventive Detention law which I suggested might be used against hoarders, blackmarketeers, etc., who interfered with the maintenance of supplies. I did so because one of the Chief Ministers informed me that in the opinion of his Law Department this law did not apply and nothing of this kind could be done unless there was special legislation. On the face of it this seemed to me a wrong interpretation. However, I referred the matter to our Law Ministry and they have given me a clear opinion on this subject. According to this there can be no doubt that this law does apply to such cases. The confusion has arisen because reference was made to something that happened before the 26th January 1950, when the law was different. There can be no doubt therefore that hoarding and

1. See *ante*, pp. 45-46.

blackmarketing do interfere with the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community. And any person interfering with this maintenance of supplies, etc., can be proceeded against. I am laying particular stress on this matter because I feel that, with all the goodwill in the world, we have been slow in taking action in this matter. The law is there and no further legislation is necessary. If we fail, it is our failure, not the law's.

3. We have taken strong action frequently for the maintenance of public order. We have not hesitated to put people under detention or to proceed against them in law courts if they are offenders against public order. We have not shown the same earnestness in dealing with other anti-social activities, such as those indulged in by hoarders, blackmarketeers and those who indulge in corrupt practices. There is a general opinion in the country that swift and stern action should be taken. Whenever any reference is made to such action, it meets immediately with an eager public response. Perhaps our whole social structure and legal system have not been fashioned to meet such emergencies. If so, we shall have to think seriously of changing that structure or machinery. Failure in controlling a situation in regard to rise in prices has disastrous results and in addition will bring discredit to Government. I would therefore draw your particular attention again to this matter. Above all, we must be very careful not to allow anything to happen which may be interpreted as a surrender to vested interests at the cost of the general community.

4. The international situation continues to be very grave. It may be said, however, that the prospect of the spread of war beyond Korea has receded, but it must be remembered that any incident or new turn in international affairs might bring the danger much nearer. The United Nations General Assembly is meeting next week at Lake Success, and some of these vital matters—Korea, Formosa, China, etc., are bound to come up there in some form or other. Perhaps the most important question will be the admission of the People's Government of China to the U.N. The future of the U.N. depends, to a large extent, on the answer that will be given to this question. So far as we are concerned, we are convinced that the new China must be admitted to the U.N. and further that every delay in this deepens the crisis. I think that most countries realise this. The United Kingdom has come to this conclusion also, so far as we know.² But opposition from the U.S.A. continues.

5. Two incidents happened recently round about Korea. One was the alleged bombing of Manchurian territory by American aircraft. The other was the shooting

2. The British representative to the United Nations, during his talks on 14 September with the representatives of the U.S.A. and France, explained that Britain would support China's entry into the U.N. as otherwise China would be forced into joining the Soviet camp.

down of a Soviet military plane by American bombers.³ Both these were very serious incidents. We do not know the exact facts and contradictory versions have been put forward. It was proposed in the U.N. Security Council that some kind of a Commission should go to Manchuria to investigate the charge. India and Sweden were the two countries mentioned in this connection. We were agreeable to shoulder this responsibility together with Sweden. The question then arose that the Chinese Government should be allowed to present its case before the Security Council. This seemed a perfectly legitimate demand, quite apart from China's admission to the U.N. Here was a complaint being considered by the Security Council and it was proper that the complainant should attend. But we were greatly surprised that the resolution was not passed although a majority voted for it, this majority including India, U.K., France and Norway. The U.S.A. opposed it stoutly and just managed to prevent its passing. I confess that I do not understand how from any viewpoint of law and commonsense, this opposition could be justified. It has created a bad impression among many people. The U.S. Government, in their intense dislike of the People's Government of China, are often acting in a manner which cannot be justified.

6. Since I wrote to you last, I have been to Assam and have visited some of the earthquake-affected area. I have already made statements about this and I shall not repeat them here except to say that the need for relief is urgent.⁴ We do not yet know the full extent of the damage done because we have not reached the hill regions. Probably part of Tibet was badly affected also. But beyond that we have no news. A curious fact has been noticed. Many uprooted trees are being carried by the rivers in Assam. Some of these trees are not to be found anywhere in Assam and it is concluded that they are coming down from Tibet.

7. The Assam earthquake has been a very big and serious affair and it would take a considerable time for us to repair the damage done. I have already told you of the floods in Bihar, U.P. and Orissa. You have to add Punjab to this list of flood-stricken provinces.

8. This earthquake and floods have made a big difference to our food position because many store houses full of grain have been swept away and cultivated areas have been washed out completely. We have therefore to be doubly careful about food. We have to avoid waste and we have to procure as much as we can get.

3. The U.S. informed the U.N. Secretary General on 5 September that a U.N. fighter patrol had the previous day shot down a Soviet bomber when it was approaching and opening fire on the U.N. naval formation off the west coast of Korea. The Soviet Union denied the charge on the following day and asserted that it was an unarmed plane on a routine training flight which had been shot down.
4. On 25 August, Nehru issued an appeal for public contributions to the earthquake relief fund started by the Governor of Assam. See also *ante*, pp. 166-170.

We are trying to import some foodgrains also. Generally speaking, the food position is much easier in West Bengal, Bihar and Madras.

9. During the last few weeks, a continuous and virulent propaganda has been carried on in Pakistan in regard to Kashmir. The press is full of it and leaders of Pakistan refer to this question almost daily.⁵ Choudhri Zafrullah Khan has made many statements containing a tendentious account of what has happened.⁶ It is evident that every attempt is being made by Pakistan to build up a case against India, not only in regard to Kashmir but other matters also. Presumably, an attempt will be made to put this case in the Security Council in the near future.

10. It is often stated in Pakistan that we have gone back upon our promises in regard to Kashmir. This is completely untrue. We have not resiled from a single promise and we are prepared to proceed on the basis of all our admissions and promises. We are all agreed about a plebiscite. The real difference has arisen about conditions governing the plebiscite. In regard to this, we have, right from the beginning, made clear what we considered the minimum conditions necessary. We adhere to that position now. The last breakdown was due to the fact that Pakistan was not agreeable to any partial plebiscite and we were not agreeable, on any account, to the removal of Shaikh Abdullah's Government there. To agree to this would mean a great betrayal on our part and a breach of many promises made. It would have been a direct encouragement and reward to the aggressor. Instead of punishing the aggressor, we were asked to reward them immediately and to create conditions for a plebiscite which were manifestly unfair to us and in favour of Pakistan. We could never agree to the removal of the legally established Government in Kashmir, merely because Pakistan wants to push it out.

11. I have referred above to the attempt being made by Pakistan to build up a case against us. In this connection they wrote to us about the canal waters dispute. They wanted a reference to be made to the International Court at The Hague. We have never refused a reference to a tribunal. What we have said in the past has been that a technical survey of the whole Indus region was necessary before we could finally decide this question. Pakistan has not agreed to this. We have now in our reply again stressed this survey which, in any event, is essential.⁷ We have further suggested that we are perfectly prepared to have a tribunal to which this matter might be referred. We have not agreed to The Hague Court as this was

5. For example, Abdul Qayyum Khan said on 1 September that Pakistan would "never allow India to deprive three million Mussalmans of Jammu and Kashmir State of their birthright of freedom either by force or by fraud." He charged the Indian Government with going back on the promise of a plebiscite.
6. Zafrullah Khan accused India on 7 September of rejecting all solutions regarding Kashmir proposed by "impartial, independent and international opinion." Rejection of Dixon's proposals by Nehru meant that either he "thinks everybody else is foolish or he himself is deluded." On 11 September, he blamed India for the failure of Dixon's mission.
7. See *ante*, pp. 320-322.

manifestly most inconvenient as well as costly. It is difficult to imagine how The Hague Court can deal with such a matter adequately from a distance. They would have to send out their own commissions. Our suggestion is that a tribunal should be established consisting of two judges of the highest standing from India and two similar judges from Pakistan.

12. We have further pointed out that the evacuee property problem is a far more urgent one and more full of dangerous possibilities than the canal waters dispute. We have suggested that this evacuee property problem should also be referred to the same tribunal.

13. Another serious railway accident occurred near Gurdaspur recently in which the Kashmir Mail was involved.⁸ The casualty toll was heavy. We are, all of us, greatly distressed by the many railway disasters that have taken place this year. It may be that they are due to sabotage, as is alleged, but we must find a remedy for this kind of thing.

14. Master Tara Singh has been arrested and will be tried soon on account of some speeches that he has delivered.⁹ He has been acting with complete irresponsibility and saying the wildest things. We were reluctant to arrest him again, but he made that impossible. There has not been any marked reaction anywhere to his arrest.

15. I have written to you frequently about the necessity of having our general elections at the latest by May next year. This was easily possible and yet is possible if we work hard. I am sorry to say, however, that some State Governments do not appear to appreciate this urgency and perhaps imagine that they can prolong the preliminaries for as long as they like. A few of them have even said that they cannot be ready by April-May next. It would almost appear that there is a deliberate desire not to have these elections fairly early next year. All kinds of obstructions have been placed in the way of preparation. Delimitation committees appointed by the Speaker have taken their work in a most leisurely manner and some of them have yet done no real work. In spite of all this, I want to tell you that we are going to make every effort to have the elections in April or May next year and I would beg of you to see to it that your part of the work is done in good time.

16. My colleague, Shri Sri Prakasa, paid a visit to Kabul to attend the Independence Day celebrations.¹⁰ He was welcomed there in the most friendly manner. As you know, there has been a great deal of tension between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Pakistan goes on accusing us of inciting Afghanistan.¹¹ There is not

8. The accident on 3 September, caused by heavy floods, resulted in the death of 11 persons and injuries to 54.

9. He was arrested on 7 September on charges of delivering objectionable speeches in July.

10. On 24 August 1950.

11. On 7 September 1950, Zafrullah Khan alleged that the issue of Pakhtoonistan was "actively mooted by the late Mahatma Gandhi", and "India was committed to it, which was also supported by Afghanistan."

an atom of truth in this and we have not given the slightest help to Afghanistan in any shape. It is perfectly true that we sympathise with much that is said in Afghanistan, though we do not agree with all that they claim. We have, however, kept perfectly clear of this dispute except for advising moderation and avoidance of war. Our desire not to interfere with the affairs of other countries is evident from the fact that we have been more or less silent about something which has pained us greatly and which continues to distress us. This is the imprisonment of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and Dr Khan Sahib as well as large numbers of their colleagues. What distresses us most is our incapacity to help these brave soldiers of Indian freedom. A great deal of trouble is brewing in the Frontier, but I do not think war will come out of it.

17. The Tibetan mission has been here in Delhi and will be seeing the new Chinese Ambassador. Probably they will have to go to Peking to carry on negotiations. We have advised them, as we have advised the Chinese Government, that it is highly desirable that a peaceful settlement should take place.

18. Our Finance Minister, Shri Chintaman Deshmukh, is attending the World Bank meetings¹² in Paris. Among other things, this Bank has been considering the question of the exchange value of the Pakistan rupee. The latest report is that these talks have not thus far yielded any result and the discussion has been postponed. I might inform you that we have decided to impose exchange control on financial transactions with Pakistan, as soon as the rate of exchange between India and Pakistan currencies is settled.

19. The situation in Bengal exhibits no marked change, although there is a slow improvement. We have received full reports from our Central Minister and from other sources, which indicate this gradual improvement. At the same time, the law and order position continues to be bad and frequent reports come to us of dacoities and thefts and sometimes of molestation of women. Recent reports indicate that the dacoities take place sometimes in Muslim houses also. It is clear that the whole economic and social structure of East Bengal has been completely shaken up and the administration there is not strong enough to deal with the new situation that has arisen. To some extent the administration is functioning better than previously. The Minority Commission and District Minority Boards and Municipal Boards have also not been functioning well.

20. We have gathered fairly accurate figures about the migrations between East and West Bengal. Our figures for Assam are not accurate. Even in regard to West Bengal, while we have reliable figures for the movements of people by train, river, steamer and air, we have not got any reliable data about those who crossed the border by foot either way. It is clear that a considerable number, especially near the border, crossed the border by foot. Our rough estimate of migrants from East

12. In fact, it was the annual meeting of the Board of Governors of the International Monetary Fund.

to West Bengal on foot has thus far been three lakhs. The West Bengal Government has now revised this estimate and put it at 13 lakhs. I suppose that any figure for this movement must be largely guess work. The present position is that there is a net excess of about 600 persons a day among Hindus coming from East Bengal to West Bengal and there is a net excess of about 1,000 Muslims a day returning to West Bengal from East Bengal. These figures are not very satisfactory but they are certainly an improvement on the past figures.

21. Our Rehabilitation Minister has been asking for the registration of claims by displaced persons so that these might be subsequently verified. I have already written to you on this subject.¹³ This is obviously necessary for any talks we may have with Pakistan or in the event of this matter going to a tribunal. Government have also stated that displaced persons from Western Pakistan will be given proportionate compensation from the amounts recovered from their properties left in West Pakistan. There has been a good deal of rather vague talk about compensation. It should be remembered that this compensation relates only to such amounts recovered from West Pakistan and will be given *pro rata* to those whose claims have been verified. Apart from this, it is Government's duty to help in rehabilitation. Government cannot undertake to compensate from the public funds all those who have suffered. Hence the use of the word compensation should be limited to recoveries from Pakistan and for the rest the word rehabilitation is the proper one. There has also been even looser talk about a capital levy. Such a levy affects our whole social and economic structure. One can think of it, if necessary, in regard to large-scale development plans which would ultimately raise standards in India. One might even have thought of it for large-scale rehabilitation. But it seems to me completely unjust to refer to it in connection with compensation as such.

22. The war in Korea is being carried on and, from all accounts, is a ghastly affair. Accounts of American correspondents have shown what terrible damage and cruelty is being inflicted on both sides. American and allied forces are confined to the South-Eastern tract of Korea. They have thus far held their ground there. The longer they can manage to do so, the stronger they are likely to become because of reinforcements which are being hurried to them from the United States.

23. I have just received a report from our Intelligence Bureau on the subject of Hindu and Muslim refugee traffic between East Pakistan and West Bengal. This report gives certain factual data obtained from a check made on Hindu and Muslim refugee traffic. The report is a very detailed one giving figures for each district, that is, whether they are old or young, men, women or children, professions, purpose of coming or going, etc. It indicates how many were normal passengers, how many smugglers and how many real migrants.

24. I am not sending you the full report which is rather voluminous. But I am sending you two notes which give an analysis of the results obtained. You will

13. See *ante*, item II.

notice that a great majority of migrants, both Hindus and Muslims, belong to the poorer classes or the lower middle class.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

V

New Delhi
October 1, 1950

My dear Chief Minister,

Since I wrote to you last, the Nasik Congress has taken place. It has laid down national, international and economic policies for the country. Answerable as we are to the Congress organisation, these resolutions of the Nasik Congress are in the nature of mandates to us which must be followed. I would, therefore, invite your particular attention to them and, more particularly, to the resolution on communalism and economic policy. I have already written to you separately about these resolutions.¹

2. As you know, for a variety of reasons the Nasik Congress attracted a great deal of attention all over the country. For Congressmen it was of course important but others also realised the significance of this session of the Congress. There is a common criticism that the Congress passes its resolutions and then Congressmen forget about them or ignore them. Perhaps there is some truth in this. If that is so, then the sooner we falsify this assumption, the better. No organisation can continue to live in an atmosphere of unreality and hypocrisy which must follow from action being divorced from precept and resolution. It is, therefore, of great importance for us to imbibe not only the words, but the spirit of the Nasik Congress resolutions and to make our administrative and other activities conform to them. This is not merely a matter for Ministers to do, but also for the whole administrative structure to understand and follow up. The Congress resolutions are clear enough about general policies and the approach to vital problems. They could not be detailed. It is for Government to apply them in detail as circumstances warrant. But, in any event, the spirit behind them and the general outlook should be strictly adhered to, both from the point of view of the Congress and the Government.

3. Our Cabinet has decided to summon the next session of Parliament for Tuesday, November 14th, 1950.

4. I have often written to you on the subject of the general elections to come and expressed my anxiety that we must hold them at the latest by April-May next.

1. See *ante*, pp. 142-144.

There has been a great deal of delay in taking the preliminary steps. The latest example of delay has been in the work of Committees for delimiting constituencies.² This has held up the work of publication of electoral rolls. We have now decided to get over this difficulty by permitting publication of electoral rolls even if constituencies have not been fixed. Any other course would have made it almost impossible for us to hold the elections in the first half of next year. As it is, according to law, constituencies cannot be finalised till Parliament has passed further electoral legislation. This means sometime in December. That would be too late. Therefore, what we propose to do now is to allow the Election Commission to publish electoral rolls on the basis of territories where constituencies have not been fixed. We would prefer, of course, to do this according to constituencies and we shall do so wherever possible. In order to give effect to this a brief ordinance will be issued within a few days and a notification will follow it.

5. You will appreciate how earnest we are to expedite elections by this step that we are taking. I seek your cooperation in this work. If we can get even the preliminary lists of constituencies by the middle of October, this will help. In any event, we shall go ahead with the publication of electoral rolls.³

6. The food situation continues to be serious, although there has been some improvement in many States. The next two months are likely to be difficult. We have reluctantly decided to import considerable quantities of foodgrains from abroad. The U.S.A. have offered us a large quantity (4,27,431 tons of milo) at a concessional price.⁴ They are also sending six tons of emergency relief supplies for relief of distress in Assam. Our Food Secretary has been sent to the U.S.A. and Canada to negotiate for the purchase of foodgrains. Rice has been ordered from various places. We hope that all these steps that we are taking will meet our present difficulties. But the basic problem remains and it is a matter of great distress for us that large numbers of our people should be living on what might almost be called a starvation diet and which certainly is below health standards. Recently there has been trouble in Hyderabad State on account of the food situation and food riots have taken place.⁵

2. On 23 September, Nehru urged conveners of all Parliamentary Advisory Committees to expedite work on delimitation of constituencies.
3. The Election Commissioner announced on 3 October that complete electoral rolls and the final list of voters according to constituencies would be published in November 1950 and February 1951 respectively. All arrangements for the general elections were to be completed by 15 April 1951.
4. The price charged was \$ 1.40 per 100 lbs of milo as against the domestic support price of \$ 1.87 in the U.S.A. Milo was in surplus in the United States where it is used for feeding poultry.
5. Three persons were killed and eleven injured in police firing on a mob when it attempted to loot a Government grain shop on 29 September at Raichur where artificial scarcity of foodgrains existed following temporary closure of the cheap grain shops by the Government and its attempt to enforce lower prices of grains.

7. We have laid great stress on the Grow-More-Food Campaign and I think a good deal of progress has been made in the past year or more. Most States are paying attention to bringing additional land under cultivation. There is talk of tractors and other machinery being used. All this is good though I should like to utter a warning as regards the sudden use of large machines. Past experience has shown that we have not fully profited by the many tractors that we purchased at a heavy price. Tractors, like all machines, not only require trained personnel to work them but even more so, a proper organisation for service and repairs and a bent of mind in the people using them. It is not possible to impose with success tractors on people utterly unused to them. This applies more specially to big tractors. Small ones are easy to work and to understand.

8. We have got too much into the habit of thinking in terms of big machines and our importing them from outside. Personally I am all for machines and I am convinced that our methods of production should be as efficient and as up-to-date as possible. Any method which is inefficient and which does not produce adequate results cannot long survive even with State help. I welcome, therefore, the use of the tractor and other machinery in our agricultural operations. But if that is to be used, it must be used properly and with knowledge and experience behind it. A machine requires understanding and loving care. If it is misused, it will not function.

9. In our river valley and other schemes also we have to obtain from abroad large-scale machinery. This is inevitable and yet I feel that many types of machines can be made in India if we gave thought and energy to this matter. We follow the easier path of paying dollars and getting them from abroad. We forget that our resources are limited; we forget also how Japan industrialised herself without importing much in the way of big machines. Right from the commencement, Japan tried to build her own machines and later succeeded remarkably.

10. Another factor has to be borne in mind. When we have to buy expensive machinery from abroad or to give contracts, we have to be particularly careful that we get the most for our money and that no opportunity is given for individuals to make private profit out of these big transactions. I say this because instances have come to my notice when such private profit has been alleged. We have, therefore, to take particular care in checking this abuse.

11. Coming back to food production, while I welcome additional lands being brought under cultivation, I am convinced that the real way to increase our food production is by increasing the yield from the land that is already cultivated. Even a ten per cent increase in this, and this should not be difficult, would more than solve our food problem. Our present yields are terribly low⁶ and a little intelligent effort could increase them.

12. Then there is the question of cultivated land deteriorating and, in some cases, actually reverting to semi-desert conditions. What steps are we taking to check

6. The yield per acre of rice and wheat in 1949-50 was 688 lbs and 584 lbs respectively.

this? We think of the positive side of adding new land to cultivation, but not of stopping the reverse process from proceeding, just as we plant new trees, which is good, but do not stop the felling of old trees which are valuable.

13. I suppose that with the coming of October we may have some momentary relief from the possibility of additional floods. We have had far more than our share of these calamities during the last three months and are now very slowly recovering. As you know, the latest to be hit, and hit badly, were Punjab and Kashmir. They have suffered a great deal of loss and deserve every help. In Assam the rivers are still in spate and it is not easy to cross them. Our Army and Air Force have done excellent work there even at some risk. We are sending specially selected officers to the Assam Government to help them both in their normal and in their abnormal work. Assam is a province which was badly neglected in the past and yet is most important today for a variety of reasons. It deserves every kind of assistance, though ultimately a province grows up because of its own efforts and the hard work it can do for its own progress. The earthquake and after have shaken up Assam. At the same time, I believe, it has done good in the sense that it has roused up the people of Assam and made them realise that it is up to them to pull their province up. I am glad to say that money has been coming in continuously from all over India as well as abroad for relief and rehabilitation work in Assam. We have received some big donations and they are welcome. But most welcome of all have been petty donations from those who could ill spare them, as well as from children.

14. A few days ago, the great Muslim festival of *Id* took place and was celebrated by Muslims all over India. I am glad to say that it passed off peacefully except for communal incidents in Lucknow and Bhagalpur in Bihar. These incidents were controlled quickly, but they made us realise that we have to be wary and vigilant all the time. There are mischief-makers about and people who wish to create trouble for political or like reasons. It is here that the importance of the Nasik Congress resolution on communalism comes in. Every communal incident in India is a stain on our record. Every District Magistrate should be made to realise that his reputation depends upon the avoidance of such incidents. It has been my experience during the last few years and more that a great deal depends in each district on the District Magistrate and the Superintendent of Police. If they are competent and right-minded, nothing wrong is likely to happen. But if they are not competent, or if they temporise with communal or anti-social elements, then trouble is bound to come some time or other. I think it would be a safe policy to put a black mark in the record of every district officer when a communal incident takes place and to inform him of this. The best of excuses are not good enough, just as all the reasons in the world which a defeated general may advance for his defeat are not good enough.

15. This takes me to the consideration of other anti-social activities, such as blackmarketing, high prices, and corruption generally. Nothing distresses me more

than the prevalence of these. They are bad of course in themselves, but for any Government to be unable to deal with them is a confession of sheer impotence. Are we helpless before them? We pass laws and lay down stringent punishments. We punish also a number of people of low degree. But it is clear that the main offenders are not those petty folk. When we deal with communist violence or with other types of violence, we are efficient enough and our actions are swift and stern. Can we not bring that energy and that will to achieve results in dealing with people who indulge in these anti-social activities of raising prices, blackmarketing, etc.? I am convinced that these evils are far worse from the social as well as the practical point of view than any amount of communist violence. They are worse, because they themselves breed that violence and social disorder. Also they are more insidious and they corrupt the individual, the group and the nation. They are the real enemies within our gates; others are open and avowed enemies, whom we can see and deal with.

16. I think in this matter too our officers should be made to appreciate that their good name is involved. They should be given every help and encouragement. If even then they cannot deal with a situation in the areas under their control, then they lack competence and others should be given charge. We have dealt with this question much too softly in the past. Innocent people should not suffer, but it is better that a few innocent suffer than that the public at large should suffer and our public and official life should be corrupted. I have often heard that when action is taken by an official against a prominent person, immediately people rush to him to save the alleged offender. Even Ministers are sometimes said to protect such persons; some Members of Legislatures also show anxiety in this matter. Obviously, officials cannot function if this kind of interference takes place in their activities. On the one side we impress upon them to take action and then when action is taken, there is obstruction and attempts to stop it. Few things discredit Government more than a belief in the public that prominent offenders are shielded.

17. It is desirable for us to have especially trained and experienced officers in various departments. As they gain experience in that particular work, they add to their utility. While this is so, it is even more important for us to remember that an officer kept too long in a particular post may become stale and without any initiative. He will work in a routine way. If by any chance he is not quite straight, then it is all the worse for the Government and the public. If kept too long in a particular post of responsibility, there is a tendency to consider that post as a private preserve. It is therefore generally desirable for officers not to be kept in a particular post for more than three years at the most. Personally, I feel that the old practice of members of the Services not remaining too long at a time at the Centre, is a good one. After some years at the Centre, they used to revert to the provinces, and thus came in more intimate contact with the people and their immediate problems. Here, in the tenuous atmosphere of Delhi, we live in a world apart.

18. The Bombay textile strike has continued now for six weeks. Merits or demerits apart, this has been a major and tragic event. I think the workers and their advisers have been completely in the wrong in challenging a matter in appeal before a tribunal. If they succeed in such a strike, then the whole machinery of tribunals collapses and, indeed, Government practically collapses in so far as labour disputes are concerned. It is not a question of prestige for Government. No Government should think of its own prestige when a matter affects vast numbers of people whom it seeks to serve. Nor should it be a question of prestige for the workers or those who advise them, because their prestige will suffer far more if they do not follow the right course. Therefore we have to consider this matter dispassionately and without any attempt to humiliate any group. In spite of the wrong action taken by many textile workers in Bombay and their advisers, our approach to them should always be friendly and our attempts should be to win them over. Otherwise frustration and bitterness of soul creep in and lay the seeds of future conflicts. I earnestly trust that all concerned will view industrial conflicts in a spirit of accommodation and not with a desire to injure and humiliate.

19. I have referred to the Nasik Congress resolutions. There is one about khadi.⁷ I would invite your attention to the wording of it. It is not a mere repetition of the old appeal, but rather a constructive approach to this question. It must always be remembered that whatever industrial progress we might make in terms of the big machine, and I am all in favour of it, yet enormous numbers of our people continue to be unemployed or only partially employed. No solution, even in terms of production, is adequate if it does not tend to solve or mitigate the problem of unemployment. This stress on khadi and cottage industries is therefore meant to emphasise this aspect of the question. We are continually giving subsidies to big industry. Can we not subsidise khadi and cottage industries also? I suggest this not on sentimental grounds, but as a practical proposition for today. At the same time, however, we have to remember that no cottage industry will ultimately succeed, even in a partial way, if it is based on completely inefficient means of production. We have in the past not tried hard enough to make cottage industry efficient, as the Japanese have done. Therefore we have remained more or less where we were relying on sentimental appeals only. I have no doubt that we can increase the efficiency of cottage industry greatly by applying scientific methods to it. Meanwhile, we should support it by subsidy or otherwise. Even as a political symbol khadi has had a long and honourable career in our country. Let us not allow that symbol to become tarnished. We are on the eve of an anniversary which we shall no doubt celebrate all over India, as we have done in past years. How will

7. The resolution, reaffirming the commitment of the Congress to promote khadi on "political and economic grounds", urged the Government to help in the development of improved techniques and encourage the purchase and use of khadi and "other products of village industries as much as possible."

it profit us to remember Gandhiji on a particular day and to forget him on the other days and to forget what he stood for throughout his life, not only khadi and cottage industry, but the basic lessons which he taught to this country, and which for a while raised us in our own estimation and in that of others?

20. I have discussed at some length certain domestic problems. I shall now deal with international affairs. Since I wrote to you, we have recognised Israel. We would have done this long ago, because Israel is a fact. We refrained because of our desire not to offend the sentiments of our friends in the Arab countries. Our recognition of Israel means no particular change in our policy.

21. We have also welcomed here the new Chinese Ambassador. His arrival in New Delhi completes the exchange of diplomatic relations between India and the new China. In spite of many differences, these two great countries look to each other and I believe have grown a little nearer to each other during these past critical months. It may be said that the fate of Asia depends a great deal on the relations between India and China. I think it may be said with some truth that this present relationship, and a certain measure of confidence in each other, has helped to avert world war.

22. The Korean situation has undergone a dramatic change and the forces of North Korea have practically been defeated and driven out of South Korea. This has given rise to new problems. Till recently it was said on behalf of some of the leading Powers of the West that there was no intention of their going beyond the 38th parallel. But this sudden success has made them think of changing their plans. We have felt that it would be wrong and dangerous for the U.N. forces to cross the 38th parallel at this stage. There is undoubtedly a risk of conflict with China, because China believes that her existence is threatened. There is also the risk of this conflict being prolonged in North Korea and many incidents happening which might lead to an extension of the conflict. We have therefore expressed our views against the crossing of the 38th parallel by U.N. forces at this stage. I do not know how the future will develop, but an earnest attempt should be made to put an end to this conflict and then devise peaceful methods for the establishment of a united and free Korea. Whatever the future may have for Korea, these last three months have shattered and destroyed large parts of both South and North Korea and the suffering of the Korean people has been incalculable.

23. Yesterday I addressed a press conference. I have sent you separately a report of what I said there in regard to the Korean situation as well as about Sir Owen Dixon's report on Kashmir to the Security Council. Also about the proposed no-war declaration between India and Pakistan. I shall not repeat that here, but I would beg of you to read that report of my press conference so that you may know how we view these important matters.

24. We had hoped that the International Monetary Fund would come to some decision regarding the exchange value of the Pakistan rupee. This decision, however, was postponed with the result that the trade impasse between India and Pakistan

continues. Normally speaking two neighbouring countries like India and Pakistan, which till recently had one economy, should depend on each other a great deal for their imports and exports. But, unfortunately, we have got tied up with various problems and conflicts. Above all, this question of the value of the Pakistan rupee has made trade very difficult. We have had some barter deals and we may have them again. But there is going to be no normal trade till this basic question is settled.

25. It may interest you to know what the recent figures are about migration between East and West Bengal. There has been a progressive change in them and more and more Hindus have been going back to East Pakistan. The average daily figures for the period 8th September to 20th September 1950 are as follows:

	East to West Bengal	West to East Bengal
Hindus	5,291	5,141
Muslims	3,112	2,551

It should be remembered that a very large proportion of these travellers are ordinary passengers and smugglers. You will notice from these figures that the surplus of Hindus coming from East Bengal to West Bengal was being progressively reduced. There was, however, some considerable surplus among the Muslims coming to West Bengal.

26. Later figures are even more significant. During the four days, 24th to 27th September, 21,418 Hindus came from East Bengal to West Bengal, and 26,619 Hindus went from West Bengal to East Bengal. Thus, in four days there was an excess of 5,201 Hindus going to East Bengal from West Bengal.

27. The Muslim figures for these four days are:

Coming to West Bengal	11,785
Going to East Bengal from West Bengal	7,949

Thus there was an excess of 3,836 Muslims coming into West Bengal.

It must be remembered again that these figures include normal passengers and smugglers. For Hindus the average daily figure of normal passengers and smugglers in both directions is about 4,000.

28. These figures definitely show: (1) that the exodus of Hindus from East Bengal to West Bengal has slowed down very considerably, and (2) that the return process is daily becoming stronger. In regard to Muslims, they show that the return of Muslim migrants to West Bengal is fairly strong. From the point of view, therefore, of people coming and going between East and West Bengal, the situation

is definitely satisfactory. This, however, does not mean that conditions in East Bengal are yet satisfactory.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

VI

New Delhi
October 16, 1950

My dear Chief Minister,

Since I wrote to you last, there has been an appreciable toning down of the tension in the Far East. The situation is still difficult and one cannot rule out the possibility of an extension of the war area. But there is less chance of this now or, at any rate, of a direct conflict between China and the U.N. forces. As you know, we were opposed to the crossing of the 38th parallel by the U.N. forces without making another effort at a peaceful settlement. We felt that after the collapse of the North Korean armies in South Korea, it was worthwhile to make an effort at a peaceful settlement. This was desirable in itself and it was also to be preferred because of the risk of the war spreading and other countries being involved in it. The reports we had received from our Ambassador in China indicated that feeling in China was exasperated and inflamed because of the repeated refusal of the United Nations to admit the new China and because of fear that the United States was bent on attacking China. The crossing of the 38th parallel appeared to the Chinese Government as another move in the direction of an attack on China itself. I believe there was no justification for thinking that either the United Nations or the U.S.A. were thinking in terms of an attack on China. But there can be little doubt that the Government of China believed that this was possible and intended sometime or other. They declared quite clearly that they would resist any forces that crossed the 38th parallel.

2. In view of this, we urged the U.K. and the U.S.A. Governments not to take a sudden step of this kind, as the risk of war spreading was great. In any event, it is always better to exhaust peaceful methods of approach. The U.N., however, at the instance of the U.K. and U.S.A., decided to cross the 38th parallel and issued directions to General MacArthur accordingly. The North Korean forces refused to surrender and have continued to resist. In the existing circumstances, the U.N. forces are bound to drive the North Koreans further towards the Chinese border. Probably the war will change its character and will be more of the nature of guerilla

warfare. This may continue for longer than is expected. It is possible that the U.N. forces will not go right upto the Chinese border but will stop some distance away from it, after capturing the North Korean capital.¹ This will avoid any danger of conflict with China. We have little news of what China has done or intends to do. There are some reports that Chinese troops have crossed the border into North Korea and occupied a strip of territory there.

3. So far as the objective in Korea is concerned, we agree to what the U.N. has declared, that is, the establishment of a free and independent Government in united Korea elected by the people. We also agree that these elections should be organised under the auspices of the United Nations. But no one knows when military operations will end. War is easy to start but more difficult to end. Meanwhile large parts of Korea have been turned into a wilderness and the casualties are very great. Seoul, the capital city, is in ruins. It was to avert or at least to limit this tragedy that we suggested a more peaceful approach after it had been shown that the North Koreans had been defeated in warfare. I still feel that this was the right approach and the longer this is delayed, the more will new problems arise. When war takes place, it is often forgotten by those who control armies that they are dealing with masses of human beings who have human feelings and human reactions. Old style warfare confined to some professional armies brought certain results which could, on the whole, be prophesied. But now when there is what is called total war in any country or area, we get mass reactions which poison the future.

4. We have had reports of atrocities by the North Koreans. We have also had reports of atrocities committed by the South Koreans. Tens of thousands of innocent people have been done to death, quite apart from the military casualties. What is happening in Korea is bad enough from the human point of view; it can serve as an example to us, many times multiplied, of what might happen over large areas of the earth's surface, if world war came.

5. It seems to me as clear as anything can be that the problem of Korea or of the Far East generally cannot be settled without the concurrence of the two great neighbouring countries—China and the U.S.S.R. Hence our desire to associate them in the U.N. for the solution of this problem. We have opposed or abstained from voting when some resolutions were brought up before the U.N. by the U.S.A. or the U.K. delegations. It seemed to us that the approach of these resolutions was not a good one and did not lead to peace but rather to a preparation for future wars. We have also felt that the United Nations should not become merely a group of nations, however many they might be, lined up together against another group. The whole object of the U.N. was to include all the nations, even though they might differ from each other. There has been much criticism in the United States of our action, although there are many there who appreciate it.² I am convinced that the

1. Pyongyang fell to the U.N. forces on 19 October.

2. For example, Einstein described India's abstention on the General Assembly resolution of 7 October as correct and in keeping with the principles upheld by Nehru.

line we have adopted has not only been a right one from the world point of view but also an advantageous one from India's point of view. Because of various developments and our own reactions to them, India has been thrust in the forefront of international affairs and a great responsibility rests upon her. I earnestly hope that we shall be true to our ideals and not barter them because of fear of some momentary gain at the cost of our larger good. Public memory is short, especially in other countries in regard to India, and passions have been roused which come in the way of clear thinking.

6. During the last fortnight a session of the Pacific Relations Conference has been held at Lucknow. This is an international conference and many important delegations from foreign countries have come to it. For the first time since the War, a Japanese delegation has also attended such a conference. Many of the problems of the Far East and of South East Asia have been discussed there and, inevitably, there has been much difference of opinion.³ Because of developments in Korea, the question of the Japanese peace treaty⁴ is becoming a more urgent one than it was. I might add that the Pacific Relations Conference was wholly non-official and Government was in no way connected with it.

7. There have been repeated references in the press to some kind of a Chinese invasion of Tibet. On inquiry we have found that these reports were not true. A Tibetan delegation is still in Delhi and has met the Chinese Ambassador. They have been invited to go to Peking and we have advised them to accept this invitation. Meanwhile they are waiting for instructions from Lhasa.

8. In two of our border countries, Afghanistan and Nepal, there has been much tension. In Afghanistan and at the border areas on this side of the Durand Line and on the Baluchistan border, there has been great excitement and reports of conflicts between Pakistani forces and tribal people have reached us.⁵ It is difficult to have details of these conflicts or to know exactly what is happening. But there can be no doubt that the tension between Afghanistan and Pakistan is very acute.

9. In Nepal there has been a good deal of political trouble and we have been warned from many sources, including the Government of Nepal, that there is likely to be more trouble. We sent for our Ambassador in Kathmandu and discussed the situation with him. Our position there is a delicate one. As a Government, we are on friendly terms with the Government of Nepal. At the same time we are strongly of opinion that conditions in Nepal are very backward and there is a good deal

3. There was no unanimity of views on such issues as the role of the U.N. in Korea, communist policy in South East Asia, the Japanese peace treaty, international effects of Japan's economic revival, the future of Formosa, and American economic and military policies in Asia.
4. While the U.S. contended that the treaty be framed by a thirteen-member Far Eastern Commission which would take decisions by a two-thirds majority vote, the Soviet Union insisted on the 'Big Four' retaining the power of veto.
5. Afghanistan denied Pakistan's allegation of violation of her territory in the Dobandi area of Baluchistan by some Afghan tribesmen and regular troops.

of repression. We have been urging the Nepal Government to introduce substantial reforms of a democratic character. Some minor reforms were recently introduced probably under stress of circumstances. But these do not make much difference and have not eased the situation. Our sympathies are therefore with those who seek to reform. But we cannot support any violence or illegality in our territories.

10. Our relations with Pakistan continue to be bad, though nothing special has happened recently. The hysterical agitation that took place and is still continuing in regard to Kashmir has undoubtedly embittered these relations further. In spite of this, there is no reason why we should not settle these differences to the advantage of both countries. Because of this overriding fact, we have continued to press for a no-war declaration and for a reference to a joint judicial tribunal of the two major questions—evacuee property and canal waters. We have had no answer from Pakistan to our latest communication on these subjects.⁶ Our proposal in fact deals with all major issues except Kashmir, which cannot be treated in this way and stands by itself. There is another question—the exchange value of the Pakistani rupee. This is being considered by the International Monetary Fund and it is possible that some decision may be arrived at in the course of the next two months or so. Thus the only two important questions that remain are evacuee property and canal waters which, we have asked, should be referred to a joint judicial tribunal of high standing. We are prepared to refer other disputes to this tribunal in the future, provided they are justiciable. Meanwhile, the temporary Indo-Pakistan Trade Agreement has lapsed and there are no formal means for carrying on trade.

11. As regards Kashmir, no further development has taken place and the matter is pending before the Security Council.

12. Some attention has been attracted recently to Mr Mandal's resignation from the Pakistan Cabinet and a long statement that he issued. Mr Mandal's past record is so unsavoury from India's point of view that it is hardly possible for us to accept him and his statement as completely *bona fide*. Throughout the gravest crises, including the holocaust in August and September 1947, Mr Mandal continued to serve Pakistan. Nevertheless some of the facts given in Mr Mandal's statement are useful to us.

13. In my last fortnightly letter I point out that the return of Hindu migrants to East Bengal from West Bengal had taken a new turn. More and more Hindus were returning to East Bengal. Later figures, during this fortnight, have confirmed this impression and there has been an ever-increasing returning exodus of Hindus to East Bengal. At the same time more Muslims are returning to West Bengal.

6. See *ante*, pp. 322-326.

This is generally a healthy sign. The average figures of exodus between East and West Bengal for the period from 21st September to 8th October are as follows:

	East Bengal to West Bengal	West Bengal to East Bengal
Hindus	5,782	6,568
Muslims	2,811	2,390

On some days the return of Hindus has been much greater than this average. Thus the figures for nine days from 4th October to 11th October were as follows, both for Hindus and Muslims:

Date	<i>Hindus</i>		<i>Muslims</i>	
	East to West	West to East	East to West	West to East
4 October 1950	6,059	7,381	3,305	2,706
5 October 1950	5,810	6,896	2,977	2,231
6 October 1950	5,442	7,217	2,647	2,299
7 October 1950	5,091	6,512	2,829	2,341
8 October 1950	4,768	6,078	3,231	2,480
9 October 1950	5,368	7,398	2,854	2,609
10 October 1950	7,171	6,913	2,437	2,468
11 October 1950	6,424	6,515	2,822	2,427

14. As you know, the South African Indian question is on the agenda of the United Nations Assembly. A vague attempt was recently made by South Africa *via* Pakistan to induce us to have some kind of informal talks. We are always prepared to have talks, formal or informal, but we have made it perfectly clear that we cannot allow this pretext of talks to keep out this question from discussion in the Assembly.

15. We have discussed at great length the sugar policy to be adopted for this season.⁷ I shall not say much about this here, as you will be hearing from our Agriculture Ministry. There has been a conflict of opinion amongst many of us on this matter. We want to increase sugar production and have offered some incentives for this. But we feel that it is dangerous to raise the price of sugar, as

7. At the conference of Chief Ministers in August 1950, there were differences of opinion on decontrol of sugar and on its import to offset the rise in price.

this is bound to have a powerful psychological effect on the prices of other important commodities. We are trying too hard to reduce the general price level. If we increase the price of sugar at this stage, no one will attach any importance to our statements for bringing down the general price level. We do not, therefore, propose to change the prices either of sugar or of cane. Certain incentives have, however, been offered for increased production.⁸

16. Another question has arisen as to whether and how far we should replace foodgrains production in favour of commercial crops, such as jute and cotton. The latter bring us more money. On the other hand we have always given first priority to food production and we shall continue to do so. There is no reason why there should be any real conflict between food crops and commercial crops. We have examined this question thoroughly and come to the conclusion that in certain areas jute and cotton should be encouraged, but, at the same time, we wish to lay the greatest stress on the production of food remaining the first priority. That is to say, we have every intention of producing enough food by the end of the 1951-52 season to meet our normal requirements. It is important that this fact should be borne in mind as doubts have arisen and some people have said that there is little chance of our keeping to our time-table. Having examined the question carefully, we feel that there is every chance of our succeeding, provided we work for it.

17. I have previously laid stress on our Grow-More-Food Campaign concentrating on high yield from the land at present being cultivated. This is far more important than bringing additional land under cultivation. If we do not increase yield, even the additional land remains at a low level. We have thus to pay special attention to the quality of our cultivation. This, as is well known, is very backward and even a little effort should make a great difference.

18. Then there is the question of destruction of food crops by pests, wild animals and bad storage conditions. An enormous quantity of food is thus destroyed annually. If we could save this, or even a fair proportion of this, our food problem would be solved. Unfortunately, some of our social habits come in the way of dealing with wild animals and other pests. All I can say is that we shall have to change such habits as come in the way of the larger good. We cannot have human beings starving or lacking food because wild animals are destroying it.

19. Two days ago, I paid a visit to our National Physical Laboratory near Delhi. I have often been there previously and every time I have gone I have noticed the great progress made. On this occasion, particularly, I was surprised and pleased to note what had already been done and what was being done. This laboratory is a magnificent one which can compare favourably with any like place in the world. I am not referring to the building and the equipment, which are good, but rather

8. The Ministry of Agriculture announced on 19 October the Cabinet's decision not to make any change in the price of sugarcane and sugar but to provide incentives to sugarcane growers and producers of all varieties of sugar.

to the whole conception and the quality of the people working there. Our younger scientists are full of promise and I have no doubt that they will produce good results, both in the realm of pure science and in the application of science to industry. Our Governments are criticized frequently about our various shortcomings. Among the things for which we can take full credit is the development of national laboratories all over India. These are the foundations of advance in almost every field of activity. Perhaps, this is not realised sufficiently by most of our people because of our political background. We have not yet developed sufficiently the scientific or the engineer's outlook, and yet whatever policy we may adopt and whatever laws we may frame, the basic fact is scientific and industrial progress. I should like you and members of your Government to visit our laboratories whenever you have the chance. The two principal ones are: the National Physical Laboratory near Delhi, and the National Chemical Laboratory near Poona.

20. We are trying hard to economise and I presume that you are also doing so. Economy at the cost of efficiency is not economy. As a matter of fact, there is no conflict between the two. I feel that our present system of working is neither efficient nor economical. We had in British times a top heavy administration, but the top was a relatively small one. Now we have a very big top and yet the same heaviness prevails throughout. It is not possible for us to continue to function in this way, and we have, therefore, to think afresh. Again the normal bureaucratic system of working is not suited to industrial and social problems. No business can be run efficiently on that basis. Government have to deal more and more with these problems and they should adapt themselves to them. The system of noting by various grades of people is a system which has been done away with in other countries. Normally, there should be only one note in the file and that by the officer who can take some action on it. Previous notings are just wasted. We should concentrate on the quality of our work. A large number of people lacking in quality do not make up for it. In any event, human beings have ceased to be cheap in India and that is a very good sign, but that also means that they have to be more efficient and more productive, whether in factory, field or office. Fewer persons should turn out better work and thus maintain their own standards and the standards of the work they do.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. To N.A. Nikam¹

New Delhi
August 13, 1950

Dear Professor Nikam,²

I have your letter of the 5th August. You ask me for a message for your Silver Jubilee Volume. I confess that I find it very difficult to send any message, because I have no message to give. Philosophy ought to play an important part in helping us to solve the world's problems. But in fact there is little of philosophy or of logical thinking or humanity in the world's dealings. All of us, in whatever group or nation we may be, seem to move in our own grooves of thought and action and thus fail to help in producing that integration, which has become so essential in life today. Some of us try to grope in the dark to find a way out. But this does not seem to hold out much promise. Still I suppose we must continue doing our best. I hope the philosophers will bring their philosophy in touch with the vital problems which overwhelm us in our lives today. There is little room for the ivory tower outlook at present or, at any rate, it does not help.

I hope that the Indian Philosophical Congress will throw some light in the general gloom that surrounds us. In that hope, I send you greetings and good wishes.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 9/148/50-PMS.
2. He was, at the time, Secretary, Indian Philosophical Congress.

2. To Vijayalakshmi Pandit¹

New Delhi
August 25, 1950

Nan dear,

I am sorry to confess to you, but my mind has apparently not been functioning with great clarity. The other day I made one of the most stupid of mistakes. I remembered that August 18th was a special day, a birthday, and I intended sending a telegram. Just about that time I had a letter from Betty, a letter which did not please me very much. So I had Betty in mind. I forgot the telegram anyhow.

1. J.N. Collection.

But two or three days later I wrote to Betty apologising to her for not having sent a message on her birthday.² It was only when I had Betty's reply to this that I realised how low I had fallen.

I suppose it is too late to say much about your birthday, although it was a very special one. But birthday or not, you have been greatly in my mind all these many days. As we grow older, we cling a little more to a few persons. I have arrived at that stage. Political and other worries hasten this process. It is comforting, however, to think of those few persons. They give one some kind of a grip of life, which otherwise might slip away.

I wrote two days ago and said something about these possible political developments here, which might very well affect my own future work intimately. I want to tell you quite seriously that in the event of your learning of any such development, you must not take any hasty action. There is plenty of time to take a step. It would be unbecoming for any hasty step to be taken.

I received today Einstein's full letter. I asked Bajpai to telegraph to you that we have no objection to its publication. Of course Einstein must agree. It will be better if your Embassy did not publish it and Einstein himself issued it to the press.

Some days ago I had a letter from the Aga Khan, rather an odd one, which surprised me. I enclose a copy of it as well as a copy of my reply to him.³ These are meant for you only and not to be talked about.

With love from
Jawahar

2. Krishna Hutheesing's birthday fell on 2 November.

3. See *ante*, pp. 493-495.

3. To P. Subbarayan¹

New Delhi
August 27, 1950

My dear Subbarayan,

I have your letter of the 12th August with its enclosure regarding the translation of my *Autobiography* into the Indonesian language. I am perfectly agreeable to the publication of this translation. I hope, however, that you will make sure that the publisher and translator are good. You can ask your Indonesian friends about

1. File No. 43(69)/49-PMS.

them. Please remember that a translation of a book does no good unless the publisher is fixed up previously.

It is right that the publishers give to the author the normal royalty. Usually, in case of translations, the royalty is ten per cent on the published price on sale of books. This is the author's royalty. The translator will be separately paid either by royalty or otherwise. Therefore this royalty should certainly be paid. But I do not wish to take this royalty myself. I should like it to be spent on some suitable charitable purpose in Indonesia. As to what this purpose should be, you can consult the President. Of course, much would depend on how much is realised.

I am returning to you the original letter that you have sent to me.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. Cable to V.K. Krishna Menon¹

Your telegram No. 6339.² You refer to my name being put forward for Vice-Chancellorship. Presumably this is error for Chancellorship. Please inform Cambridge deputation to you that I am deeply sensible of honour especially coming from my old University but I do not think it will be fitting for me to accept it when I can be of no service to University. More especially it would be undesirable for me to enter into any contest.

1. New Delhi, 23 October 1950. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, N.M.M.L.
2. Krishna Menon telegraphed on 22 October that a deputation of professors and fellows of Cambridge University would be visiting him the next day to intimate their desire to nominate Nehru for Vice-Chancellorship of the University, the vacancy having been caused by the death of J.C. Smuts. He stated that opinion in the University favoured Nehru against Lord Tedder, a possible contender.

GLOSSARY

Akhand Bharat	undivided India
Bakrid	a festival falling on the tenth day of the Islamic month of Zil-hijja; also called Id-uz-Zuha
bhai	brother
gram sudhar saptah	village improvement week
hakim	a physician
Id	an Islamic festival
Jai Hind	victory to India
jehad	a holy war to defend Islam
ji	an affix denoting respect
kahani	story
mai-baap government	colloquially used to mean a paternal administration
pandal	a large tent
pitta, vayu and kuff	bile, wind and phlegm
priya	dear
rashtra	nation
sanskriti	culture
sanyas	renunciation of the world
supari	areca nut
Vishal Bharat	greater India

(Biographical footnotes in this volume and in volumes in the first series are italicized and those in the Second Series are given in block letters.)

- Abdullah, Shaikh Muhammad, (*Vol. 7, p. 308*), 215 & fn, 232, 235, 239-242, 362, 539
- Acheson, Dean, (*VOL. 1, P. 511*), 233, 331, 340, 343, 353, 372 fn-373, 395 fn, 398 fn, 406, 418 fn, 463 fn, 517
- Adenauer, Konrad, 395 fn
- Afghanistan, 234 & fn, 394 fn, 540 & fn-541, 553 & fn
- Africa, 24, 346, 477, 488, 513
- , East, 475-477
- , South, 408 fn, 555
- Aga Khan, (*Vol. 1, p. 189*), 493 & fn-494 fn, 562
- Agreement of 8 April 1950 *see* Indo-Pakistan Agreement (8 April 1950)
- Agriculture Department, 47, 65
- Agriculture, Ministry of, 555-556 fn
- Ahmad, Nazimuddin, 354 fn
- Ahmed, Aziz, 254 & fn, 257, 525
- , R., 251 fn
- Ahmedabad, 136, 235
- Ahrar Conference (Rawalpindi), 327 fn
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The period from 1 August to 25 October 1950, covered by this first part of the fifteenth volume of the *Selected Works*, was marked by serious national and international crises. The war in Korea was closely linked to great power rivalry. Nehru realized the importance of early admission of People's China into the United Nations if the chances of avoiding an extension of the war were to be strengthened. This strained relations with the United States.

There were disquieting reports of a Chinese invasion of Tibet and repression of a popular movement for reforms in Nepal caused concern. With the Dixon mission failing to ease the tension over Kashmir, Pakistan became eager to build a case against India before world bodies. She repudiated the Agreement of 1948 on canal waters and was cool towards India's proposal of a no-war declaration. The only welcome trend was a progressive decline in the exodus from East Pakistan.

In domestic affairs, the primary problem was the growth of communal and revivalist tendencies. As the President of the Congress, Purushottamdas Tandon, seemed to symbolize these tendencies, Nehru did not shirk confrontation and the Congress Session at Nasik in September 1950 passed various resolutions reflecting Nehru's viewpoints.

The documents in this volume, apart from throwing light on Nehru's attitudes to immediate issues, give some idea of his wide interests, his involvement in details of administration and his all-encompassing vision of a future India.

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